



## **EUSA Review Forum**

### **European Foreign, Security, and Defense Policy**

This *EUSA Review* Forum examines an increasingly important aspect of the EU's global role: its pursuit of a common foreign, security, and (potentially) defense policy. Although the EU has made great strides in foreign policy cooperation over the past few decades, especially when compared to similar efforts in other regional organizations, it still faces a number of challenges in attempting to enhance its foreign policy capabilities in light of the current debate on the EU's constitutional structure. The following essays by four EUSA members provide various perspectives on some of these challenges, focusing on the complex interplay between policy outcomes, institutional arrangements, and the EU's growing ambitions in security/defense affairs.

#### **European Security and Defense Policy: The State of Play** **Roy H. Ginsberg**

HOW CAN THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) work better abroad, and why ask now? Although European foreign policy has considerable political impact on many international actors and issues, the world's richest group of democracies does not have the influence in international security that it does in international economics. It under-funds the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its offspring, the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The jewel in the crown of ESDP will be the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) to conduct such tasks as peacekeeping and conflict prevention when NATO does not wish to be involved. Yet the gap between goals and capabilities is, well, legion. This cause of alarm is exacerbated by two new, related external developments. Counterterrorism requires an international response to a primarily transnational phenomenon. President Bush's foreign policy, which stresses military dominance in a unipolar world of ubiquitous security threats, challenges practices of U.S.-EU foreign policy cooperation established by the first Bush and Clinton Administrations.

The Constitutional Convention is considering proposals to make the EU more efficient and democratic at home ahead of enlargement. The better the EU works at home, the better it works abroad. The more operational ESDP is, the more it fastens the missing link of CFSP. The sooner the EU begins to reduce some

of the transatlantic military capabilities gaps, the more likely what the EU does in international security will matter and create conditions for more balance with the U.S. The more the EU responds to changes in international security, the more it will influence U.S. security policy. The EU needs political will and resources to make ESDP work to its, and NATO's, advantage.

ESDP is not new. The Europeans asked in the 1950s and again in the 1990s how they could best enhance their own and international security without American dominance. Efforts to forge foreign policy cooperation in the 1970s led to passage of the Maastricht Treaty, which established CFSP in 1993.

Whereas the "F" in CFSP continued to develop as overall EU influence in international politics grew, the "S" in CFSP weakened—nay, punished—European foreign policy during the wars of national dissolution in Yugoslavia. There, in a "baptism by fire," the EU got burned for employing civilian diplomacy to proffer peace in a zone of war while American air power brought the Bosnian and Kosovo wars to an end (Ginsberg, 2001). This sense of European powerlessness, which compared unfavorably with American capabilities, and the specter of American pre-emptiveness, set off developments that launched ESDP. The Amsterdam Treaty gave the CFSP a High Representative and codified the Petersburg Tasks (peacekeeping, humanitarian tasks, conflict prevention, peace enforcement). The United Kingdom supported an EU capacity for independent security action linked with NATO at St. Malo. Between 1999 and 2001, the EU established ESDP and announced the goals by 2003 to deploy the RRF and a police force of 5,000 officers for crisis management operations to perform Petersburg Tasks.

The EU exerts considerable influence in international affairs even in the absence of a fully formed CFSP/ESDP. The external relations *acquis* provides the base and frame for further refinement and growth in European foreign policy. The EU has considerable political impact on U.S. foreign policy/security interests. For example, U.S.-EU counterterrorism cooperation is stunning—witness the deployment of officials of the FBI in Brussels and of Europol in Washington; the EU definition of terrorism and freezing of terrorist assets; the EU-wide arrest warrant; and U.S.-EU negotiations to expand cooperation on extradition, prosecution of criminal/terrorist suspects, money laundering, and intelligence sharing.

Enlargement is already reshaping polities, economies, and societies of applicant states while exerting enormous influence over vital interests of nonmembers in the wider neighborhood. EU diplomacy played a key role in Milosevic's (*cont. on p.3*)

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## From the Chair

### Martin A. Schain

THIS IS MY FIRST COLUMN for the year 2003, and it gives me an opportunity to reflect on another year as chair of this robust, growing organization. The year 2002 ends with the Copenhagen European Council, and the successful conclusion of the accession negotiations that will vastly expand the membership of the European Union, with full participation of ten new states in the institutional framework of the Union. Of course, the fate of the candidacy of Turkey has been left hanging, and most of the problems of governance in an expanded Union have not been resolved, but the accession itself is an awesome moment worth noting. The year also ends with the threat of war in the Middle East, and the uncertainty of nuclear threat in Korea and the Indian sub-continent. In this context, the establishment of an extended Union in a Europe that produced some of the bloodiest wars in modern history is an element of some comfort.

As we are all aware, the governance problems raised by accession and expansion have hardly been dealt with. Certainly one key question will be the ability of the EU to develop common foreign and security policy in the dangerous world of 2003. This month our EUSA 5th U.S.-EU Relations Project will explore the core of that question. In the first part of this project, Project Scholar Elizabeth Pond, the editor of *Transatlantic Internationale Politik*, writes about "The New Security Relationship." Pond will deliver her new work for the first time at an invited workshop in Washington, DC, where participants will give feedback that will help shape the final version of Pond's work. Among the respondents to her work at the workshop will be Eberhard Koelsch, Deputy Chief of Mission at the German Embassy, Bowman Miller, Director of Analysis for Europe, U.S. Department of State, and Simon Serfaty, Director of the Europe Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies. We expect an engaging dialogue in Washington, and EUSA members will have the opportunity to hear a revised version of Pond's paper at our conference in Nashville. The extended paper will then be published for us by the Brookings Institution, and distributed to EUSA members.

Our 8th International Conference is moving full steam ahead. Under the leadership of Professor John Keeler (University of Washington), the Program Committee crafted a very fine set of panels that reflect both the broadening and deepening of the field and the expanding policy impacts of developments in the EU. We have more than 90 panels on a multitude of EU-related topics scheduled for the Nashville conference. Among the not-to-be-missed events at the Nashville conference will be the keynote address by Professor Stanley Hoffmann (Harvard University), who will be receiving our Lifetime Contribution to the Field Award (see below). His talk will be given in the Country Music Hall of Fame Conservatory. We are happy to announce that the *Journal of Common Market Studies* will host our conference closing reception and a lecture by Professor Benjamin J. Cohen (University of California San Diego), the well-known scholar of political economy and international relations. Vanderbilt University will also generously host a conference reception on their campus.

(cont. on p.22)

(*Ginsberg, cont. from p.1*) decision to end the Kosovo war when he did. EU participation in the “Mid-East Quartet” underlines its importance in reaching and implementing a final settlement. The EU is critical to postwar reconstruction in Bosnia and Afghanistan. Dialogues with states Washington considers rogue give the EU access to capitals where there is little U.S. influence. The EU is forging new links in East Asia and the Western Hemisphere to open trade and support democracy. Participation in and funding for multilateral institutions and nongovernmental organizations allow the EU to shape the outcome of international negotiations.

Although the EU matters in international politics, there are numerous instances when it could have acted but did not (Iraq), and thus lost opportunity for influence. National foreign policy preferences cannot always be melded into one. There are limits to civilian diplomacy. Still, most Europeans generally express support for ESDP to influence U.S. foreign policy and NATO, curtail preemptive American leadership, and/or take responsibility for international peace and security. With uncharacteristic speed the EU has now set up a new institutional structure for CFSP/ESDP.

The Political and Security Committee (PSC)—members’ ambassadors and the Commission—exercises political control and strategic direction for EU military responses to a crisis. The Crisis Situation Center provides the PSC with intelligence in crisis management. The Policy Planning Unit identifies potential crisis situations. The EU Military Committee (Chiefs of Defense) is the forum for military cooperation in conflict prevention/crisis management. It gives military advice to the PSC and provides military direction to the EU Military Staff. The Military Staff, which provides expertise and advice to the Military Committee and PSC on defense issues, is responsible for early warning, situation assessment, strategic planning for Petersburg Tasks, and implementation of policies determined by the Military Committee. The Joint Situation Center analyzes and makes use of intelligence. The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management provides support for nonmilitary responses to crisis management and the Police Unit plans/conducts police operations.

Since the EU depends on NATO to implement many Petersburg Tasks, EU-NATO cooperation is critical. The two held their first ministerial in Budapest in 2001. The cease-fire between rebel forces and the Macedonian government in summer 2001 was brokered and enforced by the EU and NATO. EU and NATO Foreign Ministers met in December 2001 to affirm joint cooperation in the fight against terrorism. The long-delayed EU-NATO accord on EU use of NATO assets when NATO does not wish to be involved is expected to be finalized soon, which could pave the way for deployment of an EU conflict prevention force to Macedonia to replace the NATO force.

In 2002, the EU incorporated the WEU into its remit, funded its satellite navigation project, held its first crisis management exercise, and held its first meeting of Defense Ministers. The Commission established the Rapid Reaction Mechanism, enabling it to respond expeditiously to international crises. France and Britain announced increases in defense spending. Germany and Sweden began to restructure armed forces for peacekeeping.

The commitment of several members to order the Airbus A400M transport carrier is a barometer of support for ESDP, although the green light to begin production hinges on the size of the German order. The EU declared some aspects of ESDP partly operational in December 2001. It has a sufficient commitment of troops to staff the future RRF and civilian police missions. The first litmus test for EU crisis management comes in 2003 with deployment of the EU Police Mission (EUPM) to Bosnia to help establish the rule of law, promote stability, and deny terrorist organizations the opportunity to take root.

Germany’s role in ESDP is growing by virtue of its willingness to deploy out of area. Its soldiers have been deployed to the Balkans. The Germans and Dutch will assume command over the international security force in Kabul in 2003. The more Germany is at home abroad, the more ESDP benefits from an increased political will and capability.

ESDP will have to evolve well beyond the year ahead to activate the RRF. It took three decades to develop monetary union from vision to reality. National defense industries remain protected, subsidized, and unable to enjoy economies of scale and profitability. More standardization, cross-border mergers, role specialization, and EU-wide defense procurement would reduce duplication and yield cost savings to fund ESDP capabilities. Given sluggish economic growth, cost savings need to come from non-defense areas and from changes within defense spending categories. Additional funding could result from a more flexible interpretation of Stability Pact spending limits. The paltry annual CFSP budget is lamentable. Members still do not agree on the formula for financing ESDP operations.

The EU has identified shortfalls in capabilities: command and control, air and sea lift, intelligence, precision guided airplanes, electronic warfare, logistics, combat support units, precision guided munitions, communications equipment and headquarters, suppression of enemy air defense, and combat search and rescue. The RAND Corporation predicts that the EU members will need to spend \$24 to \$56 billion to meet capabilities shortfalls and suggests ESDP will not be fully operational until 2007.

The world will not wait for the EU to respond to changes in international security. The EU has often been catalyzed by outside events to shape new policy initiatives. The EU should make the EUPM a success and Germany should fund the Airbus A400M. Members should make faster progress in reorganizing European defense and procurement markets and increase spending on R&D in defense technologies. Here the United States can help by easing up on certain export controls.

The need for the EU to back diplomacy with lower-end security tasks, the specter of continued terrorism, and the prospect of EU marginalization in U.S. foreign policy deliberations together ought to weigh heavily on the EU leadership. Recommitment to ESDP at the highest political levels (a St. Malo II, including Berlin) can break the logjam of resistance to reforms necessary to make ESDP operational. The Cassandras who speak of transatlantic drift because of the U.S.-EU military imbalances ought to note the results of the recent poll of Americans and Europeans conducted by the Chicago Council on (*cont. on p.4*)

Foreign Relations and the German Marshall Fund. Respondents want good transatlantic relations as well as bilateral and multilateral cooperation to help solve global problems like terrorism.

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## **Institutional Moments, Policy Performance, and the Future of EU Security/Defense Policy**

**Michael E. Smith**

THE EU'S AGGRESSIVE PURSUIT of a global political role over the past several decades is a unique ambition for a regional economic organization. A combination of exogenous and endogenous factors has further encouraged the institutionalization of these efforts at the EU level (Smith, forthcoming). Enlargements in particular can serve as key "institutional moments" during which EU member states reconsider the ends and means of their cooperation. As the EU faces yet another such moment, combined with its first-ever Constitutional Convention, it may be helpful to revisit some general lessons about how the EU adapts to pressures for institutional change for insights into the prospects for reforms in this domain.

Since the creation of European Political Cooperation in the 1970s, change in this policy domain can be understood in terms of a sequential process of institutional development involving intergovernmental, transgovernmental, and supranational elements guided by several more general principles. First, exogenous forces, such as enlargements, typically provide only a window of opportunity for debate over institutional change; they do not determine the specific outcome. Second, endogenous processes within EU foreign policy structures (chiefly learning-by-doing and imitation) generally provide the range of possible options. Third, reforms tend to reflect a balance between pragmatic operational concerns and enduring ideological/legal debates within the EU. As a result, specific choices codified by EU member states are almost always incremental and progressive rather than revolutionary. In other words, the EU's pursuit of a coherent, high-profile external relations capability is predicated on the respect of both the functional track record of foreign policy rules and the legitimacy those rules have earned based on that track record.

At present, the EU is again attempting to strike a workable balance between institutional stability (to promote a coherent global identity) and flexibility (to allow a variety of responses and participants). At the same time, however, it is attempting to develop a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) that provides for the application of deadly force. The question here is whether this approach will suffice in light of the EU's ambitions as a global military actor and the high political and economic costs surrounding enlargement. In my view, although the EU has reached a high level of civilian and economic foreign policy cooperation (Ginsberg, 2001), there are reasons to be concerned about the pursuit of an ESDP based on the EU's performance since the Nice Treaty. Leaving aside the issues of involving non-

EU states (like Turkey) in EU foreign policy and harmonizing the ESDP with NATO, Nice and its immediate aftermath did little to enhance ESDP capabilities beyond a slight clarification and expansion of existing procedures. In line with the principles noted above, Nice in particular failed to extend the notion of "enhanced cooperation" to the ESDP. This is a crippling limitation; if there is any area of the CFSP that might require a "coalition of willing" to take charge, it is in the area of military/defense issues. Given the limited reforms under Nice, the EU will have to resort, as usual, to selective learning-by-doing (and thus institution-building) in the ESDP domain. However, we cannot fully assess this possibility until several EU states actually attempt an independent military operation. Two recent examples demonstrate the practical limits of achieving a consensus on such an operation.

In Macedonia, the EU revealed a division between those willing to lead (France and the UK), others preferring to hold back or let NATO lead (Germany) and the smaller and/or neutral EU states concerned about being left out or dominated by the larger ones. France, with some support from Germany, proposed a 1,500-person multinational peace force for Macedonia to remain beyond NATO's self-imposed 30-day limit. Instead, EU foreign ministers backed a NATO-led follow-on force to protect up to 200 monitors after the main force left. At this point, French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine admitted that the EU was still not yet ready to lead its own force. Thus, due to the opposition of one or more member states, the EU seems to have failed at least four times (Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia) to play an independent military role in the Balkans. This does not suggest a potential for true operational independence from NATO even in an area of strategic significance for the EU. Even when EU states deploy troops, they are hobbled by concerns about mission creep, public opposition to the use of military force, and open-ended troop commitments. These issues will further constrain the operational capability of the ESDP.

The September 11 terrorist attacks revealed a similar dynamic. Here the EU was extremely quick to speak with a common voice in its initial response to the attacks. However, as Howorth recently reported (2002), EU states expressed support for the U.S. and offered troops to the effort, but on a bilateral and national basis rather than collectively on behalf of the EU. Equally problematic for the ESDP, the bulk of operational support for the U.S. was provided by the UK, which further reinforced perceptions of an unfair or inappropriate special relationship between these countries. Even more embarrassing for the EU, in December 2001 the Belgian EU presidency prematurely announced at the Laeken summit that the ESDP was "operational" and that the EU would provide up to 4,000 troops for the peacekeeping force in Afghanistan. This could have been the first deployment of the EU's new Rapid Reaction Force, yet France, Germany, and the UK (among others) quickly denied the announcement and insisted that they would deploy troops on their own accord, not under the institutional umbrella of the EU. These missed opportunities show that exogenous problems alone do not prompt significant institutional changes in the EU (at least in terms of CFSP/ESDP). Moreover, it still seems all too easy

for other actors (whether allies or enemies) to divide the EU on security/defense issues where perceptions of a direct, major threat to common European interests are absent. The current situation with Iraq, like Afghanistan and Macedonia, also clearly exhibits these dynamics.

These episodes, and past experience in EPC/CFSP, also suggest that the EU may have reached the limits of a consensus-driven approach to CFSP in light of the pending stresses of enlargement. EU states will have to delegate more responsibilities to the Commission and/or allow a Council of Defense Ministers to govern this domain, while also possibly instituting compliance mechanisms. EU states still seem unable to agree on a fundamental justification for the ESDP: as a support arm for NATO (UK), as an independent EU force (France), or solely as a peace-keeping/humanitarian force (Germany and Sweden). Even with these changes, the ESDP is likely to be operational only in situations where NATO (i.e., the U.S.) clearly refuses to participate. NATO is still better organized and equipped for operational action, and shows far more dynamism in terms of mission expansion, enlargement, and cooperating with key non-EU states (Turkey, Russia). How the ESDP will develop while upholding equally important principles of subsidiarity, transparency, and democracy also remains to be seen. And unless the ESDP provides for a more robust decision-making mechanism (even through “enhanced cooperation” or “differentiated integration”) with more resources, it is highly doubtful it could be used to compel other actors to change their behavior in line with EU policies. There is a huge conceptual and operational gap between well-developed “normal” CFSP activities and military-related actions, and it may be that only a major external crisis and/or a major change of U.S. policy (such as withdrawing from NATO) would lead the EU to transform its weak ESDP plans into a truly effective independent military force. In short, limited institutional reforms, tight defense budgets, and uncertain political will, coupled with the challenge of enlargement and the presence of NATO as an alternative, suggest that ESDP may be little more than a psychological insurance policy to back up NATO.

However, recent experience, particularly in Macedonia, suggests a potential, though still evolving, division of labor between the EU and NATO: NATO threatens military force while the EU simultaneously offers economic rewards. This could be the future model, assuming both institutions agree on the political priorities in such cases (i.e., to deter, compel, or punish; to support fragmentation or unification; etc.) and on the same balance between carrots and sticks. If ultimately successful, Macedonia might also demonstrate how an early, smaller deployment could prevent long, open-ended missions as in Kosovo and Bosnia. Still, unless major institutional reforms can overcome the problems noted above, the ESDP will remain a passive symbol of collective identity rather than an active behavioral expression of it. The history of institutional change in this domain, however, suggests that the former, rather than the latter, is the most likely outcome.

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## **Giving Peace a Chance: What the EU Can Teach the U.S.**

**Hazel Smith**

IN THIS ESSAY, I REVIEW how the European Union deals with “anti-systemic” states and groups, focusing on the examples of Central America in the 1980s and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), more commonly known as North Korea, in the 1990s and 2000s. I argue that although the EU shared common objectives with the United States, it adopted policy instruments at variance with those used by the U.S. and, as a result, was more successful than that of the U.S. in achieving foreign policy goals. I further argue that the United States should learn from the European Union in devising and implementing policies designed to cope with the proliferation of anti-systemic movements in the twenty-first century.

### **EU philosophy, policy and instruments towards anti-systemic states and movements**

In this essay, anti-systemic states and movements are understood as being underpinned by radical anti-liberal ideologies—whether these be motivated by religious, nationalist or political rationales. The Union’s approach towards anti-systemic states and movements was shaped by the historical, political and geographical interrelationship with the Communist states of East Europe and the former Soviet Union that was constitutive of its political and institutional ontology. During the Cold War, the Community and the member states learned the art of peaceful coexistence as well as judicious engagement while, at the same time, avoiding military conflict that could spill over into its territory. The Community also learned that its coordination with the United States was essential but that did not mean that there would never be distinct “European” interests and sometimes conflict with its most important partner as to what should be the appropriate instruments of foreign policy. Its resistance, for instance, to the imposition of sanctions on the USSR in 1979 and Poland in 1981 caused both irritation and anger in the United States.

A distinct European *modus operandi* was further molded by its global policies towards discrete conflicts and particular anti-systemic states and social movements—starting with the first extra-European activity in the 1960s and 1970s as the Community developed a policy towards the Middle East, including the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The Community’s shared objectives with its major partner, the United States, were to promote peace and stability in the region. Where it differed was in its willingness to recognize the PLO as a legitimate partner in the process of peace-making, its reliance on economic instruments including the promotion of trade agreements and associations and the allocation of aid, its emphasis on the promotion of political dialogue with all actors and its rejection of the use of military and security instruments as a method of “peace-building.” This was not just a case of making a virtue out of necessity of the Community’s civilian character attributes. After all, France and the United Kingdom (after its accession in 1973) had capable military forces—as demonstrated in military interventions in the Sinai in 1981 and in the (*continued on p.6*)

(H. Smith, cont. from p.5) Balkans in the 1990s, when both nations used their military forces in support of policies closely coordinated with the Community/Union.

#### Mitigating revolution in Central America

The Community finessed its philosophy and instruments in the Central American conflicts of the 1980s as it developed a comprehensive strategy towards the armed revolutionary movement, the FMLN, in El Salvador, and the revolutionary government of Sandinista Nicaragua (1979-1990). The Community offered positive inducements in return for demonstrable commitments to building institutions embedded in liberal democratic norms. Inducements included aid, diplomatic recognition, support for intra and inter-regional cooperation and a willingness to act as a diplomatic interlocutor with the United States government. By contrast, the United States relied almost wholly on a strategy of militarization of the conflicts—becoming the most substantial financier and trainer of counter-revolutionary governmental forces in El Salvador and the *contra* mercenaries that brought destruction to Nicaraguan border regions, resulting in the killing and maiming of Sandinista soldiers and Nicaraguan civilians. Neither the Salvadorean FMLN nor the Sandinista military were defeated by military forces and yet both El Salvador and Nicaragua achieved transitions to democracy through political negotiation and electoral processes. This outcome owed much to international efforts, including the EU's active diplomacy, that both encouraged peaceful solutions and delegitimized the military options favored by the United States.

#### Dealing with the DPRK

More recently, the European Union has demonstrated a renewed commitment to its tried and tested approach to anti-systemic states. In the wake of the North-South Korea summit of June 2000, EU member states and the EU, at the behest of South Korean president and now Nobel Peace prize-winner Kim Dae Jung, engaged in a round of diplomacy that ended with diplomatic recognition of the DPRK by 13 of the 15 member states and the Union itself. Diplomatic recognition was accompanied by tough dialogue on security and human rights along with aid designed specifically to support a transition to a market economy. DPRK officials received training on human rights in Sweden and the UK, the principles and practices of market economies, as well as in less politically sensitive areas such as agriculture and English language studies. Moves towards imposing restrictions on technical assistance after the revelations of late 2002 that the DPRK has acquired uranium enrichment technology, a prerequisite for a nuclear arms program, demonstrate the use of another civilian instrument, that of aid withdrawal, as part of the armory of EU instruments.

The common objectives of U.S. and Union policy towards the DPRK are the promotion of stability and the transition to the market economy and democracy. The belligerent policies of the Bush administration have noticeably failed to achieve progress towards any of these goals. The refusal to continue the negotiations on the security/missile deal that took Madeleine Albright to Pyongyang in October 2000 and the subsequent inability to craft a policy other than at the level of rhetoric have left the administration in policy paralysis. By contrast, the EU is

engaged in active diplomacy and, given the market reforms of September 2002, may be contributing to the slow transformation towards marketization in the DPRK. The European Union, however, unlike the United States, has only indirect interests in security issues on the Korean peninsula and it is the latter which must craft a policy to resolve security tensions. The United States could usefully learn from the Union and develop a comprehensive policy that combines vigorous diplomacy with carefully employed inducements, close monitoring of agreements and the encouragement of intra-regional cooperation as a means of integrating this most anti-systemic of anti-systemic states into the international system.

#### Learning from the European Union

The Union cannot achieve foreign policy success in all arenas with its supercession by U.S. diplomacy in the Balkans in the mid-1990s still a powerful reminder that the United States can sometimes achieve results when the Union cannot. Lack of EU capacity in one conflict, however, should not mask the enormous achievements in other areas, not the least being the transformation of East and Central Europe towards democracy, largely assisted by an intensive Union involvement designed to support common Western goals of peace, stability and economic renewal in the wider Europe.

The philosophy and methods developed by the EU are more than ever relevant today given the variety of difficult relations with anti-systemic states and groups that major powers must manage in order to achieve global stability. The most immediate challenge to both the United States and the European Union is to build a strategy that can convince the poor and disenfranchised of the Muslim world that Western capitalism has more to offer than fundamentalist Islam. This policy cannot be based on belligerent rhetoric, disrespect (perceived or actual) of Islam, or inattention to the extraordinary economic and political deprivation and extreme inequality facing these populations.

A strategy based on a tough but nuanced and mutually respectful dialogue may initially appear unappealing because of its implicit understanding that compromise may be needed on all sides. Provided compromise is not on matters of principle, however, this is what successful diplomacy is all about. The United States is the most powerful military power on earth yet preponderant military power, as the U.S. knows from its experiences in Korea and Vietnam, does not always translate into the ability to control outcomes. The United States should learn lessons from European Union success in dealing with anti-systemic states and movements and apply these lessons in its approaches to dealing with countries whose objectives it does not share. This way the United States, might achieve the foreign policy goals it has set itself. Like the European Union, the United States should “give peace a chance.”

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## An Effective and Legitimate CFSP: Challenges Faced by the Constitutional Convention and the Next IGC

### Walter Carlsnaes

ALTHOUGH THE CONVENTION ON THE Future of Europe established at the Laeken Summit in 2001 was initially set up in response to a general unease with the functioning of the EU, especially in anticipation of enlargement and the decision-making problems that would inevitably follow in its wake, it has also come to embrace foreign policy issues and attempts at reforming Pillar II structures. The latter has come as something of a surprise, since CFSP/ESDP issues were scarcely mentioned either in the Treaty of Nice or in the Laeken Declaration. In any event, as recently noted by Christopher Hill, the question whether reform of the CFSP is necessary or not has been quickly answered in the affirmative by the Convention, with the result that already at this point in its deliberations, “some quite serious measures are on the table” (Hill, 2002: 25).

However, the Convention is not simply faced with the task of coming to grips with problems of size and effective decision-making procedures within the context of enlargement, but was also given a broad mandate to show the way toward “a clear, open, effective, democratically controlled Community approach.” In short, underlying its creation lies not only a concern with the future problem-solving effectiveness of EU institutions, even though these are clearly of an overriding nature. Of equal importance, Fritz Scharpf recently argued in a talk given in Stockholm, is the normative appropriateness of EU institutions and processes, especially in the light of the increased demand within Europe for a greater clarity of competencies, a greater transparency of decision processes, and a greater democratic accountability of decision-makers (Scharpf, 2002: 2). The question is how the Convention will be able to contribute to both aims without compromising either. In the past successful institutional reforms – such as those adopted in the Single European Act or at Maastricht – were focused almost exclusively on substantive policy issues or on goals on which prior agreement had been reached, whereas present concerns seem less preoccupied with questions of policy effectiveness and more with criteria pertaining to institutional appropriateness and democratic legitimacy.

Although the tension between these two aims affects the future of the EU as a whole, particularly in view of the challenge posed by the upcoming integration of the new accession states, it also complicates the ambition of making the CFSP more effective. This increased concern with foreign policy and security issues was already evident prior to the events of 11 September 2001 (particularly in connection with the launch of the ESDP in 1998), and has become even more pronounced subsequently as the U.S. has expanded—mainly in a unilateralist and militarist mode—its all-out campaign against international terrorism and Saddam Hussein’s regime. However, here I will confine myself to a single aspect, albeit a central one if the ambition of the Convention of reforming the intergovernmental Pillar II structures will have any chance of success: the issue of how foreign policy should be made in future.

At present, as Scharpf has argued, EU policy-making is conducted in terms of three different modes of governance differing substantially with respect to the criteria of effectiveness and legitimacy. The first and most fundamental is that of *intergovernmental negotiation*, based essentially on the principle of unanimity. Its polar opposite is *supranational centralization*, requiring—as, e.g., with the European Central Bank—no agreement whatsoever on the part of national governments. However, the most frequently employed mode is what Scharpf has called *joint-decision making*, in Brussels often referred to as “the Community method.” It has a number of procedural variants (one of the tasks of the Convention is in fact to simplify these), but the dominant mode is that policy proposals must originate in the Commission, and in order to become effectuated, they need to be approved by a qualified majority vote in the Council of Ministers and by an absolute majority of the members of the European Parliament.

All three modes differ on how they balance the dual desiderata of effectiveness and legitimacy. Based on the power (both positive and negative) of the veto, the first scores high on legitimacy but considerably less on its problem-solving effectiveness. The second, not dependent on national agreement or preferences, is potentially very effective, but achieves legitimacy only within the narrow boundaries of its specific mandate, premised on earlier joint and essentially irrevocable commitments. The third mode produces considerably better effectiveness than intergovernmentalism, and—given its beholdenness to support from both national governments and the European Parliament—has a broader foundation underwriting its legitimacy than the supranational model.

Why, given the availability of these three types of governance, and especially the advantages of the joint-decision mode, is there nevertheless a perceived need to reform the institutional framework for making EU foreign policy decisions? If these have worked in the past, why has the Convention come to feel that reform is now necessary? The answer is clearly anything but straightforward, but the following factors hint at the dilemma involved.

Given the establishment and rapid development of the ESDP as an integral part of the CFSP, including the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), intended to consist of national armed forces ready for swift deployment to high-risk conflict areas, any decisions made in its name will, of necessity, achieve high political salience within member states. As a result it will be well nigh impossible for their governments to be bound by *majority decisions* involving the sending of national contingents of RRF troops to combat zones. As W. Wessels noted recently, “[O]nly national authorities are legitimated to send out soldiers with the risk to be killed” (Wessels, 2002: 5). At the same time it will be very difficult—for all kinds of historical, ideological and other reasons—to attain *unanimity* on European missions of this nature. Instead, any attempts to do so will undoubtedly provoke both divisive national debates and sticky negotiations on the European level, none of which is conducive to constructive diplomatic behavior in crisis situations or, if the need arises, the kind of fleet-footed capability envisaged by the architects of RRF.

(continued on p.8)

In the light of this dilemma and the need for high levels of consensus on foreign policy issues, essentially two options are available within the Community framework. The first is to downgrade the influence of member governments in favour of upgrading the role of the Commission and the European Parliament. However, as Scharpf has argued, proposals along these lines are "based on an inadequate understanding of the normative preconditions of legitimate majority rule" (Scharpf, 2002: 11). There is in any case little reason to expect the upcoming Intergovernmental Conference to move in this direction, and any attempts by the Convention to propel European institutions towards a more majoritarian system could very well backfire by provoking current European debate and opinion to go against such change.

The second option, advocated by Scharpf, is to accept the legitimacy of divergent national interests and preferences, and hence also the continued functionality of the current three modes of governing within the Union. The crucial issue then becomes how to cope with legitimate diversity in the pursuit of European foreign and security policy. If the Union is not to become wholly impotent in its foreign and security policy-making, this means that its members have to be willing to compromise on the requirement of uniformity.

The magic words here are "differentiated integration," opportunities for which already exist within the framework of the Treaties. In theory, this means that it would be "possible for some governments to pool their military resources and to integrate their foreign policy even if such initiatives were not supported by all members states ... In short, differentiated integration could facilitate European solutions in policy areas where unilateral national solutions are no longer effective while uniform European solutions could not be agreed upon" (Scharpf, 2002: 14). However, this solution has one major drawback: while "in theory" possible, this type of proposal is highly circumscribed by the Amsterdam Treaty, and policies promulgated in its name cannot challenge the existing body of European law. Also, it has never been tried.

The underlying scepticism—even hostility—towards differentiated integration emanates from a deep-rooted ideological commitment to uniform law as a precondition for full integration. Scharpf's conclusion, and one which I find persuasive, is not only that a distinction should be made in the ongoing constitutional debate in Europe between legitimate and illegitimate diversity, but also that the Convention and the upcoming IGC should take upon themselves the task of trying to override this negative frame of mind and, instead, to base their deliberations on an acceptance of the reality of a multi-level European polity. If this task is taken seriously, we can perhaps also look forward to European foreign and security policy in due course becoming both more effective and more legitimate.

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### Study Abroad: European Integration and Portugal

June 20-July 18, 2003 Lisbon, Portugal

This program offers six credits at the undergraduate or graduate level and includes two courses, "Portugal and the EU: The Political Economy of the European Union," taught by EUSA member Michael Baum (University of Massachusetts Dartmouth), and "The Politics of European Integration," taught by Antonio Goucha Soares (Technical University of Lisbon). Baum writes, "Students are encouraged to think and write about the comparative lessons of the Portuguese case for other small- to medium-sized open economies soon to join the Union." Field visits and guest lectures are part of the program. Students from any university may apply. Scholarships may be available to qualified applicants. For more details visit <[www.umassd.edu/dce/lisbon](http://www.umassd.edu/dce/lisbon)>.

### Stupid or Sensible? The Future of the Stability and Growth Pact

Patrick Crowley

THE STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT (SGP) was agreed to in principle at the Dublin European Council in December 1996, and was meant to clarify the excessive deficit procedure of the Maastricht Treaty once member states had joined Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Germany, in particular, pushed hard for not just a clarification of how the excessive deficit procedure would work under EMU, but also as a way to allay fears over the implications of the attainment of the Maastricht convergence criteria by traditionally fiscally profligate countries such as Italy and Belgium. The SGP eventually voted on in Amsterdam included a specified process for identifying and correcting excessive budget deficits, with a procedural timetable and ultimately the imposition of fines to ensure that monetary union in the EU was accompanied by a high degree of convergence in fiscal positions.

The SGP itself consists of three components: (1) two Council regulations (1466 and 1467/97); (2) a resolution/directive (17/6/97 #26); and (3) an opinion of the monetary committee (Opinion on the content and format of stability and convergence programs, 12 October 1998). The pact consists of the two Council regulations, with the resolution as a confirmatory measure and the opinion as a clarification for purposes of implementation. The first Council regulation (1466/97) strengthens the surveillance and monitoring of fiscal stance based on Article 99 of the Treaty on European Union. The stability programs have to contain a medium-term objective for fiscal policy with the budgetary position close to balance or in surplus, the dynamic towards this goal and the assumptions in the program, plus measures proposed to achieve the goal and a sensitivity analysis. These are public programs, updated annually. The Council monitors the implementation of the programs, and if a significant divergence is detected, an "early warning" can be issued to a member state, in the form of a recommendation under Article 99(4) of the Treaty. The second Council regulation (1467/97) speeds up and clarifies the excessive deficit procedure from the Treaty. The pact adds definitions to terms such as "exceptional and temporary" and specifies the timeline for the excessive deficit procedure. It also implements a system of non-interest bearing deposits for transgression of the guidelines or non-implementation of EU recommendations and the possibility of converting these deposits into fines if satisfactory action is not taken after two years.

The resolution made at the Amsterdam European Council meeting is not a Treaty document, but essentially invites all participants to abide by the Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact in a strict and timely manner. The resolution refers to the Council regulations "as a rule"—an automatic procedure was ruled out because it would go beyond the terms of the original

Maastricht Treaty. The fact that the SGP is not a Treaty document is puzzling (Crowley 2002), as it could be interpreted as implying that the SGP is not as unassailable as Treaty contents, implying that the SGP can be scrapped or changed with a qualified majority vote of the Council. The penalties and fines in the SGP, however, are more severe than anything included in the Maastricht Treaty.

The last component of the pact consists of an opinion given by the Monetary Committee during 1998 and endorsed by Ecofin in October of the same year. The opinion essentially gave the "medium term" adjustment to budgetary positions close to balance or in surplus a timeline, specifying that by the end of 2002, the adjustment should be complete (this deadline has been extended to 2005), and also that the assessment of completion of the adjustment should take into account the business cycle and therefore the cyclically adjusted (or structural) budgetary position.

As is well known, despite the five convergence criteria included in the Maastricht criteria, the main emphasis for EMU membership was placed on the budget deficit criterion of 3 percent of GDP, partly because of the softening of the debt criterion of 60 percent of GDP by the addition of a supplemental clause in Maastricht that allowed for attainment of this criterion if there was a recorded fall in the debt measure for those heavily indebted member states. This emphasis on the budget deficit carried over into the SGP despite the fact that the rationale for the SGP was to safeguard EMU, by providing some elementary coordination of fiscal policy (Artis and Winkler, 1997).

The recent problems with the SGP can be easily explained by elementary public debt dynamics. As the key indicator in the SGP is the budget deficit to GDP ratio, clearly a reduction in this ratio is achieved if either GDP increases, or if the budget deficit decreases. But one particular feature of the criteria used in the SGP was the cyclical nature of the budget deficits—in booms they automatically fall, and in recessions, they automatically rise (these components are called "automatic stabilizers"). Many of the recent problems with the SGP stem from the fact that EU growth has slowed substantially (constant or falling denominator), leading to automatic stabilizers giving rise to growth in budget deficits (rising numerator). This problem would have been moot if measures of the budget deficit (called cyclically adjusted or structural measures) that took the stage of the business cycle into account were the focus of attention in the original Maastricht Treaty, but this was not the case (even though the Commission has now been told to put more emphasis on these measures when reporting its assessment). Another factor that came into play during the 1990s was interest rates. If interest rates fall/rise, then for highly indebted member states this will automatically lead to an decrease/increase in public expenditure because of falling/rising interest payments to service an existing stock of debt. Thus it could be argued that a budget balance measure that takes out debt service payments (the "primary" budget balance) should be used in place of the crude budget measure that is currently the focus of the pact. Indeed, if interest rates start to rise over the next year, highly indebted member states will immediately face rising budget deficits even if they continue to run primary budget surpluses. *(cont. on p.10)*

(Crowley, cont. from p.9)

Even before the Commission President's recent remarks calling the SGP "stupid," many economists were puzzled as to the economic intent of the SGP. If the SGP were to be a crude fiscal coordination mechanism constructed as a counterpart to a centralized monetary policy, then surely the fixed 3 percent budget deficit limits are not relevant: a true coordination mechanism would allow fiscal stimulus or contraction relative to some average stimulus that was calculated at the EU level—that is, the EU business cycle should determine the level of stimulus or retrenchment required, with no penalties for limited divergence from this given individual member state economic conditions. If the SGP were intended to protect the ECB from fiscal profligacy in a single member state or collection of member states, then surely the focus should have been on public debt rather than on budget deficits (Canzoneri and Diba, 2000). If the SGP were a guarantee that during the transition to EMU member states would not abandon the fiscal policies that led to satisfaction of the Maastricht fiscal criteria (to satisfy German concerns, for example), then surely the SGP should be only a transitional feature, and should be removed once monetary integration is achieved to allow automatic stabilizers to work.

But the SGP raises further concerns. First, as the ECB clearly favors the SGP, there is the issue of whether some sort of pact could act as an effective coordination mechanism between fiscal and monetary policy in the eurozone (Buti, Roeger and in't Veld, 2001). Recent empirical research on the U.S. suggests that indeed the Fed does respond to fiscal policy shocks (Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba, 2002), but fiscal shocks at the U.S. federal level. But this U.S. is a federal system so if one U.S. state experiences a negative shock, then the U.S. federal system allows fiscal transfers to flow from other states to that state to offset the impact; such fiscal transfers only exist in the EU to a very limited extent. The argument that a fiscal policy crisis in one member state could force higher interest rates in the eurozone as a whole is still the main fear of the ECB, and there is little empirical evidence that this would be the case (Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 1997). Thus, on this basis there is little evidence that an SGP is necessary, and certainly not one that embodies penalties and fines.

The second concern (Crowley, 2002) relates to the political ramifications of the SGP. This has already been a concern after the Commission's "early warning" pronouncements on the fiscal policies of Germany, France, Italy and Portugal, and the decision by the French government to effectively ignore the pact. In this regard, the pact represents a potential for conflict between member states and between member states and the Commission. In particular, a scenario where an anti-EU party became the ruling party in a member state might cause an unnecessary crisis if the member state then refused to obey the strictures of the SGP. Even if penalties or fines were then implemented to protect the credibility of the pact, the framework under which this might happen is not clear, and even if implemented through a withholding of EU funds, for example, would likely only exacerbate the situation. Most economists view the threat of penalties and fines when a country does not impose harsh austerity measures as only an incentive measure—presumably if

implemented they would be counter-productive, and if not implemented, then the threat would not be taken seriously. But until it is clear whether this threat is real, this incentive measure also can act to increase political anxieties (as has been seen recently in Portugal), and potentially could lead to increased opposition to EU measures in other policy areas.

The rules for penalties and fines are also poorly designed: a drop in real GDP of more than 0.75 per cent does not trigger automatic exemption from SGP penalties, and yet a drop of more than 0.75 percent does allow an exemption with Council approval. In other words, if a member state is to have a recession it is better to have a deep recession than a shallow recession—and if a member state acts to counter a recession, then GDP might shrink less, but the likelihood of SGP fines or penalties then increases. Only a fall of GDP greater than 2 percent (a very large decrease in GDP) triggers automatic exemption. Clearly a Japanese-style deflationary recession would not trigger automatic exemption and would lead to severe problems in execution of policy to stimulate such an economy. The distorted conclusion reached by the SGP then, is that a long shallow recession is not as damaging as a short deep recession!

What are the alternatives to the current SGP? One possibility is that the SGP should be scrapped altogether. No other federal state or confederation has rules on fiscal policy that are as limiting or as harsh as the EU (Eichengreen and Von Hagen, 1995), and it could be argued that the "no bailout" article in Maastricht provides sufficient protection for the ECB. In the U.S., balanced budget rules at the state level are self-imposed and bonds issued by U.S. states still carry different interest rates because investors do not view the economic prospects of different states as perfect substitutes—presumably a widening of the spreads between debt instruments of member states would be observed if the SGP were to be scrapped, but this would allow the market to more appropriately price the risk involved in holding public debt.

A second possibility is that a system of tradable deficit permits could be implemented (similar to traded pollution permits), an idea that has not gained currency yet with EU policymakers or academics (Casella, 1999). Each member state would be issued with a standard amount of deficit permits and then when a member state wanted to run a larger than usual budget deficit, it would have to buy permits to do so from another member state that had surplus permits. The total amount of deficit permits would be decided by the EU economic position so that in slow growth periods, more permits were available than in periods of rapid growth.

A third possibility is that the SGP is overhauled so that it operates differently from the Amsterdam SGP, and this appears to be the course taken by the Commission in its recently announced plans to make proposals to redesign the pact during the summer of 2003. The Commission plans to focus a new SGP on debt levels as well as cyclically adjusted budget deficits, but to keep the strictures of the pact largely unchanged to appease the ECB. Although this will likely represent a more sensible form of fiscal policy restraint on member states, it is still likely to represent an unnecessary constraint on EU fiscal policies and risks alienating governments that have inherited large public debts

## EUSA 2003 Prizes

We are delighted to announce the winners of our 2003 prizes, to be awarded at EUSA's 8th International Conference in Nashville, Tennessee, Conference Dinner Banquet and Keynote Address, March 28, 2003, 7-10 p.m.:

### Best Dissertation in EU Studies

Georg Konrad Menz, "National Response Strategies to Transnational Challenges: The Austrian, French, and German Re-regulation of the Liberalization of Service Provision in the European Union Wage" (Dissertation completed at the University of Pittsburgh, Alberta Sbragia, Committee Chair).

The prize selection committee (Karen Alter, Northwestern University; Simon Hix, London School of Economics and Political Science; and Johan Olsen, University of Oslo) found Menz's dissertation to be "highly topical" and noted that "the author tries both to (a) engage with the cutting-edge work in the field of Europeanisation, and (b) develop his own theoretical argument and analysis in response to this field." The Committee also commented that, "[t]his approach of connecting peoples' lives to the process of European integration is likely to yield insights that people care about. The analysis of the political economy of the construction industry was very good—and studies that focus on sectors offer a useful and innovative way to study European integration."

### Best 2001 EUSA Conference Paper

Virginie Guiraudon, "The EU 'Garbage Can': Accounting for Policy Developments in the Immigration Domain"

The prize selection committee (Dorothee Heisenberg, Johns Hopkins University; James Hollifield, Southern Methodist University; George Ross, Brandeis University) noted that Guiraudon's paper "captures the complexity of contemporary EU policy formation in the immigration area ... [and] is remarkable for its recognition and mastery of different streams of policy making over time. It foregrounds real EU politics in an unstable, constantly changing set of institutional arenas without imposing artificial social science parsimony. Reading the paper, we enter the EU as it is, not as we would like it to be in our *a priori* models. Guiraudon's refreshing theoretical quest instead goes toward the sociology of organizations, borrowing from March and Olson's 'garbage can' approach." Guiraudon's paper will be published in the *Journal of European Public Policy*.

### Lifetime Contribution to the Field of EU Studies

Stanley Hoffman, Paul and Catherine Buttenwieser University Professor, Harvard University

The third recipient of EUSA's lifetime contribution to the field prize, Professor Hoffmann's accomplishments and publications are too numerous to list here, but among them are his seminal books *Primacy or World Order*, *Duties beyond Borders*, *The European Sisyphus: Essays on Europe*, and *World Disorders: Troubled Peace in a Post-Cold War Era*. Read EUSA Chair Martin Schain's further comments in this issue on p.22.

Congratulations to these three scholars for their superior contributions to European integration scholarship.

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### EUSA Interest Sections

The European Union Studies Association now has seven active interest sections based on members' areas of special interest in European integration: EU Law; EU Political Economy; Teaching the EU; EU Latin America Caribbean; EU Economics; EU Public Opinion and Participation; and EU as Global Actor. Each section has its own Web pages (with syllabi banks, textbook lists, and more) and e-mail distribution list, and all will hold business meetings and programs at the EUSA Conference in Nashville (March 2003). For more information, please visit <[www.eustudies.org/EUSAsections.html](http://www.eustudies.org/EUSAsections.html)>.

## Teaching the EU

*Editor's note: This column is written by members of EUSA's "Teaching the EU" Interest Section. For details about the Section, please visit [www.eustudies.org/teachingsection.html](http://www.eustudies.org/teachingsection.html).*

### EU Teacher-Librarian Collaboration

Ann Snoeyenbos

SEVERAL MODELS EXIST FOR teacher-librarian collaboration at the college and university level. The most common model is for the teacher to bring her or his class into the library for a one-hour orientation session at the beginning of the semester. These presentations are often very general in nature, providing the students with an overview of the resources available to them. In this essay, I advocate for a much deeper level of collaboration—the team-teaching model. Team-teaching between any two instructors brings certain elements to the classroom, and often the result is a richer experience for the students. However, when half the team is a bibliographer working in the college library, I believe that everybody is enriched, including the instructors.

Team-teaching offers students two different perspectives on the same topic. Whether the instructors are scholars from the same or different disciplines, they will approach the subject matter from different aspects based on personal experience, exposure to research materials, and level of interest. Often in a team-teaching dynamic there is a mix of personality types, ages, genders, and racial/ethnic backgrounds. This difference in perspective helps students look at the course material more objectively because they can see how the same pieces of information are processed differently by two people. Two instructors in the classroom means the odds are twice as good that a student will have an instructor they can connect with—someone they feel comfortable talking with about their research topic, or their concerns about the class.

Since 1994 Professor Martin Schain, Director of the Center for European Studies at New York University, and Ann Snoeyenbos, NYU's Librarian for West European Social Science, have team-taught a fall semester senior seminar for European Studies majors. Both Schain and Snoeyenbos believe that their combination of subject knowledge and research expertise leads to higher quality research papers, and they have learned a lot from each other over the course of their collaboration.

Librarians generally consider that a research paper can be written on any topic, as long as the student can put his or her hands on the right materials. The librarian usually knows whether such materials exist or can be easily obtained by the student, but they do not always know whether a particular line of inquiry makes sense in the context of the broader topic.

Teachers are better positioned to comment on the line of inquiry, but often do not know what materials are available to their students, or the procedures for obtaining them. When teachers do their own research, they enjoy many advantages that their students do not, such as the benefit of years and years of

close work on a specific topic, a private library collection, and an "invisible college." The "invisible college" refers to personal relationships based on friendship circles, alma mater, collegial networks, etc., that extend beyond institutional walls. The "invisible college" can be very helpful with a graduate student's research, but is rarely called in for undergraduates. For all intents and purposes, undergraduates are perpetual novices; they are rarely given the opportunity to do more than two semesters' work on one specific topic.

Librarians are usually aware of new research technologies (e-journal access, online tables of contents, subject pages on the Internet, etc.), but have not had the opportunity to observe students working with them over an extended period of time. In general, librarian-student consultations are isolated to a one-on-one experience. Most reference desk transactions at the library last between thirty seconds and one minute. E-mail or telephone inquiries rarely reveal the larger research question because the inquiry focuses on one specific aspect. Team-teaching a semester-long course allows the librarian to observe an entire learning cycle. The librarian is able to understand more about general demands on student time (course load, job stresses, family and friend issues), and these insights then inform their work at the reference desk, and their decision-making when evaluating reference services and tools. By being in a general classroom, the librarian is given exposure to a group experience.

At most research institutions the curriculum drives library collections. Working together in the classroom with students and researchers (teaching partners) gives the librarian access to the teaching-learning continuum in a significant way. It also allows the librarian to expose the teaching partner to new technologies and new resources without putting the teacher on the spot.

The quality of the students' final papers improves dramatically with semester-long exposure to two different perspectives on research and writing. The papers are better because the students are given the tools and skills they need to pursue a topic they actually care about. All too often students select a topic that is interesting to them, only to be forced into something they do not particularly like because they could not find enough material on their original topic.

One warning: this type of teaching arrangement should not be attempted on short notice. First, you must have a strong working relationship with your library liaison. Ask the librarian a year in advance, or at the very least one semester in advance. It takes time to create a new course and it is important that both parties in the teaching team feel their interests are represented in the final syllabus. Furthermore, the librarian should be compensated in the same way as an adjunct professor. Some institutions will allow release time for the librarians to work on research projects, but it is easy to underestimate the amount of time that will be spent in class preparation and student meetings. Do not be fooled: team-teaching does not mean that two people each do half the work of a regular course; team-teaching means two people each do three-quarters of the work.

*Ann Snoeyenbos is the librarian for West European Social Science at New York University.*

## Resources

Snoeyenbos' and Schain's course description:

[www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/europe/under/descript.html](http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/europe/under/descript.html)

On-line syllabus for their course:

[www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/europe/under/immigpol.pdf](http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/europe/under/immigpol.pdf)

Snoeyenbos' library Web page:

[www.nyu.edu/library/bobst/research/soc/eurostud/](http://www.nyu.edu/library/bobst/research/soc/eurostud/)

A list of all the EU Depository Libraries in the U.S. is on-line, with their URLs and mailing addresses:

[www.eurunion.org/infores/libmap.htm](http://www.eurunion.org/infores/libmap.htm)

The current list of EU Depository Libraries in the U.S.:

American University

Cornell University

Duke University

Emory University

Florida International University

George Mason University

Harvard University

Illinois Institute of Technology

Indiana University

Library of Congress

Miami University of Ohio

Michigan State University

New York University

Northwestern University

Ohio State University

Pennsylvania State University

Princeton University

Stanford University

State University of New York Albany, Buffalo

Texas Christian University

University of Arizona

University of Arkansas

University of California at Berkeley, Los Angeles, San Diego

University of Chicago

University of Colorado

University of Georgia

University of Illinois

University of Iowa

University of Kansas

University of Kentucky

University of Maine

University of Michigan

University of Minnesota

University of Nebraska

University of New Orleans

University of Notre Dame

University of Oklahoma

University of Oregon

University of Pennsylvania

University of Pittsburgh

University of Puerto Rico

University of South Carolina

University of Southern California

University of Texas

University of Utah

University of Virginia

University of Washington Seattle

University of Wisconsin Madison

Washington University

Yale University

## EUSA List Serve

We received the following replies to EUSA member Victor Gavin's 6 December list serve query seeking sources on the "snake" exchange rate mechanism during the early 1970s:

(1) On the "Snake" Exchange Rate Mechanism and EMS, I recommend: Horst Ungerer, *A Concise History of European Monetary Integration*, Quorum Books, London, 1997; K. Dyson, K. Featherstone, *The Road to Maastricht*, Oxford University Press, 1993.

—Irene Finel-Honigman, Columbia University

(2) I think that the following books are good in providing a quite detailed description of the 'snake' mechanism as well as how it emerged and why it fell apart without becoming too technical: Tsoukalis, Loukas (1997), *The New European Economy Revisited* (3rd ed.), Oxford, OUP, and Swann, Dennis, (2000), *The Economics of Europe: From Common Market to European Union*, (9th ed.), London, Penguin.

—Sotiria Theodoropoulou, London School of Economics

(3) One key work on the Snake is Loukas Tsoukalis's book, *The Politics and Economics of European Monetary Integration* (Allen and Unwin, 1977). I also treat it in chapter 5 of my book, Kathleen R. McNamara, *The Currency of Ideas* (Cornell, 1998), comparing it to the EMS (ch. 6). A brief history is also provided in Daniel Gros and Niels Thygesen, *European Monetary Integration* (2nd edition, Longman, 1998).

—Kathleen R. McNamara, Princeton University.

(4) In my *Comparative Economics* book, second edition, there is a section in Chapter 14 about the "snake" which might be useful. The book has been published by Prentice Hall.

—James Angresano, Albertson College

(5) As far as I remember, a concise treatment exists in *The New European Economy* by Loukas Tsoukalis (1993), Oxford University Press. It might be outdated but it explains clearly the early stages of the fascinating story of the Euro and can be read easily by newcomers to this field.

—Dr. A. Bisopoulos, European Commission

(6) See Loukas Tsoukalis, *The Politics and Economics of European Monetary Integration*, London: Allen & Unwin, 1977. You could also cull some useful stuff from Alfred Steinherr (ed.), *Thirty Years of European Monetary Integration: From the Werner Plan to EMU*, London: Longman, 1994; Niels Thygesen, "The Emerging European Monetary System: Precursors, First Steps and Policy Options," in Robert Triffin (ed.), *EMS: The Emerging European Monetary System*, Brussels: National Bank of Belgium, 1979; and D. C. Kruse, *Monetary Integration in Western Europe: EMU, EMS and Beyond*, London: Butterworths, 1980.

—Desmond Dinan, George Mason University

## Book Reviews

**Liesbet Hooghe. The European Commission and the Integration of Europe: Images of Governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 279 pp.**

LIESBET HOOGHE'S STUDY OF THE preferences of top European Union officials makes an important contribution to the literature on the European Commission in the field of EU studies. Yet, it purports to do much more than that. As Hooghe herself claims, ambitiously, the book also contributes to the political science literature on preference formation. This ambition is very much in line with a general trend in the study of EU governance to place greater emphasis on what the study of the EU can tell us more generally about the world of politics (something EU researchers have not done so well in the past). Hooghe's priority, then, is not only to offer the reader an analysis of her very satisfying data (which she does), but also to add to a more general understanding of human motivation.

To outline the content and approach adopted by this study is a relatively easy task for a reviewer, as the author has taken a great deal of care over spelling out and explaining her theoretical framework, methodology and research methods. The book's primary empirical objective is to provide an account of the preferences of top officials within the European Commission as they relate to the future of European governance. This focus is justified given that very little research has been undertaken on the preferences of those working within the Commission, and that top officials' positions on who should govern, how and over whom, will no doubt affect the future development of the European Union. Thus, even if Commission officials are unable to determine, single-handedly, political outcomes at European level, Hooghe assumes that they do indeed influence European politics. This argument runs counter to the tenets of (liberal) intergovernmentalism, which tends to see organizations like the European Commission as little more than servants of the member states.

Hooghe stresses, importantly, that she is interested only in *basic* preferences—those that underpin what might be deemed more superficial policy positions or attitudes towards specific issues. The study is based on 137 interviews conducted with senior Commission officials between 1995 and 1997. Indeed some of the more fascinating insights of the book emerge out of the many direct quotations taken from the transcripts of these meetings. The book begins with a discussion in Chapter 1 of preference formation, both generally and as applied to the case of the European Commission. Chapter 2 deals with the study's methodology and provides an introduction to the Commission—or rather, to the people that inhabit it. The third chapter presents a summary of findings. In Chapters 4 through 7, the four dimensions of the study, which structure the research project, are analyzed in more depth, allowing a more subtle presentation of officials' preferences. The four dimensions covered are (i) intergovernmentalism/supranationalism (as a preference for how European governance ought to develop); (ii) market liberalism/regulated

capitalism (as a preference for how the EU ought to engage with the European economy); (iii) principal/agent (as a preference for the future role of the Commission); and (iv) international/national (as a preference for the type of organization the Commission ought to be).

The book's findings point to the conclusion that top officials' preferences are better explained by their experiences *outside* the Commission—their political party, country of origin, work experience—rather than those within the organization. The book also concludes that the preferences of these top officials are more influenced by internalized values than by “career calculation.” This is interesting in that Hooghe claims that it challenges common assumptions about the internal workings of the Commission, particularly those that attribute a common, usually pro-integration, culture or set of interests to those working within the Commission.

Theoretically, Hooghe begins the book by presenting two contending theories of human motivation. The first is a “sociological paradigm,” out of which hypotheses reflecting the assumption that values shape preferences are drawn. The second theory is an “economic paradigm,” one of self-interested utility, which rests on the understanding that interests shape preferences. The author positions herself between two extremes and tries to synthesize the two approaches. Inevitably, perhaps, while incorporating sociological insights into her framework, Hooghe's positivism will mean that sociological institutionalists and constructivists will probably not be convinced that she has moved far enough in explaining how ideas impinge on action. Values may well have been injected as causes into her framework (and hypotheses), but the very focus on *preferences* would seem to preclude a truly “sociological” perspective on the “motivation” behind the actions of Commission officials. Even if this is not feasible in a study such as this, it would have been helpful to have a more detailed critique of the existing literature on the Commission, in order to understand more clearly how the book positions itself against both rational choice and sociological accounts.

While the author is to be commended for the clarity of her research framework, and while I would certainly recommend this book to graduate students keen to understand how they might structure their dissertations, the explicit discussion of the framework and approach sometimes get in the way of the substance and results of the study. Indeed, by the end of the book, I had a much clearer idea of how the research was conducted than I did of some of the specific findings and implications of the project.

In conclusion, there is no doubt that this book will be of interest to students of the European Union, and that it clearly provides a welcome addition to the literature on the European Commission. Nonetheless, I reserve judgment on the question of its potential theoretical impact, though I am very sympathetic to the idea that a book on EU politics might break new ground within the political science literature. Clearly, given the attention to theory and method, this book is more likely to appeal to a political science readership than to any general readership interested in the workings of the European Commission. This

is not a criticism, however, as I would guess that it was never the author's intention to provide us with yet another general overview of the Commission. Indeed, with some reservations over its theoretical contribution, the book achieves what it set out to achieve—no mean feat in an ambitious project such as this.

Michelle Cini  
University of Bristol

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**Patrick Crowley, ed. Before and Beyond EMU: Historical Lessons and Future Prospects. Routledge Studies in the Modern World Economy, No. 34. New York: Routledge, 2002, 228 pp.**

THIS PARTICULAR COLLECTION OF RESEARCH papers on aspects of Economic and Monetary union grew out of a March 1999 conference held at York University under the auspices of the European Community Studies Association of Canada. The authors come from the United States, Canada, and Europe and approach questions from the perspectives of economics, politics, and international political economy. Along with several introductory historical viewpoints, the book gives a broad ranging look at the foundations and development of the EMU project while looking forward to consequential future changes engendered by the venture beyond the normally examined bounds of economic policy issues. Patrick Crowley, the editor, is also the author of two of the eleven papers contained in the volume and has organized the analysis into four roughly equal parts sorted by the era of analysis rather than by disciplinary divisions.

Part I, titled "Before EMU: some historical perspectives," offers three background chapters analyzing the record of both previous monetary consolidation and unification projects along with a presentation on economic and political integration in Europe in the early postwar period. Historian Alison Meek gives a succinct look at the influence and role of the United States in the critical process of institutional formation in postwar Europe over the period 1945-57 with a focus on the unfolding of the OEEC, NATO, the ECSC, and EURATOM. Xavier de Vanssay then outlines the basic frameworks undertaken for the implementation of a variety of monetary unions around the world over the past century, including the adoption of the U.S. dollar by both Panama and Liberia. Particular attention is paid to the differences in the German monetary unification tied to the larger political and economic unification project and the cooperative efforts between central banks under the Scandinavian monetary union. The long history of French national monetary unification completed only at the end of the eighteenth century is examined by T.J.A. Le Goff under the premise that the examination of the stages of unification enhances our understanding of the importance of the groundwork laid by monetary unification for a further deepening of political and economic unification.

Part II reflects a more traditional set of approaches to examining the pros and cons of EMU. The political scientist Amy Verdun, in a tightly organized paper, presents an excellent summary of the alternative theoretical approaches that have been

taken to examine and explain the nature of the forces shaping EMU. Verdun does a solid job of reviewing this vast literature and presenting a clear and discernible classification scheme for the works covered. Economist James Dean's contribution is to produce only a slightly reformulated version of some of his previous arguments concerning the misconceptions and misapplications of economic policy analysis surrounding the European common currency project. Patrick Crowley's first contribution to the volume is to tease out of a straightforward application of standard micro and macroeconomic analysis a set of interesting and substantive assertions concerning more broad-based international impacts of the EMU adventure and its implementation. Certainly the analysis of the origin and justification of the Stability and Growth Pact offers fertile ground for insights to the widespread current debate surrounding the appropriate use of fiscal and monetary policy tools in today's European economic environment.

Part III offers up a series of short essays on how EMU will offer opportunities or constraints on alternative economic and political integration plans within the European Union. Mitchell Smith offers his view of how EMU has influenced and helped to recast the framework in which political actors at both the EU and member state levels think and act with regard to issues of economic liberalization across alternative economic sectors. This certainly has applications to and implications for the prospects of the final successful completion of a major segment of the Single Market project—the determination of a new and workable regulatory framework for financial markets across the EU. And what set of analysis from the Canadian ECSA would be complete without a focused Canadian perspective on some aspect of EMU? Here Malte Kruger answers that question by asking whether what the Canadian Confederation has learned about the process of secession has an application to questions of fiscal policy and debt management within the EMU framework. Part III closes with Patrick Crowley's second contribution, this time on the topic of which direction European integration might take after EMU. Crowley gives a good overview of the alternative paths possible in both standard and more recent innovative models of the economic integration process. Again, this perspective offers a number of insights into the current attempts and struggles to initiate a constitutional formation process coinciding with a long-term institutional consolidation effort that must be confronted with the accession of up to ten new EU member states.

The book closes with papers on two rather unusual topics from the perspective of most political economy research on EMU. Eric Helleiner takes a crack at the cultural and historical question of how the public's perceptions of the state and their political identities have been affected by the form and use of monetary instruments. Certainly the question is worth asking in the context of EMU and the evolving European identity. The final chapter, written by David Long, addresses how EMU and its institutional structures will alter and impact international relations ranging from simple questions of changing forms of representation in international fora to the potential for restructuring constraints and global operations in the context of trade and monetary relationships. The combined decline of the Japanese economy

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and the evolution of the future range of the eurozone will change international currency and financial markets in fundamental ways and give significant competition with the dollar's influence.

In appraising the overall substance and quality of this research volume, it is necessary to consider the originating source of the papers. This alone explains much of the rather eclectic mix of topics and approaches represented. It is clear that the entirety of the work will be of limited interest to mainstream scholars in either economics or politics or even among those crossing over via the realm of political economy. Rather, readers should approach the work as an opportunity to examine the breadth of issues that can be confronted when studying contemporary and historical angles from which to view the EMU enterprise.

Likewise the substance, quality, and analytical facets of the collection vary widely from paper to paper. Certainly the contributions of Crowley, Verdun, and Smith stand above the others and represent solidly productive mainstream contributions furthering our understanding of the transforming role of EMU in the European integration process. These papers will predictably be those most widely cited by readers of the volume and will likely begin to appear on course reading lists covering institutional and political developments in contemporary European integration. Verdun's work serves as an excellent starting point for students looking to take a systematic approach to studying the political analysis of the formation of EMU, while Crowley's two chapters together give an excellent road map of the systemic interactions between economic and political integration and international political economy. I am sure a copy of this book will reside on my bookshelf for an extended period of time and, unlike many others, will be taken down now and again to be consulted and lent to other colleagues and students.

**David L. Cleeton**  
**Oberlin College**

**Sieglinde Gstöhl. Reluctant Europeans: Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland in the Process of Integration. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002, 269 pp.**

SIEGLINDE GSTÖHL'S RECENT WORK EXAMINES the question: why have small, industrialized states historically been reluctant to engage in the European integration process. Furthermore, when they do engage, what accounts for the level and intensity of their involvement?

Using multivariate analysis, Gstöhl explores these questions by examining some thirty policy decisions over five decades. Her hypothesis is that participation in an integration scheme is dependent on a combination of economic, political, geohistorical and societal factors, among others. Specifically, she places her variables under two main rubrics: economic incentives and political constraints. Economic incentives are measured using a country's export ratio (the percentage of their exports to the integration scheme relative to their total exports) and GDP ratio (exports to the integration scheme as a percentage of GNP). Political constraints consist of geohistorical factors such as the experience of foreign rule and the compatibility of foreign policy objectives, and domestic factors such as societal cleavages and institutional/policy loyalties. Using a low, medium, high scaling method, Gstöhl hypothesizes that the targeted level of integration will be high when economic incentives are high and political impediments are low. Conversely, when economic incentives are low and political impediments are high, there will be little involvement with an integration scheme. With these variables defined, Gstöhl then outlines the next step in her methodological scheme, that is, explaining national integration preferences. This refers to "... the process that translates these explanatory variables ... into a country's integration preferences" (p.10). Here she assumes a liberal approach to preference formation, which postulates a fairly direct link between societal/interest group preferences and those of elites. As such, her data includes parliamentary records, government reports and official statistics, among other sources.

Gstöhl then tests this hypothesis by examining the various policy decisions of Sweden, Norway and Switzerland starting in the 1950s with the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and continuing through to the membership applications of 1991-1992. One of the strengths of Gstöhl's study is that besides the European Community (EC)/European Union (EU) she also examines the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the European Economic Area (EEA). The latter two are important to the study as they represent lower levels of integration. A brief description of her treatment of the three countries will serve to demonstrate the above framework.

Gstöhl maintains that in the mid-sixties Sweden's economic and political incentives to join the EC were in the "medium" range. Their export ratio was only 26.8% and their GDP ratio only 4.6% (p.107). Similarly, two political issues—international neutrality and the "Swedish model" of social welfare policy—were thought to be threatened by full EC membership. As a result, a rather vague "open" letter of application was submitted and by 1971 the Swedish government shelved membership plans.

This all changed by the late 1980s. Gstöhl claims that by this time the economic incentives increased to the “high” category and political impediments decreased. For example, by 1989 their export ratio increased to 53.2% and their GDP ratio to 14.3% (p.171). In addition, successive Swedish governments had amended the “Swedish model” so it more closely approximated the welfare policies of member states, at least enough so that membership was not perceived as a threat to that system. Similarly, there appeared to be a willingness by EU institutions to work with Sweden on the issue of its neutrality. Thus, Sweden’s membership in 1995.

The Norwegian case is important to this study since it strikingly illustrates the varying degrees of integration. Both the 1972 and 1994 membership debates had similar outcomes. In both situations, Gstöhl claims that the economic incentives were high and the political impediments were low. Hence, a high level of integration (membership at a minimum) should have been assured. However, there existed a gap between political and economic elite perceptions of the potential costs and benefits of membership and that of the people. In both cases the people voted down membership in national referendums. The rural sector in particular came out against membership; this despite the fact that their associate industries (e.g., the fish-processing industry) were in favor of membership. As a result of this grassroots opposition, Norway aimed for a lower level of integration, concluding a series of bilateral agreements. These covered such areas as fishing, shipping and ferro-alloys, but fell well short of full political and economic integration. This case illustrates well the impact of the process of national preference formation on Gstöhl’s variables.

The Swiss case shares elements of both of the above cases. Gstöhl maintains that since the early 1970s Switzerland has “...had strong economic incentives to participate in integration” (p.132). By 1994 their export ratio was 56.5% and their GDP ratio was 15.4% (p.171). Though the economic situation remained fairly constant, the political impediments actually declined during this period. The main political impediments were, of course, international neutrality and the Swiss federal structure, which has direct democracy as its foundation. In 1972 the Swiss government felt that these impediments were so strong that full membership was not an option, especially when compared with the purely economic benefits of bilateral free trade agreements. By the early 1990s this changed. The threat of being marginalized on the periphery of Europe created a re-evaluation of the political costs of full integration. “The Federal Council asserted that accession to the EC would not mean that Switzerland had to renounce direct democracy, federalism, and neutrality, but that these institutions would have to be adjusted—without endangering national identity” (p.191). However, as in the Norwegian case, these political impediments ranked high in the minds of the Swiss people. In the late 1980s the Swiss government pursued negotiations to join the EEA with the conception that this would be a precursor to EC membership. But in 1992 the Swiss electorate refused to ratify this agreement, making full EU membership a political impossibility.

Gstöhl’s book contributes greatly to EU literature. Specifically, her inclusion of both material and nonmaterial variables in order to explain the integration process is a fruitful yet neglected methodological approach in the field. European integration theory tends to focus on economic factors or issues concerning identity formation, but studies that combine the two within a useful methodological framework are not as common. This study also adds to our knowledge of the integration process not only by focusing on the variables that are involved, but by examining the process that actuates (or not) these variables. As was demonstrated in the Swiss and Norwegian cases, this is a crucial step. Additionally, by focusing on the varying degrees of integration across states, this study captures the nuances and subtleties that actually characterize current European integration. These are often missed by other approaches.

What the study lacks is a fuller explanation of the relationship between the variables; specifically, the direction (if any) of causation. Does economics change identity or does identity change economics? For example, in the Swiss case, what accounts for the decline in elite perceptions of the costs of political impediments? What attributed to their acceptance of “adjustments” to “direct democracy, federalism and neutrality”? If it is a changed economic environment (increased economic incentives) then are these values dependent on economic conditions? That is, are these valued institutions luxuries that can only be afforded during periods of economic prosperity and independence? The causal relationship between economics and values/institutional identities (an extremely interesting aspect of this study) needs to be explored further. Similarly, the relationship between elite and public perceptions is an area that could have been examined in greater detail. In both the Norwegian and Swiss cases, there was a fundamental gap between the two populations’ perceptions of the costs and benefits of further integration. What accounts for this? Is it a matter of public ignorance concerning these benefits? Or, are there forces at work at the grassroots level that strengthen national identities that are not dependent on economic factors? These are crucial questions that cannot be ignored.

Despite these shortcomings (and in Gstöhl’s defense, they are probably beyond the purview of the book) this study greatly adds to our understanding of the integration process. Gstöhl’s methodological approach should be encouraged and emulated within the field.

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## Spotlight on Portugal

Many EUSA members focus on EU member states. This feature highlights an individual EU member state's major presences in the USA and beyond.

### Important Web sites

- [www.portugalinbusiness.com](http://www.portugalinbusiness.com)  
The Web site of the Portuguese government's Investment, Trade, and Tourism Office (ICEP)
- [www.portugal.org](http://www.portugal.org)  
Another site of ICEP (above), includes more detailed information on Portugal and the Portuguese economy
- [jurist.law.pitt.edu/world/portugal.htm](http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/world/portugal.htm)  
Complete, current information on the Portuguese government, constitution, parliament, etc.

Missions Embassy of Portugal, 2125 Kalorama Road NW, Washington DC 20008; tel. 202.328.8610. No Web site. Consulates in Boston, New Bedford (MA), New York, Newark, Providence, and San Francisco.

The U.S. Embassy in Lisbon (on-line at [www.american-embassy.pt](http://www.american-embassy.pt)) is located at Av. das Forças Armadas, 1600-081 Lisbon, Portugal.

Media *The Portugal News* is an English-language weekly newspaper, on-line at <[www/the-news.net/](http://www/the-news.net/)>

The Luso-American Foundation (on-line at <[www.flad.pt/flad\\_en](http://www.flad.pt/flad_en)>) is a private institution launched by the Portuguese government in 1985 to "foster cooperation between Portuguese and American civil society," following the 1983 Cooperation and Defense Agreement between Portugal and the USA. The Foundation funds programs that promote educational, technological, and scientific exchanges and development. Located in Lisbon. E-mail <[fladport@flad.pt](mailto:fladport@flad.pt)>.

### Selected scholarly resources

- *Portuguese Studies Review* is a twice-yearly journal focusing on the Portuguese-speaking world, esp. via history, geography, economics, political science, international relations, sociology, policy studies, anthropology, ethnography and folklore, archaeology, and cultural studies and preservation. Editorial office is at Trent University, Canada: <[www.trentu.ca/psr/](http://www.trentu.ca/psr/)>.
- Headquartered at Iowa State University, the American Portuguese Studies Association (founded in 1996) has held three international conferences. Information at <[imp.lss.wisc.edu/~sapega/apsa](http://imp.lss.wisc.edu/~sapega/apsa)> or <[www.portembassy.gla.ac.uk/info/apsa.html](http://www.portembassy.gla.ac.uk/info/apsa.html)>.

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## Fellowships and Grants

The **Committee of the Regions of the European Union** announces a doctoral thesis competition on the subject, "The role of the regions and cities in the integration of the candidate countries: evaluation and prospects." To be eligible, doctoral theses must have been completed in 2002 in the fields of law, economics, politics or social science, must be written in one of the official languages of the European Union, and may not have been awarded any other prize; the thesis author must be a national of an EU member state. First prize is •2.000 and support for publication; second prize is •1.000 and support for publication. Submissions must include the following: a summary in English, French, German, Italian, or Spanish (8 pages maximum), demonstrating the relevance of the thesis to the competition topic, and the candidate's c.v., full address and telephone number. Visit <[www.cor.eu.int](http://www.cor.eu.int)> or write European Union Committee of the Regions, General Secretariat, Rue Montoyer 92-102, B-1000 Brussels, Belgium. Deadline: *January 31, 2003*.

The **Council for European Studies** offers doctoral fellowships at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Social Sciences, Germany, as well as summer pre-dissertation fellowships to explore the feasibility of dissertation projects in Europe. The pre-dissertation fellowships vary among those for research in Europe, broadly understood, those for research in France or in Portugal, and those for social or cultural anthropological research in Europe. E-mail <[ces@columbia.org](mailto:ces@columbia.org)> or visit <[www.europenet.org](http://www.europenet.org)>. Deadline for all fellowships: *February 1, 2003*.

The **Bicentennial Swedish-American Exchange Fund** offers travel grants for professional enrichment to qualified U.S. citizens and permanent residents. Grants of 25,000 Swedish crowns will be made to support two- to four-week intensive research trips to Sweden. Well-developed research projects in politics, public administration, mass media, business and industry, working life, human environment, education, and culture will be considered. Research trips must take place between July 2003-June 2004. Grants may not be used to finance participation in conferences or academic courses. E-mail <[requests@swedeninfo.com](mailto:requests@swedeninfo.com)> or visit <[www.swedeninfo.com](http://www.swedeninfo.com)>. Deadline: *February 7, 2003*.

The Council on International Educational Exchange sponsors a faculty development seminar, **From Communism Toward the European Union: A Decade of Change**, in Budapest, Hungary and Prague, Czech Republic, June 17-27, 2003. Includes lectures on economic, political, and social issues, and site visits to the Hungarian Parliament and Senate, Czech National Bank, and elsewhere. Focus is on impacts of transition to market economy and democracy, membership in NATO, and future EU accession. For faculty and administrators at the college or university level. Full scholarship may be available to faculty from Historically Black Colleges and Universities. E-mail <[ifds@ciee.org](mailto:ifds@ciee.org)> or visit <[www.ciee.org](http://www.ciee.org)>. Deadline: *March 15, 2003*.

## Conferences

*February 7-8, 2003:* "Cultural Transactions, Colonial Relations, National Formations: Africa and Europe Conference," Seattle, Washington. University of Washington Center for West European Studies and EU Center. E-mail <[cwes@u.washington.edu](mailto:cwes@u.washington.edu)>.

*February 27-28, 2003:* "The Changing Face of Transatlantic Relations: History, Politics, Economics and Culture," New York. 20th Annual Graduate Student Conference, Columbia University. E-mail <[mmb178@columbia.edu](mailto:mmb178@columbia.edu)>, <[lek2004@columbia.edu](mailto:lek2004@columbia.edu)>.

*March 27-29, 2003:* 8th Biennial International Conference, European Union Studies Association, Nashville, Tennessee. Visit <[www.eustudies.org/conf2003.html](http://www.eustudies.org/conf2003.html)>.

*March 31-April 1, 2003:* "Surviving EU Information: Strategies and Skills for Success," Cambridge, UK. 12th Annual Conference, European Information Association. See <[www.eia.org.uk](http://www.eia.org.uk)>.

*April 4-5, 2003:* "From Copenhagen to Copenhagen and Beyond: ... Analysis of the EU's Fifth Enlargement," London, UK. UACES Conference. See <[www.uaces.org](http://www.uaces.org)>.

*April 11-12, 2003:* "Islam in Europe," Kalamazoo, MI. Kalamazoo College, Center for West European Studies. E-mail <[cfwes@kzoo.edu](mailto:cfwes@kzoo.edu)>.

*May 2-3, 2003:* "Accountability and Representation in European Democracy," Cambridge, MA. Harvard University, Center for European Studies. See <[www.ces.fas.harvard.edu](http://www.ces.fas.harvard.edu)>.

*May 8-9, 2003:* "Innovation in Europe: Dynamics, Institutions, and Values," Roskilde, Denmark. Organized by Roskilde University. Visit <[www.segera.ruc.dk](http://www.segera.ruc.dk)>. See call below.

*May 22-23, 2003:* "Integrating the Study of the EU with Disciplinary Advances in the Social Sciences," Cambridge, MA. Harvard University, Center for European Studies. See <[www.ces.fas.harvard.edu](http://www.ces.fas.harvard.edu)>.

*June 26-28, 2003:* "Global Tensions and Their Challenges to Governance of the International Community," Budapest, Hungary. Sponsored by the ISA and the Central and East European ISA. For details visit <[www.isanet.org/budapest](http://www.isanet.org/budapest)>.

*Call for proposals:* "The Cultures of Post-1989 Central and East Europe," August 21-24, 2003, Targu-Mures, Romania. Hosted by the Romanian Academy of Sciences and Petru Maior University. Abstracts (200 words) in English, German, or French are invited (comparative papers preferred). Send to conference conveners Carmen Andras at e-mail <[prognoze@cjmures.orizont.net](mailto:prognoze@cjmures.orizont.net)> and Steven Totosy at e-mail <[clcweb@purdue.edu](mailto:clcweb@purdue.edu)>. Deadline: *March 31, 2003*.

## Calls for Papers

**Gender and Power in the New Europe: Intersections of Ethnicity, Class, Disability, Sexualities, and Generations**, 5th European Feminist Research Conference, Lund, Sweden, August 19-24, 2003. Workshop themes are Changing Europe; Equality; Resistance and Empowerment; Normativity and Hegemony; Sexuality and Desire; Academy; Science and Technology Studies and Feminism; Bodies, Embodiment, Health; Violence; Global Europe; Women's/Gender/Feminist Studies in Europe; Theory, Methodology and Epistemology; Language, Images and Representation; Working; Narratives and Memories; and Sources for Research and Action. Organizers seek abstracts of completed, in-progress or proposed research as well as case studies, reports and analyses of teaching women's studies, and workshop proposals. For details see <[www.5thfeminist.lu.se](http://www.5thfeminist.lu.se)>. Deadline: *February 1, 2003*.

**The EU: The First Ten Years, The Next Ten Years?** The University Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES) 33rd Annual Conference and 8th Research Conference, Newcastle, UK, September 2-4, 2003. Proposals for pre-organized panels of papers and for individual papers are invited to fit into these sections: institutions and governance; policies and policy making; external relations and CFSP; enlargement; member states and integration; theories and perspectives; parties, interests, and popular participation; and, the future of Europe (the Convention and constitutionalism). Proposals from or including postgraduate students are particularly encouraged, as are contributions from all academic disciplines, including law, economics, geography, history, sociology, social policy and politics. Proposal forms are posted on the UACES Web site at <[www.uaces.org](http://www.uaces.org)>. Deadline: *February 17, 2003*.

**Challenges and Prospects for the European Union in a Globalizing World**, Undergraduate Student Research Conference on the European Union, Claremont, CA, April 24-25, 2003. Co-sponsored by the EU Center of California and the EU Center at the University of California Berkeley. Open to undergraduate students of the Claremont Colleges or one of the University of California campuses (Berkeley, Davis, Irvine, Los Angeles, Riverside, San Diego, San Francisco, Santa Cruz, Santa Barbara). Individual students and schools (school delegation/group with a faculty mentor/coordinator) are encouraged to apply. Proposal topics may deal with, but are not limited to: reforming European institutions, enlargement, Common Agricultural Policy, the labor market, immigration policies, the single currency, CFSP, internal security, the role of the state in modern Europe, or issues of culture and identity. There are no conference fees and approved travel related expenses for accepted participants will be covered. Application form and details online at <[www.eucenter.scrippscol.edu](http://www.eucenter.scrippscol.edu)>. You may also contact Lukas Loncko by telephone 909.607.8263 or e-mail <[eucenter@scrippscol.edu](mailto:eucenter@scrippscol.edu)>. Deadline: *March 10, 2003*.

## Publications

### New EU-Related Books and Working Papers

- Bainbridge, Timothy (2002) *The Penguin Companion to European Union* (3rd ed.). London: Penguin.
- Begg, Iain (ed.) (2002) *Europe: Government and Money.. Running EMU: The Challenges of Policy Co-ordination*. London: Federal Trust.
- Bukowski, Jeanie, Simona Piattoni, and Marc Smyrl (eds.) (2003) *Between Europeanization and Local Societies: The Space for Territorial Governance*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Central and South-Eastern Europe 2003* (3rd ed.) (2003) London: Taylor & Francis (Europa Publications).
- Church, Clive H. and David Phinnemore (2002) *The Penguin Guide to the European Treaties: From Rome to Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and Beyond*. London: Penguin.
- Crowley, Patrick M. (ed.) (2002) *Before and Beyond EMU: Historical Lessons and Future Prospects*. NY: Routledge.
- A Dictionary of the European Union* (2002). London: Taylor & Francis (Europa Publications).
- Forster, Anthony, Timothy Edmunds, and Andrew Cottey (2002) *The Challenge of Military Reform in Postcommunist Europe: Building Professional Armed Forces*. London: Palgrave.
- Klopp, Brett (2002) *German Multiculturalism: Immigrant Integration and the Transformation of Citizenship*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Lewis, Ann (ed.) (2002) *The EU and Belarus: Between Moscow and Brussels*. London: Federal Trust.
- Maclean, Mairi (2002) *Economic Management and French Business: From de Gaulle to Chirac*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Nilsson, Hans G. (2002) *Decision-Making in EU Justice and Home Affairs: Current Shortcomings and Reform Possibilities*. Working Paper 57. Sussex, UK: Sussex European Institute.
- Rüb, Ulrike (ed.) (2002) *European Governance: Views from the UK on Democracy, Participation and Policy-making in the EU*. London: Federal Trust.
- Schabert, Tilo (2002) *Wie Weltgeschichte Gemacht Wird: Frankreich und die Deutsche Einheit*. Stuttgart, Germany: Klett-Cotta.
- Sitter, Nick (2002) *Opposing Europe: Euro-Scepticism, Opposition, and Party Competition*. Working Paper 56. Sussex, UK: Sussex European Institute.
- Sloan, Stanley R. (2002) *NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Reconsidered*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Tanlak, Pinar (2002) *Turkey-EU Relations in the Post-Helsinki Phase and the EU Harmonisation Laws Adopted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly in August 2002*. Working Paper 55. Sussex, UK: Sussex European Institute.
- Western Europe 2003* (5th ed.) (2003) London: Taylor & Francis (Europa Publications).

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With grateful thanks, we recognize the following EUSA members who made financial gifts to the European Union Studies Association in 2002 (as of press time):

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The **EUSA Review** follows an annual calendar of announcements and listings organized in four topic areas: Winter (December 15): EU-Related Academic Programs (degree or certificate-granting, worldwide); Spring (March 15): EU-Related Web Sites (especially primary sources such as databases, on-line publications, and bibliographies); Summer (June 15): EU-Related Organizations (academic and professional associations or independent research centers and institutes with significant EU aspects in their missions); and Fall (September 15): EUSA Members' Research Notes (EUSA members' current EU-related funded research projects. Send brief announcements by e-mail to <eusa@pitt.edu> or by mail to EUSA, 415 Bellefield Hall, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA. We reserve the right to edit for length, and we cannot guarantee inclusion in the listings. We do not accept unsolicited e-mail attachments.

## From the Chair

(cont. from p.2) Coinciding with our biennial conferences, the European Union Studies Association awards prizes for excellence in the field, such as for the best dissertation in EU studies during the two-year period and the best paper given at our previous conference. For 2003, our prize selection committees have chosen the work of Georg Konrad Menz, "National Response Strategies to Transnational Challenges: The Austrian, French, and German Re-regulation of the Liberalization of Service Provision in the European Union Wage," for the Best Dissertation Prize, and that of Virginie Guiraudon, "The EU 'Garbage Can': Accounting for Policy Developments in the Immigration Domain," for the best paper delivered at our 2001 conference in Madison. Full details about both these prizes appear in this issue on p.11.

We give a third award as well and it is my personal pleasure to announce that the 2001-03 EUSA Executive Committee has unanimously chosen Stanley Hoffmann, Harvard University, for our 2003 Lifetime Contribution to the Field of EU Studies award. (Previous recipients have been Ernst Haas and Leon Lindberg.) As EUSA board member George Ross wrote, "[Hoffman's] scholarship and commentary on Europe and European integration have for decades been our intellectual benchmark. [He has] analyzed and explained the deeper logic of the building of Europe with unequaled grasp of the intersections of domestic, EU and international politics ..." Professor Hoffmann will accept the award in person at our Nashville conference dinner banquet, when he will deliver the conference keynote address, "The European Union between Regional Enlargement and Global Irrelevance." Congratulations to all our 2003 prize winners on your invaluable contributions to the study of European integration.

More details about optional outings in Nashville, conference hotel and registration, and a conference registration form are included in this issue of the *Review* on p.18, as well as on our Web site, where you will also find the entire provisional program. The continued strengthening of our conference is a clear indication that European integration and its consequences are an important and growing focus of scholarly enquiry. I look forward to seeing all of you in Nashville. (Our next conference is March 31-April 2, 2005, Austin, Texas—please note the dates).

In other Association business, this month all current EUSA members will receive by mail the ballot for the election of new members to the EUSA Executive Committee. Please be sure to cast your vote for these important positions to the body that makes policy decisions and oversees the programs of the European Union Studies Association. Three of our current board members —Karen Alter, Jeffrey Anderson, and George Ross—will be continuing (they have 2001-2005 terms), and the four new ones elected this spring will serve from 2003-2007. As for me, my term as chair ends June 1, 2003, and I look forward to retirement to the "committee" of former chairs. Happy New Year. The next few months will be exciting for all of us.

MARTIN A. SCHAIN  
New York University

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
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