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EUSA REVIEW

Bargaining Among Unequals: Enlargement and the Future of European Integration Andrew Moravcsik and Milada Anna Vachudova

AS MANY AS TEN STATES stand poised to conclude negotiations with the EU for full membership by the end of 2002. This prospect has elicited much anxiety about the prospect of gridlock in European institutions, stagnation in European integration, or popular backlash in European countries, East and West. We submit, to the contrary, that the entry of new members is more likely to reinforce existing incremental trends in EU politics, including the shift in attention from classic economic cooperation to cooperation outside of the first pillar, growing conflict over the budget, the declining persuasiveness of any *grand projet*, and the dissipation of the goal of “United States of Europe” as a widely-held ideal for Europe. Fears of gridlock, stagnation or backlash are exaggerated; the more likely result is a strengthening of the *status quo*.

Neither the success of enlargement nor the terms on which it is taking place should come as a surprise to either theoretically aware observers of international relations or historically aware observers of European integration.¹ Enlargement rests on the convergent interests of existing and potential members. EU leaders promote accession because they consider enlargement to have longer-term economic and geopolitical benefits—the creation of commercial opportunities and the stabilization of neighboring countries (Grabbe 2001). East European states similarly participate because EU membership brings access to the world’s largest single market, strengthening of political ties with the West, and the stabilization of domestic democracy and capitalism. The latter advantages are particularly clear when compared to the “costs of exclusion”—that is, the potentially catastrophic costs of staying behind while others advance. While the candidates have had to comply with the EU’s requirements and acquiesce to certain unfavorable terms, EU membership has remained a matter of net national interest. These adjustments, like most economic reforms costly in the short-term, are viewed as inevitable steps toward long-term convergence.²

The accession countries, to be sure, are in a weak bargaining position and must therefore make concessions—a fact that is often invoked as evidence for the fundamental injustice of enlargement. Yet the underlying reason for this asymmetry in bargaining power is rarely taken into account: while existing EU members and candidates will both benefit from the basic fact of enlargement, the candidates benefit more. For the eastern

candidates, the benefits of basic membership outweigh the costs so substantially that they have a very strong preference for reaching an agreement. This greatly reduces their bargaining leverage with EU members over the terms of their accession to the EU. During the final phase of the enlargement negotiations taking place at the end of 2002, they are choosing to make significant short-term concessions—but only in exchange for the long-term advantages that accrue uniquely from EU membership. This simple logic of “asymmetrical interdependence”—those who benefit the most from a policy must sacrifice the most on the margin—is the most profound factor shaping the negotiations.³

Yet the negotiation phase is nearly complete, and the spotlight is turning now to the consequences of as many as ten new states joining the EU—perhaps as early as 2004. How will these states behave as new members of the EU? How will their choices impact the course of future European integration? The basic relationship of “asymmetric interdependence” between the members and candidates will change subtly once they are members, and this will have four important consequences for the disposition of the EU’s new member states.

First, *the new members will enter as moderately well-qualified member states*. The political consequences of the fundamental asymmetry have been evident in the pre-accession process, in which applicants must satisfy the Copenhagen criteria and adopt the *acquis* in its entirety to qualify for membership. The resulting negotiations have until recently been little more than a process of checking off a massive and essentially non-negotiable list of EU laws and regulations, chapter by chapter.

The asymmetry of power between the EU and the candidates facilitates this transformation. The EU can exclude any that do not conform to the broad political and economic parameters of national politics in the EU. This process will continue. Slovakia, for example, will be kept out of the EU if the Slovak voters return a nationalist government to power in late 2002.

Thus, the transition from communism has meant not only that a market economy must be constructed from the ground up, but also that a modern regulatory state capable of implementing the EU’s *acquis* must be put in place—a task far more formidable than that previous enlargement countries faced. For the construction of a well-functioning market economy and a strong, democratic state—long-term goals that are hardly in question—the requirements for EU membership have been, on balance, positive (Vachudova 2001a). For its part, the EU will thus not be derailed for having admitted poorly qualified states.

(continued on p.3)

EUSA Review

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From the Chair

Martin A. Schain

A QUICK YEAR AFTER THE events of September 11, it is useful to look back to see what has changed, and what has not. It would appear that transatlantic relations have been transformed in important ways. The Red-Green coalition in Germany has survived by opposing evolving U.S. policy on Iraq, leaving the French to play the good broker—the traditional German role. The unilateralist trend in American foreign policy, which began well before September 11, has been accentuated since. The key difference, however, is that in the early months of the Bush administration this trend was linked to withdrawal (the “no nation-building” commitment), while since it has been linked to a vast expansion of American commitments. Under the new and emerging doctrine of pre-emptive war, the downgrading of NATO has taken on a new meaning that seems to be undermining many of the assumptions of transatlantic relations. This is the gist of the comments that our Project Scholar, Elizabeth Pond, gave to the *New York Times* on September 1, in anticipation of the German Elections. She will elaborate on these brief comments in her EUSA workshop in January 2003, and then again at our Nashville Conference in March (see below).

Plans for our 2003 International Conference (March 27-29, 2003) are now moving quickly. By the time you read this, our call for proposals deadline will have passed and the conference program committee will be about to meet, under the leadership of John Keeler, Director, Center for West European Studies at the University of Washington Seattle. The program committee faces the arduous tasks of choosing from among many paper and panel proposals, putting paper proposals together into coherent panels, and crafting a program schedule where topics and presentations flow without overlap. In all, we will have eighty-plus panels over three days, but even this number of panels will be insufficient to accommodate all of the fine proposals that we receive. The EUSA office will send out responses to your proposals in December, and complete conference registration forms and hotel and logistical information will be posted on our Web site shortly.

As is always the case in a conference year for EUSA, we have a large number of simultaneous activities. One of the most important of them is our upcoming biennial election of executive committee members of the organization (ballots will be mailed to current EUSA members in February 2003). For this election, four seats on the board will be open for four-year terms that run 2003-2007. (Thanks to organizational reforms enacted in 1999, the seats of the EUSA board are now staggered, with either three or four coming up for election every other year.) Any current EUSA member who has not already served eight years total on the committee is eligible to run for a seat on the executive committee, which meets once a year and sets policies and programs for the organization. The full call for nominations appears in this issue on p.22. I encourage any EUSA member who is interested in serving the organization to nominate him/herself or another member. The deadline for nominations is December 31, 2002. (*continued on p.22*)

(continued from p.1) Second, *new members are unlikely to support great strides forward in European integration*. After joining, accession countries will be working to satisfy requirements for full membership in Schengen and in the EMU. They hardly need more to digest. A measure of Euroskepticism is rising among applicant countries that have received stiff report cards from the Commission every autumn for almost a decade, and now must endure pressure for unpopular concessions in the last phase of negotiations.

In existing EU member countries, enlargement is also unpopular with voters, many of whom associate it with rising illegal immigration, international crime, and unemployment. While there is little evidence that enlargement will contribute measurably to any of these problems—to the contrary!—EU politicians have nonetheless faced restive publics. In the short-term, any electoral response will be blunted by the negotiated outcome. The asymmetry of power between the EU and the candidates renders accommodation relatively easy: new members will not be allowed to lift their internal Schengen borders for many years; they will be required to reinforce their external borders; and they will wait for up to seven years after accession before their citizens enjoy the right, at least in the abstract, to live and work anywhere in the EU (Vachudova 2001b). Before the decade is out, the issue may recede as stagnant population growth in the EU leaves old members scrambling to attract workers from the new members or third countries.

Third, *the new states are likely to bargain hard on budgetary issues after they enter*. The next twelve prospective new members are highly diverse, but they are also numerous and almost certain to agree that any financial advantages old members enjoy over them should be reversed. If they join forces, they will collectively have the ability to block not just unanimous votes (such as those on treaty change or budgetary matters) but some qualified majority votes. Given that it will be difficult for the EU to settle the budget for 2007 onwards prior to enlargement, the candidates will already be full members by the time the EU starts the next round of budgetary negotiations. The long transition periods and unequal benefits currently being imposed on the applicant countries have instructed them that only by playing tough in EU bargaining can they get a better deal, just as they learned in the 1990s that only full membership would give them full access to the EU market. For all these reasons, new members are nearly certain to deploy their voting power in an effort to secure a greater share of EU spending. This is likely to be a major EU concern for the next decade, just as it was for the periods immediately following previous accessions.

Fourth, *new members are unlikely to import divergent or destabilizing policy agendas into the EU*. Many fear that new members will spark unprecedented conflict within the EU. The real threat of disruption comes not from the sheer number of participants at a Council or Commission *tour de table* (a prospect about which Brussels insiders seem obsessed), but the increasing diversity of the policy preferences of EU member states.

Yet this diversity, while undeniably real, is unlikely to divert existing trends in European integration. EU member states have no consensual “grand project” that could easily be stalled by the

veto of unruly new members seeking budgetary side payments. This has been the lesson of three successive treaty amendment exercises. Nor would it be easy for new members to employ their voting power in QMV to block legislation, since the internal market is largely complete and everyday legislation moves forward at a slower pace than ten years ago. Today EU governments are instead prioritizing policy areas that lie partly outside of the first pillar, such as foreign policy, immigration policy, and monetary policy.

In precisely these areas of current interest outside of the first pillar—and some within it—flexible institutional mechanisms other than majority voting can be used to combat gridlock. Nearly every significant recent initiative in the EU has involved only (or has provisions to involve only) a subset of EU members: EMU, social policy, foreign and defense policy, environmental policy, Schengen, etc. The trend is toward differentiation, flexibility and *ad hoc* arrangements. In many of these areas—foreign policy and flanking policies to EMU being prime examples—uniformity is not required for effective policy-making. From the perspective of collective action theory, the EU is more about coordinating “coalitions of the willing” than avoiding “free riding.” Meanwhile, member governments no doubt favor flexibility, though they do not say so in public, as a means to avoid placing themselves in a position where poorer countries can extort financial side-payments.

In conclusion, the consequence of enlargement is unlikely to be gridlock, stagnation or backlash. Instead, enlargement is most likely to reinforce existing trends in the EU: trends toward diversity and differentiation, tighter limits on spending, reform of the major fiscal policies (CAP and structural funds), incremental evolution rather than *grands projets*, and broad acceptance that the EU is unlikely to develop into a “United States of Europe” (Moravcsik 1998a). This is neither novel nor ominous. It signals instead that the EU is becoming a more “normal” polity—one that has established itself beyond the point of no return and can thus afford to tolerate a diversity of opinion about its future course.

Andrew Moravcsik is professor of government and director of the European Union Center at Harvard University, and currently a visiting fellow at Princeton University. Milada Anna Vachudova is assistant professor of political science at the University of North Carolina Chapel Hill.

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Notes

1. The argument in this paper is set forth in more detail in Moravcsik and Vachudova 2003.
2. For a contrary view, see Schimmelfennig 2000, who views enlargement as the result of rhetorical entrapment—West European countries, he believes, uttered idealistic rhetoric and then found themselves unable to resist demands to realize it. While only more detailed research can demonstrate the extent to which Schimmelfennig is correct, we note only that his theory is deployed to explain the relatively narrow difference between a special arrangement with potential members and membership.
3. For a similar interpretation of bargaining among existing member states during the course of European integration, see Moravcsik 1998b.

Call for Papers: New Journal

Palgrave/Macmillan announces the launch of a major new international peer-reviewed journal on the comparative politics and political economy of contemporary Europe. Spanning political science, international relations, and global political economy, *Comparative European Politics* (CEP) will provide an international and interdisciplinary forum for research, theory, and debate. Linking political scientists in Europe and North America, CEP defines its scope broadly to include the comparative politics and political economy of the whole of contemporary Europe within and beyond the European Union, the process of European integration and enlargement and the place of Europe and European states within international/global political and economic dynamics. CEP will publish substantial articles marking either core empirical developments, theoretical innovation or, preferably, both. For more details and the full call for papers, contact e-mail <CEP@palgrave.com> or visit the Web page www.palgrave-journals.com/cep.

EUSA Review Essay

"Listening" to Europe: Progress Report on the European Convention Jesse Scott

AS THE CONVENTION ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE (European Convention) returns to work after the Summer recess, all are in agreement that the EU has reached a historic turning point. Even *The Economist* (2002) concedes that the direction in which Europe now develops institutionally—or implodes—"will be drastic for the rest of the world." Charged with the potential to shape this future, the Convention is in every way extraordinary: its mandate and formula constitute a radical political experiment. That experiment is not only important according to the terms of decisive success or failure by which it will be politically judged; its progress and quality *qua* experiment are also of acute academic and political interest.

In a recent *EUSA Review*, Eric Philippart (2002) dissected the Convention's *ad hoc* foundation as the forum for "structured reflection" on the complex and inter-related developments and expectations captured in the prism of the Laeken Declaration. Now, after five months in session, it is still far too early to forecast the Convention's result—either its conclusions (now beginning to emerge in working groups and due to be presented by next Summer), or the use to be made of these by the envisaged IGC in 2004. While a final assessment must therefore wait, events, media speculation and academic investigation flourish. The Convention is becoming a genre in its own right.

In one direction, its first months have inspired an onslaught of dense analysis of the unique recasting of its participants from their habitual roles in the national and European parliaments, Council and Commission (Hughes 2002). In another direction, many commentators seek to identify the contours of the Convention's constitutional possibilities and views, most recently focusing on President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's careful utterances and on an elusively circulating "non-paper" described as presenting a blueprint eye-catchingly close to the known opinions of Vice-President Giuliano Amato.

At this stage in the life of the Convention, however, it is perhaps useful to leave aside long-run questions of results and methods and instead look at the substance of the first of the three phases into which the Convention's reflection is formally structured: Giscard's—sceptically received—assertion that work so far has been a "listening phase" (now to be followed by "deliberating" and "proposing") serves as a peg on which to hang some samples of the Convention at its most experimental—where negotiation meets representation.

On the Convention web site, "listening" is defined as "identification of the expectations and needs of the Member States, their Governments and Parliaments, and those of European society" (but not, curiously, those of the expert EU institutions). This declaration of intent is the essence of the Convention's moral authority to "provide a starting point" for

the IGC. Talk to enthusiasts, and “listening”—as the Convention itself—is heralded as the means to redemption of the EU’s existential doubt, uncertain missions and deficit of democratic legitimacy: a catalytic opportunity to inspire interest and confidence in integration beyond the confines of the EU elite. The Laeken Declaration of December 2001 sets a similarly high ambition: “Within the Union, the European institutions must be brought closer to its citizens. Citizens [...] feel that deals are all too often cut out of their sight and they want better democratic scrutiny.”

Look closely, however, at the Convention’s performance, and the voices to which it is listening are of two kinds: those that will decide the future debate (member-state governments), and those that wish to contribute and are uncertain whether they are being heard—including academe (much analysis of the Convention is also intended for it). Other voices are ominously silent.

The exertion of government opinion in Brussels is never wholly on public view. In the relatively open black-box of the Convention, however, two patterns can be seen. First, simply, there are aggressive policy pronouncements, especially from the British: the Blair-Aznar scheme for empowering a five-year EU President is the most cited of all executive goals (and Jack Straw’s “golf-club rules” are the most disparaged). Second, and more subtly interwoven with the challenge of constitutional delineation, is the Convention’s vulnerability to the repercussions of electoral fortune. During the spring two major constitutional ideas emerged as front-runners for consensual adoption: the appointment/election by the Council/Parliament of an EU President, to replace the unsatisfactory six-month rotation system, and the incorporation of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights into the new treaty/constitution (issues of ECJ compatibility with the Strasbourg Court permitting). Subsequently, however, reflection on the rapid sea-change in the political colour of Europe’s governments since the Convention’s inception has given pause regarding the status of a Brussels President owing office to a majority political affiliation in Council or Parliament that can be expected to shift over time.

Such political shifts already begin to raise delicate questions for the Convention. The German electoral hiatus (pending September) has weakened any federalist leadership at this delicate moment of group coordination and gives weight to New Labour’s opposition to inclusion of the Charter (a possible source of industrial relations rights) in the PES camp. It remains to be seen whether a CDU victory in Germany would result in the withdrawal of the present regime’s Convention appointees—as was proposed in France and as the initial Portuguese appointment of diplomats foresaw. Socialist appointee Pierre Moscovici successfully asserted the independence of his French appointment, but the Convention risks being sidelined if it regularly opposes national executives (it may be indicative that the Summer EPP and PES Convention group meetings were hosted respectively in Birmingham and Sardinia).

Less certain to remain a factor are the (largely meretricious) opinions of the representatives of civil society (including academe, NGOs, the social partners, and—somewhat anomalously—local/regional governments) who met with the

Convention before the Summer. While determinedly positive about the Convention’s genuine intentions, Euractiv reported that “Reactions are mixed as to the [meeting’s] significance—and indeed relevance ... Some sceptics wonder whether the Convention Presidium is genuinely involving the civil society or merely paying lip service to it. Others criticize the manner in which the session was prepared, and organized—at short notice and very formally ... [T]here was no real interaction between civil society representatives and Convention members, and no ‘excitement’” (Crossick 2002).

In this case “listening” also means reading: although unlikely to prove as classic as the Philadelphia papers the meeting’s myriad documents indicate that civil society is eager to be heard. In them the Convention (Secretariat) identifies a set of broad themes. There is a “wish to see the Union operating more closely to those it seeks to serve”—giving citizens a greater stake in decisions and ensuring that those decisions are taken at the appropriate level—which is “linked to” a “concern to improve the level of involvement of civil society, through its constituent organisations, in the European decision-making process” (European Convention 2002). Civil society groups support constitutionalization of the Charter, while sectoral interest groups call for an expansion of qualified majority voting and of the co-decision procedure.

Two observations follow on this episode. First, civil society is assertive and confident in its proposals regarding reforms, plans and policies, but about the role and impact of its contributions to the Convention process, the tone is conspicuously less certain—a mixture of petitioning and puzzlement. The European Policy Institutes Network blandly aims “to make a major contribution,” and the Centre for Applied Policy Research and Bertelsmann Foundation’s *Convention Spotlight* recognises “this unique process of discussion and reform” as “a new challenge for us.” Left moot is how “listening” will link to the “deliberating phase” of “comparison of the various opinions put forward and assessment of their implications and consequences.”

Second, the fact is that the Convention’s consultative effort is demand-led. Supply is plentiful, but the resources and time to digest the enthusiastic (in some cases carpet-selling) flood of material and ideas are painfully slight: instinctively the Convention’s pose is defensive—open to advice, but not really to distracting participation. In his plenary speech, Giscard welcomed the draft constitutions put forward by “political groups” and individuals, but warned that while a political group or a Convention member can “advance propositions on controversial subjects” the Convention may not, “as we cannot imagine that this project be rejected, even before its parts be discussed” (plenary speech 12 July, quoted in *EU Observer* 2002).

This point leads to the silent voices. With Eurobarometer (2002) concluding that the Convention—let alone the intricacies of its task—is “still relatively little known” to citizens, the Conventioneers’ frustration is palpable. In July Giscard protested “*La presse écrite en rend compte dans ses pages spécialisées. Mais les grands médias audiovisuels lui font peu de place, car il ne s’y est pas produit—moins jusqu’ici—d’affrontement violent ou de scandale public. Il me semble pourtant que les citoyennes et les citoyens de l’Europe ne* (continued on p.6)

(continued from p.5) *devraient pas se désintéresser de ce qui se passe à la Convention. C'est leur avenir personnel qui s'y joue*" (Giscard d'Estaing, 2002).

For the Convention, then, the democratic deficit is also an attention deficit: neither the mainstream media nor the citizen-in-the-street appears engaged by the Convention, or indeed by the broader questions of the future of Europe. Here the cheerful but imprecise insistence from Vice-President Jean-Luc Dehaene (having overall responsibility for the Convention's outward face) that the Internet will facilitate wondrously the extension of a pan-European public sphere is at once unproven and suspiciously desperate. A more effective stunt, albeit a costly one, might be a transnational deliberative poll.

No one—least of all the assembly itself—questions that it is beneficial and appropriate to incorporate as many voices as possible into the Convention's work and to accrue representivity to its authority, but it remains unclear, after months of putative "listening," how this is to be achieved. If the Convention is a dry run for a "new look" transparent and participatory EU and is to match the dimensions of its experimental potential, this is a space to watch over the next year.

Meanwhile, a crisis lurks: representation and negotiation will shortly be put to the test in Ireland, providing an object lesson which the Convention must digest. Underwriting every discussion is an awareness that a repeat Irish "no" to Nice might stall the future, requiring an urgent IGC—and unpredictably postponing or accelerating the Convention agenda. The June 2001 referendum in no small part launched the Convention project, and an Autumn 2004 IGC would be hosted by Ireland. Irish voters, then, *will* be heard. In the Convention's corridors, however, contemplated responses to this upset are more legal than democratically persuasive in character: the Irish experience suggests that future referenda on a new EU institutional order risk that positive votes from some member states establish a restructured machinery while rejection elsewhere confirms the old model. Clearly pan-European unanimity cannot be presupposed and two different model Commissions—old and new—cannot co-exist. Will it be possible to offer recalcitrants continued membership (of common market, currency and citizenship) on an all-but-the-institutions basis?

To conclude: for all the effort to rethink EU reform negotiations in the novel format of the Convention, the difficulties of launching an open and inclusive debate about the future of Europe are already frustratingly clear. While volunteered contributions from civil society may match demands for timely ingenuity, it is the policies of governments that familiarly dominate, with the big countries already lining up to take on the major speaking parts in the Convention's second act. What does this indicate about the quality of the Convention experiment by the standards of its conception as a more promising and legitimate source of answers than was Nice? Perhaps only that "listening" on the scale and level of the Convention is the greatest challenge which a politically maturing Union faces—to propose that decisions taken in isolation by embattled executives are inadequate is to launch a task which inspires as many questions as it is hoped it will provide robust answers.

Finally, it must be underlined that the Convention has had a slow start and that its potential, even as regards its more routine drafting task, remains highly contingent. Its first months have produced only two certainties: that the Strasbourg alternation by the European Parliament must end, and that the 20+ language budget issue may not prove a lasting problem—at the Youth Convention (otherwise a messy disappointment) few used the translators and English took the floor.

Jesse Scott is co-ordinator of the European University Institute Convention Watch.

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Key Web Sites

- European Convention: <http://european-convention.eu.int>
- Bertelsmann Foundation: <http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de>
- EU Observer: <http://www.euobserver.com>
- Euractiv: <http://www.euractiv.com>
- European Policy Institutes Network: <http://www.epin.org>
- European University Institute Convention Watch: <http://conventionwatch.iue.it> or <http://www.iue.it/RSC/Treaties.html>

The European Union Studies Association extends congratulations to long-time member **Emil Kirchner** (University of Essex, UK), who has recently been awarded the **Cross of the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany**, one of Germany's highest honors, for his outstanding service to Anglo-German relations in teaching, research, and cultural activities. He was presented with the award insignia by the German Ambassador, on behalf of the Federal President, at a special ceremony at the German Embassy in London.

The 2002 Danish EU-Presidency: Wonderful Copenhagen?

Lykke Friis

The Presidency of all Presidencies

AT THE BEGINNING OF its EU Presidency, each member state tends to claim that its spell in office coincides with one of the most challenging six-month periods in the history of the EU (Stubb, 2000: 49). In that respect, it is hardly surprising that Danish politicians have come close to labelling the 2002 Danish Presidency as the Presidency of all Presidencies. The Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen has framed the challenge as follows: “The goal is to make a decision on accession for all Central and Eastern European countries that are ready [for membership] ... By enlarging the EU with the new democracies, we will create a whole and undivided Europe ... We shall seize this historic opportunity. We shall set ourselves new goals for the 21st century” (Rasmussen, 2002).

Despite the high hopes for entering into the EU history book, the run up to Danish Presidency has also been characterized by some concern, both within and outside Denmark. Will a (small) country with four opt-outs be able to have a full Presidency, or will it rather slip on the ice like Bambi in the Disney classic? After all, Denmark is outside three of the most dynamic areas of integration, the common currency, supranational cooperation on justice and home affairs and defence. And what about Denmark’s new immigration policy, agreed by the liberal-conservative government with the votes of the right-wing Danish People’s Party? Will a country, which is no longer portrayed as such a cozy and considerate Scandinavian country in which police men stop traffic to help small ducks across the streets, really be able to handle the task of opening the EU towards the East?

The core argument of this small essay is that the long-lasting worth of the Presidency (its success or failure) will be almost exclusively determined by the ability to clinch accession negotiations in December 2002. If accession negotiations are closed, no one will bother to spend even a few seconds on the Danish opt-outs (or immigration policy). However, if enlargement fails, the EU will be on the lookout for a scapegoat. As with other Presidencies that have come under fire, the limited results will probably be seen as a confirmation of the country’s general reputation in the EU. Critics could here take the following line of argument: “The Danish Presidency turned out to be a flop since the Danes, with all their opt-outs, are not whole-hearted Europeans.”

All the Money on One Horse: The Three Es

Although there are other items on the Danish Presidency agenda (such as a reform of the fisheries policy, the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, etc.), the government has basically put all its money on one horse—enlargement. The unofficial motto of the Presidency is therefore the same as Sweden’s in 2001: the three Es. Where the Swedish

three Es referred to enlargement, employment and environment, the Danish Es refer to enlargement, enlargement and enlargement. Concluding the accession negotiations would indeed entail a great deal of symbolism as the Danish Prime Minister could stress that the EU has come full circle (“It was here in Copenhagen in June 1993 that the EU promised full membership, and today we have completed the first accession negotiations in the very same city—*From Copenhagen to Copenhagen*”).

To be sure, a “Wonderful Copenhagen” scenario where accession talks are closed with up to 10 applicants, would fulfill one of the most important foreign policy goals which Danish governments have worked for consistently since the fall of the Berlin wall. Unlike many other countries, enlargement is generally also very popular among Danish voters. Public opinion polls underscore that Danes are not worried about immigration “from the east” and together with Sweden, the Netherlands and Ireland, Denmark has indeed decided to open its job market for Central and Eastern Europeans from day one after accession.

Since the tough decisions in the enlargement process have to wait until Schröder or Stoiber is elected on September 22 in Germany, the Danish Presidency has exactly 80 days (including weekends) to finalise the enlargement talks at the European Council on December 12-13. In various policy statements, the Danish Prime Minister has highlighted three events as possible stumbling blocks on the road to enlargement.

The first potential stumbling block is the EU budget. After all, the decision to agree on a mandate on how much to offer the applicants on agriculture is one of the few decisions that was left by the previous Spanish Presidency to Denmark. The core problem is not so much who should finance the present enlargement round. The sticking point is rather how this enlargement round will cast shadows on the next budgetary deal (2006). If applicants, for instance, are given some direct payments, Germany fears that they will come back in 2006 demanding full access to the agricultural funds. Such a demand would lead to an increase of the EU’s budget and hence also in Germany’s contributions. However, since the countries which are eager to reform the common agricultural policy (CAP) are exactly those which are also most interested in enlargement (Germany, UK, Denmark and Sweden), the budget is not considered the most dangerous stumbling block in Copenhagen.

The same goes for Cyprus. In September 2002, the chances of a solution to the overall division of the island seem dim. Hence the Presidency will be faced with the tricky question: Can the EU take in a divided island? The answer is largely given by Athens. The Greek government has already made it very clear that it will veto eastern enlargement should Cyprus be left outside the door. Although many countries would be concerned to import the Cyprus problem, they will most likely step down once confronted by the Greek ultimatum: “Are you so worried about taking in Cyprus that you are willing to sacrifice eastern enlargement? No Cyprus, no eastern enlargement” (Friis and Jarosz-Friis, 2002: 52-56).

Seen from Copenhagen, the greatest threat against enlargement is the referendum in Ireland. If the Irish reject the Treaty of Nice the second time around, it (*continued on p.8*)

(continued from p.7) seems very doubtful indeed that the member states will be able to close accession negotiations in Copenhagen. After all, the Treaty has been “sold” as a crucial stepping stone for the institutional preparations of enlargement. It is anything but clear how an Irish no would affect enlargement in the longer term. Two scenarios dominate the debate: either member states find a so-called plan B and manage to enlarge without Nice, or enlargement is postponed until the 2004 Intergovernmental Conference has geared the EU’s institutions to enlargement.

Viewed from this perspective, the Danish Presidency is in the unpleasant situation of having limited control of its destiny, as the most imminent threat comes from an event it has no ability of influencing. As already mentioned, Denmark is sure to receive its share of the blame if things go wrong. Conversely, if enlargement is a success, it will—also largely undeservedly—reap the laurels and enjoy many hymns along the lines of “Wonderful Copenhagen.”

Although Denmark’s chances of having a major impact on the outcome of enlargement negotiations are rather slim, it has played one card that could at least increase the chances of success. Basically since the 1st of July 2002, Danish decision makers have put considerable energy into framing the Copenhagen summit as a “now or never moment for enlargement.” If member states are not willing to compromise, they run the risk of postponing enlargement. Delay could simply feed delay. To quote Prime Minister Rasmussen at length, “All experience shows that the EU is at its best when addressing one major task at a time. The second half of 2002 will be dominated by enlargement, with new urgent tasks coming up afterwards. In 2003 we shall finalise the deliberations on the Convention on the future of the EU and commence work on the subsequent Intergovernmental Conference. The year 2004 will be dominated by the Intergovernmental Conference and elections to the European Parliament. And in the years 2005 and 2006 the framework for the next budget period of 2007-2013 will have to be established” (Rasmussen 2002). Member states toying with the idea of demanding special guarantees and side payments in Copenhagen should therefore think twice before changing the world famous tune into “Horrible Copenhagen.”

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EUSA List Serve

EUSA members posted the following replies to Federiga Bindi’s 17 July 2002 list serve query seeking textbook sources for a new U.S.-EU relations class (including a comparison between the two institutional systems):

- (1) See David Calleo, *Rethinking Europe’s Future*, and James Caporaso, *Dilemmas of Regional Integration* -- from Michael Loriaux, Northwestern University
- (2) I found these books to be helpful in understanding the U.S.-EU institutional differences during my studies as an American in Bruges: *Checks and Balances? How a Parliamentary System Could Change American Politics*, by Paul Christopher Manual and Anne Marie Cammisa; *European Democracies* (4th Ed.), by Jurg Steiner -- from Heidi Budro, College of Europe
- (3) Please take a look at the EUSA Teaching the EU Interest Section Web pages, including the section’s on-line syllabi bank with several courses on U.S.-EU relations, posted at www.eustudies.org/teachingsection.html -- from Peter Loedel, West Chester University
- (4) Mark Pollack and I jointly taught a course last spring. We used our book, *Transatlantic Governance in the Global Economy* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), as the basic text, complemented by other readings ... -- from Greg Shaffer, University of Wisconsin Madison
- (5) You could try the following books: Terrence Guay (1999) *The United States and the European Union: The Political Economy of a Relationship* (Sheffield Academic Press); John Peterson (1996) *Europe and America: The Prospects for Partnership* (Routledge); Mark Pollack and Gregory Shaffer (2001) (*ibid.*) -- from Terrence Guay, Syracuse University
- (6) This is especially on the comparison between the two institutional systems: Kalypso Nicolaidis and Robert Howse (eds.), *The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the U.S. and the EU* (Oxford University Press, 2001). The book includes chapters on the U.S. and EU federalism, from a historical, legal, and theoretical perspective -- from Kalypso Nicolaidis, Oxford University
- (7) This book, too, might be of interest: Eric Philippart and Pascaline Winand (eds.), *Ever Closer Partnership: Policy-Making in U.S.-EU Relations* (Peter Lang, 2001) -- from Alan Henrikson, Tufts University
- (8) The EUSA Office adds: See the monographs from our various U.S.-EU Relations Projects, listed on-line at <http://www.eustudies.org/pubs.html>

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Teaching the EU

Editor's note: This column is written by members of EUSA's "Teaching the EU" Interest Section. For details about the Section and how to join it, please visit www.eustudies.org/teachingsection.html.

Teaching France and the EU in French and English Patricia W. Cummins

TEACHING GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE students in interdisciplinary courses on France and the European Union can enrich the teaching and develop the interests of language faculty at the dawn of the new century. Since changes in French national identity are taking place as a result of French participation in the European Union, French faculty have gone from integrating material on the European Union into their existing civilization and language courses to developing interdisciplinary courses dedicated to the European Union. Given the small class size typical of language courses, both my graduates and undergraduates in courses entitled "France and the European Union" have been able to tailor some of the assignments to their specific needs.

Student Population

At the University of Toledo (UT), I taught graduate seminars in French during 1999 and 2000 to students who were either school teachers or MBA students. At Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU) in 2002, I teach an undergraduate course in English that has an added discussion hour in French for those who take the cross-listed course for French language credit. The VCU undergraduate class consists not only of French majors and business students but also political science and history majors. Although currently the undergraduate class is offered under a special topics rubric, it is being proposed as a regular undergraduate course that we expect to satisfy major requirements for several programs as well as a general education requirement.

Course Materials

Course materials were provided to students through course packs. They consisted primarily of free materials provided by the European Union in both English and French. The starting point for the course pack was the overview provided by Pascal Fontaine in *L'Europe en dix leçons* (in English, *Europe in 10 Points*), and his more recent *Une idée neuve pour l'Europe: La déclaration Schuman 1950-2000*, and its English-language counterpart. He gives a good overview of the history of the European Union and its institutions and activities. Subsequent materials in the course pack included publications specific to the topic covered in a given week, and many of those were obtained free of charge from the offices of the European Union.

In addition to such readings, students were required to have regular access to the Internet, and special opportunities for Internet access were provided through either the UT or the VCU Language Learning Center both during and outside of class. Some

frequently used sites that students consulted are: the EU's home page and other EU sites, at europa.eu.int, and other sites included French search engines such as www.yahoo.fr and www.wanadoo.fr and French publications' Web sites like www.lemonde.fr or www.lesechos.fr. Since they had to do research on special topics, students were encouraged to consult Tennessee Bob's French links at www.utm.edu/departments/french/french.html and the French news agency *Agence France Presse's* www.afp.fr, which has links to French media worldwide. Focusing on specifically French topics, students were encouraged to use the French Embassy's site www.info-france-usa.org, as well as the site of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs www.diplomatie.fr/index.gb.html. Several other sites focused on French politics, and we provided our French partner school as a resource for students.

Other materials for student projects were made available in a resource area of the Language Learning Center. The instructor provided study guides to students in paper version at UT. They are made available to students through www.blackboard.com at VCU. Anyone wishing to explore the Blackboard site I set up may be provided a special access code by contacting me at pcummins@vcu.edu. There are a number of other study aids and links available on that Blackboard site.

Course Content

Course content over a semester period includes the following topics:

- history of the European Union from 1950 to the present
- introduction to institutions of the European Union and its political groups
- comparison of French institutions and political groups with those of Europe
- review of the major events leading to the European Monetary Union and the euro from 1979 to the present
- development of the Single Market and its implications
- the Treaty of Maastricht and the Treaty of Amsterdam and the results of and issues related to the implementation of their provisions
- regions of France and regions of Europe
- French and European social issues and labor issues
- French and European agriculture and industry
- French and European financial markets and the service sector
- French and European educational and cultural issues
- French and European environmental issues
- France and Europe and the United States
- France and Europe and the World

Course Format

Format for the course is a three-hour seminar that takes place in a classroom not far from the Language Learning Center. The first hour of the course is dedicated to presentation of new materials, review of the study guides prepared as homework, and short quizzes to assure comprehension. In the second hour, students are given Web assignment sheets and within assigned groups they explore specific topics on the Internet in the nearby Language Learning Center. In the final hour, the groups exchange information on their specific Web topics. During the final minutes

of the course, students either select or review their individual course projects (usually tailored to student interests). Homework assignments consist of readings from the course pack and from Internet information resulting from student Web searches. Some Web searches require students to work with other class members for a group report during the first hour of the next class. Individual projects are also done as part of the homework assignments.

Grading

Grading is based on quizzes, individual projects, group projects, and class participation. Individual projects go through at least two drafts and in their final form are expected to be good enough for majors to use this as an item for assessment portfolios for their major. They are also encouraged to participate in the undergraduate International Studies colloquium held on campus each November. At the graduate level, school teachers prepared lesson plans to accompany the books they used in their high school classrooms, and three of those teachers accompanied me to the 2000 annual meeting of the American Association of Teachers of French in Paris where they presented their work to other high school teachers. An MBA student gathered information on e-commerce in France and subsequently used what she learned on the job. The number of students has been limited to twenty-five, a limit that allows for writing intensive course work and much individual attention student projects.

Course Goals

Goals for the class include the improvement of or acquisition of skills as well as the learning of content. French classes always include a focus on reading, writing, speaking, and listening skills in French while acquiring cultural competence. The undergraduate class taught in English also allows students to develop their oral and written communication skills. However, a new aspect of the course as it is taught in Fall 2002 involves Blackboard (on-line) discussion groups and chat rooms during October and November with students from the Center of Education and Research Applied to Management (CERAM) business school in southern France. Students from CERAM are in some cases working in a Master's program that is delivered entirely in English, and they are able to interact with class members who do not speak French. Those taking the course this semester for credit in French language must work with CERAM students in French-language discussion groups and chat rooms. Skills VCU students are expected to acquire from the interaction with CERAM students are not limited to skills in using technology or in written communication. Students have specific discussion group assignments that are designed to improve cross-cultural communication for students in France and the United States.

My role as a humanities faculty member has expanded beyond French language, culture and civilization to more opportunities to teach about cross-cultural communication, especially as my students communicate with their European counterparts. After publishing two books focused on French for business, an area in which the European Union and NAFTA played significant roles, my next book will have an interdisciplinary focus on French national identity and culture within the European Union. Some of my VCU colleagues teaching German and Spanish are also considering interdisciplinary

courses on the European Union that focus on Germany or Spain, and the course proposal has been designed as “_____ and the European Union,” so that the target country can change from semester to semester. Those in other departments are discussing possible team teaching and joint research opportunities. Teaching France and the European Union changes each time I do it, and I welcome any comments, suggestions, and opportunities to collaborate with colleagues elsewhere.

Patricia W. Cummins, professor of French and international studies at Virginia Commonwealth University, is working on a book on French national identity and its evolution within the European Union.

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Constitutionalism Web-Papers

The editors of Constitutionalism Web-Papers (ConWEB), EUSA members Jo Shaw and Antje Wiener, announce the publication of new papers on ConWEB; they papers are free to download:

No.6/2002: “Pathos and Patina: The Failure and Promise of Constitutionalism in the European Imagination,” Ulrich Haltern, Humboldt Universität Berlin

No.5/2002: “Education, Multiculturalism and the EU Charter of Rights,” Chloe Wallace, University of Leeds and Jo Shaw, University of Manchester

No.4/2002: “Drafting a European Constitution: Challenges and Opportunities,” Andreas Follesdal, University of Oslo

No.3/2002: “Europe in the Republication Imagination,” Dimitris N. Chrysochoou, University of Essex

No.2/2002: “Brussels Between Bern and Berlin: Comparative Federalism Meets the European Union,” Tanja A. Börzel, Humboldt University, and Madeleine Hosli, University of Amsterdam

To download the papers (PDF files), go to:
<http://www.les1.man.ac.uk/conweb>

Book Reviews

Tanja A. Börzel. *States and Regions in the European Union: Institutional Adaptation in Germany and Spain*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, 269 pp.

AMONG THE MAJOR DEBATES in the field of European Union studies are those surrounding the issues of Europeanization, regionalization, and the democratic deficit. Tanja Börzel's new book makes useful contributions to each of these three debates, on the basis of a carefully researched comparative study of intra-state intergovernmental relations in Germany and Spain.

The theoretical core of the book concerns the first of these debates, as the author seeks to explain the differential effect of European integration on domestic institutional change. Rejecting predominant resource-dependency approaches to explaining the domestic impact of Europe (liberal intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism, multilevel governance) because they wrongly predict convergence and do not sufficiently account for national variation in domestic institutional change, Börzel constructs her own historical institutionalist model, drawing on the insights of both rational choice and sociological institutionalism. Her "Institution Dependency Model (IDM)" argues that institutions mediate the domestic impact of Europe, depending on both the "goodness of fit" of EU and domestic institutions (which determines the degree of pressure for adaptation and likelihood of change) and the adaptability of domestic institutions, which itself is largely the product of historically evolved institutional culture.

Börzel then applies her model in a comparative study of the impact of EU integration on intergovernmental (central state-region) relations in Germany and Spain. These are comparable cases in that both are highly decentralized states in which regional governments possess a considerable amount of governmental resources and autonomy. Her basic argument is as follows: 1) European integration has altered the territorial balance of power in highly decentralized member states, creating an uneven distribution of both "say" (decision-making input) and "pay" (the financial burdens of implementing EU policies) that favors the central state to the detriment of regional governments; 2) regional governments in Germany (Länder) and Spain (Comunidades Autónomas, CCAA) responded very differently to similar pressures for institutional change created by European integration: while the Länder adopted a strategy of cooperation with the federal government to attain powers of co-decision in European policy and a sharing of implementation costs, the CCAA initially pursued a strategy of non-cooperation, seeking to "ring-fence" their competencies to protect them from central state incursion and establishing direct links to EU institutions that bypassed the central state. This divergence of response is largely the result of different institutional cultures and traditions: "cooperative federalism" in Germany, and "competitive regionalism" in Spain; and 3) while the Länder strategy proved relatively successful in redressing the territorial imbalance of

power created by European integration, the more confrontational strategy of the CCAA did not. Eventually, through a process of experiential learning, the CCAA began adopting a more cooperative strategy, which emulated and borrowed from the more successful German approach. 4) As demonstrated with particular clarity in a more focused case study of EU environmental policy in Germany and Spain, Europeanization has promoted an increase in multilateral intergovernmental cooperation in these two highly decentralized member states.

Börzel's analysis and conclusions are based on solid empirical foundations, including extensive interview research (over 100 interviews with national and regional actors in both Germany and Spain between 1995 and 2000). They also seem fairly convincing, although one can doubt the power of her institutional cultural explanation of the CCAA response to Europeanization. While the Länder predisposition to cooperate with the federal government may well be the product of several decades of cooperative federalism, the Spanish regional system had only existed for less than a decade when Spain joined the EU in 1986 and began confronting head-on the pressures of Europeanization. While normative factors are undoubtedly important for explaining the CCAA response, these are probably more deeply rooted in Spanish history, culture, and ethnic differences, and not solely attributable to limited experience with an institutional system of regional governance that was only established in 1978.

The generalizability of her IDM model of domestic institutional change beyond the specific policy area of intrastate intergovernmental relations also remains to be seen, but it appears promising. Regarding this policy area itself, in her concluding chapter Börzel extends her study with a brief review of the literature on Europeanization and regionalization in two centralized member states (the UK and France) as well as three other highly decentralized systems (Belgium, Austria, and Italy). Her review shows that while European integration has not exerted a significant impact on territorial governance institutions in the former two countries, the latter three all display movement towards the model of "cooperative regionalism" found in the cases of Germany and Spain. This leads her to conclude that, rather than a generalized institutional convergence in response to Europeanization, we may increasingly see a pattern of "clustered convergence," or "convergence within certain clusters of member states whose domestic institutions (policies, identities) face comparable pressure for adaptation" (p.231). This is an interesting proposition that deserves to be explored further.

Beyond its contribution to the theoretical debate on Europeanization and domestic institutional change, Börzel's book also has important implications for the debate on regionalization in Europe. While some scholars have argued that European integration creates opportunities for sub-national regions to act independently and enhance their autonomy vis-à-vis the central state, others are not so sure, arguing that national governments can be effective "gate-keepers" and limit the impact of EU policies on domestic institutions of territorial governance. For the most part, regionalization skeptics have pointed to traditionally centralized or unitary states (the UK, France,

Greece, Portugal) to make their case, leaving open the possibility that Europeanization does indeed enhance the autonomy of regions in federal or more decentralized member states (in addition to Germany and Spain, also Belgium, Austria, and Italy), in which regional governments have sufficient resources to exploit new opportunities presented by the EU. Börzel's findings undermine this thesis, however, by showing that, if anything, integration has a centralizing effect within decentralized systems. As the German and Spanish cases demonstrate, far from enhancing the independent power and autonomy of regions, integration makes them even more dependent on the central state and necessitates greater cooperation with national authorities in order to redress the imbalances of power and resources that it creates. In Europe's emerging multilevel system of governance, therefore, even in highly decentralized systems integration appears to be strengthening the power of the central state due to its pivotal role as link between Europe and the regions. This is an outcome that diverges considerably from the "Europe of the Regions" scenario.

Börzel's study also has important implications for the debate about Europe's democratic deficit. The shift of governmental power to the regional level is viewed by many in Europe as an antidote to the centralization of power in the EU's non-accountable and non-transparent institutions, as well as the declining influence of democratically elected national parliaments as a result of integration. However, Börzel shows us that regionalization, to the extent and in the manner that it has occurred, may in fact contribute to this democratic deficit rather than providing a remedy. The model of "cooperative regionalism" that she argues is the emerging trend in decentralized systems is characterized by executive dominance (the cooperative interaction of central state and regional executives) and sectorization (the interaction of national and regional sectoral experts), and as a result, the growing marginalization of regional parliaments. Thus, cooperative regionalism contributes to the phenomenon of "deparliamentarization" that is widely decried as a key element of Europe's democratic deficit. While this is among the least well-documented arguments of the book, it is an important assertion and an implication of her study that deserves greater attention.

Börzel's book is a model of comparative empirical research demonstrating the usefulness of particular theoretical approaches and generating broader theoretical insights. Her book should be read by anyone interested in the debates on Europeanization, regionalization, and the EU's democratic deficit. It contributes substantially to our understanding of these issues, and provides us with much food for thought as well as questions for future research.

Michael Baun
Valdosta State University

Matthias Kaelberer. *Money and Power in Europe: The Political Economy of European Monetary Cooperation*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001, 254 pp.

THIS BOOK CONSIDERS THE DEVELOPMENT of monetary policy regime rules in European Union countries from the early 1960s through EMU. As the book's title suggests, the explanation for these rules is rooted in the international relations literature. The focus is on power relationships in Europe, what determines them, and how inter-state bargaining given these relationships led to some monetary policy regime rules and not others. There are two factors that play a critical role. The first is the sign on the current account balance. Countries with positive balances are strong currency countries that have low inflation, while those with negative balances are weak currency countries with high inflation. Strong currency countries have leverage over weak currency countries because they do not face reserve constraints. The crucial point is that strong currency states can walk away from monetary "deals" that establish rules with other countries while weak currency countries cannot. The second explanation centers upon the leadership role of Germany. The country consistently has low inflation and therefore served as the standard setter for the rest of Europe, and this position allowed it to lead the other states.

The main finding is that Germany consistently gets what is important to it. The country does not want to adopt any monetary rules that would upset its domestic policy goals, namely the maintenance of low inflation. In practice, the rules that emerge reflect German preferences.

This book has several strengths. The cleavage between weak and strong currency states, while an incomplete explanation on its own (see below), makes sense and serves as a useful device to explain the strategies of actors, and especially of Germany. The argument in Chapter 3 that Germany is not a hegemon in the traditional international relations sense of the term is convincing. I like the emphasis on how a German policy of low inflation gives it a privileged, even dominant, role. The book is also nicely grounded in four decades of European monetary history. I knew little about the Commission's Second Action Programme (or Hallstein Initiative) proposed in 1962, which would have established a common currency by 1970 at the latest. More generally, the examination of more than just the EMU period gives the theoretical analysis more weight than similar analyses that focus just on the 1990s. Reinforcing Moravscik's (1998) argument, I also buy the contention that Germany got what it wanted in the EMU negotiations. The outcome was not decidedly pro-France (Garrett 2001).

I have two concerns about the book's argument that arise from two sub-fields in political science. From an international relations perspective, I am puzzled that the author did not integrate the role of the United States more explicitly into the discussion. If states are the main players, and if their relative power determines outcomes, then the United States is too critical a player to leave out. As Henning (1998) elegantly demonstrates, efforts at European monetary integration increased whenever (monetary) tensions with the United States increased. To be fair, the United States does appear in parts of the narrative and in

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particular during the Bretton Woods period, but it is never integrated formally into the theory.

The second concern comes from a comparative political economy perspective. The book provides a sense of what Germany wants and what strategies Germany adopted to reach its goals. It does not, however, equally clarify why other states adopted the strategies that they did. Concerning weak currency states, there is a contention that they either had to swallow what Germany wanted or suffer often harsh economic consequences. In particular, the author emphasizes that they had two choices in several settings across time—either adopt a fix on German terms or devalue. Yet there was a third option, namely to float the currency outright. This is not the same thing as a devaluation, and reserves are less relevant under a complete float. An example comes from the establishment of the EMS in 1979. One weak currency country, Italy, chose to join, but with fairly large bands and (probably) with the intention to devalue where appropriate in any event. Another weak currency country, the United Kingdom, did not join at all when the rules were first created. The emphases on strong vs. weak currency states and on Germany's leadership position do not explain these divergent paths. Similarly, the focus on the strong currency states is almost exclusively on Germany. The index indicates, for example, that the Netherlands is mentioned only five times in the text. This is a shame. During the Maastricht negotiations, the Dutch often (though not always) served as the agenda-setter, and they did not simply propose whatever Germany wanted. Moving to a period not covered in the book, it is hard to understand why the Stability and Growth Pact did not die away after the Germans began to lose interest in 1996 without including the small strong currency countries that kept the proposal alive. Finally, comparativists would also like to understand why countries choose to be "weak" or "strong" currency countries in the first place.

These concerns aside, the book has much to recommend it. Scholars who would like an explicitly international relations perspective on monetary unification should read this book.

Mark Hallerberg
University of Pittsburgh

Amy Verdun (ed.) *The Euro: European Integration Theory and Economic and Monetary Union*. Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield, 2002, 282 pp.

AMY VERDUN'S EDITED VOLUME is an attempt to shed light on the process of European monetary integration, specifically the European Monetary Union (EMU) process, using various theories of European integration. The book's core claim is that it advances the body of knowledge about the many facets of EMU. Verdun argues that the book does not seek to test the theories of integration, but rather use them to help us understand a complex and dynamic process.

While Verdun asserts that the book does not set out to "test" theories of integration, the book addresses three core sets of questions that ultimately weigh the relative explanatory power of the various theories of integration. The three sets of questions are: First, what is the usefulness of traditional and more recent integration theories in relative terms? Second, what do the theoretical approaches tell us about the EMU process and what is the value-added of each of the theories to explaining all or parts of EMU? Third, how is EMU embedded in a wider global process and how do national factors affect that process?

This is an ambitious set of questions, and the fourteen chapters of the volume do hold to these general core questions, which is not always the case in edited volumes. The book is divided into four sections. The first section examines the explanatory power of theories. Two of the chapters, by Verdun and Dieter Wolf respectively, deal with how neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism contribute to our understanding of EMU and how their amalgamation could improve our understanding of the process. Verdun argues that it is best to avoid using one general theory of integration to understand the process and she advocates taking a "flexible approach" to understanding integration. Thus there are insights from both neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism that can be useful to exploring EMU.

Wolf argues that if we added how interests and preferences are influenced by socio-economic structures to the theories of neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism, then we can have a more complete analysis than is provided by those two theories alone.

The third chapter, by F. A. W. J. van Esch, focuses on how neorealism has not been able to provide much understanding of the EMU process. She attacks the notion that national preferences are assumed rather than explained in realist work on integration. She argues that to understand how countries approach integration, we must consider both domestic and international sources of preferences.

The second section of the book explores more recent theories of integration and international relations. Lloy Wylie explores the usefulness of the constructivist and neoliberal approaches to studying EMU. He sees merit in both types of explanations of EMU. According to Wylie, it was both convergence of interests and ideas that made EMU possible.

Kenneth Dyson also sees a convergence of ideas contributing to the development of EMU. EMU is also causing

a convergence of policies at the domestic level. But Dyson stresses that national differences persist that preclude a complete Europeanization of domestic policies related to EMU. He does not see EMU as the end of national political-economic differences in the foreseeable future.

Amy Elman takes a feminist perspective on the EMU process. She argues that women's identities have been neglected in the process of European integration. Specifically, the neoliberal ethos of the European integration project does not consider how the distribution of gains impacts men and women in different ways.

The third section of the book is devoted to exploring the accountability of institutions. The Peter Loedel chapter uses the theory of multilevel governance to explain the independence of the European Central Bank (ECB). He asserts that the ECB does operate, to a degree, as a multilevel governed institution. It is not merely the decision-makers at the supranational level who impact policy, but also those at the national level. Thus while the ECB is legally independent, there are avenues of accountability for the central bank.

Erik Jones' chapter on the ECB is a departure from the other chapters in that it does not build on integration or general international relations theory. Instead, Jones explains the independence of the ECB using general theories of central banking, which are rooted in American and comparative politics and the literature in monetary economics. He concludes that it should come as no surprise that the ECB was made an independent central bank, given that the consensus among scholars and practitioners of central banking is that an independent central bank is necessary to provide price stability, the cornerstone of a healthy economy. Jones makes it clear that he believes that making the ECB independent of government control was the right course of action for European decision-makers to take.

The third section is completed by a chapter by Patrick Crowley that ascertains the economic impact of the Stability and Growth Pact. Like Jones, Crowley does not root his study in the theories of integration or international relations, but rather in economics. Crowley criticizes the design of EMU, specifically the lack of a mechanism to coordinate macroeconomic policy. He advocates a set of reforms for improving the prospects of the Stability and Growth Pact.

The Jones and Crowley chapters, while well written and argued, seem a bit out of place in a volume that is generally tied together conceptually. These chapters deviate from the preceding chapters in that they do not use integration or international relations theories to help explain their subject matter. They are also more prescriptive than the other chapters in the book.

The fourth and final section is comprised of three country studies. William Chandler explores Germany's role in the process of European monetary integration; Osvaldo Croci and Lucio Picci examine Italy's role; and David Howarth assesses France's role. Howarth argues for a personality-centered approach, focusing on the top national leadership, to understand countries' positions on European monetary integration. This is a unique argument in the existing studies of the monetary integration process.

Chandler explores the German position on European Monetary Union and describes how Germany has been beset with the dilemma of having to weigh its support for the integration process with its commitment to domestic goals, such as price stability. He concludes that the intergovernmental bargaining process leads to the development of supranational institutions, which begs the question of whether we can really separate intergovernmentalism from neofunctionalism. The book concludes with a chapter by Verdun and Wylie that summarizes the findings of the book.

This volume is, in general, a successful attempt to marry theory and empirical work to illuminate the hugely important process of European Monetary Union. The book does violate a claim that Verdun makes in the introduction: that the book is not meant to test theories of integration. It is implicit in several of the chapters, which aim to determine the usefulness of the theories, that the theories are in fact being tested for their explanatory power. Thus, there is a bit of a disconnect between what Verdun claims the book is intended to do and what the various authors do in their chapters.

The coverage of the use of theory to explain EMU is quite comprehensive and broader in scope than any other existing book on this subject matter. This coverage, combined with the high quality of scholarship that went into each of the chapters, makes the book a very welcome addition to the literature on European monetary integration. Despite the wide coverage of various theories, two schools of thought in international relations were not included for contributions: realism and Marxism. While the realist work of Joseph Grieco on European integration was criticized in the van Esch chapter, there is no chapter by a scholar written from a realist perspective. Granted, there are few scholars who study European integration from a realist perspective, but it is still an important perspective in the broader field of international relations. There are several scholars in Europe who have written on European monetary integration from a Marxian perspective, and at least one could have been included to enhance the theoretical breadth of the book. Space for such chapters could have been made by deleting some chapters that either overlapped in subject matter or did not fit into the book well because they did not apply integration or general international relations theories.

Overall, this book is a very meritorious contribution to our understanding of European integration that would be very useful in both undergraduate and graduate level courses.

Karl Kaltenthaler
Rhodes College

Martin Schain (ed.) *The Marshall Plan: Fifty Years After.* New York: Palgrave, 2001, 297 pp.

THE MARSHALL PLAN QUALIFIES AS one of the truly bold policy initiatives and great puzzles of the postwar multilateral economic order. In boldness, the Marshall Plan was equivalent in today's dollars to over \$100 billion in U.S. economic assistance for

Western Europe, and as a similar proportion of U.S. GDP would amount to just over \$200 billion (p.120). The enduring puzzle, and focus of Martin Schain's edited volume, *The Marshall Plan: Fifty Years After*, is how does one assess the long-term impact of the European Recovery Program (ERP)? As Schain points out in the preface, measuring this impact is not easy and after five decades the debate has grown more, rather than less, complicated. The book centers on two main themes. The first is the multidimensional role of the ERP in rebuilding postwar Western Europe, and perhaps more fundamentally, in restoring Europeans' faith in capitalism. This theme is well documented by the individual chapter contributions. A second theme explores the ERP's role in influencing the integration process that we now know as the EU. Although Cini's nicely detailed chapter is a partial exception, the chain of causation between the ERP and the EU integration process remains fuzzy in the volume as a whole. Rather than providing definitive answers, this volume offers a state-of-the-art retrospective on the ERP as an economic, political, and ideational package that became a cornerstone in Europe's postwar rebirth. It also indirectly confirms that debates over the ERP's impact are nowhere near resolution.

The book is composed of fourteen chapters, an introduction by Tony Judt, and a preface by Martin Schain. Eight chapters focus on country-specific contexts including: Czechoslovakia (Bradley Abrams), Greece (Stelios Zachariou), Britain (Jolyon Howorth), three chapters on France (Irwin Wall, Stewart Patrick, and Roland Cayrol), and two on the United States (Jacqueline McGlade, Robert Shapiro). The remainder examine ERP linkages to the EU integration process (Michelle Cini), NATO (Robert Latham), the political discourse of the Cold War (James Cronin), and three chapters on longer-term economic developments (Roy Gardner, Barry Eichengreen, Imanuel Wexler).

Taken together, the volume identifies four major dimensions to the Marshall Plan's impact. The first, and most controversial, is economic impact. In its immediate effects, no one denies the ERP mattered. Even hardcore skeptics like Alan Milward have acknowledged the ERP bridged temporary dollar shortfalls and widened economic bottlenecks to allow levels of investment and consumption which otherwise would have been deferred. But measuring the long-term impact proves more contentious. In Judt's assessment, skeptics like Milward discount the critical timing of this capital injection in reversing "the long descent of the European economies into self-defeating policies of deflation and autarky" (p.4). For Judt, Cronin, and others, the true novelty of the Plan lay in breaking the short-term vicious cycles and widespread sense of despair in the market (see psychological dimension below). Counterfactually, several authors credit the ERP with averting austerity policies and depressed living standards that would have risked fomenting domestic unrest. And for some, the long-term effects were even more impressive. Wexler, for example, directly credits the success of the ERP with the economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s. But others seem to disagree, and present evidence supporting the minimal impact view of revisionist historians like Milward. The chapter by Wall, for example, goes beyond the revisionist thesis to make a case that for France, Marshall aid primarily enabled and helped

prolong the Fourth Republic's colonial wars in Algeria and Indochina.

The second dimension is how the ERP contributed to the Cold War division of Europe. As Eichengreen summarizes, the Marshall Plan framed the "East-West conflict as a choice between plan and market" (p.133). And within several Western European countries, Marshall aid conditionality helped delegitimize powerful Communist movements which were arrayed against free markets. The third is how the institutionalization of the Marshall Plan (in the form of the OEEC) helped forge a brand of "new thinking" among Europe's elites which contributed to the other (and even grander) postwar multilateral institutions in Europe (NATO and the ECSC/EU). These ideational factors, discussed most explicitly by Judt, Cini, and Eichengreen, included a shared perception that something new and radical was required to break the vicious cycle of policy failure and a receptiveness to the tenets of planning and managed capitalism. In this respect, as Eichengreen puts it, "the Marshall planners fueled an already powerful strand of communitarian thought with ideological roots deep in European Christian Democracy" (p.134).

The fourth factor is the intangible psychological dimension. According to Judt, the psychological boost of the Marshall Plan to Europe's leaders and citizens alike was even more important than the actual dollars in overcoming the "widespread sense of gloom and incipient disaster" (p.7). Cronin's chapter explores this dimension further and underlines how the timing for Marshall assistance galvanized confidence in capitalism and the fledgling European welfare state.

While impossible to do justice to all the text's rich findings in this brief review, several contributions deserve additional mention. Michelle Cini's chapter traces the tricky lineage between administration of the ERP and the initiation of the EU integration process. She carefully summarizes the dissonant views held within the U.S. administration for European integration, for example, between the "free traders" and New Deal "planners" (pp.14-22). The main contribution of her chapter, however, lies in the excellent analysis of the indirect influences on the EU process, and in particular, the role of the OEEC experience in providing "a framework for socializing West European elites into new ways of working and of familiarizing them with the practice as well as the language of European integration" (p.31). While she sidesteps the Milwardian argument that what Europe's elites learned with the weakly institutionalized and overtly intergovernmental OEEC model was how not to do things when they created the ECSC, she makes a strong case that this experience "induced a process of transnational socialization in favor of further cooperation" (p.32).

Another standout is Stewart Patrick's chapter on the entrepreneurial role of Jean Monnet in helping to cement "embedded liberalism" in France. Patrick adopts a constructivist approach to explain the competition between French "neoliberals" and "structural reformers." His chapter is based on a process-tracing research design to track how Monnet's comprehensive blueprint for economic management gave neoliberals the edge in reformulating the culture of French commercial policy.

And finally, Barry Eichengreen offers a provocative argument that Central and Eastern Europe today face a far different recovery trajectory than the West did fifty years ago, not so much because the generosity of donor states has dried up but because the nature of international capital markets is completely different. In today's era of global finance, Eichengreen argues, private capital markets serve as a "market-based Marshall Plan" to developing countries. One crucial difference, which Eichengreen does not consider, is that the volatility of today's "footloose" capital cannot provide anything close to the psychological support that Marshall planners indirectly supplied to Western Europe, and which several contributors found to be so decisive.

One shortcoming of the volume is a lack of integration between individual chapters; this leads to a fair amount of redundancy, especially on basic background to the ERP and on underlying U.S. preferences and motivations. It is also somewhat disappointing that differences of substantive interpretation—

especially on the ERP's long-term economic effects and role in stimulating the EU integration process—are not more clearly identified and discussed. The volume would have benefited greatly from a concluding chapter which attempted to draw some generalizations across the range of individual contributions, though to some extent the introductory chapter by Tony Judt can also be read as a proxy for such a synthesis. In a terse nine pages, he delivers a tour de force overview of the disputed origins, impact, and legacy of the ERP. Judt's introduction, short but sweet, is certainly a highlight of the volume.

In summary, this book is highly recommended as a wide-ranging introduction to the role of the ERP in postwar Europe's recovery and a current survey of the debates surrounding its long-term impact. Readers still in search of more definitive answers would do well to also consult the classic and authoritative studies by Michael Hogan, Alan Milward, and John Gimbel, among others.

Jeffrey Lewis
Oklahoma State University

EUSA's 5th U.S.-EU Relations Project (2003): The New Security Relationship - Elizabeth Pond, Project Scholar

IN 1993, THE EUROPEAN UNION Studies Association (EUSA) launched its seminal U.S.-EU Relations Project in which prominent thinkers on current issues in transatlantic relations focus on a topic chosen by the EUSA board of directors and write an original monograph on it. The scholars also deliver their papers at workshops of experts on the issue and at the European Union Studies Association's biennial international conference. The EUSA, with the Council on Foreign Relations and later, Brookings Institution Press, has published four monographs resulting from the Project, and we are now delighted to announce the launch of our 5th Project, which will revisit our 1993 launch topic.

In 1993 Catherine McArdle Kelleher wrote the first monograph for the Project, *A New Security Order: The United States and the European Community in the 1990s*. In her work she examined how changes in an evolving Europe affected security relations, the impact of the opening up of Central and East European countries, and U.S. and European actions outside the NATO area (such as in the Persian Gulf). Kelleher wrote, "What is lacking at present is an agreed transatlantic political commitment to take on these [security] tasks in their entirety or even in some critical dimensions" (p.42). A decade later, 2003 Project Scholar Pond takes another look at the status of transatlantic security relations, especially in the face of the new challenge of global terrorism, and finds that transatlantic tensions in a number of areas have contributed to poorer prospects for cooperation.

On security relations between the United States and the European Union at present, Pond writes: "This time around, it's far worse than the lovers' spats of the 1980s, the 1970s, and possibly even the 1960s. The gulf between the U.S. and Europe is now both wider and deeper, and the resulting acrimony is worse. The spectrum of disputes covers everything from the chronic trade and burden-sharing quarrels to the International Criminal Court to the Kyoto Protocol to Iraq and Israeli-Palestinian violence to Hobbesian vs. Kantian perspectives—and the discrete brawls reinforce and exacerbate each other. The bad American temper toward the Europeans, along with European shock at discovering the transatlantic military gap, have brought European governments to accept a rhetorical responsibility for global (and not just European) security. But both the European dearth of defense funding and disagreements over tactics add to the estrangement."

Elizabeth Pond lives in Berlin and is writing a book about the Balkans on a grant from the U.S. Institute of Peace. Her most recent books are *The Rebirth of Europe* (Brookings Institution Press, rev., 2002) and *Die Stunde Europas* (Propylaeen, 2000). She is editor of the English-language *Transatlantic Internationale Politik* and contributes to the *Wall Street Journal*, the *Washington Quarterly*, and other publications; she was a correspondent for the *Christian Science Monitor*. Pond has been a fellow of the Woodrow Wilson Center, the Twentieth Century Fund, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and the National Endowment for the Humanities. She is on the advisory council of Women in International Security and is a member of EUSA, Council on Foreign Relations, International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Atlantic Council, and the German Council on Foreign Relations. In 2001 she received the Manfred Woerner Medal for contributing to peace and freedom in Europe.

Our 5th Project has been made possible in part by support from The German Marshall Fund of the United States, the Europe Program of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, who will host our Project Workshop, and Brookings Institution Press, who will publish the Project monograph. Visit www.eustudies.org/pubs.html for more information on our series.

Members Research Notes

Editor's note: The following is a compilation of currently funded EU-related research projects of EUSA members. The next compilation will appear in the Fall 2003 EUSA Review.

Brian Ardy is a research fellow working for **Iain Begg** (both of South Bank University, London) on an Anglo German Foundation funded project, "Employment Policies in Germany and the United Kingdom: The Impact of Europeanisation." Their German partners are **Wolfgang Wessels** and others at the University of Cologne.

Kenneth Armstrong, senior lecturer in law, Queen Mary, University of London, has received a Leverhulme Fellowship to research EU social inclusion policy and the open method of coordination in the context of devolution in the UK.

Fulvio Attinà, Jean Monnet Professor of EU Politics at the University of Catania (Italy), received the 2002 research fund of his university to study the construction of the Euro-Mediterranean security partnership.

Professor **Francesca Bignami**, Duke University School of Law, received German Marshall Fund senior research support in 2002-03 to investigate the impact of EU law on domestic constitutional and administrative law.

Dr. **Tanja A. Börzel**, lecturer at the Humboldt University, Berlin, received a grant from the German Research Foundation in 2002-04 to investigate conditions under which member states violate European law.

Christopher Burdick, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, received a research scholarship from the Frank Fund of the Association To Unite The Democracies for a project on federalism in the context of the European Convention.

Helen Callaghan, Ph.D. candidate at Northwestern University, received a Chateaubriand fellowship from the French government and a Max Planck fellowship from the Council of European Studies to conduct research on the domestic sources of intergovernmental disagreement regarding the harmonization of company law in the European Union.

Doctoral candidate **Lucian Cernat**, University of Manchester, received a PHARE-ACE dissertation grant for his research on the impact of institutional transformation on economic performance in EU candidate countries, with a focus on Romania.

Postdoctoral research fellow **Ben Crum** (Ph.D., European University Institute) received a 2002-04 Marie Curie Fellowship to pursue his research on the sources of legitimacy of the EU at the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels.

Kevin Featherstone, Venizelos Professor, the Hellenic Observatory, London School of Economics, is co-investigator for an Observatory project researching the impact of Europeanization on domestic adaptation in Greece in the areas of pension, labour and taxation policies.

Professor **Terri Givens**, University of Washington Seattle, received a Ford Foundation Postdoctoral Fellowship in 2002-03 to investigate the relationship between EU and national level immigration policy.

Liesbet Hooghe, University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, received an Alexander von Humboldt Research Grant in 2002-03 for her project, "Domestic Politics by Other Means: Political Parties and the Future of Europe."

Visiting professor **Clifford A. Jones**, University of Florida Levin College of Law, is co-recipient of a grant from the Center for International Business Education and Research to research the situation where network industries such as Microsoft face potentially conflicting remedies imposed by the EU and USA antitrust regimes.

Dr. **Andrew Jordan** (University of East Anglia, UK) is co-recipient of a European Science Foundation grant to study the Europeanisation of environmental policy in ten EU states; he is manager of the Economic and Social Research Council (UK) Programme for Environmental Decision Making, based at CSERGE, University of East Anglia, for 2001-06.

Professor **Joseph S. Joseph**, University of Cyprus, has been awarded a Jean Monnet Chair on European Foreign and Security Policy, to do research on security aspects of the next EU enlargement with emphasis on the accession of Cyprus.

Dr. **Bart Kerremans** and Dr. **Jan Beyers**, both at Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, received a research grant from the Scientific Fund Flanders for a three-year research project, "Access and Legitimacy: EU Trade Policymaking in the WTO and Opportunities of Access for Societal Interests."

Dr. **Johan Lembke**, George Washington University, received research grants from the Swedish Institute of International Affairs and the Swedish-American Foundation to research transatlantic economic relations and institutional development in high technology and critical infrastructures (biotechnology, space, and civil aviation and maritime safety and security).

Doctoral candidate **Willem Maas**, Yale University, received a 2002-03 University Dissertation Fellowship for his research on the politics of EU citizenship.

Professor **David G. Mayes**, South Bank University (London) and Bank of Finland, has received funding from the Bank of Estonia to coordinate a comparative project on the Monetary Transmission Mechanism in the Baltic States in 2003.

Doctoral candidate **Frederic Merand**, University of California Berkeley, received a 2002-03 Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation dissertation fellowship for his research on the impact of European Security and Defense Policy on military organization and doctrine in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.

Layna Mosley, assistant professor of political science, University of Notre Dame, received a German Marshall Fund fellowship for a project analyzing the impact of foreign direct and portfolio investors on government policy choices in Central and Eastern Europe.

Professor **Brent Nelsen**, Furman University, received a fully funded writing leave from his university during academic year 2002-03 to complete his co-authored study, "Religion and the Struggle for Europe: How Religion Divides the European Union and Why It Matters."

Elizabeth Pond, editor of *Transatlantic Internationale Politik* and EUSA's 5th U.S.-EU Relations Project Scholar, has also received a two-year grant from the U.S. Institute of Peace to write about the impact of the EU on the Balkans and of the Balkans on the EU.

Professor **Jo Shaw**, University of Manchester, is a co-researcher on the Constitutionalisation of Transnational Political Parties. The work is funded by a grant from the Economic and Social Research Council (UK).

Professor **Steven J. Silvia**, American University, received a 2002-03 DaimlerChrysler Fund Fellowship to be in residence at the American Institute of Contemporary German Studies, to investigate the impact of European Monetary Union on labor markets in France, Germany, and Italy.

Carolyn M. Warner, associate professor of political science, Arizona State University, received a U.S. National Science Foundation Professional Opportunities for Women in Research and Education grant to study corruption and fraud in the EU.

Dr. **Anthony R. Zito**, is co-recipient of a UK Economic and Social Research Programme on Future Governance Grant for 2000-03 to assess the use and transfer of new environmental policy instruments in the EU and five member states.

Special note: Comparative Federalism (COMFED) is a new research project funded by the U.S. Dept. of Ed. FIPSE and the European Commission to promote the comparative study of the American federal system and the developing quasi-federal institutions of the European Union in 2002-04. Five EUSA members are among the COMFED project directors: **Renaud Dehousse**, Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris; **John Keeler**, University of Washington; **Anand Menon**, University of Birmingham; **Alberta Sbragia**, University of Pittsburgh; and **Martin Schain**, New York University.

Spotlight on Austria in the USA

Many EUSA members focus on EU member states. This feature highlights an individual EU member state's official presences in the USA, and more.

Important Web sites

• Primary diplomatic Web site: www.austria.org
The Embassy of Austria and the Austrian Press & Information Service are located at 3524 International Court NW, Washington, DC 20008.

Missions Embassy of Austria in Washington and consulates in Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York. Honorary consulates too numerous to list here, from Anchorage, Alaska to San Juan, Puerto Rico; find list and contact information on the Embassy's Web site. The U.S. Embassy in Austria (on-line at www.usembassy.at/en) is located at Boltzmanngasse 16, A-1090 Vienna, Austria.

Media Austria Today (on-line at www.austriatoday.at) is an English language newspaper, often including features on EU-related issues.

The United States Austrian Chamber of Commerce (on-line at www.usatchamber.com), located at 165 West 46th Street, New York, NY 10036, telephone 212 819 0117, e-mail <office@usatchamber.com>, has individual and corporate memberships and organizes networking events.

The Austrian Cultural Forum (an Austrian government agency), located in Manhattan (on-line at www.acfny.org), "seeks to enhance the appreciation of contemporary Austrian cultural achievements in the United States." Telephone 212 319 5300.

Selected scholarly resources

- The University of Minnesota hosts the Center for Austrian Studies (on-line at www.cas.umn.edu). Contact e-mail <casahy@umn.edu>. They publish working papers and the *Austrian History Yearbook*.
- The University of New Orleans hosts Center Austria (on-line at www.centeraustria.uno.edu). Contact e-mail <camc@uno.edu>. They publish a book series, *Contemporary Austrian Studies*. Volume 10 (2002) is *Austria in the European Union*.
- *Austrian Studies* is an English-language journal focusing on Austria 1750 to present, published by the Modern Humanities Research Association (on-line at www.rhul.ac.uk/German/AustrianStudies.html)

Fellowships and Awards

The **Fulbright German Studies Seminar** offers 25 awards to participate in a group seminar on current German society and culture that will examine the political, social and economic institutions of Germany. Ph.D. candidates who hold full-time teaching appointments and meet other requirements are eligible. Length: 3 weeks, starting June 2003. There is also a **U.S.-Germany International Education Administrators Program** (25 awards) to participate in a group seminar on German higher education and society, designed for U.S. university and college administrators with responsibility for international exchanges in higher education. Ph.D. not required. Length: 3 weeks, starting April 2003. Visit <www.cies.org> or e-mail <apprequest@cies.iie.org>. Deadline for both programs: *November 1, 2002*.

The **International Dissertation Field Research Fellowship** program of the Social Science Research Council provides support for social scientists and humanists' dissertation field research and will award up to 50 fellowships in 2003. The program is open to full-time graduate students in the social sciences and humanities enrolled in U.S. doctoral programs. Proposals are invited for field research on all areas or regions of the world. Applicants must have completed all Ph.D. requirements except the fieldwork by December 2003. The fellowship must be held between July 2003-December 2004. See <www.ssrc.org/fellowships/idrf>. Deadline: *November 12, 2002*.

The **German Marshall Fund of the U.S.** offers Research Fellowships for research to improve the understanding of significant contemporary economic, political, and social developments relating to Europe, European integration and relations between Europe and the U.S. The geographic scope of the program is Western, Central and Eastern Europe, including Russia and Turkey as they relate to Europe. The Program is available for Ph.D. candidates, recent Ph.D. recipients, and more senior scholars. U.S. citizens and permanent residents are eligible. Recipients should work full-time on the proposed project, for six months to one year. Visit <www.gmfus.org> or e-mail <info@gmfus.org>. Deadline (postmark): *November 15, 2002*.

The **Berlin Program for Advanced German and European Studies** of the Social Science Research Council invites applications from U.S. and Canadian nationals who are full-time graduate students in the humanities and social sciences for doctoral or post-doctoral field research in Berlin. See <www.ssrc.org/fellowships/berlin>. Deadline: *December 1, 2002*.

The **European University Institute**, Florence, Italy, offers three-year postgraduate grants for support of doctoral studies in law, economics, history, and social and political sciences at EUI. Applications are sought from researchers in EU member states and other countries by special arrangement. Visit <www.iue.it> or e-mail <applyres@iue.it>. Deadline: *January 15, 2003*.

Conferences

October 4-5, 2002: "Reclaiming the Future: The Central European Quest," Annual Conference, Dublin European Institute, Ireland, on the reshaping and future of the European continent and the European idea. See <www.europeanstudies.ie>.

October 4-5, 2002: "EU/US Cooperation for the Prevention of Computer Related Crime," Pittsburgh, PA. Cosponsored by the University of Pittsburgh, Carnegie Mellon University, University of Trento (Italy), and others. Visit <www.ucis.pitt.edu/cwes>.

October 11-12, 2002: "Democracy and Legitimacy of the European Union and Other International Organisations," Brussels, Belgium. Organized by University of Antwerp and Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. See <www.international-law.be> [omit hyphen] or contact <pascale.buyck@ua.ac.be>.

October 17-19, 2002: "Multilevel and Federal Governance: The Experiences of Canada and the EU," Victoria, Canada. Organized by the European Studies Program, University of Victoria. Contact <averdun@uvic.ca> or <lloy@uvic.ca>.

October 23-26, 2002: "Cultura Europea," Pamplona, Spain, VII Congreso. Organized by the Centro de Estudios Europeos, University of Navarra. Visit <www.unav.es/cee/viicongre.html>.

October 25-26, 2002: "Britain and the European Union: At the Heart of Europe or on Its Edge?" EU Center, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK. See <www.ou.edu/eucenter>.

October 30-November 2, 2002: 20th International Federation of European Law Congress, London. Sessions on EU law, the euro and e-commerce, et alia. See <www.fide2002.org>.

October 31-November 2, 2002: 29th Annual Conference on International Antritrust Law and Policy, New York, NY. Organized by Fordham University School of Law's Corporate Law Institute. For details visit <www.fordhamantitrust.com>.

November 14-16, 2002: "Reshaping Transatlantic Relations for the XXIst Century: The Citizen's Perspective," Miami, Florida. Organized by the TransAtlantic Information Exchange Service with numerous co-sponsors. See <www.tiesweb.org>.

December 5-6 2002: "Peace, Security, and Stability: International Dialogue and the Role of the EU," Brussels, Belgium. 6th ECSA World Conference. Organized by the European Commission, DG Education and Culture. E-mail <info@ecsnet.org>.

December 14-15, 2002: "Governance in Europe: The Role of Interest Groups," Konstanz, Germany. Organized by the University of Konstanz. Visit <www.uni-konstanz.de/europa/en/konf/konf.htm> or e-mail <governance_europe@yahoogroups.com>.

March 27-29, 2003: 8th Biennial International Conference, European Union Studies Association, Nashville, TN. Info. and registration details at <www.eustudies.org/conf2003.html>.

May 8-9, 2003: "Innovation in Europe: Dynamics, Institutions, and Values," Roskilde, Denmark. Organized by Roskilde University. Visit <www.segera.ruc.dk>. See call below.

June 26-28, 2003: "Global Tensions and Their Challenges to Governance of the International Community," Budapest, Hungary. Sponsored by the ISA and the Central and East European ISA. For details visit <www.isanet.org/budapest>.

Call for proposals: "Innovation in Europe: Dynamics, Institutions, and Values" (see above). The EU has recently engaged in a series of policy initiatives to foster innovation and technological development. Fundamental social dynamics related to the innovation process are also undergoing rapid transformation, such as new regimes for knowledge production and appropriation, changing social values on science, information society, and rapid development of private risk capital markets/industry. This conference aims to analyse the dynamics, institutions, and values that characterize the innovation process and technological development in Europe, with focus on the EU. We seek papers with a perspective on European/EU dynamics, multiple-country/comparative studies, or national experiences that have a European relevance, in the following topics: (1) systems of innovation, institutions and values in Europe; (2) knowledge dynamics and co-operation; (3) intellectual property rights; (4) private financing and public-private partnership for innovation (5) risk society and the governance of science; (6) innovation for competitiveness and cohesion; or (7) information society. E-mail extended abstracts of 1-2 pages to Kenny Larsen at <kennyl@ruc.dk>. Deadline: December 1, 2002.

Call for proposals: "The Cultures of Post-1989 Central and East Europe," August 21-24, 2003, Targu-Mures, Romania. Hosted by the Romanian Academy of Sciences and Petru Maior University. Since the events of 1989-90 and the demise of the Soviet empire, the cultures of Central and East Europe have engaged in a restructuring of their political, economic, social, and cultural environments and societies. Abstracts of 200 words in English, German, or French with a biographical detail of 200 words are invited in the following areas (comparative papers preferred): culture in general and including literature, the arts, film, music, etc.; comparative media studies (aspects of television, radio, film, journalism, etc.); the politics of culture and cultural policy; the histories of post-1989 Central and East Europe; cultural traditions and European integration; intersections of society and socialization; globalization, economics, and culture; aspects of minorities, the marginal, and marginalization. Send abstracts to the conference conveners, Carmen Andras at <prognoze@cjmures.orient.net> or <carmen_andras@yahoo.com>, and Steven Totosy <totosy@medienkomm.uni-halle.de> or <clweb@purdue.edu>. Deadline: March 31, 2003.

Publications

New EU-Related Books and Working Papers

- Bull, Martin and Paolo Bellucci (eds.) (2002) *The Return of Berlusconi*. (Italian Politics Series). NY: Berghahn Books.
- Devuyst, Youri (2002) *The European Union at the Crossroads: An Introduction to the EU's Institutional Evolution*. Bern, Switzerland: Peter Lang.
- Goldstein, Leslie Friedman (2002) "Constituting Federal Sovereignty." Research Brief 6. Claremont, CA: EU Center of California.
- Hansen, Randall and Patrick Weil (eds.) (2002) *Dual Nationality, Social Rights and Federal Citizenship in the U.S. and Europe: The Reinvention of Citizenship*. NY: Berghahn.
- Jordan, Andrew J. (ed.) (2002) *Environmental Policy in the European Union: Actors, Institutions, and Processes*. London: Earthscan.
- _____ (2002) *The Europeanization of British Environmental Policy: A Departmental Perspective*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave/Macmillan.
- Kaelble, Hartmut (2002) *The European Way: European Societies in the 19th and 20th Centuries*. NY: Berghahn Books.
- Lees, Charles (2002) "'Dark Matter': Institutional Constraints and the Failure of Party-Based Euroscepticism in Germany." SEI Working Paper 54. Sussex: Sussex European Institute.
- Maes, Ivo (2002) "On the Origins of the Franco-German EMU Controversies." Working Papers Research Series 34. Brussels: National Bank of Belgium.
- Magocsi, Paul Robert (2002, rev. ed.) *Historical Atlas of Central Europe*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Messina, Anthony M. (2002) *West European Immigration and Immigrant Policy in the New Century*. Westport, CT: Greenwood/Praeger.
- Open Society Institute (2002) Monitoring the EU Accession Process Series [four titles]: *Judicial Capacity; Judicial Independence; Minority Protection in Selected EU Member States; National Strategies for Minority Protection in Candidate States*. NY: Central European University Press.
- Ross, Cameron (ed.) (2002) *Perspectives on the Enlargement of the European Union*. (Perspectives on European Politics and Society Series.) Boston: Brill.
- Volgy, Thomas J. and Alison Bailin (2002) *International Politics and State Strength*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- von Dosenrode, Soren and Anders Stubkjaer (2002) *The European Union and the Middle East*. (UACES Contemporary European Studies Series). NY: Continuum.
- Warleigh, Alex (2002) *Flexible Integration: What Model for the European Union?* (UACES Contemporary European Studies Series). NY: Continuum.
- Wiessala, Georg (2002) *The European Union and Asian Countries*. (UACES Contemporary European Studies Series). NY: Continuum.
- Wolff, Stefan (2002) *Disputed Territories: Transnational Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict Settlement*. NY: Berghahn Books.

From the Chair

(continued from p.2)

We are very pleased to announce the launch of our 5th U.S.-EU Relations Project, for which Project Scholar Elizabeth Pond will write an original monograph on "The New Security Relationship." She will revisit the topic of our 1st U.S.-EU [EC] Relations Project in 1993, when we issued a monograph by Catherine McArdle Kelleher, "A New Security Order: The United States and the European Community in the 1990s." Our 5th Project features an invited workshop in January 2003 when Pond will deliver the first draft of her monograph at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC (sponsored by their Europe Program); she will revise and deliver the monograph again at the EUSA Conference in Nashville. Current EUSA members will receive a copy of the monograph when it is published for EUSA by Brookings Institution Press in late 2003.

Speaking of EUSA publications, we are also delighted to share the results of our competition for the editorship of the sixth volume in our series, *State of the European Union*, to be published for us by Oxford University Press. The winning proposal was submitted by EUSA members Rachel Cichowski (University of Washington Seattle) and Tanja Börzel (University of Mannheim), who have organized a volume to be subtitled "Law, Politics, and Society." The EUSA executive committee found their proposal to have "a tightly focused topic ... of timely political importance," in which the editors link their theme with other, more established literatures in a volume that has an excellent line-up of contributors. Look for a preliminary panel on *State of the European Union Volume Six* at our Nashville conference. We congratulate the editors and look forward to the new volume.

MARTIN A. SCHAIN
New York University

The *EUSA Review* follows an annual calendar of announcements and listings organized in four topic areas: Winter (December 15): EU-Related Academic Programs (degree or certificate-granting, worldwide); Spring (March 15): EU-Related Web Sites (especially primary sources such as databases, on-line publications, and bibliographies); Summer (June 15): EU-Related Organizations (academic and professional associations or independent research centers and institutes with significant EU aspects in their missions); and Fall (September 15): EUSA Members' Research Notes (EUSA members' current EU-related funded research projects. Send brief announcements by e-mail to <eusa@pitt.edu> or by mail to EUSA, 415 Bellefield Hall, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA. We reserve the right to edit for length, and we cannot guarantee inclusion in the listings. We do not accept unsolicited e-mail attachments.

EUSA News and Notes

Dates to remember: Our conference proposal receipt deadline is October 15, 2002 (and mark your calendars for our 9th Biennial International Conference, March 31-April 2, 2005, Austin, Texas!) Also: December 31, 2002, deadline for EUSA Executive Committee nominations for the Spring 2003 election.

Your home institution may cover your EUSA membership; many institutions have budgets for **professional memberships** for their employees. Don't forget to ask. By the way, does your institution **match employees' charitable contributions** to 501(c)3 organizations? This is a fine way to increase the value of your gift to EUSA, be it unrestricted or a gift to one of our Funds. Please contact the EUSA Office in Pittsburgh for our U.S. federal ID number for either of these purposes.

Call for Nominations EUSA Executive Committee

Nominations for the 2003 European Union Studies Association (EUSA) Executive Committee election are now being accepted. The seven members of the Executive Committee meet once a year, determine Association policies, and oversee programs; four seats are open for the 2003 election, to be elected to four-year terms. Nominations (including self-nominations) must include:

- (1) a letter of interest;
- (2) current curriculum vita (short version preferred);
- (3) one brief biographical paragraph not to exceed 100 words (for use with the ballot); and,
- (4) a short narrative describing any past/current service to EUSA.

Executive Committee members must be current members of EUSA who have not already served eight years total on the Committee. The EUSA welcomes all qualified candidates, including those from outside the academy. It is hoped that the final slate will be characterized by a balance among senior and junior level candidates, and among minority and women candidates, as well as a cross-representation of academic disciplines, colleges and universities, and geographic locations.

All nomination materials should be sent by regular mail to Dr. Valerie Staats, Executive Director, European Union Studies Association, 415 Bellefield Hall, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA. Deadline for receipt of materials is December 31, 2002. A slate of candidates will appear in the Winter 2003 *EUSA Review* and a ballot will be mailed to all current EUSA members at that time. Election results will be announced in May 2003 and the four new Executive Committee members will take office on May 31, 2003.

EUSA Lifetime Membership

What is it?

Simply put, it is a one-time dues payment to EUSA of US\$ 1500.

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The Lifetime Membership includes all regular membership benefits for life. Among those benefits currently are subscription to the quarterly *EUSA Review*, receipt of occasional EUSA monographs, discounted registration rates at the EUSA International Conference, subscription to our e-mail List Serve, and the opportunity to join EUSA interest sections.

Are there any other benefits?

By making a one-time membership payment, you not only avoid the task of renewing each year, but gain the twin advantages of securing lifetime membership at today's dollar values and avoiding future dues increases.

Who should do this?

Any person wishing to support the endeavors of the European Union Studies Association—the fostering of scholarship and inquiry on the European integration project. For U.S. taxpayers, an additional benefit is a receipt for a one-time \$500 charitable contribution to EUSA, tax-deductible to the extent allowed by law (reducing your tax liability for the year in which you become a Lifetime Member).

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Will my Lifetime Membership be publicly recognized?

Yes, EUSA Lifetime Members will be listed in the *EUSA Review* and in our printed, biennial Member Directory.

EUROPEAN UNION STUDIES ASSOCIATION

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Student* _____ \$30 one year _____ \$55 two years

Lifetime Membership _____ \$1500 (see left for details)

* Students must provide copy of current semester's registration form.

EU Law Interest Section _____ \$5 (2 yrs. \$10)

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EU Economics Interest Section _____ \$5 (2 yrs. \$10)

EU Public Opinion and Participation Section _____ \$5 (2 yrs. \$10)

U.S. taxpayers may make a tax-deductible contribution to support the work of EUSA in any amount over membership dues:

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Mail or fax this form (please do not mail and fax this form) to:

European Union Studies Association

415 Bellefield Hall

University of Pittsburgh

Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA

Facsimile 412.648.1168