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EUSA REVIEW

Why the United States and Europe See the World Differently: An Atlanticist's Rejoinder to the Kagan Thesis Lecture by Alan K. Henrikson

Editor's Note: As a Fulbright/Diplomatic Academy Visiting Professor of International Relations, Diplomatische Akademie Wien, EUSA member Henrikson delivered the following lecture on March 27, 2003 at the Academy's Festaal. The lecture was co-sponsored by the Austrian Fulbright Commission and the Austrian Fulbright Alumni Association, in conjunction with the Public Affairs Section of the U.S. Embassy, Vienna.

MY SUBJECT IS THE PROBLEM of why the United States and Europe see the world differently, as that problem has been framed by Robert Kagan in his much-discussed essay, "Power and Weakness," in *Policy Review* in 2002 and his subsequent book, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (2003). I shall address the arguments that Kagan advances. Rather than engaging just in an exercise in "Kaganology," however, I hope to offer a broader view of the transatlantic relationship, with some reference to the current conflict in and over Iraq. I shall also attempt to identify a way—a structural way—by which the currently strained U.S.-European relationship can be improved, and, more importantly, built into a real strategic partnership that can provide *Atlantic* and not just "American" or "European" leadership in regional and global affairs.

The countries verging on the Atlantic, in my view, belong to a single economic, political, and cultural system. The United States and its American neighbors, on the one side, and the countries of Europe, on the other, are two halves of the same historical entity—the same basic, diverse, ever-changing but nonetheless mutually recognizable civilization. The continued close cooperation of the Atlantic countries, increasingly including countries well beyond the ocean front itself, is vital, I believe, not only to their own futures but also to the future of the world as a whole.

Some of you may have heard or read the remarks of Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair the other day in which he said, referring to the tension in the transatlantic relationship right now, that "if Europe and America split apart from each other, the loser is not going to be Britain. We will retain our position in Europe and we will retain our strong position with the United States. The loser will be the wider world because on every single issue

that comes up there will be rival poles of power to which people can gravitate. It will be far harder to make the international order stable and secure." He acknowledged that "real tensions between America and Europe within the transatlantic alliance" have been exposed by the "action in Iraq" and the lack of "progress in the Middle East." Nonetheless, he said, "we have got to find a way afterwards of putting this back together on a sound basis for both of us, because the alternative is this concept of rival poles of power in the world and that is a profoundly dangerous concept. It is not something that is in the interests of Europe or America. A partnership is what we want and a partnership is what we should have ..." I agree with this assessment completely, and for the same basic reason: American-European relations must now be thought of globally. This understanding is right, and it applies to all sorts of fields—not just the peace and security field, but also to trade, human rights, the environment, and many others.

Believing this as I do, I hardly knew what to think when I read, as many of you have done, the Kagan essay which posits such a difference between "America and Europe in the New World Order." His opening paragraph states his case clearly:

"It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world. On the all-important question of power—the efficacy of power, the morality of power, the desirability of power—American and European perspectives are diverging. Europe is turning away from power, or to put it a little differently, it is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation. It is entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Immanuel Kant's "Perpetual Peace." Meanwhile, the United States remains mired in history, exercising power in the anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable, and where true security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might. That is why on major strategic and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus: They agree on little and understand one another less and less. And this state of affairs is not transitory—the product of one American election or one catastrophic event. The reasons for the transatlantic divide are deep, long in development, and likely to endure. When it comes to setting national priorities, determining threats, defining challenges, and fashioning and implementing foreign and defense policies, the United States and Europe have parted ways."

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EUSA Review

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From the Chair

George Ross

AS I BEGIN A TWO-YEAR term as Chair of the European Union Studies Association, let me express my delight at working with my fine colleagues on the new 2003-2005 EUSA board (elected by you, the membership). Our new board shows how truly international an organization EUSA has become, with members from Seattle, Washington, USA, to Florence, Italy. I hope that this internationalization will continue as we build membership in Europe and work with institutions and organizations in Europe and beyond on EU-related projects. I speak for the whole board in inviting your suggestions along these lines.

And what an exciting time indeed to take up the EUSA Chair! The most significant accomplishment of European integration—among very many—has been consolidating peace-loving democracies across the European continent, beginning with the EU's original members and continuing to today. The EU thus has every reason to take pride in its ten new members. Still, they are certain to change the EU game, but how? The Convention has produced a new draft Constitution bolder than most of us had anticipated. It promises improved EU institutions, greater transparency and deeper commitment to human and citizens' rights. What will happen to it in the new IGC on the way to becoming a new Treaty of Rome? Transatlantic relations are in turmoil after Iraq, with few indications that European leaders know how to move forward. How will this profoundly important story turn out? Will the recent reform of the CAP allow the DOHA talks now to move forward? Will new hands at the ECB help dissipate fears of stagnation and deflation? There are many puzzles to solve, therefore, and many new complexities for us in EUSA to master.

It is also EUSA's fifteenth anniversary year. As a member of EUSA since its early (ECSA) days, I'm highly aware of how the organization has expanded and matured. EUSA has stayed true to its mission of fostering inquiry about the project of European integration, building a community of scholars and practitioners of EU affairs, and enhancing general awareness of the European Union. Our fifteenth is a milestone and a signal to all that we are around for the long haul. There are many who deserve our gratitude for this success. We owe thanks to our founders—the first board—and to all the former chairs of ECSA/EUSA, as well as those who had the financial faith to get us going: the European Commission, the Ford Foundation, and the German Marshall Fund of the United States. The huge events of the day should launch us forward on new paths, but we cannot forget our large responsibility to bring students and others the knowledge of EU and Europe that was so woefully absent in this winter's international crisis.

Also in honor of our fifteenth anniversary, we have included with this issue—as we did for our tenth anniversary in 1998—a member survey. Please take the time to complete this simple survey and mail it to the EUSA office in the envelope provided. We welcome your responses and take them all into account. Our interest sections, for example, were launched after results from the (*continued on p.28*)

(Henrikson, continued from p.1)

This description, with a power-oriented “America” on the one hand and a law-oriented “Europe” on the other hand, is a “caricature” of both, as Kagan himself acknowledges. There are Martians and Venusians on both sides of the Atlantic. Some, such as Tony Blair, are Martian *as well as* Venusian. One “cannot generalize,” Kagan admits, but yet he does. He insists that “the caricatures do capture an *essential* truth: The United States and Europe are *fundamentally* different today” (emphasis added).

I admit that I, too, initially found the Kagan essay captivating. It is rattling good fun. And yet, from the first reading, I felt there was something deeply wrong with it. From my own perspective, this is his positing “America” and “Europe” as two separate entities not connected in their very identities within a single sphere, however we may wish to characterize that “world”—as the West, as Atlantic Civilization, or, more simply today, as transatlantic partnership. Partners are not just allies, joined by a common purpose. They are parts of a whole, constituting that whole and deriving their very “selves” to some degree from it. I myself like to think in terms of an Atlantic *community* of states and peoples. A community is more than an official entity. It involves not just ministries of government or embassies set up in capital cities but everyone, everywhere, who may be involved in transatlantic exchange, of every kind and at every level.

We are, in America and Europe, deeply connected. Our economic relationship is the largest two-way trade and investment relationship in the world, totalling some \$2.5 trillion in value. Together, we share about 50 percent of the global economy. Transatlantic investment is now even more important than trade. A couple of illustrations, from a recent study by Joseph P. Quinlan, may show its direction, its growth, and its comparative size in relation to U.S. and European investment in other parts of the world. During the last decade American investment in the tiny Netherlands alone was twice what it was in Mexico and ten times what it was in China. There is now more European investment in the state of Texas than all of American investment in Japan. This, I would emphasize, is mutual, a two-way flow. Moreover, the amounts that Americans have invested in Europe and Europeans in America are roughly equal, varying somewhat with the business cycle. The “balance” of this relationship is part of the reason why it is now possible, and often necessary, for American and European authorities to develop their policies or to adjust their policies cooperatively. The very issues that divide us—many of them nowadays concerning regulatory matters, such as which financial accounting standards (the EU-favored International Accounting Standards or the U.S.-favored Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) should govern international corporations—are in many cases just evidences of the extent of our integration. Transatlantic companies are now often so fused that it is difficult to tell whether they are more “American” or “European.” They share ideas—R & D—as well as production and marketing. The reality is that North America and Europe have become the most integrated parts of the planet, by far. A further measure of this is the Internet and its use. Interregional bandwidth between North America and Europe is four times greater than bandwidth between North America and

Asia, and many more times still the bandwidth amount between either North America or Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean or the continent of Africa. It is not only businesses that are interconnected across the Atlantic. It is academic institutions, scientific research centers, arts and cultural organizations, and just ordinary individuals. By now, we all have a great deal at stake in each other.

Especially at present, when vital security issues have come back to the fore, we must work together. As Germany’s Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, has said, “when the going gets tough,” there are the United States and Europe. We share “the same values” of liberty, democracy, the rule of law, and a functioning market economy—far more than just narrowly defined “interests,” I would add.

Years ago, the political scientist Karl W. Deutsch and some of his colleagues described the countries around the Atlantic as forming a “pluralistic security community.” That idea derives in part from the earlier perception of the philosopher-journalist Walter Lippmann that a security community, such as the circum-Atlantic one, can be said to exist if no member of it can defend itself by its own efforts, from inside its own territory, and with only its own means—even, by implication, the country with the strongest military. That definition—a functional test—of the existence of a “security community” still has validity, I believe. The international fight against terrorism, for instance, and even the current battles in Iraq could not possibly be fought by the United States or by the United Kingdom, and the ten or so other countries that are cooperating, directly from their home territories without the help of allies and other countries, in Europe and elsewhere, that have offered assistance of various kinds.

As a historian of the Atlantic security relationship, of NATO in particular, I still find absolutely remarkable the proposition stated in Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty (Washington Treaty) that an armed attack against one or more of the Alliance members “in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.” All for one, and one for all—anywhere within the treaty area. An attack on Hamburg, for example, would be treated no differently from an attack on, say, Chicago or Toronto. This commitment and understanding has been the geo-psychological bedrock, as well as the major political and legal premise, of transatlantic cooperation—not only in the security field—for more than fifty years now. When Article V was formally invoked by all the NATO allies, including its new members, following the assaults by the terrorist group al-Qaeda against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, the act was a natural expression of European and North American solidarity. It should be noted that the initiative came from Europe. “Europeans were the driving force in invoking Article V—the mutual defense clause—of the NATO Treaty, before we could even think to ask,” a U.S. State Department official said. This was deeply appreciated in the United States, although it must be said that, in official circles, there was some suspicion of the motivation behind this European wrapping of arms, so to speak, around the United States.

It should also be recognized that, from a longer historical point of view, the Article V pledge, when it (*continued on p.4*)

(continued from p.3) initially was made in 1949, was seen and felt, from the American side, to be a departure from a long-established tradition that advised against forming alliances, especially permanent ones, with countries in Europe. President George Washington had stated in his 1796 Farewell Address that “Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation.” Some Americans, admittedly, still believe this today. In truth, however, in 1796 and also later, the “political system” of Europe and that of America, to use the expression of President James Monroe in his Annual Message in 1823, were intermixed in terms of political strategy and also ideologically. This is despite the image of two spheres—an Old World and a New World—that underlay the Monroe Doctrine. At least, Washington and Monroe did not, unlike Robert Kagan, place Americans and Europeans on different *planets*. Or segregate them by gender orientation.

This is not to imply that Robert Kagan is a neo-Washingtonian or neo-Monrovia. His personal belief in the need for transatlantic cooperation is evident. Oddly, however, the effect of the analysis he gives, because it so *polarizes* the difference between America and Europe, could prove to be exactly the opposite of the effect he obviously intends. This is because, by dividing America and Europe categorically (as different “worlds” parting ways), he can cause people not just to assume the existence of an Atlantic gulf but also to look for further ways of explaining it, thus making it seem wider, more multi-factored, and more serious—and unbridgeable—than it really is. The Kagan prognosis could become, in short, a self-fulfilling prophecy. That it is already highly influential is evident.

Now to try to understand, more precisely, what Robert Kagan is saying. Discounting somewhat the simplification and exaggeration that he himself acknowledges, one can find in his essay and book three fairly definite points that, together, make up what might be termed the “Kagan thesis.” It may be noted, as reviewers such as Timothy Garton Ash have done, that there is some “tension” between Kagan’s several arguments. This is not so much because they don’t logically fit together, it seems to me. They do all, generally, point in the same direction. It is rather that his arguments proceed from very different premises. They are *theoretically* inconsistent. They are contentions of very different kinds. It is difficult, therefore, to ascribe the same weight or significance to them within his overall interpretation. One is a realist’s argument. The second is an idealist’s argument. The third is what I would call a constructivist’s argument.

Kagan’s first explanation of the divergence between American and European outlooks upon world affairs, and the one that he himself most emphasizes, concerns “the all-important question of power,” in his phrase. Calling the power question “all-important,” almost in *a priori* fashion, presumably means that he judges power to be not just the decisive factor in most circumstances but also that he believes the reality of power underlies and encompasses all other issues—whatever the decision makers, or persons observing them, might *think* the issues are. This is an extreme realist argument. There could hardly be a stronger statement of it. The very title of Kagan’s *Policy Review* essay, “Power and Weakness,” epitomizes this contrast

he makes between America and Europe. His basic argument is that, because of the now very large and still widening gap between the United States and Europe, even as a “Union,” in terms of military assets and organization and thinking, Americans and Europeans and their leaders no longer even define problems in the same way. In terms of our present topic, they “see the world differently.”

What Americans are inclined to see as “threats”—because they have something solid with which to meet them—Europeans now tend to see only as “challenges”—which may not need to be responded to at all or, if they are responded to, can be responded to by other means. An objective difference, defined in terms of physical strength, thus determines a subjective difference, in the way reality actually is perceived. This, he asserts, has nothing to do with the “national characters” of Americans or Europeans. It has everything to do with their power or, in the case of Europeans, their weakness. As Kagan writes, in words surely calculated to provoke: “appeasement is never a dirty word to those whose genuine weakness offers few appealing alternatives. For them, it is a policy of sophistication.”

“The psychology of weakness is easy enough to understand,” as Kagan explains his argument with a neat little parable. “A man armed with only a knife may decide that a bear prowling the forest is a tolerable danger, inasmuch as the alternative—hunting the bear armed with only a knife—actually is riskier than lying low and hoping the bear never attacks. The same man with a rifle, however, will likely make a different calculation of what constitutes a tolerable risk. Why should he risk being mauled to death if he doesn’t need to?” Thus, the logic of the story implies, the United States was more likely to take action against Saddam Hussein because it had greater, and the necessary, military capability—a “rifle,” i.e., its space satellites, its high tech weapons, its air and naval transport, and its trained manpower. This made it rational for it to do so, whereas it would not have been rational—or even thinkable, Kagan argues—for Europe to have done the same. Everything, including policy and will, thus flows from power—from having it and from not having it, *Macht und ohne Macht*.

From *both* power and lack-of-power there can arise a certain self-righteousness. J. William Fulbright called one mentality “the arrogance of power.” Hedley Bull called the opposite mentality “the arrogance of impotence.” But that is not, I believe, Kagan’s point. He is hardly criticizing American arrogance. His argument is not that power or its absence conveys a sense of moral or other superiority but rather, as noted, that it distorts perceptions. This should work both ways. But, in the case of the United States, he seems to believe that perceptions of reality are enhanced, lifted into a kind of hyper-reality. In the case of Europe, however, reality is thought to be disregarded or even denied—made to disappear. Basically, reality is seen, or not seen, in accordance with what one can do, and not as it really is.

At a conference at the Diplomatische Akademie last weekend on the subject of Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy in the context of the EU’s impending further enlargement, a speaker warned of falling into “the trap of Kaganism.” He illustrated this as follows. “If you are a big hammer,” he said,

presumably referring to the United States, “all your problems look like nails.” As for Europe: “If you have only carrots, all your problems look like rabbits.” Imagining a “European” Theodore Roosevelt, he said: “Speak softly, and carry a big carrot.”

There is indeed a brutal reductionism in the Kaganist realism that discredits the judgment of political leaders and commentators. Their views are ascribed ultimately either to their own power or to their own impotence. His analysis further discredits the resources and instruments that they do have, not all of which are or need be implements of war. In my view, Kagan’s analysis leads to a radical undervaluing of what Europe can do in the world—for example, in stabilizing and also helping to develop and democratize the countries of the vast former Soviet and Soviet-controlled area. This is no small or insignificant task, and military force is not the way to do it. European “power,” which is not the best word to use to characterize Europe’s capacity and capability in this realm, is enormous and it consists of far more than just wealth (“carrots”). It may be much more effective than American-style power (“sticks”) in accomplishing this important long-term goal. This is partly, of course, because of geographical proximity. The United States is an island-continent 3,000 miles away. It must always be remembered that power is relative to position. It attenuates with distance and it grows with closeness. One of the panels at the CFSP Conference here at the Diplomatische Akademie was on the subject of “Austria’s Policy of Regional Partnership,” concerning what this country has been doing and can continue to do to assist the neighboring countries of Central and Eastern Europe from a “European perspective.” This activity does not make Austria a “power,” but it demonstrates its real influence, its effectiveness.

Kagan treats the phenomenon of power much, much too simply—too unidimensionally, as many of his critics have pointed out. Given that he considers power to be the “all-important” phenomenon, making everything else epiphenomenal, this is a serious deficiency in his case. Permit me a few words on how the phenomenon of power can be given a more differentiated treatment, which may suggest how even “weaker” countries and groups of countries can exert a positive sway, i.e., in accordance with their own intentions, plans, and programs.

Power, as I see it, is of three kinds or, perhaps better, works in three ways. First, there is power as *physical coercion*—that is, the use of force, such as the military force we are now seeing at work in Iraq. Such power operates immediately on things and on people as though they are things—that is, upon their bodies, rather than through their minds or feelings, although the “shock and awe” of the direct use of force can enhance its impact. Physical power can be irresistible. However, it usually is limited. It can’t be sustained for very long or employed in very many places at once. Second, there is power as articulated *threat and promise*—that is, the prospect of punishment (with a stick) and, also, of reward (with carrots). Usually warnings—for example, of economic or military sanctions—and offers—for example, of foreign aid—are made explicit in formal policies, though they

can be implicit too. The prospect of being denied membership or of being accepted for admission to NATO and the European Union exerts a tremendous sway of this kind. Especially now that the NATO and EU enlargement processes are proceeding more or less in tandem, with EU membership having the greater long-term substantive meaning, it is more and more Europeans along with Americans who are exercising this form of suasion. Third, there is what I call *emanated* power, essentially the power that comes from size and the energy that often goes with it, especially if that energy is concentrated. Such power, of which there must be at least some consciousness, or intentionality, on the part of its holders for it properly to be considered power, can either repel or attract. The World Trade Center in New York as a powerful symbol of American capitalism and the Pentagon in Washington as a powerful symbol of American militarism, from the point of view of al-Qaeda, were repulsive. The Statue of Liberty, by contrast, has had mostly an attractive effect, as a welcoming sign for actual and potential immigrants to the vast American “land of the free.” Europe also has strong poles of magnetism within it. Robert Kagan implicitly recognizes Europe’s attractive qualities by calling it a “paradise,” although he seems to attribute this image of Europe in the stage it has reached (as America allegedly has not) mainly to Europeans themselves, happily living inside Europe, rather than to those on the outside. For both America and Europe, such continental-cultural attractiveness is as much a reflection of the power of an idea, or ideas, as it is the power solely of concentrated mass, or material power.

This brings me to Robert Kagan’s second explanation of the divergence in American and European outlooks upon the world, which is that the particular historical experiences of Europe’s nations, both negative and in more recent decades positive, have produced in them a different ideology from that of America—a post-historical and “postmodern” ideology (using Robert Cooper’s application of this term, adopted by Kagan). This is his *idealist* argument. It appears to be based, not on the power that Europeans dispose, but on their beliefs about the shape of Europe as it *should be*—“a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation” or, more learnedly, “the realization of Immanuel Kant’s ‘Perpetual Peace.’” Warfare simply has no place in this vision, as decisions are made and policies are adopted consensually and, increasingly, even by qualified majority voting. I say that this argument of Kagan’s “appears” to be based on ideology, rather than power factors and power calculations. But there is some ambiguity here. Timothy Garton Ash, as earlier noted, remarks upon the “certain tension between these explanations,” which I have called the realist and idealist. He asks, of Kagan’s case: “do Europeans dislike war because they do not have enough guns, or do they not have enough guns because they dislike war? Kagan favors the former, philosophically materialist view: being determines consciousness. But he also allows for an influence the other way round.”

However seriously Robert Kagan really intends his second argument, it is flawed. This is partly because, in my view, it is ideologically and historically too narrow. Europe’s experiences during 1914-1918 and 1939-1945 were, to be sure, profound, and they did give rise to idealistic visions of (*continued on p.6*)

An essay based on this lecture will appear in Global Society (October 2003).

(continued from p.5) transcending the old balance-of-power system with communitarian notions of international unity. What I would emphasize is that these experiences were not only European, and concepts that inspired Europe's integration were not just European either. When Aristide Briand spoke in 1930 of a "United States of Europe" he, of course, did not have precisely in mind what the United States of America historically had achieved, but it is inconceivable that Briand could or would have made exactly the proposal he did without the recognized benefit of the American federal example. It is no accident that *The Federalist Papers* are still widely read today, in Europe hardly less than in America, and that the names of James Madison and Jean Monnet (and even Richard de Coudenhove-Kalergi) are closely joined as theorists of what is, I insist, a transatlantic or, as we often today also say, Euro-Atlantic, model for balancing local political autonomy with central governmental authority.

I also cannot agree that the United States and the countries of Europe live in different stages of history, either because of the determinative effect of their disparity in power (Kagan's first argument) or because of their having had very different experiences (Kagan's second argument). Americans did come late to the 1914-1918 and 1939-1945 wars, but they did come. And they stayed for a long time, and did a lot of good work. I have found here in Vienna, from things people have said to me, that this is well recognized—and not forgotten. Just as Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Ambassador Richard Holbrooke have said that the United States is "a European power," so *Le Monde* stated, after the events of September 11, 2001, on behalf of many Europeans besides just Frenchmen, "*Nous sommes tous américains.*" There is an Atlantic consciousness, and memory, that is well founded in history, and in ideology too.

Now for the third and final argument that Robert Kagan has advanced to explain the profound difference that he senses between the American and European outlooks upon the world. This is the argument that I find by far the most interesting, though Kagan develops it less fully than the others, and may not even be fundamentally persuaded by it, because for him power is basic, and the "all-important" factor. Timothy Garton Ash succinctly restates Kagan's third argument this way: "since the end of the cold war, Europeans have sought to define 'Europe' as something apart from America, rather than seeking a common definition of the 'west'." Kagan himself writes: "Post-Cold War Europe agreed that the issue was no longer 'the West.' For Europeans, the issue became 'Europe.' Proving that there was a united Europe took precedence over proving that there was a united West. A European 'nationalism' mirrored the American nationalism, and although this was not Europe's intent, the present gap between the United States and Europe today may be traced in part to Europe's decision to establish itself as a single entity apart from the United States." This is what I have termed the constructivist argument, and I believe there is a great deal of merit in it. After saying a bit more about it, noting that there has been "constructivism" on both sides, I would like to adapt the constructivist *approach*, as distinct from Kagan's own particular argument using it, to a larger "Atlantic," rather than "American" or "European," purpose.

Both at the rhetorical level and at the institutional level, the countries that have formed the European Union have, to some degree, built themselves separate from, and even against, the United States. Admittedly, "America," or the independent republican states of the Western Hemisphere generally, have earlier, and in a much more profound way, built themselves in opposition to Europe, to its political influence, and to what it stood for. The historian Daniel J. Boorstin argues that the notion of America was, in its formative stages, an "anti-Europe" concept, with little independent content of its own. Does the same apply, and in what way might it apply, to "European" cooperation, especially at the international level, today?

The objective of achieving a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for Europe has been, especially during its early days as the European Political Cooperation (EPC) process prior to the Maastricht Treaty, clearly in some part motivated by a desire, and even a felt need, to present a more solid front to the United States—whether to "coordinate" with it or to "counterbalance" it. The famous Henry Kissinger question—"When I want to speak to Europe, whom do I call?"—continues to hang over European foreign policy making. It was in significant part to provide an answer to this basic question that the position of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, now held by Dr. Javier Solana, was established. The fact that Dr. Solana previously had been Secretary-General of the transatlantic organization, NATO, and also Foreign Minister of the Atlantic-oriented Spain, made him in more than one way the perfect candidate for this new role.

At the same time, it must be admitted, the United States government is not satisfied with talking only or even mainly with one "European" person. It wishes to consult with the national leaders as well—as evidenced by the many trips Prime Minister Blair has made to Washington and also the recent caucus-like "Atlantic Summit" in the Azores involving President George Bush, Prime Minister Blair, Spanish leader José María Aznar, and their host, the Prime Minister of Portugal. The ambivalence that some governments in Europe show regarding a Common Foreign and Security Policy is matched by similar American reservations and skepticism—although, despite the present confusion of transatlantic diplomacy, there probably is a gradual trend toward respecting the representative and organizational voices of the Atlantic community.

The present trouble over Iraq demonstrates Europe's difficulty in speaking authoritatively and in a unified way with the leadership of the United States. The present division among European governments, even within the EU itself, with Britain, Spain, and Italy lining up with the United States, on one side, and France, Germany, and some others, on the other side, shows how hard it is to find a solution to the problem. An attempt was made at a recent European Council meeting in Brussels. In a "Statement on Iraq" (20 March 2003) the Council listed (as Kagan might have predicted) its "common challenges." It reiterated therein its commitment to the fundamental role of the United Nations in the international system, expressed its determination to strengthen the EU's capacity in the context of the CFSP and also the European Security and Defense Policy

(ESDP), and, most pertinent to our present discussion, affirmed its intent “to strengthen the transatlantic partnership.” That relationship, the Council stated, “remains a fundamental strategic priority for the European Union.” Moreover, it recognized that “a sustained dialogue on the new regional and global challenges is necessary.” This sounds good. But is not Europe’s attitude in engaging in such a dialogue likely to be stiffened by statements such as that just made by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, who is leading the drafting of a European Constitution—“The European Union needs to affirm itself as an independent entity in the world of the 21st Century. We have to find a formulation of European independence”? An American cannot but think, rightly or wrongly, that this means, at least in part, independence from the United States, which the French, more than any other European nation, helped to establish.

I mentioned at the outset my belief that the United States and Europe belong, basically, to one, overall political system. By this, I mean that decision making on one side of the Atlantic, be it Europe or North America, cannot take place independently of, and without reference to, decision making on the Atlantic’s other shore. One frequently hears it said that Europeans are so affected by what the United States does or doesn’t do in the world that they “ought to be able to vote” in U.S. presidential elections. Americans, I submit, are though in a somewhat different way now becoming increasingly dependent on the critical, if not necessarily the countervailing, influence of Europe as a substantive factor in U.S. decision making, even though most Americans, it must be admitted, are not yet fully conscious of this growing political and intellectual dependence.

For many of us—and here I am going to be bold—the failure of the United States Congress adequately to assert itself with a fully considered judgment and definite position regarding the Iraq problem, in accordance with the separation of powers and, in particular, Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution giving Congress the responsibility for declaring war, meant that the deliberative process that had to take place (but didn’t) got shifted to the international level—to the level of diplomacy, or at least communication at the international level. The question of war or peace needs to be a collective decision, not just for reasons of legitimacy but also for reasons of wisdom, of sound judgment. As the young politician Abraham Lincoln wrote during the time of the controversial U.S. war against Mexico, “no one man should hold the power” of making war, which would involve the whole people and could impoverish the entire country. As Lincoln then understood it, it was to avoid this “Kingly oppression” that the founding fathers at their Convention in 1787 had framed the American Constitution as they did, assigned the war-making power to Congress, rather than to the President—at the time, President James K. Polk.

Some of you may have read the recent speech (“Today, I Weep for my Country”) by Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia, which echoes these historic sentiments. “A pall has fallen over the Senate Chamber,” he said. “We avoid our solemn duty to debate the one topic on the minds of all Americans, even while scores of thousands of our sons and daughters faithfully do their duty in Iraq.” The difference between the old days, which Byrd

dearly loves, and today, was recognized by the Senator. That difference is the present *international* legal and political context of U.S. policy making. With regard to the new doctrine of “preemption,” Senator Byrd said: “We assert that right without the sanction of any international body.” Further, he asked: “When did we decide to risk undermining international order by adopting a radical and doctrinaire approach to using our awesome military might? How can we abandon diplomatic efforts when the turmoil in the world cries out for diplomacy?” What, he demanded, “is happening”? *(continued on p.8)*

Commentaries on Transatlantic Relations

THIS SPRING THE GREEK PRESIDENCY of the European Union commissioned a set of invited commentaries by academics and other experts on the subject of transatlantic relations. These essays (now posted on the Greek Presidency Web site) were intended to inform the Informal Meeting of the 25 EU Foreign Ministers (from member and candidate countries) in Rhodes-Kastelorizo, Greece, in early May.

An explanatory note leads off the forum: “During its six-month Presidency of the EU, Greece has prioritized the need to re-establish the transatlantic relationship on a new, equal, and mutually beneficial basis which will ultimately promote international stability, security, cooperation, peace, and development. Within this context, the acting President of the EU Council, Mr. George A. Papandreou, has invited renowned figures in the academic and political scene both in the EU and in the USA in order to contribute their expertise and opinions on the matter ... The texts will be distributed by Minister G. A. Papandreou to his counterparts from the EU member-states and candidate countries ... We believe that the texts may prove to be highly instrumental not only in the context of the aforementioned discussions but for the wider public as well.”

Seven EUSA members were among the invited authors, and their contributions are as follows:

Alan K. Henrikson, “A Structural Approach to Transatlantic Unity

Christopher Hill, “The Choices in Euro-American Relations”

Stanley Hoffmann, “On EU/US Relations”

Anand Menon (and Jonathan Lipkin), “European Attitudes Towards Transatlantic Relations 2002-2003: An Analytical Survey”

Kalypso Nicolaidis, “Living with Our Differences”

Helen Wallace and **David Andrews**, “Mending the Transatlantic Partnership”

The full texts of all the twenty-nine essays are posted at: <http://www.eu2003.gr/en/cat/25>

(continued from p.7)

Part of what “is happening,” I believe, is a systemic change in which national decision making, even that of the United States, is incapable of rendering, in a sound way, major international judgments. This is surely part of the reason why President Bush was persuaded to take the Iraq question to the United Nations in the first place. He actually did so, and I give him credit for that. To be sure, his doing so was conditional. The United Nations had to prove that it was not “irrelevant.”

While it is clear that the United States has not finally given the power over war and peace to “the international community,” what it has increasingly done, in effect and without fully realizing what is happening, is to transfer much of the open discussion of the issues involved to the international plane. Diplomacy, such as it was in the case of the events leading up to the present war in Iraq, became a partial substitute for a proper national dialogue.

It was, above all, the American-European dialogue that replaced what might earlier have been, as during the Vietnam War when the U.S. Senate held full-scale hearings, mainly an intra-U.S. discussion. And the American-European dialogue was not effective. In the end, it probably polarized the debate over the Iraq problem as much as it rationalized it. Posturing replaced reasoning. Publicity replaced real consultation. Positions were “constructed,” and defended, rather than mutually adjusted. It should have been possible, in the Iraq case, to have achieved a reasonable compromise perhaps along the lines of what the Canadians—still the best Atlanticists—proposed, namely, provisions for inspections to proceed according to a realistic timetable, with a decision regarding the use of force to be taken at the end, but not as a foregone conclusion. That did not happen.

The problem, as I see it, is that the transatlantic dialogue, within the de facto political system that exists across the Atlantic, is not well or sufficiently *constituted*. What needs to happen is that that an “Atlantic,” and not just an “American” or “European,” framework for policy consideration should be constructed—built, set in place, and put to work. We have seen, in the established American Constitutional order and in the currently forming European Constitutional order how powerful “construction” can be. The right rhetoric alone is not enough. James Madison and Jean Monnet, in their separate settings, understood this very well. An Atlanticist framework of thought needs first to be articulated, and then *institutionalized*.

Certainly, the American political system, in itself, is not well set up for factoring in European interests, opinions, and judgments. It is too self-contained. In Washington, D.C., the Delegate of the European Commission is just one ambassador among many. He must compete for the U.S. government’s attention—not only with other diplomats but also with unofficial lobbyists of many kinds. Even the formally-transatlantic North Atlantic Council, of which the United States is a charter and also the predominant member, does not always serve its purposes, or those of “Europe” either. This became quite evident as the crisis over weapons of mass destruction—or regime change—in Iraq intensified. From the point of view of some officials in Washington, the NATO Council was becoming a kind of snare, in which the United States could be caught in a consultative

process from which no decision for action, i.e., military action, could ever issue. The NATO Council’s delay in extending the full protection of the Alliance to NATO-member Turkey, situated on the front line of any war against the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, produced a strong reaction among many in Washington against relying on the NATO authorization process—which had, earlier, worked in the case of Kosovo. It did not seem much better than the UN Security Council, which was the French government’s forum of choice.

The European Council of the EU was not the right setting either. It was observed by one European participant in the recent CFSP Conference at the Diplomatische Akademie that the impending Iraq conflict simply could not be “comprehended” within the European Union. This was because of three “characteristics” the Iraq issue had. First, it involved the Security Council of the United Nations, whose members are countries, not international organizations such as the European Union. Second, it involved the transatlantic relationship, and not only or even mainly European relationships. Third, it involved the issue of war and peace, life and death—regarding which, he noted, there is “no compromise.” The speaker at the conference, in a position to know what the possibilities were and are, concluded that, when one considers even the boldest “European” proposals that have been put forward at the European Convention, the only one that, conceivably, might be able to make a difference would be the establishment of a “European” seat on the Security Council. (Here the fact that there is a single European representation within the World Trade Organization is a positive example—though that pattern does not necessarily transfer to the field of high politics and international security.) Given France’s and the United Kingdom’s tenacity in holding on to their present national seats on the Security Council, as two of its only five permanent (veto-wielding) members, the prospect of a single European representation in that UN body does not at present seem at all likely. And, in truth, the voices of those two countries were essential to the limited dialogue that did take place on the Iraq problem.

How, then, might the “Atlantic” political system, including the American-European foreign policy dialogue, be better constituted, or “constructed”? I would present for consideration several ideas. I myself do not pretend to know what, precisely, the organizational answer should be. But one thing is clear, and that is, as Prime Minister Blair has stated: at the end of this crisis there is “going to have to be a discussion, and indeed a reckoning, about the relations between America and Europe.” He added that “if we are going to have a strategic partnership between Europe and America, we have *to work out the basis of that* and how we make progress on issues that are difficult between us” (emphasis added). Much will depend on the discussions that soon should take place between and among the Atlantic partners.

What “basis” might they consider establishing as a foundation for their closer cooperation? One recurrent idea, which I believe merits serious consideration, is that there be established a transatlantic leadership group of some kind. The purpose of such a group would be, at a minimum, to improve policy coordination and also to manage difficulties and even crises that

might arise. At a maximum, it would be to concert grand strategy—for taking joint or at least closely parallel action in the world at large, with foresight. “Foreign policy,” in the formal sense of declared principles and highly developed programs, is not the same thing as long-term “grand strategy,” which entails discussion of significant common goals and the adoption of deliberate, sequential, and practical measures of coordinated action to achieve them. Today, our major preoccupation is with security, and that may be the case for a long time to come. “Faced with these threats of terrorism and repressive states with weapons of mass destruction, we need a common agenda and that common agenda has got to be about security and about, where necessary, military action,” declared Prime Minister Blair. He then went on to emphasize, however: “But it has also got to be about a basic and essential concept of justice, which is why I say to people at the same time that we do the action in Iraq we have got to make progress in the Middle East.”

The Atlantic community has got to be—and strategically act—for something, not only *against* terrorism and other evils. “Why can this President not seem to see,” observed Senator Byrd of President Bush, “that America’s true power lies not in its will to intimidate, but in its ability to inspire”? That same question should be posed to the Atlantic community as a whole, to all of its leaders. The idea of a Greater Middle East initiative emphasizing, as Prime Minister Blair has said, “justice” would be a worthy “New Transatlantic Project” to be undertaken by the United States and Europe acting together. Both do have complicated historical relationships with that region. But, united by a constructive purpose, surely they should be able to turn those to advantage.

For this, or any other large and long-term undertaking, a leadership group will be needed. How could and should it be organized? On what model? An early proposal along these lines, worth mentioning as a historical benchmark, was that of President Charles de Gaulle in 1958 for a Franco-Anglo-American triumvirate—the “*directoire*” idea, as it has come to be known. These three big Atlantic powers (with the Federal Republic of Germany notably not included) could and would, if they wished, bypass NATO channels and consult only among themselves regarding global and nuclear issues. The smaller countries of Europe, of course, did not like it any more than did Germany, or Italy. Certain of them, the Netherlands for instance, had maritime histories, extensive overseas holdings, and global perspectives to match those of the big powers. But the Dutch didn’t fit into de Gaulle’s transatlantic power equation.

Some of the deficiencies of the “*directoire*” idea have been remedied by Henry Kissinger with his recent proposal for an “Atlantic Steering Group.” His starting point, with which I have come to agree, is that NATO cannot serve any longer as “the sole institution for Atlantic cooperation.” The European Union, too, must be factored in. But first, Kissinger believes, the EU “must affirm its determination to safeguard its territorial integrity”—presumably with some kind of solidarity pact. Then, what NATO should do is to “affirm that the territory of the European Union is a vital NATO interest”—thereby, in effect, extending NATO’s security guarantee to every EU country

including those, such as Austria, that are not NATO members.

The membership of the Atlantic Steering Group, as Kissinger conceives of it, would include: the United States of America, the integrated European Union, European nations that are not part of politically integrated Europe, the Secretary-General of NATO, and the European High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy. The essential point, as I see it, would be to bring NATO and the European Union together within an Atlantic context. The Steering Group would not be just a floating entity. It would have a solid institutional base. It would be, in a sense, at the apex of transatlantic institutions. Some of these, or parts of them, would be new.

There would be, first, NATO to handle major security issues. Second, there would be—and this is perhaps Kissinger’s most substantial proposal—a newly formed Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA). This would be the economic component. This is not an entirely new idea, of course, because suggestions were made long ago for extending the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) across the Atlantic to create a “TAFTA.” But the increasing de facto integration of European and North American markets in recent years has made the proposal for a formalized European-North American economic arrangement of a comprehensive nature more compelling.

A TAFTA would connect the European Community, as Kissinger sees it, with not only the United States but also with Canada and with Mexico, all of them members of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)—as it happens, the subject of an excellent conference (“The Impact of NAFTA”) recently organized by the three countries’ embassies at the Haus der Industrie here in Vienna. Kissinger would add some “consultative machinery” to the TAFTA/NAFTA arrangement, not only to address economic issues but also to address related political and social issues that would come up. And the arrangement would not be limited only to the EU and the present NAFTA countries. As the present negotiations looking toward formation by the year 2005 of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) proceed—and real momentum is being shown again, now that Trade Promotion Authority has been approved by Congress—all of Latin America might be brought in. Kissinger would even include in due time, perhaps as an “associate member,” a more constitutional and fully democratizing Russia.

The aforementioned Atlantic Steering Group, at the apex of this security-cum-economic ensemble, would be the third component. It would be responsible for developing “parallel approaches” to world affairs and it would “manage differences” as they arise, as Kissinger describes its purpose. In effect, it would deal with high politics, grand strategy, and crisis management. The result could be, Kissinger is convinced, a proper structure for the “growing community of democracies in the Americas and Europe.”

Whatever one might think of the particulars of this proposal, which Kissinger outlines in his book, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?* (2001), some such overall Atlantic structure is needed, I believe. Otherwise the polarization of which Robert Kagan warns, and indeed is encouraging (no doubt unintentionally), will very likely increase—barring (*concluded on p.10*)

(continued from p.9) another solidifying existential peril such as the Cold War, which the “War on Terror,” if too narrowly and negatively defined, is not likely to replace.

This, then, is an approach that could be taken. It is a constructivist approach. That is, through use of the language of transatlantic unity and even some new Atlantic institutions, it offers a way forward that would give more structure and more coherence to relationships that already exist, and to European-American planning. Not all Atlantic institutions need to be formal. I would not go so far as did former German Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, when, more than a decade ago, he proposed, in speeches given in Canada and the United States, a formal Transatlantic Treaty that would legally embrace both the NATO relationship and the two North American countries’ relationships with the European Community. He himself had evidently concluded, along with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, that to try to get a formal treaty ratified—particularly by the U.S. Senate—could be more trouble than it was worth. Yet it is still useful, conceptually, to hold up the “Transatlantic Treaty” model as being at least thinkable. It is the outer benchmark, so to speak. It makes the proposals for an expansive transatlantic economic area and an Atlantic leadership group, or steering group, seem almost modest!

In my view, which is a historically based one, an Atlantic community does now, in fact, exist. But it is currently at risk. Robert Kagan has done us a tremendous service, indirectly, by causing us to remind ourselves of the larger and deeper realities of our common history and destiny. Moreover, by proposing a radically reductionist explanation—“the power equation”—to account for the state of the Atlantic relationship at any given time, he forces us to consider other important factors, besides the shifting power differential, that work to explain transatlantic agreements and disagreements. One of these other factors, emphasized here, is the structural-institutional factor, its presence and absence.

Kagan himself can only propose as solutions, as he admits, “small steps,” because, given what he considers to be the “dramatic” power disparity between the United States and Europe, he does not think that Europe is capable of taking big ones. He even allows at one point that the problem between the United States and Europe is “incurable.” Thus his prescriptions—that Europe should try marginally to increase its military strength, for example—seem inconsistent with his diagnosis. Moreover, if Europe truly is entering into a “post-historical paradise,” how could it possibly build up its military capacity so as to attempt to match the United States without reverting to the very balance-of-power logic that it has, intellectually and morally, rejected? Yet, Kagan insists: “Europe must amass power, but for no other reason than to save the world and the United States from the dangers inherent in the present lop-sided situation.”

That reason—to counterbalance the United States—is not a good enough “reason.” There is little evidence, in any case, that such power-realism would be likely to carry much conviction with Europeans, or to impress the United States either. There must be some higher purpose for a European military build-up, an idealistic purpose—one that not only embodies European

values of peace, justice, and prosperity but also has wider, even universal scope. And such a purpose, as is becoming increasingly evident today, despite the serious and firm intentions behind even the peacekeeping-oriented ESDP, probably cannot be formulated except transatlantically, in consultation with the United States and even other American countries. The objective of improving the capacity of European governments to take effective military action, by themselves or with others nearby, is not, in itself, wrong. It is not even impossible. But the institutions are wrong, partly because the right ones aren’t there. That is why further Atlantic construction is needed. This is especially necessary now that there are global, and not just regional, problems to be addressed, together.

This has been a Fulbright Lecture. Senator Fulbright was one of the great “constructors” of thought, during and following the Second World War, with a view toward building international order and fostering understanding between nations. He was not only an Atlanticist. He was a multilateralist. But he did deeply believe in Atlantic unity. With regard to American-European relations, Senator Fulbright wrote, at a time when the European continent was still divided by the Cold War, but one could nonetheless imagine a relaxation of East-West tensions: “I do not believe that reunification of Eastern and Western Europe requires the severance of the latter’s bonds with the United States.” Those bonds were too strong, and they remain too important.

Having himself been an American student in Europe during an earlier time, in the 1920s, he had lived to see the transatlantic relationship transformed from a temporary wartime alliance into a continuing peacetime alliance—one that even included America’s former adversaries in Europe. In fact, this was more than an alliance. It was the beginnings of a security community, and it has come to include nearly the entirety of a Europe—or a Euro-Atlantica—that is whole, free, and at peace. This would not have happened without bold internationalist thought, such as Fulbright’s and that of many others, Europeans as well as Americans. They, together, created the United Nations. They created the Marshall Plan, or European Recovery Program. They even collaborated in building the European Coal and Steel Community and the rest of the integrated European structure, as well as wider international organizations such as today’s Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Such constructive thinking is needed again, half a century later, when the world situation is again in flux and new imperatives exist for the Atlantic countries (not just “powers”) to work together, purposefully, in a global setting. The Atlantic alliance endures, but it needs to be augmented with new formal and informal structures. The present, once the current crisis is over, would be a good time to begin this re-institutionalization of the Atlantic community. Thereby the United States and Europe might continue to see the world, not in the same way, but more clearly and thus more similarly—rather than differently.

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The African Union Debuts: Following in the Footsteps of the EU? Olufemi Babarinde

ON JULY 9, 2002, FIFTY-THREE HEADS OF state and government from across the African continent gathered in Durban, the Republic of South Africa (RSA) to bid adieu to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and to welcome the new African Union (AU). African leaders, one after another, not only took stock of the OAU's accomplishments, but also heralded the new Union as the dawn of a new era for the continent and its peoples. According to the host President and the AU's first president, Thabo Mbeki, the Union would liberate the African people from their misery, abject poverty and perennial underdevelopment. Other delegates in Durban also hoped that the new Union would intensify intra-African economic activities, resolve socio-political crises, foster continental unity, and improve the region's visibility and profile on the global stage.

The Evolution of the AU

The advent of the AU had been in the making arguably since 1977, when African leaders acknowledged that aspects of the OAU Charter had become outdated and needed to be reformed. On September 9, 1999, at the organization's fourth extraordinary session in Sirte, Libya, where African Heads of State had gathered purposely to revise the OAU Charter in order to meet the challenges of globalization, they agreed, *inter alia*, to create an African Union. The Libyan leader and host, Muammar Qadhafi, had called the meeting in order to give impetus to his pan-Africanist aspiration of creating supranational institutions, in accordance with the June 1991 Treaty of Abuja that aimed to establish an African Economic Community (AEC) within 34-40 years.¹ The launching of the AU would thus conform to the ultimate objectives of the OAU Charter and of the AEC.

African leaders later adopted the Constitutive Act of the AU at the OAU's 36th ordinary session in Lomé, Togo on July 11, 2000. Soon afterwards, at the fifth extraordinary summit of the organization in March 1-2, 2001, again in Sirte, African leaders unanimously declared the formation of the AU. On April 26, 2001, Nigeria became the 36th member state to ratify the Constitutive Act, thus enabling it to enter into force on May 26, 2001, in compliance with Article 28 of the Constitutive Act. Shortly thereafter, on July 9, 2001 in Lusaka Zambia, African Heads of State agreed a one-year transition plan for the transformation of the OAU to the AU. At the same 37th summit of the OAU, President Mbeki of South Africa was elected the AU's first president for one year. As well, African leaders elected Amara Essy, a former foreign minister of Côte d'Ivoire, the Secretary-General of the OAU, and assigned him the important task of overseeing the transition process.

Major Provisions of the AU

Compared to the OAU Charter, the objectives of the AU are more comprehensive and specific, because they combine the

outstanding goals of the Charter and the provisions of the Treaty of Abuja. As outlined in Article 3 of the Constitutive Act, the objectives of the AU include achieving greater unity and solidarity between the African peoples and countries, defending the territorial integrity and independence of member states, and accelerating the political, social, and economic integration of the continent.² Furthermore, the AU aims to defend and advance Africa's common position on issues of interest to it and its people, support international cooperation with a view to relevant international agreements, and promote peace, security, and stability throughout the continent. Other objectives of the AU include the promotion of research and development in science and technology, sustainable development in all facets of society, and cooperation in all fields of human activity. The AU also aims to collaborate with the outside world to eradicate preventable diseases, as well as encourage policy coordination and harmonization between existing and future regional economic communities of Africa. In addition to protecting and promoting human rights, the AU also seeks to advance and defend democracy, democratic institutions, good governance, and popular participation across the continent. All told, the mission of the AU is to raise the overall living standards of the African people, ensure their safety, and propel Africa into the future with a sense of purpose, strength, and confidence.

To help implement and enforce the aforementioned objectives, the Constitutive Act (Articles 5-22) identifies a handful of institutions and organs. The supreme institution of the AU is the Assembly of the Union, which is comprised of the Heads of State and Government of member states or their duly accredited representatives, meets annually, and is supported by an Economic, Social and Cultural Council. The Executive Council is a meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs or such other ministers of member states, meets twice a year, and is assisted by Specialized Technical Committees. A Permanent Representative Committee, which is comprised of member states' permanent representatives to the AU, also assists the Executive Council.

The Commission, which is based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, is both the executive arm and the bureaucracy of the nascent AU. In managing the affairs of the AU, the Chairperson of the Commission is assisted by a Deputy Chairperson and eight other Commissioners. Each of the continent's five regions—Central, Eastern, Northern, Southern, and Western—is entitled to two commissioners, half of whom shall be women. The number of Commissioners/portfolios is subject to change by the Assembly, and Commissioners are elected by secret ballot. The portfolios of the Commission are: Peace and Security; Political Affairs; Infrastructure and Energy; Social Affairs; Human Resources, Science, and Technology; Trade and Industry; Rural Economy and Agriculture; and Economic Affairs. The Commission's functions include implementing the decisions taken by other bodies of the AU, preparing strategic plans and studies for the Executive Council, taking action where a common position already exists, working closely with the Permanent Representative Committee, and mobilizing resources and devising strategies for self-financing and income-generating activities for the Union.

(continued on p.12)

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Other institutions, which are hoped to be created in the not-too-distant future, are a Pan-African Parliament, a Court of Justice, and Financial Institutions—African Central Bank, African Monetary Fund, and African Investment Bank.

Analysis: The Limits of Mimicking

To any student of the European Union (EU), many of the aforementioned AU institutions bear a striking resemblance to those of the EU. Indeed, architects of the AU acknowledged that they relied on the EU as the model for constructing their Union. For example, Qadhafi admitted that the best practices of the EU largely inspired his more ambitious United States of Africa scheme.³ Other African leaders, such as Mbeki, however, favored a more piecemeal inter-governmental cooperation on key economic and social issues. The question, though, is can the African continent, which employed the EU structural template, replicate the EU's remarkable success? Put differently, what are the limits to the imitation of the EU by the AU? The discourse that follows briefly compares and contrasts the integration experiences and approaches of the EU and the AU.

A common feature of the two unions is that participation has been voluntary and a function of the political will of member states, because they perceive membership to be in their interests. Like the EU, African leaders are hoping to use integration to rejuvenate the continent's *balkanized* battered economies and to promote sustainable development and prosperity that would ultimately discourage war and promote peace in the region. In promoting an ever closer union, the EU has benefited from the rapprochement between two wartime foes—France and Germany—and the resultant resilient Franco-German alliance, which has propelled European peace and prosperity via integration. Although the AU is devoid of such key actors, largely because the circumstances of its birth are different, the *détente* between, say, Rwanda, and Uganda (the Great Lakes region), or Eritrea and Ethiopia (the Horn of Africa) could be leveraged to stem the tides of frequent civil strife and cross-border skirmishes, and achieve the ultimate aims of “greater unity and solidarity” in Africa.

The evolution and edification of the EU was also made possible by the relative economic affluence of its member states, and by the political willingness of Germany to be its economic locomotive and paymaster. Besides the EU's ‘own resources’ and other means, Germany has been the largest net contributor to the coffers of the EU. Even in the face of economic difficulties and reunification hiccups, Germany has played this role rather well, sometimes much to the chagrin of its populace. The two largest economies of the AU are the RSA (\$130 billion) and Egypt (\$95 billion), followed by Algeria (\$48 billion). What is yet unknown about the nascent AU is if Pretoria and/or Cairo is/are willing to be its anchor economies and net contributors *à la* Germany in the EU. To date, Egypt has maintained a low-key profile in AU activities, implying that its priorities reside elsewhere, perhaps in the Middle East. Likewise, for sundry reasons, including domestic challenges and other international interests, the RSA may not be able or willing to shoulder the burden of leadership by itself.

In a similar vein, African leaders still have to resolve the perennial integration issue of how fast they travel as they traverse the various stages of integration—Qaddafi's “big bang” federalist inclination or Mbeki's “gradualist” neo-functional preference—even though the Constitutive Act subscribes to the widely held view that integration is a “process.”⁴ Unlike the EU, whose integration strategy was predicated on a sector-by-sector philosophy, beginning with the now defunct European Coal and Steel Community, the AU approach is essentially more holistic and derives from previous continental and current regional structures. Arguably, the closest examples of sectoral emphases and perhaps of functional spillover in the AU are the adoption of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) at the 2001 Lusaka summit as its economic blueprint, and the adoption of a protocol on Peace and Security Council at the 2002 Durban summit for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts.

Furthermore, the path ahead is fraught with concerns, not the least of which is the sad reminder of the continent's checkered history with intra-African agreements. Amidst the attendant fanfare and pageantry at the Durban summit, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, wisely cautioned the gathering “not to mistake hope for achievement.” Africa's flirtation with regional integration is not new, and can be traced back to the independent period or earlier, when its proponents called for Africa to unite and create a United States of Africa.⁵ Since the founding of the OAU on May 25 1963, virtually every region of Africa has concluded at least one regional integration scheme, including the oldest regional integration scheme in the world.⁶ Another concern pertains to how they distribute the spoils of integration, a vexing issue at the sub-continental level. A further concern involves the management of the AU and the policing of member states' intransigencies. Take for example, the odd situation whereby some of the most strident champions of the AU (idea) do not operate bona fide democratic governments (e.g., Libya and Uganda). Yet, they are expected to help promote democracy and democratic institutions across Africa, including the suspension of the membership of governments who come to power through unconstitutional means.⁷ How then do these countries react to election failures or to allegations of widespread electoral malpractices, when they themselves do not allow multi-party politics?

Another concern with the AU is the sheer size of the group. While it can be a blessing in terms of economies of scale to have 53 countries on board, the unwieldy size of the Union may conceivably drag decision-making. For example, if the Assembly or the Executive Council were to decide on whether to “intervene” in a war-torn area, especially where cases of genocide have been reported (e.g., 1994 Rwanda), the odds are in favor of a protracted resolution, especially since both bodies are required by the Constitutive Act to take decisions by consensus or by two-thirds majority. One of the lessons from the EU's experience is that starting out small, albeit unintentionally at the time, turned out to be a blessing in disguise with regard to the development of its institutions. Had the EU started out with, say, 25 members, it is unlikely that its integration would have been deepened to the

degree that it has today, or survived early failures, such as the 1954 stillborn European Defense Community. At any rate, in its present composition of 53 members, an external spillback is more likely for the AU.⁸ The AU will thus need some quick and small successes that can be leveraged and bolster confidence in it.

Looking Ahead for African Union

Notwithstanding the foregoing, regional integration on a continental level portends a hopeful future for the African continent and its people, provided appropriate policies are adopted and industriously implemented. Sadly, the “good news” is that the African condition is so appalling at the turn of the 21st century that it is almost inconceivable that it can get any worse. For example, at the dawn of the new millennium, the gross national product for sub-Saharan Africa is \$310 billion and \$520 billion for Africa in constant terms.⁹ In other words, the estimated 800 million population of Africa generate only 5% of the national output produced by the 282 million people of the United States, or less than the much smaller populations of say, Canada (\$650 billion), Brazil (\$610 billion), and Spain (\$595 billion). Not surprisingly, roughly 60% of the countries in the World Bank’s group of low-income countries are Africans. As well, all the welfare indices—Human Poverty, Human Development, and Physical Quality of Life—are generally low for the African people. Additionally, Africa is on the periphery of international commerce, as it accounts for a paltry 2% of total trade and an abysmal 1.2% of direct foreign investment. What is even more worrying is that the share of intra-African trade in the continent’s total trade volume hovers around 10%.

It is, therefore, encouraging that the AU may be the panacea that stops the hemorrhaging and improves the economic and social welfare of Africa. One of the most encouraging signals that this may happen is the important role accorded to women, directly and otherwise, in the Constitutive Act. It is reflective of the consensus in the development literature that women must be at the core of any development strategies in developing countries, including African.¹⁰ Another encouraging sign in the Constitutive Act is the importance given to civil society and ancillary institutions. The AU will be a success if it pays more than lip service attention to the aforementioned, is able to stop the continent’s inexorably incessant flashpoints, and advances the economic and social welfare of the African people.

What role, if any, can the EU play in ensuring the success of the AU integration? Clearly, the formation of the AU is in consonance with the Cotonou Agreement, which encourages African, Caribbean, and Pacific states to establish, strengthen or consolidate regional integration schemes and to conclude free trade agreements with the EU. The launching of the African Union may give additional impetus to its members to avail themselves of EU concessions, such as the Everything But Arms initiative, via economies of scale and rational allocation of scarce resources. The EU can also bring its resources to bear by reforming the infamous Common Agricultural Policy (which has distorted the farm sector in many developing/African countries), helping to eradicate the diseases that debilitate Africans, and training African personnel for peacekeeping missions in the continent.

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Internet Sources on the African Union

Compiled by the EUSA Office

<http://www.africa-union.org>

The African Union’s official Web site (in English and French) has a basic primer, the official documents, information about the member states, news, and much more.

<http://www.africanfront.com>

Web site of the African Union Front, “working to consolidate Africa into a unified political, social, and economic entity ...” The AUF’s site includes resources such as the AU map, history of the AU, policy briefs (including one on AU-EU relations), debate on a proposed single African currency, and much more.

<http://www.au2002.gov.za>

This official site of the 2002 Durban Summit includes all the documents produced by the Summit as well as an archive of many key documents in AU development.

<http://allafrica.com>

This bilingual (French and English) commercial site posts very current news on the AU, individual countries, regions, and external relations, including, *inter alia*, sections devoted to Africa-Europe relations and to U.S.-Canada-Africa relations. Includes a searchable archive and posts hundreds of articles daily.

Book Reviews

Richard Bellamy and Alex Warleigh (eds.) Citizenship and Governance in the European Union. London and New York: Continuum, 2001, 213 pp.

BY TAKING ON THE TOPIC of European Union citizenship, Richard Bellamy, Alex Warleigh and the contributors to this edited volume analyze one of the least understood, often dismissed, but potentially very important aspects of European integration. Written as a separate part of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (Part Two, Articles 8-8e), the provisions on European Union citizenship state that every national of a member state is a citizen of the Union. This citizenship provides: the right to move and reside within the Union; the right to vote and stand for election in local and European Parliamentary elections in the citizen's place of residence; the right to diplomatic and consular protection of fellow member states in countries in which the citizen's member state is not represented; the right to petition the European Parliament and the right to register complaints to Community institutions (except the Court) with an ombudsman.

The book provides a wealth of background information on EU citizenship as well as helpful analysis of what is a bit of an odd duck. As the editors point out, EU citizenship presents a puzzle in that the EU is not a state but no other international organization has its own citizens. This puzzle leads to consideration of the broader contexts for analysis, namely that the institutions and practices of citizenship are changing in a globalizing world; that the EU itself is a moving target with a progression of more theories developed by scholars attempting to make sense of it; and, finally, that European Union citizenship must be considered with the broader debates over the EU's "democratic deficit." It is this final context that serves as a driving theme of the volume as most of the contributors seem to come to the collective conclusion that existing EU citizenship is a "market-based" citizenship that falls short when it comes to generating loyalty to the EU and that "for EU citizenship to be meaningful, it must be reinvented as an instrument of political engagement" (p.13).

The volume is divided into three straightforward parts with the first covering the concept and development of a citizenship of the European Union. After the editors set out the initial puzzle in the first chapter, Alex Warleigh then considers how EU citizenship came into being through opportunistic negotiations and bargaining of a host of political actors including the EU's institutions, which leaves open the possibility of further "deepening" of citizenship practice as well as constitutional elaboration. Next, Richard Bellamy considers the conceptualization of citizenship as the "right to have rights" and argues that as citizenship is constitutive of a polity through political practice, the EU needs an active form of citizenship for its legitimacy.

The second part provides more detailed analysis of aspects of EU citizenship that relate to matters primarily within the EU. Roy Gregory and Philip Giddings open this section with a penetrating analysis of the EU Ombudsman's office established

as a part of EU citizenship. Given that EU citizenship largely developed out of the codification of rights to free movement that nationals of one EU member state had in another by virtue of being economic actors (e.g., workers), Tony Downes considers the role of an "activist" European Court of Justice as an opportunistic actor in the development of EU citizenship and, in this context, he assesses the current understanding of the EU citizenship as "market citizenship." Carl Stychin examines the intersection of European and sexual citizenship discourses within the EU's legal and political order. Mita Castle-Kanerova and Bill Jordan consider the expansion of EU citizenship to social rights in an exploration of equal opportunity provisions for men and women that reflects the ambiguities of EU social policy as it confronts the challenges of enlargement.

The third part deals with aspects of EU citizenship with implications that go beyond the EU itself. R. J. Barry Jones leads off by differentiating instrumental and affective citizenship from formal citizenship and arguing that building the EU will require generating affective citizenship though effective instrumental citizenship related to the goods and services provided by the European polity. Stelios Stavridis and Colleen Thouez examine rights to diplomatic and consular protection and come to a tentative conclusion that EU citizens, theoretically speaking, have more protections while outside of the EU than within it. They also find that, practically speaking, the realization of those protections depends upon member states—whose cooperation on this front is still a bit of a muddle. Theodora Kostakopoulou then considers the bearing of EU citizenship on people who live in the EU but are not EU citizens because they are not nationals of the EU member state in which they reside—so-called "third country nationals." She argues that while these people are no longer invisible they remain rather marginalized subjects rather than active participants in the polity being constructed.

The volume offers something for general students of European integration as well as aficionados of EU citizenship studies. In particular, the combination of Warleigh's insightful analysis of the political development of EU citizenship and Down's rehearsal of the classical legal story of the gradual articulation and codification of rights that became EU citizenship provide a helpful introduction to the subject. The Gregory and Giddings chapter on the EU ombudsman and the Stavridis and Thouez chapter on diplomatic protection shed light on aspects of EU citizenship that are all too often ignored in less comprehensive treatments of the subject. When reading about the contributors at the beginning of the book and noticing that eight of the twelve hailed from the University of Reading, I had a sinking feeling that the topic of European citizenship might just be one of those labels on a package of a set of divergent papers about the EU generated by a university administrator-decreed conference on a very tight travel budget. I was pleasantly surprised that the University of Reading has a combination of specialists on EU citizenship and specialists in other areas who diligently focused their attention on the subject (i.e., it's a good place for graduate students interested in the subject).

While the book passes the edited volume coherence test, the central thrust of the volume—that the current state of EU

citizenship is wanting and that EU citizenship must become more to overcome the democratic deficit—is typical of both the discussions of EU citizenship and the EU generally. That is, like much of teleological analysis of the EU, this book largely examines EU citizenship more in terms of what it might become rather than what it is. The puzzle that the EU is not a state but no other international organization has its own citizens really is a puzzle only if one assumes that the state and citizenship are two sides of the same coin. Either the existence of EU citizenship means that the EU is, *de facto*, a state, or, if the EU is just an international organization, EU citizenship is insignificant, if not meaningless. This either/or framing of the problem of European integration tends to lead to the position that the “in betweenness” of the European condition is somehow unsustainable and that Europe will at some point either gain momentum and become a federation or fall back into a set of independent though highly cooperative states. The problem is that Europe has moved beyond confederation, yet the EU may *never* become a federal state, à la “The United States of Europe.” While EU citizenship is not analogous to member state nationality, it nevertheless is an institution that sets out legal relationships, which together constitute a novel form of membership in an equally novel form of polity.

In a sense it may not be fair to ask so much of EU citizenship. One leaves this book thinking that if somehow more voting rights were extended, rights for third country nationals established, firmer commitments to diplomatic protection made, etc., that this would address the democratic deficit and really make EU citizenship a major building block in the construction of Europe. Given common implicit, if not explicit, comparisons made between Europe integration and the U.S. federation, most recently in depictions of the Convention of the Future of Europe that compare it with Philadelphia in 1787, it is worth noting that provisions in the Maastricht Treaty on EU citizenship go well beyond that of the U.S. Constitution, in which citizenship is mentioned once: “The Citizens in each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several states” (Art. 4, Sect. 2). Citizenship is not mentioned again until the 14th Amendment, which first establishes U.S. citizenship in 1868. As Tocqueville observed, democratic practices throughout American society outpaced formal political institutions, including, it appears, citizenship. Similarly, it may well be that EU citizenship will only reflect a closing of the EU’s democratic deficit well after it happens—if it happens.

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Andrew Jordan. *The Europeanization of British Environmental Policy: A Departmental Perspective*. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, 236 pp.

ANDREW JORDAN IS A SCHOLAR well-known to those interested in British and EU environmental policy. With this book he targets a much wider readership, however, and he does so successfully.

His study of the Europeanization of British environmental policy pursues several analytical aims of interest for scholars of British politics as well as European integration and policy making. Most notably it provides critical inputs to theories of integration, the ongoing debates on processes of Europeanization as well as the transformation of the state in Europe.

From a public policy perspective the book first outlines the growth of the environmental *acquis* since the founding of the European Community in 1957. He pays special attention to three successive Treaty changes (SEA, TEU and Amsterdam) facilitating a dramatic expansion and deepening of EU environmental regulation. Jordan then offers a detailed investigation of the kinds of policy adaptations the British government undertook in the environmental field in response to the steadily expanding environmental *acquis*. Looking at four areas of environmental policy—water pollution, air pollution, biodiversity and land-use planning—he shows that during the past more than thirty years Britain slowly escaped the image of being “the dirty man of Europe” by raising domestic environmental standards and altering fundamental paradigms and traditional policy instruments underpinning British environmental policy. While the remarkable impact EU environmental policy has had on the member states comes as no surprise to most scholars in the field, there has been no comparably comprehensive and detailed investigation of the adaptation processes on the domestic level (in Britain), turning initial policy “misfits” into transformative processes even in the face of intense opposition on the part of national policy makers.

But this book offers more than “simple” Europeanization stories. Jordan takes his readers through the entire policy cycle: discussing policy formulation at the EU level, the negotiation process leading to the adoption of EU law, formal and practical implementation in the member state, and even feedback effects for subsequent policy revisions and “spillovers” to related policy developments. By combining the study of “European integration” in the environmental policy field with that of “Europeanization”—i.e., the national adaptation to EU decisions—Jordan embeds domestic adaptation processes in a much larger picture of British environmental policy makers struggling for, but frequently losing (!), control over EU policy making. Hence, Europeanization is considered a process shaped by EU decision making and not a mere reactive process in response to “given” EU policies.

In this “shaped process” human agency plays a central role. National policy makers try to minimize adaptational pressures either proactively by “uploading” national practices to the EU level or defensively by resisting full implementation. At the same time, supranational actors not only react to intergovernmental demands but also aim at autonomously expanding the environmental *acquis*. The evidence provided suggests a complex dynamic with no fixed power relations or strategic “logics.” Nevertheless, Jordan is able to outline some interesting and (for some) surprising patterns in British behavior. Britain has not only been “awkward,” attempting to block most policy departing from the (British) status quo and agreeing merely to “unimportant” changes as strategic tradeoffs for larger deals in more important areas (such as the single market). According to

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Jordan, Britain has acted much less shrewdly than frequently thought and instead has been frequently blinded by naïveté and ignorance. As a consequence Britain encountered numerous policy “misfits” entirely unforeseen or underestimated during the decision making process. Also, the EU’s sanctioning potential and its ability to “lock in” the environmental *acquis* in the minds of societal actors, thereby creating domestic pressure in favor of adjusting to EU requirements, were taken too lightly with the effect that policy dilution during implementation proved only a short-term solution out of the misfit situation.

Jordan’s broadened view of Europeanization succeeds in getting us beyond the sometimes static and overly structural analysis and juxtaposition of “fits” and “misfits.” By giving us also the “story before” he emphasizes that national policy makers can (but need not) play a part in shaping—but rarely fully controlling (!)—the policy requirements they later encounter.

This gets us to the third dimension of Jordan’s account: the departmental perspective. The book departs from existing accounts of the co-evolution of EU and British environmental policy by taking a close look at the activities of the national Department of the Environment (DoE) in both influencing policy making in the EU and in supervising the implementation of EU law. In this context, we learn about another interesting transformation (or Europeanization) process as over the years British environmental policy makers have learned to “think European” and shifted their behavior from routine obstruction or general disinterest in EU environmental policy making to more proactively shaping EU policies (and “uploading” national practices). Considering that the initial “strategy” of obstruction and neglect resulted in very costly misfits between EU requirements and national practices, even in the area of nature conservation where Britain rightly claimed international leadership, this learning process took a long time. Jordan argues such learning was hampered by the general EU-skepticism prevalent among the British political and administrative leadership and—somewhat paradoxically—the subordinate role of environmental preferences within the DoE. The DoE was only cured of its anti-environmentalism after repeatedly falling victim to unintended and unexpected implementation crises related to

the requirements of EU directives. Learning the environmental lesson first, the DoE gradually grew more prepared also to adjust its organizational structure, management style and EU negotiation strategies for the game of multi-level policy making—with the effect that recent EU environmental law has gained a notable British flavor.

All three themes of the book—the Europeanization of national environmental policy, the politics of European integration, and the Europeanization of the DoE and the British state—are examined through two competing theoretical lenses, namely the state-centric, liberal intergovernmentalist (LI) paradigm of European integration and policy making, on the one hand, and a process-oriented model emphasizing historical, institutional and spillover effects. Jordan presents vast empirical evidence countering especially the rationalist assumption of the LI paradigm and the claim that the state (or national executive) is strengthened by European integration. Neither the British core executive, in negotiating the “big” Treaty changes (SEA, TEU and Amsterdam) with their significant implications for environmental policy making, nor the DoE responsible for the day-to-day environmental policy making, were making fully calculated choices in order to maximize national economic interests and increase their autonomy vis-à-vis domestic societal actors. Instead, both negotiators are shown as losing (or giving up) control over agenda setting and subsequently being drawn into a dynamic of policy feedback, unintended consequences and path-dependencies forcing them into costly and undesired adaptation processes. Interestingly, Jordan shows that Britain became more successful in pursuing national preferences—i.e., minimizing costly policy misfits—only after becoming a “team player” in the complex institutional arena of the EU. But even as a team player Britain had to recognize that EU policy making implies a lot less certainty about what can be achieved from the process at the end of the day.

It will be evident that Jordan quite clearly sides with the process-oriented account of European integration and Europeanization. Even in the case of the three “big” or “history-making” decisions, which are frequently conceded to intergovernmental explanations, he shows how British negotiators were drawn quite unwillingly into the IGC processes, were surprised by the associated environmental agenda and then completely miscalculated the (expansive) effects of the environment-related Treaty changes to which they agreed. While quite convincing in this critique, Jordan may nevertheless be challenged for putting up the LI paradigm as somewhat of a straw man. LI approaches the integration process from the perspective of bargaining and decision making; it never sets out to theorize a perpetual policy cycle. Also the fact that LI presents a somewhat more “bounded” variant of rationality than Jordan makes us believe does not change this explicitly limited focus. Therefore, in setting out to elaborate on and explain the process linking European integration and Europeanization and back again, Jordan *needs* to adopt a process-oriented perspective; his very research question does not lend itself to a research design focusing on individual decisions. The real contribution of this book lies in showing the richness and excitement of this process for scholars of EU and national

politics. The reader is led to ask why anybody would want to bother analyzing individual decisions isolated from their historical context. In that sense, Jordan makes an important departure from LI.

The book is very clearly structured and also stylistically a very pleasant read. It can be recommended not only for academics but equally for teaching advanced undergraduate and graduate students. Students in particular will also appreciate Jordan's attempt continuously to relate his rich empirical account to theoretical questions. Readers already well informed of these debates may sometimes find the theoretical interpretations repetitive, however. A bit distracting—especially for non-British readers—is the enormous number of acronyms used in the text. By contrast, almost excessively—if not unnecessarily—user-friendly are Jordan's repeated references back to previous chapters. But these are small details that do not detract from the empirical and analytical quality of the book. It deserves attention far beyond the narrow environmental policy circle.

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Anatol Lieven and Dmitri Trenin (eds.) *Ambivalent Neighbors: The EU, NATO and the Price of Membership*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003, 330 pp.

ANATOL LIEVEN AND DMITRI TRENIN, who are associated with the Carnegie Endowment, invited a distinguished group of mainly academic specialists to write about various aspects of the EU and NATO enlargements. Many of the essays, which were written in early 2001, comment on the danger that enlargement of these two institutions could further isolate the countries to the east and increase their tendency toward authoritarian rule and economic stagnation.

This remains an important concern even though the broad international context has changed considerably in the past two years. Partly because of the unilateral approach favored by the present U.S. Administration, transatlantic relations have entered their most difficult period since World War II. Europe is deeply divided over how to deal with the United States, and for the first time in fifty years the U.S. is viewed by some Europeans as seeking to undermine the integration process. Russia sided with France and Germany on the issue of Iraq, and Russian leaders probably hope the EU will become strong enough to serve as a counterweight to U.S. world dominance. Meanwhile, the NATO and EU enlargements are moving ahead, and the implications for countries to the east deserve careful study. While the essays in this collection are individually useful and interesting, a symposium of this sort would be more effective if the contributors had read and responded to each others' essays.

As Heather Grabbe of the Centre for European Reform notes, the hardest bargaining in the EU enlargement process always takes place between the member states as they thrash out common positions, and the most difficult issues were left to be decided in

the final months of 2002 after elections were held in France and Germany. It should be noted that the final stages of the enlargement process also were influenced by the most recent elections in Denmark, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Cyprus and Turkey.

For better or worse, the EU's new eastern border is now being created. Visa regimes and other border controls have been or are being put in place between the accession states and Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, although some of the procedures are still being decided. The accession states have made it very clear that they are anxious to maintain and expand their economic and social ties with their eastern neighbors. Their arguments for doing so are receiving a sympathetic hearing in the Commission and in some of the member states, notably Finland, Sweden, Britain, Denmark, and Greece.

The accession states are also helping to lay the groundwork for a further enlargement into southeastern Europe, a prospect viewed as remote or nonexistent by most of the contributors to this book as recently as 2001. The Commission and the Copenhagen Council have declared that Romania and Bulgaria are on track to join the Union by 2007. Croatia and Macedonia have applied for membership, and Turkey has been told it can start negotiations if it meets the Copenhagen criteria and fosters the reunification of Cyprus. Of course, all the usual caveats apply to this enlargement, and for the first time in history the United States has been warned by the Enlargement Commissioner that lobbying for Turkey or other candidates could be counter-productive. Still, history shows that it is difficult for the EU to reverse the accession process once it has begun because this cancels incentives for reform.

Although there is great concern now in Western Europe about illegal immigration, crime, terrorism, and competition for jobs, there is also growing recognition of the point which Heather Grabbe makes that none of these problems can be solved by visa regimes or stricter border controls. Common policies on immigration and asylum are now on the EU's agenda along with common policies to deal with crime and terrorism. So the timing is perfect for a book that underscores the need to avoid creating a new iron curtain, and it is unfortunate that more of the contributors did not provide concrete suggestions for balancing the EU's JHA policies with the need to maintain and expand legitimate east-west contacts. A few contributors noted that "left out" states like Ukraine might get their act together if the eastern enlargement were somehow delayed, but the writers recognized that this would destroy the main incentive for reform in the accession states.

James Sherr, a lecturer at Oxford and research fellow at Sandhurst, notes that Ukraine's cooperation with NATO has produced results in the area of military reform, but these have not been matched by any notable success in reforming Ukraine's economic ministries or the police and intelligence services. Sherr says that reform-minded Ukrainian officials want close ties with NATO but are opposed to joining the alliance because they recognize the need for good relations with Russia. Conversely, they do want to join the EU (which Russia views as far less threatening), but they lack the political will to undertake the

sweeping reforms that EU membership would require.

Alexander Motyl, who teaches political science at Rutgers University, argues that Ukraine will never be accepted as a candidate for EU membership, even if it embarks on a full-scale process of reform, because the EU is afraid of antagonizing Russia. Therefore, he fears that Ukraine is consigned to the dismal prospect of perpetual domination by Russia. Other contributors note, however, that the orientation of Russia itself is changing. Leonid Zaiko, who heads an independent think tank in Belarus, offers a much more upbeat view of what the future may hold. Zaiko provides a well-documented discussion of the attitudes of Belarusian citizens about their country's alignment in world affairs. Although they have never controlled their national destiny in the past, Zaiko believes they may now have the option of moving toward the west in step with Russia.

William Wallace, who is professor of international studies at the London School of Economics and foreign affairs spokesman for the Liberal Democratic party in the House of Lords, argues that the EU's leverage in dealing with Russia has been weakened by its failure to coordinate collective EU efforts with those of the member states. Until very recently, the EU had virtually no bilateral dealings with Russia except on trade, aid and environmental issues. Broad political or security issues were regarded by the member states as their sole prerogative. Vladimir Baranovsky, deputy director of the Institute of the World Economy and International relations in Moscow, provides a fascinating discussion of the evolution of official Russian policies toward the EU. He notes that Moscow has been increasingly interested in the EU, particularly as the European Security and Defense Policy has begun to develop. He frankly views ESDP as a counterweight to NATO and points to the possibility that Russia might offer to assist the EU in ESDP missions in such areas as air transport and satellite communication, observation, and navigation.

Alexander Sergounin, chairman of the political science department at Nizhny Novgorod Linguistic University, provides a detailed and useful discussion of Russia's concerns about the fate of Kaliningrad after Poland and Lithuania join the Union. The EU and Russia managed to settle the visa issue just before the Copenhagen summit last December. This may mark the start of a more significant bilateral relationship between the EU and Russia, and as this book suggests, the range of issues that await the attention of these two "ambivalent neighbors" is practically unlimited.

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**Vivien Schmidt, *The Futures of European Capitalism*.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 357 pp.**

HAVE FORCES OF GLOBALIZATION AND Europeanization eroded distinctive national models of capitalism? What is the relationship between changes wrought by the former and those induced by the latter? Numerous scholars of comparative political economy

have argued that these external pressures have not brought about convergence of institutions and policies. But along which dimensions does diversity persist, and why? How do we explain cross-national differences in patterns and timing of adjustment to globalization and Europeanization? These are some of the questions answered in Vivien Schmidt's wide-ranging study, which finds that, while there has been change in the direction of market liberalization across countries, a narrowing of the range of policy responses has not produced convergence.

Schmidt traces the evolution of three models of capitalism—British market capitalism, German managed capitalism, and French state capitalism—over three decades in response to pressures of globalization and Europeanization. In the process, she identifies the mediating factors that explain how pressures for policy adjustment translate into outcomes. These factors include the degree of a country's economic vulnerability, each government's political institutional capacity, policy legacies and preferences, and discourse.

Economic vulnerability refers to the extent of a country's exposure to pressures from increasing competition in capital and product markets. This may change over time. For example, Germany, not highly vulnerable to pressures of globalization and Europeanization due to its financial and economic strength in the 1980s, became even more vulnerable to these pressures than Britain and France in the 1990s. This is one factor explaining the much later inception of major policy reforms in Germany, which have only begun during the past few years (p.63). Political institutional capacity is the ability of policy makers to "impose or negotiate" change. The concept of capacity includes more than the number of veto points, incorporating political conditions and the resources of various domestic political actors. Accordingly, like economic vulnerability, political institutional capacity varies across time and across policy areas. Policy legacies concern the degree of isomorphism between adaptational pressures and existing institutions and patterns of interaction. Discourse is an ideational force fostering policy change or continuity by acting on perceptions of economic vulnerability—the need for change—and of policy legacies—the appropriateness of change.

The factors that mediate between pressures for change and policy outcomes also are interactive. Economic vulnerability and policy legacies determine the strength of political institutional capacities needed for successful policy adaptation. Political discourse can affect the ability of political elites to impose or negotiate change, and can alter policy preferences.

Adding another layer to the explanatory model, levels of adaptational pressure themselves vary. First, Europeanization flows from a more potent set of forces for change than globalization, representing both "a conduit for global forces and a shield against them ..." (p.14). For EU member state governments, Europeanization implies a loss of policy autonomy, while at the same time states gain shared control. Moreover, the adjustment pressures deriving from Europeanization entail varying levels of coercion. Combined with these varying levels of adaptational pressure, the mediating factors produce one of three outcomes across time, countries, and sectors: inertia (resistance to change), absorption (domestically driven reform

coincides with external pressures for change) or transformation. But simple generalizations “about the mechanics of member states’ adjustment to Europeanization” are not possible, “given the mediating factors influencing outcomes and the different losses of autonomy and control in different policy sectors at different times in response to different EU decision-making constraints” (p.101).

In accounting for persistent diversity, discourse is a critical factor. Discourse generates and legitimates ideas for change. Schmidt asserts that, in contrast with discourse as an independent variable, institutionalism more powerfully accounts for continuity rather than change. Accordingly, in comparison with interest-based, institutional, and cultural explanations for policy change, discourse has received insufficient attention. In this context, Schmidt identifies what is, ultimately, the critical burden on discourse: when does discourse matter for policy change? To induce change, Schmidt argues, discourse must “help policy actors overcome entrenched interests, institutional obstacles, and cultural blinkers to change” (p.251). This is most likely to occur in a receptive environment marked by a crisis or critical juncture, characterized by ineffectiveness of existing policies or internal contradictions in the policy program (p. 227).

Ultimately, the book weaves together adaptational pressures, mediating factors, and discourse to explain patterns and sequencing of change in policies and practices. Thus in Germany, adaptation in the realm of monetary policy came as early as the 1970s; reform of industrial policy was initiated only in the 1990s, and labor market policy and social policy reform barely have begun (p.70). Although British monetary policy adjustment came later than in Germany, industrial, labor market, and social policy reform followed rapidly, a reflection of the robust political institutional capacity of British governments and a powerful legitimating discourse (p.74). In the French case, political institutional capacities also were substantial, producing change in monetary, industrial, and labor market policies. However, in sharp contrast with the British case (and like the German case), successive French governments have struggled to find a discourse that can legitimate social policy reform (p.271).

Schmidt’s detailed examination of a broad range of policy sectors leads to the conclusion that, in spite of reductions in national autonomy, states remain important gatekeepers, reflected in persisting cross-national diversity of national welfare systems, systems of corporate governance, and labor market regulation. International capital is not entirely footloose; international business not entirely stateless. The result is that three models of capitalism—market, managed and state—persist, even if in modified form from their early post-WWII prototypes. And rather than managed and state capitalism evolving into hybrids with strong features of market capitalism, Schmidt asserts that each model has strengthened its comparative advantages even while embracing greater competition in a variety of markets. This result is intensified market capitalism, a more competitive managed capitalism, and a shift from state capitalism to “state-enhanced capitalism” (pp.110-111).

The book is an important step forward in the effort to understand the contours of Europeanization and the relationship

between Europeanization and globalization. What the analysis relinquishes in parsimony of explanatory factors, it gains in explanatory leverage on the phenomenon of policy responses to external pressures and in the richness of empirical detail. As the discussion of adaptational pressures, mediating factors, and models of capitalism indicates, the book speaks to the concerns of a wide range of scholars. This makes it an especially useful work for graduate courses on comparative capitalism and comparative or international political economy. In addition to the bevy of scholars studying Europeanization, the book is indispensable for those engaged in debates about continuity and change in varieties of capitalism. All of these scholars will benefit from two crucial strengths of the book: theoretical eclecticism that does not come at the expense of rigor, and a staunch resistance to determinism in debates over the consequences of European integration for domestic political economies and over the potential futures of European capitalism.

Mitchell P. Smith
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Jolyon Howorth and John T. S. Keeler (eds.) Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy. New York: Palgrave, 2003, 247 pp.

EVER SINCE THE END OF THE Cold War, there has been a need to reevaluate security needs and arrangements. As the editors of *Defending Europe* make clear, on both sides of the Atlantic within NATO and the European Union (EU) much thought has been given to how to defend Europe and assure its security. Not only has the gap in European and U.S. defense spending increased significantly since the iron curtain fell, but, as Jolyon Howorth and John Keeler convincingly demonstrate, there is also a serious U.S.-European capability gap, particularly with respect to high tech equipment. It is obvious to the Europeans that they need to do more to assure their security, yet there is no agreement what the right formula might be. Does the answer lie within a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO, or a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) for the EU? The essays in this impressive and thought-provoking book seek to shed light on “the competing ambitions, the contrasting visions and transatlantic tensions” that were brought on by recent attempts on the part of Europe to increase its autonomy in the security realm (p.5).

Defending Europe is divided into three main parts. Following an introduction by the editors, essays two through four (part I) deal with the evolution of NATO and the development of ESDI/ESDP. Essays five and six (part II) examine the enormous U.S.-European capabilities gap, whereas essays seven, eight and nine (part III) discuss NATO enlargement and the issues of discrimination brought about by ESDP. The book ends with two opposing views on ESDP—“misguided and dangerous” versus “necessary and beneficial” (p.viii).

In the introduction Jolyon Howorth and John Keeler trace the history of the drive for European autonomy from the Saint-Malo summit in 1998 to the present and argue that the events of September 11 made an ESDP even more compelling. Alexander Moens then scrutinizes the political and military dynamics of the ESDP and the respective debates within the Atlantic Alliance. He shows that, for the most part, the ESDP has been advanced by France, Germany and Great Britain and, placing the initiative in the larger context of European integration, cautions that the creation of a viable European security force may be decades away.

In chapter three Terry Terriff traces NATO's plans for a CJTF from the mid-1990s to the present and explains why NATO is unlikely to rely on the CJTF concept in dealing with future crises. He persuasively argues that, in the long run, Europe should have its own integrated military structure since a continued reliance on NATO assets would leave the Europeans too vulnerable. Frédéric Bozo (chapter four) agrees that there is a need for a greater European role in the security arena. Focusing on the Kosovo crisis he contends that transatlantic relations need to be modified and that a rebalancing of the Alliance with respect to "capabilities, responsibilities, and priorities" (p.66) will be of utmost importance.

David Yost (chapter five) sheds additional light on the U.S.-European capabilities gap, stressing that this gap is multifaceted and includes technology, investment and procurement. He predicts that narrowing the gap may be difficult, due to a lack of political cohesion in Europe, the absence of a shared vision of strategic requirements, and the unwillingness of many European governments to increase their defense spending.

In chapter six Kori Schake makes a good case for "constructive duplication"—"innovative ways to replicate by cost-effective means the high-end capabilities on which U.S. forces depend" (p.118). This would diminish European reliance on U.S. assets and prevent a serious divergence of U.S. and European military developments. And yet, as Shake reminds us, European military autonomy will come at a price: an annual ten percent increase in European defense budgets.

Turning to the issue of discrimination, Sunniva Tofte (chapter seven) examines the role of Turkey and Norway (both non-EU members) vis-à-vis the ESDP. She makes clear that, although both countries would prefer that "NATO remains the linchpin of an integrated security policy covering the whole of Europe" (p.136), they now seek to maximize their influence within the ESDP structures. Interestingly, whereas Turkey has repeatedly threatened to veto EU access to NATO capabilities, Norway now stresses how it might contribute to the ESDP.

Along the same lines, Mark Webber (chapter eight) scrutinizes the relationship between NATO enlargement, on the one hand, and ESDI/ESDP on the other. Given that the memberships of NATO and the EU are not the same, those countries which are only members of NATO have to fear discrimination. Yet, as Webber correctly points out, this will only be a problem if the ESDP becomes a significant material force to reckon with.

Julian Lindley-French (chapter nine) also focuses on NATO enlargement, arguing that it brings as many complications—"it

redefines the political mission, complicates decision making, creates a diffuse security role for the Alliance, reduces the qualitative level of military-operational effectiveness and costs a lot of money" (p.182)—as security benefits. What NATO needs to remain a viable security organization, he deduces, is a set of reforms collectively known as the five Cs: "credibility, cohesion, convergence, commitment and candor" (p.196).

Finally, Anand Menon and Jolyon Howorth challenge the reader to form his/her own opinion regarding transatlantic security issues by presenting two opposing views on the EU's quest for autonomy within the Atlantic Alliance. In chapter ten Menon argues that the ESDP is likely to weaken rather than strengthen Europe's ability to deal with security threats. He advocates a clear division of responsibilities between the EU and NATO and envisions the two institutions playing complementary rather than competing roles. Howorth, by contrast, is a strong proponent of the ESDP. He describes it as "an infant in diapers ... certainly worth hanging onto" (p.220). Given the changes in the international environment since the end of the Cold War, there is a need for "some measure of European security autonomy." Howorth concludes that, "if ESDP did not exist at this point, it would have to be invented" (p.235).

Unlike many other edited volumes, this collection of essays forms one coherent piece. It not only fills a critical gap in the literature by providing a comprehensive discussion of U.S.-European security issues, but, given the timely nature of the topic, it is essential reading for all those interested in transatlantic security relations. Due to its accessible writing style, *Defending Europe* makes a great text for both upper-level undergraduate and graduate seminars.

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Georgia Institute of Technology

Archive of European Integration <http://aei.pitt.edu>

THE ARCHIVE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (AEI) is an online repository for non-commercial, non-governmental publications (short monographs, working or policy papers, conference papers, etc.) dealing with any aspect of European integration. The AEI is hosted by the University Library System at the University of Pittsburgh with the co-sponsorship of EUSA and the Center for West European Studies/EU Center, University of Pittsburgh. All those who presented papers in person at the 2003 EUSA Conference in Nashville may post their conference papers on the AEI.

Anyone can access and download materials on the AEI. The search engine allows searching by author, title, keyword, year, etc. The AEI editors invite all with appropriate papers to submit them to the AEI. If you wish to deposit papers in a series, you *must* contact the AEI editor before beginning deposit of papers. With questions about the AEI, e-mail <aei@library.pitt.edu>.



The European Union Studies Association Announces:

Ernst Haas Memorial Fund for EU Studies

The 2003-2005 Executive Committee of the European Union Studies Association announces the launch of a new fund to honor the memory of Ernst Bernard Haas (1924-2003), whose work helped develop the field of European integration studies and who received our first Lifetime Contribution to EU Studies award in 1999.

In announcing this new memorial fund, donations to which will be earmarked to support the research of graduate students in the field, EUSA Chair George Ross says, "This is a particularly important moment for us to create the Haas Fund. Ernst Haas was an intellectual pioneer who alerted North American scholars to the signal importance of European integration. In today's transatlantic climate it is altogether too easy to overlook that Europe is integrating ever more profoundly and that understanding it is more important to us than ever."

Ross further explains that, as we imagine Professor Haas would have wished, donations to the Haas Fund will be used to benefit students. EUSA anticipates, depending on the level of contributions, offering doctoral dissertation fellowships (on EU-related topics). Please watch this List Serve, our Web site, and the *EUSA Review* for updates.

On the importance of the work of Ernst Haas to our field:

Stanley Hoffmann, keynote speaker at EUSA's 2003 conference in Nashville, opened his talk with this testimony:

"Haas, who died in March 2003 at age 78, was both a fine human being with unlimited reserves of good humor, wit, and energy, and a liberal who felt acutely the disconnection between the traditional liberal vision of international relations and the realities of a nuclear world. His *Uniting of Europe* displayed the liberal faith in knowledge and science, acknowledged the importance of converging interests in moving 'beyond the nation-state' and expressed the need to constrain the inescapable role of state power."

— Stanley Hoffmann, EUSA Conference Keynote Address, March 2003.

Gary Marks, Chair of the European Union Studies Association when the EUSA Prizes were initiated and Haas was unanimously selected as the first recipient, wrote of Haas' work:

"Haas' ideas and books have defined the field of European integration studies, and they remain a potent source of theory testing and elaboration today. The theory with which his name is indelibly associated — neofunctionalism — was not only the first comprehensive theory of European integration but has been by far the most influential."

—Gary Marks, 1997-1999 Chair, EUSA [ECSA].

EUSA members, friends, and all other interested persons who wish to contribute to our Ernst Haas Memorial Fund for EU Studies should do one of the following:

- Send a check or international money order in any amount, payable to "EUSA" with "Haas Fund" noted in the memo. line of the check; checks must be in US\$ and drawn on a bank with representation in the U.S.
- Mail or fax the complete number/expiry of a current MasterCard or Visa card with the amount of your contribution to the Haas Fund indicated (in these cases, EUSA must extract 4% of the gift to cover the credit card processing fees)
- On your next EUSA membership renewal form, mark your donation to the Haas Fund on the line indicated for this purpose. We mail renewal forms in March, June, September, and December. (June notices have gone out; if you wish to donate on your June renewal form, simply hand-write "Haas Fund" and the amount of your gift).

The European Union Studies Association, Inc. is a tax-exempt, non-profit educational organization. Gifts to our Funds are tax-deductible (for U.S. taxpayers). Donors of \$25 or more will receive a receipt; all donors will be listed in the *EUSA Review*. Our annual tax return is on file with the U.S. Internal Revenue Service.

EU-Related Organizations

Editor's note: This list includes independent non-profit organizations, foundations, and think tanks with a significant EU focus as part of their missions. The information herein is current as of June 2003. Inclusion here does not constitute endorsement by the European Union Studies Association.

Academy of European Law is a public foundation whose purpose is to provide law practitioners with both continuing education opportunities and a forum for debate on EU law. The Academy holds conferences and seminars in several European cities and has an office in Brussels as well.

ERA Trier T 49 651 937 37 0
Metzer Allee 4 F 49 651 937 37 90
D-54290 Trier, Germany W www.era.int

Atlantic Council of the United States has a Program on Transatlantic Relations that promotes dialogue on the major issues that will affect transatlantic relations in the near term, through publications, conferences, briefing tours, and public events. It also serves as the NATO liaison office in the U.S.

910 17th Street NW, Suite 1000
Washington, DC 20006 USA
T 202 463 7226 W www.acus.org
F 202 463 7241 E info@acus.org

Center for Strategic and International Studies has a Europe Program for public debate on U.S.-European and intra-European relations, from the perspectives of nation-states and institutions such as the EU and NATO. Sponsors a Euro-Forum and Euro-Focus newsletters, *inter alia*.

1800 K Street NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20006 USA
T 202 887 0200 W www.csis.org
F 202 775 3199 E msparkman@csis.org

Centre for European Policy Studies is a research institute with a focus on European economic policy and security policy (including Europe's external relations). CEPS sponsors many lectures and fora and publishes many briefs and reports.

1 Place du Congrès
B-1000 Brussels, Belgium
T 32 2 229 39 11 W www.ceps.be
F 32 2 219 41 51 E info@ceps.be

Council for European Studies promotes the interdisciplinary research and study of Europe in the social sciences and humanities. It holds the Conference of Europeanists, gives pre-dissertation fellowships, publishes a newsletter, and more.

Columbia University
1203A International Affairs Bldg.
420 West 118th Street, MC 3310
NY, NY 10027 USA
T 212 854 4172 W www.europanet.org
F 212 854 8808 E ces@columbia.edu

Europa Grande operates in Spanish, on-line, and is devoted to information gathering, the commissioning of studies, and the

transmission of information on European integration and enlargement to policy makers and the general public.

E info@europagrande.org
W www.europagrande.org

Europe 2020 is a think tank "for the generations born since the Rome Treaty," working with European institutions, news media, research centers, and others, providing seminars, fora, position papers, etc., often on-line (site in French and English).

16, Rue Fontaine
F-75009 Paris, France
T 33 1 48 78 50 44 W www.europe2020.org
F 33 1 48 78 50 73 E centre@europe2020.org

European Community Studies Association is a project of the European Commission developed to be an umbrella for associations of EU scholars, primarily in EU member states. It promotes the study/teaching of European integration and cooperation among its member associations. It offers technical assistance to associations and organizes a biennial conference.

67, Rue de Trèves
B-1040 Brussels, Belgium
T 32 2 230 54 72 W www.ecsanet.org
F 32 2 230 56 08 E ldf@icp-ajm.org

European Institute of Public Administration is funded in part by EU member states and the European Commission to provide high-level training for public officials in the member states and candidate countries. EIPA provides services to develop the capacities of public officials in dealing with EU affairs through training, applied research, consultancy and publications, with frequent seminars in Maastricht and satellite offices in Barcelona, Luxembourg, and Milan.

P. O. Box 1229, O. L. Vrouweplein 22
NL-6201 BE Maastricht, The Netherlands
T 31 43 329 62 22 W www.eipa.nl
F 31 43 329 62 96 E eipa@eipa-nl.com

European Union Studies Association is the premier scholarly and professional association, worldwide, for all those following EU affairs. With 1600+ members in more than 40 countries, EUSA publishes a quarterly journal, a book series, (*State of the European Union*), and a printed Member Directory, holds international conferences, gives awards, has member-based special interest sections, and much more.

415 Bellefield Hall
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA
T 412 648 7635 W www.eustudies.org
F 412 648 1168 E eusa@pitt.edu

Forum Europe offers governments, international institutions, industry associations, and companies information and contacts at the senior levels of European policy making by organizing conferences, high-level roundtables, working groups, and news media visits, as well as through its publications.

Bibliothèque Solvay
Leopold Park, 137 Rue Belliard
B-1040 Brussels, Belgium
T 32 2 736 14 30 W www.forum-europe.com
F 32 2 736 32 16 E info@forum-europe.com

German Marshall Fund of the United States is a U.S.-based institution that promotes cooperation and the exchange of ideas between the U.S. and Europe in the spirit of the Marshall Plan. It promotes the study of international and domestic policies, supports comparative research and debate on key issues, and assists policy and opinion leaders' understanding of the issues.

1744 R Street NW
Washington, DC 20009 USA
T 202 745 3950 W www.gmfus.org
F 202 265 1662 E info@gmfus.org

Hellenic Centre for European Studies (aka EKEM) is an independent research centre focusing on issues concerning the European unification and the participation of Greece in the EU as well as general issues that affect Greek foreign policy.

Sponsors research groups, conferences, various publications.

1, G. Prassa & Didotou Str. T 30 210 36 36 880
106 80 Athens, Greece F 30 210 36 31 133
W www.ekem.gr E info@ekem.gr

International Atlantic Economic Society facilitates communication among economists across the Atlantic, promotes the field of economics, and fosters the intellectual development of economists by sponsoring conferences and publishing articles for international dissemination.

4949 West Pine Blvd., Second Floor
St. Louis, MO 63108 USA
T 314 454 0100 W www.iaes.org
F 314 454 9109 E iaes@iaes.org

L'Observatoire Social Européen is a research and information center that "foster[s] a better understanding ... of the social implications of the building of Europe." It produces books and dossiers, supports original research, creates training materials, and houses a documents library for civil servants, journalists, NGOs, policy makers, researchers, and others.

rue Paul Emile Janson, 13
B-1050 Brussels, Belgium
T 32 2 537 19 71 W www.ose.be
F 32 2 539 28 08 E info@ose.be

Transatlantic Business Dialogue promotes closer trade ties between the U.S. and the EU. It is an informal process in which European and American companies and business associations develop joint trade policy recommendations, working with the EU European Commission and the U.S. government.

1200 Wilson Blvd. MC-RS-00
Arlington, VA 22209 USA
T 703 465 3607 W www.tabd.com
F 703 465 3884 E info@tabd.com

Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue is a forum of U.S. and EU consumer organizations which develops consumer policy recommendations to the U.S. government and EU in order to promote the consumer's interests; through it, EU and U.S. consumer groups have input into EU - U.S. negotiations.

TACD Secretariat
24 Highbury Crescent
London N5 1RX, UK

T 44 207 226 66 63 W www.tacd.org
F 44 207 354 06 07 E tacd@consint.org

Transatlantic Information Exchange Service, also known as TIESWeb, uses the Internet to promote transatlantic dialogue on a people to people level. The site offers a Webzine, subscription to a daily EU news digest, on-line fora, and much more. TIESWeb sponsors a conference in Miami in April 2004, "Reshaping Transatlantic Relations for the 21st Century: The Citizens' Perspective Reconsidered."

4, rue de Bérite W www.tiesweb.org
F-75006 Paris, France E contact@tiesweb.org

Transatlantic Studies Association, launched in 2002, focuses on "all aspects of transatlantic studies in all time periods." The field is defined as Europe as it relates to North, South, and Central America and the Caribbean, including the history of economic, political and security links, migration, and interdependence. Organizes a biennial conference.

School of American Studies
University of Dundee
Dundee DD1 4HN Scotland, UK
T 44 1382 344 588
F 44 1382 344 588 E a.p.dobson@dundee.ac.uk
W www.dundee.ac.uk/iteas/welcome.html

TransEuropean Policy Studies Association promotes the study of European public policy, particularly EMU, EU institutions, CFSP, enlargement, and citizens' acceptance of the above. It organizes pre-EU presidency conferences and links national institutes in member states and candidate countries. Its members are European institutes and centres.

11, rue d'Egmont
B-1000 Brussels, Belgium
T 32 2 511 34 70 W www.tepsa.be
F 32 2 511 67 70 E tepsa@tepsa.be

University Association for Contemporary European Studies brings together academics researching Europe with practitioners in European affairs. It is a clearing house for information on European studies, and promotes research and the development of research networks through conferences, workshops, publications, and more.

King's College London, Strand
London WC2R 2LS, UK
T 44 20 7240 0206 W www.uaces.org
F 44 20 7836 2350 E admin@uaces.org

Young European Federalists is a supranational, political movement active in most European countries. It is an autonomous youth organization with no political party affiliations or commitments; it works for increased democracy on the federal model, mainly at the EU level and Europe-wide.

Chaussée de Wavre 214d
B-1050 Brussels, Belgium
T 32 2 512 00 53 W www.jef-europe.net
F 32 2 626 95 01 E info@jef-europe.net

Editor's note: Our next compilation of EU-related organizations will be published with the Summer 2004 EUSA Review. Send brief details to <eusa@pitt.edu> by June 15, 2004.

EU-Related Miscellany

Summer Course: “**Foundations of European Union Law**,” to be held September 1-5, 2003 in Slanchev Briag (Sunny Beach) Resort on the Black Sea, Bulgaria. Organized by the School of Law, New Bulgarian University. Language of instruction is English. Courses will include Historical Development of the European Communities, Institutions of the EU, Legal Order of the EU, Judicial System of the EU, The Common Market, Competition Law of the EU, and Enlargement of the EU. Fee: • 200. Contact Nikolay Dobrev at e-mail <eulawcourse@yahoo.com>.

New journal received: *Asia-Pacific Journal of EU Studies*, in English, published at the School of Economics, Seoul National University, Korea. The English-language journal aims to publish twice yearly. Volume 1, No.1 (Summer 2003) includes six articles, among them “East Asian Economic Integration and the Strategy of the EU,” by Sung-Hoon Park, and “EU’s Role in the Post Cold War Period and the Future of Asia-Europe Relations,” by Bingran Dai. Contact Cae-One Kim, School of Economics, Seoul National University, San 56-1, Sillim-Dong, Kwanak-Ku, Seoul, Korea, or by e-mail <caeone@plaza.snu.ac.kr>.

Journals received: *Cuadernos Europeos de Deusto*, Num.28/2003, published by the Instituto de Estudios Europeos, Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao, Spain. Articles in Spanish and English, including “¿Un modelo social europea? Análisis comparado del gasto en protección social en la Unión Europea,” by J. Alsasua López et alia, and “Second Thoughts on European Citizenship as Secondary Citizenship,” by Philippe C. Schmitter. Contact Nicolás Mariscal, Instituto de Estudios Europeos, Universidad de Deusto, Apartado 1, E-48080 Bilbao, Spain.

EIPASCOPE, No.2003/1, bulletin of the European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht, The Netherlands. Articles include “Alternative Regulations or Complementary Methods? Evolving Options in European Governance,” by Edward Best, and “The Next Phase in the Europeanisation of National Ministries: Preparing EU Dialogues,” by Adriaan Schout and Kees Bastmeijer. Contact Veerle Deckmyn, European Institute of Public Administration, P. O. Box 1229, 6201 BE Maastricht, The Netherlands, or visit the Web site <www.eipa.nl>.

The **Central and East European Law Initiative** (CEELI) is a public service project of the American Bar Association, with the purpose of supporting the legal reform process in Central and Eastern Europe and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. Founded in 1991, CEELI judges, attorneys, and law professors have contributed millions of dollars of pro bono legal assistance. Legal professionals with at least five years of legal experience in the United States, membership in a U.S. bar, high energy, and strong interpersonal skills may apply to participate in the program. Contact the American Bar Association Central and East European Law Initiative, 740 15th Street NW, Washington, DC 20005 USA, or e-mail <ceeli@abanet.org>.

Newsletters received: *Euro-Focus* (Volume 9, Nos.3, 4, 5, April 11, April 16, May 22, 2003), a publication of the Europe Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington. Each 4- to 6-page issue consists of one academic article on current EU-related issues, e.g., “EU-U.S. Relations Beyond Iraq: Setting the Terms of Complementary,” by Simon Serfaty, and “Europe’s Constitutional Contentions,” by Christina Balis and Elizabeth Collett. Contact the Europe Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1800 K Street NW, Washington, DC 20006 USA, or visit <www.csis.org/europe>.

The *CEPII Newsletter* (No.18, Winter 2002/2003) comes from the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales, Paris, and is published in English. This 8-page issue focuses on “The Economics of Panic: Confronting Financial Crises,” and includes three short articles by CEPII scholars. Contact CEPII, 9, rue Georges Petard, F-75740 Paris Cedex 15, France, or e-mail Sylvie Hurion at <hurion@cepil.fr>.

One Europe or Several? is the newsletter of the Economic & Social Research Council program of the same name, based at Sussex European Institute, Sussex, UK. This issue (No.9, Spring 2003) summarizes the program and the outputs from the 26 projects and activities that made up the ‘One Europe or Several?’ program, now completed. Among the projects summarized (too numerous to list here), are “Borders, Migration and Labour Market Dynamics in a Changing Europe,” “The Europeanisation of State-Society Relations: A Comparative Study,” “Globalisation, European Integration and the European Social Model,” “Germany and the Reshaping of Europe,” and “‘Fuzzy Statehood’ and European Integration in Central and Eastern Europe.” All papers and briefing notes are available for downloading from the program’s Web site at <www.one-europe.ac.uk> or by contacting the ESRC ‘One Europe or Several?’ Programme, Sussex European Institute, University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9SH, UK.

The six-month **Italian Presidency** of the European Union took effect on July 1, 2003. The Web site is <www.ueitalia2003.it>. Italy last held the rotating Presidency from January-June 1996. According to an EU news release, “

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The schedule of Presidencies through 2006 is posted on the EU’s Web page <http://ue.eu.int/en/presid.htm>. Ireland will assume the Presidency in January 2004.

The next **European Parliament** elections (for what will be the sixth term) will take place in 2004.

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EU-Related Journal Discounts for EUSA Members (effective May 30, 2003)

The European Union Studies Association is delighted to announce a new benefit for members, in the form of discounted subscription rates to key journals (and a weekly newspaper) focusing on European integration. The journals and their EUSA-member discounted rates (rates may change after 2003), available to current EUSA members only are:

Columbia Journal of European Law

US\$ 68 (professors), US\$ 38 (students),
US\$ 232 (outside USA)

Comparative European Politics

US\$ 36 (discounted from \$50)

European Union Politics

US\$ 39 (discounted from \$56)

European Voice

US\$ 168 (discounted from \$240,
includes on-line archive access)

Journal of European Integration

US\$ 56 (discounted from \$59)

Journal of European Public Policy

US\$ 61 (discounted from \$98)

To order one or more of the journals at the EUSA-member rate, simply select them on the next membership renewal form you receive from EUSA (we send them by first class mail each March, June, September, and December).

You may also select the journals via our on-line membership form (go to <http://www.eustudies.org> and click on "Join or Renew Here") if renewing your EUSA membership electronically. If you have recently renewed your EUSA membership and now wish to take advantage of the discounted journal subscription offers, simply send an e-mail to the EUSA office at eusa@pitt.edu giving your name, current mailing address, and journals to which you wish to subscribe, and we will do the rest.

Please note the following important stipulations:

- These offers apply to individual, current EUSA members only (not library or institutional members).
- The journal(s) will bill you directly and will be responsible for all collections, subscription fulfillment, and customer service matters.
- EUSA will promptly provide your name and address to our representatives at the journal(s) and verify your current EUSA membership status for them.
- We don't collect subscription payments; you will be billed by and pay the journal(s) directly.
- EUSA receives no financial benefit from these discounted subscription arrangements, which were developed as an added benefit to our membership.

Spotlight on The Netherlands

Missions

The, 4200
,, 20008, 202 244
5300; 202 362 3430.

• The Netherlands America Commission for Educational Exchange is a bi-national, non-profit organization established by agreement between the U.S. and The Netherlands. It administers educational exchange programs between the two countries. Based in Amsterdam. Web: www.nacee.nl

Fellowships and Grants

The **Fulbright Scholar Program** offers the **European Union Affairs Research Program**, for conducting research on EU affairs or U.S.-E.U. relations. Preference will be given to projects focusing on the organizations of the EU, particularly on the process of institution building within the EU. Fluency in French or German may be required, depending on the nature of the project; fluency in one or more of the other languages of the EU may be required if based in another EU member state. Must have proven teaching and research experience and publications. Professionals with at least five years experience will also be considered. Applicants must arrange the institutional affiliation and the letter of invitation. For 2-5 months, between September 2004-June 2005. Preference given to grants starting in September.

Also of interest to EUSA members is the **Fulbright Lectureship in U.S.-E.U. Relations**, to teach a course on some aspect on transatlantic relations and supervise a few M.A. theses at the College of Europe, Brugge, Belgium. Courses are taught to a select group of graduate students from all European countries and North America. There is one seminar taught during the second term, taught in a "block system" with dates individually arranged. Average class size is 20-30 students. Grantee may also be asked to participate in conferences and other activities. Language: fluency in French is desirable but not required. Additional qualifications: several years of teaching experience at the graduate level, associate or full professor rank desired. Six months starting September 2004 or January 2005. For both programs, see <www.cies.org> or contact Daria Teutonico, telephone 202.686.6245, e-mail <dteutonico@cies.iie.org>. *Deadline for both programs: August 1, 2003.*

Ten **German Chancellor Scholarships** will be awarded by the **Alexander von Humboldt Foundation** for the period September 2004-August 2005. The 12-month scholarship is intended for persons in the private, public, non-profit, cultural, and academic sectors who have the potential to strengthen the ties between Germany and the United States through their professions or studies. The program is preceded by language instruction in Germany during August 2004. Candidates must be U.S. citizens, possess a bachelor's degree by the start of the scholarship, and under 35 years old. Prior knowledge of German is not required. (Those with little or no knowledge of German should undertake language training in the U.S. as soon as they accept the scholarship.) Applicants should design individual projects tailored to their professional development and goals, and decide at which institutions to pursue them; applicants may also arrange internships, junior staff positions, or training/performance programs. Before submitting the application, applicants should have established contact with a mentor in Germany who agrees to provide professional and/or scholarly assistance throughout the program. The monthly stipend ranges from • 2,000-3,500. Visit <www.humboldt-foundation.de> or e-mail <avh@bellatlantic.net>. *Deadline: October 31, 2003.*

Conferences

July 9-11, 2003: "The Constitutional Future of Europe: A Transatlantic Dialogue," Florence, Italy. Organized by the Global Law Program and the Jean Monnet Center of the New York University School of Law. See <www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/conference>.

July 22-23, 2003: "The European Union and the United States Today," Seattle, WA. Summer workshop for secondary teachers. Organized by the EU Center of the University of Washington and the Washington Council on International Trade. See <jsis.artsci.washington.edu/programs/europe/euc.html>.

July 23-24, 2003: "The Future of Transatlantic Relations," Columbia, MO. Organized by the EU Center at the University of Missouri. See <eu.missouri.edu/TransatlanticForum.html>.

September 2-4, 2003: "The European Union: The First Ten Years, The Next Ten Years?" Newcastle, UK. UACES 33rd Annual Conference and 8th Research Conference. See <www.uaces.org> or e-mail <admin@uaces.org>.

September 18-21, 2003: "Governance in the New Europe," Marburg, Germany. Part of 2nd European Consortium for Political Research Conference. See <www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr>

September 18-21, 2003: 27th Annual Conference of the German Studies Association, New Orleans, LA. Covers all aspects of German studies. See <www.g-s-a.org>.

September 24-26, 2003: "International Governance after 9/11: Interdependence, Security, Democracy," Belfast, Northern Ireland. Organized by the Institute of Governance, Queen's University Belfast. See <www.governance.qub.ac.uk>.

October 17-19, 2003: 56th Conference of the International Atlantic Economic Society. Quebec City, Canada. The IAES holds two conferences each year, one in Europe and one in the U.S. See <www.iaes.org>.

October 23-24, 2003: "30th Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy." New York, NY. Organized by the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, Fordham University College of Law. See <www.fordhamantitrust.com>.

October 24-25, 2003: "Strategy of Poland's Membership in the European Union," Sopot, Poland. 20th anniversary conference of the University of Gdansk's Research Centre on European Integration. See <ekonom.univ.gda.pl/conference>.

November 13-14, 2003: "European Migration and Refugee Policy: Towards a Harmonized European Approach?" Rome, Italy. Organized by the Cicero Foundation. See <www.cicero-foundation.org>.

Calls for Papers

“Europe and the World: Integration, Interdependence, Exceptionalism?” 14th Conference of Europeanists, March 12-14, 2004, Chicago, IL. Organized by the Council for European Studies. Proposals from all fields of study are invited, and especially those on these themes: Reckoning with the European Past: Empires, the Cold War and Human Rights; Europeanization: Prospects, Opportunities, Challenges; European Cities, European Regions; New Party Politics: East and West, North and South; Constitutions, Governance, and Citizenship; Traveling, Trafficking, and Transnational Regulation; and, Transformations in Work, Welfare, and Family: New Risks, New Politics. The program committee will consider panel and individual paper submissions; the acceptance rate for submissions of complete panels (with three or four papers or roundtable participants, a chair and one or two discussants) has been higher than for individual papers in the past, and scholars working on similar topics are encouraged to propose panels. Proposals from graduate students are welcomed. For more information, see <www.europanet.org>. *Deadline: October 15, 2003.*

“Constructing World Orders,” 5th Pan-European International Relations Conference, September 9-11, 2004, The Hague, The Netherlands. Organized by the Standing Group on International Relations. The conference will further the debate about the intertwinement of International Relations Theory and International Law. This *pan*-European conference will analyse the societal, economic, political, legal and military consequences of Europe’s “new deal.” We welcome panels that combine both academics and practitioners. Themes: What did we learn over the past century? Are we still in a fruitless debate between Idealism and Realism? Can new approaches, notably Social Constructivism, shed new light on the analysis? How will International Relations Theory meet International Law in the historical setting of The Hague? The Fifth Pan-European Conference will provide input in both academic and public debates about Europe’s future.

Additionally, the conference will present an early opportunity to evaluate the enlargement process that started in Berlin in 1989. Scholars from both sides of the table can discuss the negotiations on the basis of their outcomes. The final theme combines the others at a higher level of abstraction. How do traditional and new schools of thought in International Relations cope with the variety of politically relevant structures in the present world society, such as the international system, the world economy, international society, and the fruits and perils of globalisation? What does the English School have to say about failed states in well-ordered subsystems? How does International Political Economy accommodate to changes in the mutually constitutive nature of “state” and “markets”? Will Strategic Studies and Security Studies grasp the transformation of war? Can International Relations survive without an echo of inside/outside logic? For more information on the proposal process, see <www.sgir.org/conference2004>. *Deadline: February 1, 2004.*

Publications

New EU-Related Books and Working Papers

- Bleich, Eric (2003) *Race Politics in Britain and France: Ideas and Policymaking since the 1960s*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Church, Clive (2003) “The Contexts of Swiss Opposition to Europe” Sussex, UK: SEI Working Paper No. 64.
- Geddes, Andrew (2003) *The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe*. London, UK: Sage Publications.
- Gilbert, Mark F. (2003) *Surpassing Realism: The Politics of European Integration since 1945*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Gillingham, John (2003) *The European Integration, 1950-2003: Superstate or New Market Economy?* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Goddard, C. Roe *et alia* (eds.) (2003) *International Political Economy: State-Market Relations in a Changing Global Order* (2nd Ed.) Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Jordan, Andrew, R. Wurzel, and A. Zito (eds.) (2003) *New Instruments of Environmental Governance? National Experiences and Prospects*. London: Frank Cass.
- Laursen, Finn (2003) “The Danish ‘No’ to the Euro and Its Implications: Towards More Variable Geometry?” Odense, Denmark: CFES Working Paper No.9/2003.
- Magone, José M. (2003) *The Politics of Southern Europe: Integration into the European Union*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Mayhew, Alan (2003) “The Financial and Budgetary Impact of Enlargement and Accession” Sussex, UK: SEI Working Paper No. 65.
- Miller, Russell *et alia* (eds.) (2003) *Annual of German & European Law 2003*. New York: Berghahn Books.
- Phillipson, Robert (2003) *English-Only Europe? Challenging Language Policy*. London, UK: Taylor & Francis.
- Rynning, Sten (2003) “Coming of Age? The European Union’s Security and Defence Policy” Odense, Denmark: CFES Working Paper No.10/2003.
- Sa’adeh, Anne (2003) *Contemporary France: A Democratic Education*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Spokeuiciute, Rasa (2003) “The Impact of EU Membership on the Lithuanian Budget” Sussex, UK: SEI Working Paper No. 63.
- Vassallo, Francesca (2003) “Another Europeanisation Case? British Political Activism?” Sussex, UK: SEI Working Paper No. 61.
- Warleigh, Alex (2003) *Democracy in the European Union: Theory, Practice and Reform*. London: Sage Publications.
- Wilga, Maciej (2003) “Nice Treaty and Candidate Countries: Poland and Institutional Leftovers” Odense, Denmark: CFES Working Paper No.11/2003.
- Williams, Kieran *et alia* (2003) “Explaining Lustration in Eastern Europe: A Post-Communist Politics Approach” Sussex, UK: SEI Working Paper No. 62.

EUSA News and Notes

Are you moving? Many EUSA members move frequently. Please drop an e-mail to the EUSA office at eus@pitt.edu in advance to let us know your new address. We regret that we are not able to replace membership materials that you have missed when you have not provided us with your new address, nor can we replace membership materials that were not delivered when you gave us an incomplete or inaccurate address.

Please make a note in your planner that the dates of our **2005 9th Biennial International Conference** in Austin, Texas, are **March 31-April 2, 2005**. We will be at the Hyatt Regency right on the water (known locally as “Town Lake”). Please visit our 2005 conference Web page: www.eustudies.org/conf2005.html. We will be circulating the Call for Proposals in Spring 2004.

Some useful facts about Austin: It is the Texas state capital, and the state legislature will be in session—and open to the public for observation—during the dates of our conference. Free guided tours are available of the stunning capitol building, built in 1888 of pink granite. Across the street is the Texas Governor’s Mansion (free guided tours also available), home to Texas’ “first family” since 1856. Austin’s oldest building is

1841

125

235

—thus Austin’s reputation as a young city. Nicknamed “live music capitol of the world,” Austin has over 100 live music venues and is home to the well-known “Austin City Limits” concert studio. Many films have been made in Austin, from “Hope Floats” to “The Rookie.”

Profile of a good EUSA member: We are grateful for all the members of EUSA, and we especially appreciate those who:

- have EUSA and its Web site (www.eustudies.org) listed as a resource on their EU-related course syllabi
- recommend EUSA membership to their students/colleagues as the key source for the latest ideas and scholarship on European integration, EU affairs, and transatlantic relations
- contact the EUSA office for EUSA membership brochures to take to EU-related events they attend
- list EUSA’s biennial international conference on calendars of upcoming events and help circulate EUSA’s call for proposals
- encourage their students to submit paper/poster proposals for the EUSA conference
- vote in (and run for) our biennial executive committee election (the next election takes place in Spring 2005)
- renew their memberships on the first renewal notice they receive.

Thank you, EUSA members, for your support in these ways.

From the Chair

(continued from p.2) 1998 survey showed that EUSA members wanted them. Please help us represent your EU-related interests by letting us know what they are.

The first formal act of the 2003-2005 board has been to launch EUSA’s new Ernst Haas Memorial Fund for EU Studies. I encourage each of you, especially those who knew Ernie and/or were influenced by his work or his teaching, to contribute to this fund. Our goal is to support the research of doctoral students writing dissertations on European integration. We believe that this is essential for developing the community of scholars and enhancing the field. Please see p.21 in this issue for the details.

Those EUSA members who subscribe to our e-mail list serve or visit our Web site may already be aware of another very recent EUSA initiative. After much thought, the 2001-2003 board decided to approach key journals in the field to establish discounted subscription rates to them for EUSA members, as a new benefit of EUSA membership. The result, announced in late May, is a package of EU-related journals to which EUSA members may subscribe at a discount, either when you join EUSA or when you renew your existing membership. You’ll find the list of journals in this issue on p.25, on your next renewal form, and on our Web site. We hope you will find this to be useful and we welcome your feedback.

I write this as summer has finally broken through the monsoon season in the Northeastern U.S., and would like to wish everyone a relaxing and rewarding summer. Our research and intellectual agendas overflow and we have lots of good work to do. EUSA exists to encourage this work and we intend to go about this task with the energy that the situation demands. Feel free to make suggestions. In the meantime, best greetings.

GEORGE ROSS
Brandeis University

The *EUSA Review* follows an annual calendar of announcements and listings organized in four topic areas: Winter (December 15): [EU-Related Academic Programs](#) (degree or certificate-granting, worldwide); Spring (March 15): [EU-Related Web Sites](#) (especially primary sources such as databases, on-line publications, and bibliographies); Summer (June 15): [EU-Related Organizations](#) (academic and professional associations or independent research centers (such as think tanks) with significant EU aspects in their missions); and Fall (September 15): [EUSA Members’ Research Notes](#) (current, EU-related, funded research projects). Send brief announcements by e-mail to eus@pitt.edu or by mail to EUSA, 415 Bellefield Hall, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA. We reserve the right to edit for length, and we cannot guarantee inclusion in the listings. We do not accept unsolicited e-mail attachments.

EUROPEAN UNION STUDIES ASSOCIATION 2002 ANNUAL REPORT

Covering the period January 1- December 31, 2002

Mission

The European Union Studies Association, Inc. (EUSA) is an independent, non-profit educational organization that (1) fosters inquiry about the European integration project, the European Union, and transatlantic relations, (2) builds a community of scholars and practitioners of EU affairs, and (3) enhances awareness, both general and specialized, of the European Union and its member states. EUSA was founded in 1988 as the European Community Studies Association.

Governance

EUSA is governed by a seven-person Executive Committee (the board), elected by current EUSA members via a mail-in ballot every other year. Once elected, the board chooses its officers from within its ranks. The board members in office during the period of this report were Martin A. Schain (New York University), Chair; M. Donald Hancock (Vanderbilt University), Vice-Chair; Mark A. Pollack (University of Wisconsin Madison), Treasurer; Jeffrey Anderson (Georgetown University), Secretary; Karen Alter (Northwestern University); George Bermann (Columbia University School of Law); and George Ross (Brandeis University). Alberta Sbragia (University of Pittsburgh), former Association Chair and board member, is EUSA's liaison to the University of Pittsburgh and holds an *ex officio* (non-voting) seat on the board while EUSA is located at Pitt. Any current EUSA member may run or be nominated for a seat on the EUSA Executive Committee. In each election, either three or four seats are open (board terms are staggered to ensure continuity). The board oversees EUSA operations, helps raise funds, and makes decisions about EUSA's programs and activities. The EUSA board holds one face-to-face meeting per year, and in October 2002 met in Nashville, Tennessee at the Hilton Suites Nashville Downtown. The board also holds occasional telephone conference calls and frequent e-mail discussions.

The EUSA administrative office is located within the University Center for International Studies (UCIS) at the University of Pittsburgh, where it has been generously hosted since spring 1993. This advantageous relationship provides both vital infrastructure and stability for EUSA operations. During 2002 EUSA continued to be staffed by a full-time Executive Director, with various student and temporary-hire assistants as budget allowed and projects required. The Executive Director is overseen by senior staff of UCIS as well as the Chair of the EUSA Executive Committee, and as such reports both to UCIS and to the EUSA board.

Membership

In 2002 the EUSA membership crossed the threshold of sixteen hundred members (in forty-two countries), its largest membership count to date. New members come in via the EUSA Web site, word of mouth, the conference call for proposals, and occasional targeted mailings done by the EUSA office. Increasing membership, including at the newly launched Sustaining level, has been identified by the EUSA board as a primary goal for helping assure the organization's viability and financial stability.

In January 2002 EUSA increased its membership dues to help offset the increased costs of printing, postage, supplies, telecommunications, and other tangibles necessary to produce and distribute membership materials. (The last increase had taken place in January 1998.) At the same time EUSA launched a new category of membership, the Sustaining Membership, in which EU-related organizations help support EUSA with higher dues and EUSA promotes the organization's EU-related activities to the membership in return. At the end of 2002, EUSA had established twelve sustaining memberships, for which we are very grateful: Center for West European Studies/European Union Center, University of Pittsburgh; Center for European Studies, University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Center for German and European Studies, Georgetown University; Center for European Studies, Vanderbilt University; Dublin European Institute, University College Dublin; Center for European Studies, New York University; European University Institute; Faculty of Law Graduate Studies, University of Leicester; Columbia Law School European Legal Studies Center; European Union Center of California; Maxwell European Union Center, Syracuse University; and the *European Voice*, Brussels.

Programs and Activities

Biennial Conference

EUSA's conference is its signature event and one of the ways in which the Association builds membership. It continues to be the most important intellectual meeting in EU affairs, drawing participants in nearly equal numbers from both sides of the Atlantic. In 2002, EUSA's off-conference year, much advance work took place for the conference to be held in Nashville, Tennessee, March 27-29, 2003. The EUSA board convened a program chair and committee, and in April began circulating the call for proposals. In accordance with EUSA's articles of incorporation and by-laws, each appointed subcommittee includes a representative from the elected EUSA board. The 2003 conference program committee consisted of John T. S. Keeler, University of Washington, Chair; Karen Alter, Northwestern University (EUSA board representative); William Brustein, University of Pittsburgh; Hugo Kaufmann, City University of New York; Amy Verdun, University of Victoria; and Joseph Weiler, New York University School of Law. The program committee met in Pittsburgh in November 2002 for a weekend meeting to select proposals and form a coherent schedule of panels for Nashville.

In early 2002 the EUSA board chose Austin, Texas as the site for its 2005 biennial conference and in March 2002 the Executive Director traveled to Austin to negotiate a hotel contract. The Austin Convention & Visitors Bureau paid for the trip.

Interest Sections

The EUSA board approved proposals from EUSA members for the establishment of two new interest sections in 2002, bringing to seven the total number of interest sections within EUSA. The new sections launched in 2002 were the "EU Public Opinion and Participation" section, proposed (*continued on p.30*)

(continued from p.29) and chaired by Mark Franklin, Trinity College, and the “EU as Global Actor” section, proposed and co-chaired (until the section’s first meeting in Nashville) by Roy H. Ginsberg (Skidmore College) and Michael E. Smith (Georgia State University). All EUSA interest sections meet at the biennial international conference and are governed by a set of guidelines and policies established by EUSA boards. Members may find this information posted on the EUSA Web site at <<http://www.eustudies.org/interestpolicy.html>>

Internet

After the 2001 name change to the European Union Studies Association, the EUSA launched a new Internet domain, eustudies.org. It had formerly used ecsa.org, a domain that EUSA gave back in 2002 (after one year of automatic forwarding from the old domain to the new) at no cost to the institution from which EUSA had negotiated it in 1998, the Eastern Christian School Association in North Haledon, New Jersey. EUSA’s Web site is a key communication tool for EUSA and its interest sections. EUSA also sponsors a moderated, moderately used e-mail list serve for current members to post EU-related queries, job announcements, conference calls, and the like. To protect EUSA members, the Association developed two relevant policies: the Internet Privacy Policy, posted at <<http://www.eustudies.org/privacy.html>> and the List Serve Policy, posted at <<http://www.eustudies.org/listserve.html>>.

Publications

In 2002 EUSA published Volume 15 of the *EUSA Review*, comprised of four (Winter, Spring, Summer, Fall), 24-page issues, and mailed them to current members, authors, and our funders. During this period the Forum and Features Editor was Mark A. Pollack (University of Wisconsin) and the Book Reviews Editor was Mitchell P. Smith (University of Oklahoma). EUSA also published the 2002 edition of its biennial printed Member Directory, an important resource in EU studies that has grown to 100 pages in small print. The Directory was mailed to current EUSA members and to its advertisers, the latter a new initiative with the 2002 edition. It is then sold for \$25 (shipping included) to other interested parties. EUSA also occasionally sells back issues of the *Review* and copies of papers presented at past conferences for cost plus shipping.

In January 2002, EUSA signed a three-volume contract with Oxford University Press for volumes 6, 7, and 8 in its book series, *State of the European Union*. After a spring 2002 competition among the membership, the EUSA board selected the proposal submitted by Tanja Börzel (Humboldt University Berlin) and Rachel Cichowski (University of Washington), for a volume to be titled “Law, Politics, and Society,” and to be published in Fall 2003. Also in 2002, the EUSA received a small grant from the German Marshall Fund of the United States to help underwrite its fifth U.S.-EU Relations Project. Independent scholar and journalist Elizabeth Pond was recruited to write on the new transatlantic security relationship, and following the format of EUSA’s past U.S.-EU Relations Projects, to deliver her monograph at an invited workshop and at the EUSA conference, both in 2003. EUSA finalized an agreement in 2002 with Brookings Institution Press for the publication of the monograph

in late 2003. (It will appear in Brookings’ Fall 2003 catalogue.) The EUSA will underwrite part of the cost of publishing the monograph and will ship it to current EUSA members.

Finance

(All figures in US\$, rounded to the nearest whole dollar).

During 2002 the EUSA took in \$108,416, as follows:

Grants and underwriting, all sources	\$50,812
Membership dues, all types and levels	\$41,740
Program revenue, all types	\$7,100
Interest income	\$7,039
Unrestricted gifts from individuals	\$1,725

During 2002 the EUSA spent \$106,231, as follows:

Human resources, all types	\$60,612
Program expenses, all types	\$39,565
Executive Committee meeting	\$4,318
Tax return preparation	\$1,000
Small business insurance, legal fees	\$736

On December 31, 2002, EUSA’s Grants and Scholarships Fund held \$12,038 and its Endowment Fund held \$1,700.

Supporters

During the period of this report the European Union Studies Association received grant monies from the European Commission, DG for External Relations, Brussels (partial payment for prior years’ projects), and from the German Marshall Fund of the United States (for the 2003 U.S.-EU Relations Project, mentioned above). EUSA also received financial support from the University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh. Previously mentioned in this report is the invaluable new support from EUSA’s sustaining members. Finally, in 2002 EUSA received gifts¹ from individual members, either to one of our funds or unrestricted, and we thank them for their support:

Christa Altenstetter	Pierre-Henri Laurent
Eugene M. Becker	Demetrios G. Melis
Berghahn Books	Sophie Meunier
Jeanie Bukowski	Ernest M. Pitt, Jr.
Karl H. Cerny	David H. Popper
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Jenise Englund	Michael J. Sodaro
Richard Flickinger	Valerie Staats
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M. Donald Hancock	Byron R. Trauger
Peter Herzog	David Vogel
Ross C. Horning	Joseph H. H. Weiler
John T. S. Keeler	Sherrill Brown Wells
Paulette Kurzer	Eleanor Zeff

1. Gifts sent in response to our 2002 year-end appeal but received in 2003 are counted in the 2003 numbers.

EUSA Lifetime Membership

What is it?

Simply put, it is a one-time dues payment to EUSA of US\$ 1500.

What does it include?

The Lifetime Membership includes all regular membership benefits for life. Among those benefits currently are subscription to the quarterly *EUSA Review*, receipt of occasional EUSA monographs, discounted registration rates at the EUSA International Conference, subscription to our e-mail List Serve, and the opportunity to join EUSA interest sections.

Are there any other benefits?

By making a one-time membership payment, you not only avoid the task of renewing each year, but gain the twin advantages of securing lifetime membership at today's dollar values and avoiding future dues increases.

Who should do this?

Any person wishing to support the endeavors of the European Union Studies Association—the fostering of scholarship and inquiry on the European integration project. For U.S. taxpayers, an additional benefit is a receipt for a one-time \$500 charitable contribution to EUSA, tax-deductible to the extent allowed by law (reducing your tax liability for the year in which you become a Lifetime Member).

How do I become a Lifetime Member?

Simply mail your check, in US\$ and made payable to “EUSA,” to the European Union Studies Association, address given at right. (We can not accept lifetime membership payments by credit card.) We will send you a receipt and letter of acknowledgment.

Will my Lifetime Membership be publicly recognized?

Yes, EUSA Lifetime Members will be listed in the *EUSA Review* and in our printed, biennial Member Directory.

EUROPEAN UNION STUDIES ASSOCIATION

New Individual Membership Form Only (Please type or print)

Name _____

Address _____

City _____

State/Province _____ Postal Code _____

Country _____

Work Telephone _____

Work Facsimile _____

E-mail _____

Your Professional Affiliation _____

Do you wish to be subscribed to EUSA's e-mail List Serve? _____ yes _____ no

Membership dues (please check as appropriate):

Individual _____ \$45 one year _____ \$85 two years

Student* _____ \$30 one year _____ \$55 two years

Lifetime Membership _____ \$1500 (see left for details)

* Students must provide copy of current semester's registration form.

EU Law Interest Section _____ \$5 (2 yrs. \$10)

EU Political Economy Interest Section _____ \$5 (2 yrs. \$10)

Teaching the EU Interest Section _____ \$5 (2 yrs. \$10)

EU Latin America Caribbean Interest Section _____ \$5 (2 yrs. \$10)

EU Economics Interest Section _____ \$5 (2 yrs. \$10)

EU Public Opinion and Participation Section _____ \$5 (2 yrs. \$10)

EU as Global Actor Section _____ \$5 (2 yrs. \$10)

EUSA members may wish to make a contribution to support the work of EUSA in any amount over membership dues:

EUSA Grants and Scholarships Fund \$ _____

EUSA Endowment Fund \$ _____

Ernst Haas Memorial Fund for EU Studies \$ _____

Total amount of dues and gifts enclosed \$ _____

We prefer payment by check (payable to “EUSA”) when possible. Checks must be in US\$ and drawn on a USA bank. We also accept international money orders and MasterCard or Visa credit cards. Your cancelled check or credit card statement will be your receipt.

MasterCard # _____/_____/_____/_____

Visa # _____/_____/_____/_____

Expiry ___/___ Last 3 digits from back side of card ___/___/___

Signature _____

Mail or fax this form (please do not mail and fax this form) to:

European Union Studies Association

415 Bellefield Hall

University of Pittsburgh

Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA

Facsimile 412.648.1168



Inside the Summer 2003 *EUSA Review*:

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This issue includes our 15th Anniversary Member Survey — please complete it and mail it in!

1988)(

®

European Union Studies Association

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Lifetime Membership

\$1500 for all our materials, for life, and credit for a one-time tax-deductible contribution of \$500

EUSA Grants and Scholarships Fund

to support EU-related scholarship and research and travel to the biennial EUSA Conference

EUSA Endowment Fund

to ensure the long-term viability and independence of our non-profit organization

Ernst Haas Memorial Fund for EU Studies

to honor the seminal work of Ernst Haas and support dissertation and other EU research

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