

**From the Chair**

**John T.S. Keeler**

I WOULD LIKE USE MY LAST Letter from the Chair to report on a development that should be of interest to many EUSA members and that illustrates vividly how the EU's outreach efforts to universities can produce unanticipated synergies. As Director of the EU Center of Excellence at the University of Washington (Seattle), I was approached last fall by a colleague from Political Science, John Wilkerson, with a proposal that he thought might be of interest. Wilkerson is a specialist on American politics who some years ago created LegSim, a computer-based simulation of the congressional legislative process. LegSim won the 2002 Information Technology and Politics Award from the American Political Science Association and has been used in conjunction with more than sixty courses at many universities over the past five years. Wilkerson wondered if our EU Center might want to work with his LegSim support team to create a computer-based simulation of the EU legislative process. I told him I thought this was an excellent idea, given the proven value of such student-centered experiential learning tools combined with the fact that many students at our university and elsewhere participate in more traditional "Model EU" simulations. An EU-LegSim, it seemed, might prove extremely valuable in preparing students for a model EU and could also be employed as a module of such traditional courses as comparative European politics.

As all readers will understand, however, we instantly recognized that two obstacles might prevent us from turning this good idea into a usable product: 1) we needed several thousand dollars to fund a computer tech to adapt the LegSim software to EU purposes, and 2) we needed someone with expertise in EU policymaking who would be willing and able to devote scores of hours working with such a technical assistant. After a few days of phone calls we found that we could overcome the first obstacle; contributions from our Center for West European Studies/EU Center, Political Science Department, Center for American Politics and Policy and Divisional Dean for Social Sciences would provide the requisite funding. The second obstacle was overcome by the presence on campus of a

***EUSA Review Forum***

**What is Science in European Union Studies?**

FOR SOME TIME THE DISCIPLINE of Political Science is experiencing a move towards questioning its basic methodologies and bases on which to make knowledge claims. A trend towards making Political Science more 'scientific' in the 'hard science' sense of the word, has been taking place recently, with increasingly more interest in quantifiable data and models. This development has not gone unnoticed. Many will remember the so-called 'Perestroika movement' that ran through the American Political Science community criticizing the American Political Science Association (APSA) and its flagship journal, the American Political Science Review (APSR), for representing too narrow a subset of the discipline (quantitative studies based on formal modeling).

European Union Studies, however, are once removed from these heated debates in the APSA, as its scholarship is, for one, interdisciplinary, and, second, dominated by North American and European scholars. Yet, the trend towards quantification has had an effect in the European Studies community as well. A recent study by Joe Jupille shows the increase in articles based on formal modeling (Jupille 2006: 227) as a percentage of all articles published in a selection of leading journals. Indeed the journal *European Union Politics* was created to offer a venue for statistical and more formal publications on the EU.

Another debate that keeps returning is the issue of taking the EU as *sui generis* or an example of something else. The debate on whether the EU was a unique case and/or whether that matters has also taken place in this forum a decade ago. Students of European integration in today's world still need to reflect on how much of what they study is specific to the EU or can be seen as similar to developments that take place elsewhere.

To shed some light on the issues, I have asked four scholars to focus on various aspects of the question, 'what is science in European Union Studies'.

**- Amy Verdun, EUSA Forum Editor**

*(continued on p.3)*

## EUSA Review

The *EUSA Review* (ISSN 1535-7031) [formerly the *ECSA Review*] is published four times yearly by the European Union Studies Association, a membership association and non-profit organization (founded in 1988 as the European Community Studies Association) devoted to the exchange of information and ideas on the European Union. We welcome the submission of scholarly manuscripts. Subscription to the *EUSA Review* is a benefit of Association membership.

### Managing Editor

Joseph A. Figliulo

### Forum and Features Editor

Amy Verdun (University of Victoria)

### Book Reviews Editor

Andrew Smith (Sciences po Bordeaux )

### Assistant Editors

Irina Andriamanana

Kim Rajdev

### 2005-2007 EUSA Executive Committee

JOHN T.S. KEELER, Chair (University of Washington)

LIESBET HOOGHE, Vice-Chair (UNC Chapel Hill)

SOPHIE MEUNIER, Secretary

(Princeton University)

AMY VERDUN, Treasurer

(University of Victoria)

GRAINNE DE BURCA (European University

Institute; New York University)

VIRGINIE GUIRAUDON

(European University Institute)

FRANK SCHIMMELFENNIG

(University of Mannheim)

ALBERTA SBRAGIA (University of Pittsburgh)

*Ex Officio*

### Immediate Past Chair (2003-2005)

GEORGE ROSS (Brandeis University)

### European Union Studies Association ®

415 Bellefield Hall

University of Pittsburgh

Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA

Web [www.eustudies.org](http://www.eustudies.org) ®

E-mail [eusa@pitt.edu](mailto:eusa@pitt.edu)

Telephone 412.648.7635

## Correction

THERE WAS AN ERROR in the *EUSA Review Forum* article printed in the Winter 2007 Issue of the *EUSA Review* ("The Finnish Presidency-Taking Stock" by Teija Tiilikainen). The first paragraph on page 3 of the Review is reprinted below, with the inadvertently deleted sentences appearing in bold type.

"Criticism on the Finnish Presidency during the crisis mainly came from the French political leadership who **complained about the slow pace with which the Finns acted to lead the EU to intervene in the crisis. France belonged to a group of EU members, which were most critical of the Israeli action and had been willing to decry its policy more sharply than for example the UK or Germany were willing to. In the end most felt that the Finnish Presidency managed the EU's part of the Lebanon crisis quite successfully.**

**In addition to the Lebanon crisis there were both successful and less successful experiences of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) during these six months. The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) ..."**

*EUSA members interested in reviewing recent EU- related books, please contact the reviews editor:*

**Dr. Andrew Smith**

**CERVL**

**Sciences po Bordeaux**

**Domaine Universitaire**

**11 Allée Ausone,**

**Pessac 33607, France**

**E-mail [a.smith@sciencespobordeaux.fr](mailto:a.smith@sciencespobordeaux.fr)**

**Fax 56 84 43 29**

*Publishers should send two review copies of books directly to Dr. Smith.*

## References

Jupille, Joe (2006) 'Knowing Europe: Metatheory and Methodology in European Union Studies', in Michelle Cini and Angela K. Bourne (eds) *Palgrave Advances in European Union Studies*, Houndmills: Palgrave.

## European Research: From Engineering towards Science?

Thomas König

THE FIELD OF European research seems to be changing from the 'art' of engineering towards more scientific methods. Engineers—as Mankiw (2006) recently phrased it with reference to macroeconomics—are primarily problem solvers, while the goal of scientists is understanding how the world works. This distinction does not discriminate between deep theoretical thinkers and simple minded technicians, nor does it prefer one to the other. Both are also not entirely exclusive, but engineers and scientists differ in their research approach and often in their favor for details. The 'art' of political scientist engineers is the provision of a plausible explanation for a widely discussed phenomenon. These phenomena are not modest and often include policy and institutional failure, reform blockade and socio-economic stagnation, crisis and wars. Ideally, the scientific approach identifies a mechanism by testing rivaling explanations for such phenomena. European research, however, requires the interaction of both approaches, and thereby promises sophisticated applications and a potentially higher predictive power for the problems at stake.

A major motivation behind my plea is that neither political nor European research are fields of a *sui generis* nature. By contrast, even in the countries of 'old' Europe, the scientific community is becoming more and more competitive, particularly because of the increasing needs of natural and technical sciences for more public financing. The logical consequence is the regular evaluation of research in- and outputs according to the standards of natural and technical sciences. Compared with this development, the scholarly debates within the political science community or within European research are of minor relevance. Without providing numbers on funding, publication output and impact factors, my impression is that *sui generis*-European research is thus at risk for forfeiting attractiveness and credibility within and outside the political science community. In my view, the internal scholarly risk results from more advanced scientific progress in the subdis-

ciplines of Comparative and American Politics, although several efforts have recently been made in European research. And after the endless conceptual discussions on European governance, much skepticism outside the discipline exists about the ability of (European) political science to identify and help solve the problems at stake.

Historically, there is no doubt that the history of European research started with people trying to solve practical problems of European integration. These problems were the starting point of their research, often biased by mainly examining cases of deficits, failure, crises, etc. Another characteristic of such studies is their promotion of a particular view, often investigating the problem through one theoretical lens without controlling for others. This has produced an extensive literature on European governance-problems/failure/crises etc., which also supports the impression of a Union that is lagging behind and failing to provide the ingredients for adequate democratic governance. Unsurprisingly, relatively few insights exist on the more successful parts of the European story, i.e. the integration of more than 20 countries, some having only recently had their first democratic experiences and beginning to restore their economies while acceding to the Union's club. This does not mean that Europe is in excellent shape, but problem-solving analyses have primarily been directed towards a specific problematic nature of European integration, which can hardly be generalized to 'conventional' political situations or even other phenomena of political life.

More recent problem-solving studies focus on process rather than outcomes, raising censoring questions about the beginning and conclusion of this process. For example, Frank Schimmelfennig (2002) recently published a study on the 'trap' of Eastern enlargement, which could hardly have been explained by the economic incentives of Western member states. Accordingly, Eastern countries successfully established a normative dimension in their accession negotiations by quoting liberal arguments, which had constantly been put forward by Western countries during the Cold War. However, this normative dimension can also be found in the following deliberations on the constitutional project, forcing new members to support the obnoxious power-changing proposals of the 'old' countries. Hence, the conclusion on which countries finally fell into a trap might depend on the researcher's definition of the process' duration as long as (some) old countries anticipated the following round of constitutional deliberations when they agreed on Eastern enlargement (Finke and König 2006). And perhaps the constitutional project will never come into force... This example may illustrate how the concentration on problems threatens a potential selec-

tion bias, which not only raises questions about findings and conclusions, but also limits the explanatory power of problem-solving studies for predictions on arising problems and outcomes.

However, there has been a remarkable change in European research from problem solving towards understanding, which also includes competitive testing of the explanatory power of rivaling approaches in a more quantitative design (i.e., Thomson et al. 2006). Perhaps a prominent example for this development can be found in Fritz W. Scharpf's work, who provided a plausible explanation by the 'joint-decision trap' for the widely lamented German gridlock during the 1970s when the SPD/FDP (social democrat and liberal) government was confronted with a Christian majority at the regional level. According to Scharpf et al. (1976), regional actors of the lower level were unable to coordinate their diverging interests at the higher level under quasi-unanimity provisions. Later on, and in order to understand 'the differing reactions of Great Britain, Sweden, Austria, and the Federal Republic of Germany to the economic stagflation of the 1970s', Scharpf (1997) was concerned about the micro-foundation of this trap in *Games Real Actors Play*. Most recently, Scharpf (2006) relates 'the joint-decision trap revisited' to Tsebelis (2002) veto players' theory, both applying their frameworks to European outcomes. While other European scholars remain in their more isolated camp, still introducing their analysis with what 'other approaches cannot...' but without providing evidence for such claims on theoretical foundation or empirical testing, this remarkable move within a prominent (European) scholar's life might exemplify a trend towards scientific understanding (note that not following this trend does not necessarily imply emergence as a prominent engineering political scientist).

To increase the explanatory and predictive power of European analyses, the move from engineering towards a scientific understanding suggests more evaluation of rivaling approaches, or, when rivaling approaches do not exist, an explicit relation to a null hypothesis. Such null hypotheses are usually powerful variables, although they often lack a theoretical foundation: throwing a coin or calculating a mean of actors' positions are trivial but sometimes better predict outcomes than sophisticated theories do. Moreover, determining the level of explanatory power remains a complicated task. In principle, this level consists of a trade-off between predictive precision and the strength of assumptions which are applied to make such predictions. However, most theories are not compatible in their sophistication and level of assumptions, nor do we have much insight into the evaluation of this trade-off between predictive precision

and assumption strength. For example, veto players' theory might produce outcome errors when a single veto player does not behave according to the theory's claim, i.e. due to either measurement error of a single position or false theoretical consideration. While this error produces false or lower predictive power, the same measurement error might have a lower impact for bargaining theories which usually predict the mean of actors' positions. But how do we compare the relative explanatory power of such theories when they make different predictions on European outcomes?

To answer such questions, European research is still lacking systematic data on process characteristics and the positions of the actors involved. Generally speaking, political science is actor-oriented research, which requires gathering information about the substantial positions at stake—whether these actors are of an individual, corporate or collective nature, and whether these actors promote personal, partisan or institutional attitudes on institutional, substantial or normative issues. Gathering these data raises a number of methodological challenges, but recent European research has made enormous progress in collecting information on actors' positions on issues during legislative and constitutional processes. At the same time, some rich datasets on procedural characteristics have been made public for the study of legislative and implementation activities that are comparable to those data used in American and Comparative Politics (i.e., Franchino 2004, König et al. 2006). While their collection and updating needs more collaborative work in European research, these data will help European researchers both to test their approaches and to select case studies in a more representative manner.

In my view, European research has recently made significant progress and the trend towards scientific understanding is particularly promising for young scholars. Although European research will always need those artists who raise the important questions and provide plausible explanations for the problems at stake, the employment conditions in and outside political science are more and more demanding for degree holders who must be aware of the methodological toolbox helping them to design a project, to identify and define questions, and to provide alternative solutions based on empirical insight. Similarly, the growing competitive situation among universities and researchers requires well-trained young scholars with high professional skills and reputation within and outside political science. For example, the most recent call for tender by the German government for funding universities of research excellence is not only promoting a contest among German universities. It also establishes a competitive situation

within universities when each department has to search for strong interdisciplinary cooperation in order to submit a promising proposal. Perhaps the many new study programs, which are introduced in the course of the so-called 'Bologna process', provide a further potential for change towards improving the professional competitiveness of European scholars instead of risking their isolation in the camp of a European sui generis-formation.

### References

Finke, Daniel, and Thomas König (2006) 'Eastern Enlargement, Institutional Reform and the Pandora Box of Using Rhetorical Action', Paper presented at the WZB-workshop on Eastern Enlargement, Berlin 31 March – 1 April 2006.

Franchino, Fabio (2004) 'Delegating Powers in the European Community'. *British Journal of Political Science*. 34: 449-76.

König, Thomas, Brooke Luetgert, and Tanja Dannwolf (2006) 'Quantifying European Legislative Research: Using CELEX and PRELEX in EU Legislative Studies', *European Union Politics*, 7: 553-574.

Mankiw, N. Gregory (2006) 'The Macroeconomist as Scientist and Engineer.' Available at: [http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/mankiw/papers/Macroeconomist\\_as\\_Scientist.pdf](http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/mankiw/papers/Macroeconomist_as_Scientist.pdf)

Scharpf, Fritz W. (1988) 'The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration', *Public Administration* 66: 239-78.

Scharpf, Fritz W. (1997) *Games Real Actors Play. Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research*. Boulder, Col., Westview Press.

Scharpf, Fritz W. (2006) 'The joint-decision trap revised.' *Journal of Common Market Studies* 44: 845-64.

Scharpf, Fritz W., B. Reissert, and F. Schnabel (1976) *Politikverflechtung. Theorie und Empirie des kooperativen Föderalismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*. Kronberg i.Ts., Scriptor.

Schimmelfennig, Frank (2002) 'Liberal community and enlargement: an event history analysis.' *Journal of European Public Policy* 9: 598-626.

Tsebelis, George (2002) *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work*, New York/ Princeton: Russell Sage Foundation/ Princeton University Press.

**Thomas König** is Professor at the German University for Administrative Sciences Speyer. He will soon move to the Department of Political Science at the University of Mannheim.

### Introduction

A SHORT ESSAY requires a pithy thesis. To wit, the European Union (EU) is a complex place. This complexity manifests itself not just in descriptive differences between the EU and other regional organizations but also as a distinctive conditioning environment (context) for policy-making and institution-building. This works against a comparative approach in the sense that even key theoretical relationships can be different in different regional settings. My claim is that the distinctiveness of the EU can be turned to advantage by utilizing qualitative methodologies being developed in comparative politics and international relations.

The EU is distinctive. The EU is but one instance of regional international organizations. Both statements are true. Just as cosmologists speak of 'Rare Earth' (Ward and Brownlee 2000) without denying the encompassing validity of the laws of physics, EU scholars need not deny the broader generalizations of social theory in order to recognize the EU's special features. These special features have powerfully affected the social and intellectual organization of research on the EU: the overwhelmingly exclusive focus on the EU itself, the concomitant decline of comparative regional integration studies, and a methodological preoccupation with sectors, countries, and the EU institutions. The EU has become a self-contained research island—broad and internally diversified but with sharp lines of demarcation with respect to the literature on other regional organizations.

While cross-regional research is desirable, I argue that the distinctive features of the EU can be turned to advantage by availing ourselves of recent work on qualitative methods and case-oriented analysis (Ragin 1987, Mahoney 2007). This research intersects with and builds upon the concept of mechanism as developed in the philosophy of science (Bunge 1997). The idea of mechanism, while by no means new, has been elaborated in such a way as to provide a model of causality more appropriate for social theory than the Humean (constant conjunction) model, or its more recent Simon-Blalock variants. Two approaches, or designs, are suggested as particularly appropriate for our 'Rare EU'. These are the leading edge design and the single case process tracing design.

### Leading Edge Design

In *Dependent Development* Peter Evans (1979) faced an interesting conundrum. He wanted to study the structure of dependency with respect to Brazil and

the world capitalist economy since it was Brazil whose position in the world economy exhibited the most advanced forms of domestic (private), state, and foreign capital. From here, one could witness the intermingling of peripheral and core capitalism, the role of the Brazilian state in the process, as well as the extraterritorial extrusions of authority from core countries. Yet, precisely because of the unusual set of circumstances, Brazil was a quite unrepresentative case. To the extent that Brazil faced developmental challenges that other countries would experience, it would be a useful approach. But to the extent that the developmental trajectories of less developed countries were different, Brazil's predicament would provide little guidance. In short, Evans' 'leading edge' justification for studying Brazil was based on an informed hunch.

In a similar vein, the EU can be seen as an advanced form of regional integration. It is more highly developed on a number of dimensions, including the four freedoms which provide the legal underpinnings of the single market, the scope and depth of its political institutions, the level of delegation of authority, and the role of law in the governance of economic and political affairs. Of course, there is no guarantee that the EU represents the future of other regional organizations but at the very least, the evolution of the EU can provide a source of hypotheses to guide investigation of other regional associations. While this approach does not provide explicit point by point comparisons among regional organizations, it does allow one to compare the EU's experiences with alternative regional development trajectories.

### Case-Oriented Methods

In mainstream social science, the theoretical work is done by variables and their interrelations. The cases, or entities, are either unproblematic givens or deep reservoirs from which one can draw variables. There are independent variables, dependent variables, and control variables. The point is to maximize the number of observations that can be explained by a fixed set of variables and specifications. Unexplained observations can be relegated to the error term or can become grist for deviant case analysis, which usually implies adding variables or changing specifications. In any case, being able to explain a lot with a little is the goal of parsimonious explanation.

This epistemological position is eloquently expressed by Przeworski and Teune (1970) in their argument that political systems (countries, international organizations) are unanalyzed complexes of variables. What we call 'cases' or 'entities' give the appearance of solidity but are in the end just tangles of variables. The

methodological task prompted by this world view is to substitute the names of variables for proper names. 'India', 'Spain', and the 'EU' are proper names that stand in for a large number of variables waiting to be identified.

Against this still dominant ontological position, the case-oriented methodology has some appeal for research on the EU. While I cannot explain the entire orientation here, it is compatible with qualitative approaches to studying the EU, in particular within-case process tracing.

### Within-Case Process Tracing

*Designing Social Inquiry* by King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) performed a service to the discipline by arguing that adequate degrees of freedom are a crucial part of the inferential process.<sup>1</sup> Notice that this is a point about internal validity (did  $X \rightarrow Y$ ) rather than external validity (to what populations can we generalize this link?). Internal validity poses acute problems for macro-historical inquiry such as the comparative study of revolutions or state building (Liebersohn 1991). Similarly, when the EU is being studied as a whole, e.g. its constitutional structure or emerging federal structure, there are numerous properties that are fixed or which change only rarely. How do we study these macro properties? King, Keohane and Verba suggest that we multiply observations, perhaps by extending the time framework and perhaps by drawing out the observational implications of auxiliary components of the theory. Another suggestion might be to identify intervening mechanisms between the macro properties and outcomes. One example of the above is provided by Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso (2001) with their three-step phase model which runs from Europeanization, to the fit-misfit of these processes with domestic structures, to nationally specific mediating institutions, to domestic structural change. This three-step model opens up numerous specific mediating mechanisms between each of any two adjacent macro variables. By identifying the steps in the process, one is encouraged to specify the mediating mechanisms that connect these steps. Each time a mechanism is identified, a new set of observations comes into play. This aids greatly with the degrees of freedom problems associated with the single case focus. This design can easily be expanded to include multiple units of analysis (countries and sectors).

### Conclusions

I see a number of advantages to the designs presented here. These designs are flexible. They do not commit the researcher to large-N research designs, though such designs of course remain an option. Ad-

mittedly, flexibility would not rank high on the list of virtues among mainstream social science researchers and there are some good reasons against it. Yet, learning on the job, inventing new concepts out of the old, managing causal heterogeneity, and entering into a conversation with one's cases have advantages too.

Second, these designs offer helpful hints regarding how to increase the number of observations, which can be a problem in both quantitative and qualitative research. One way to increase observations is to increase the number of readings on the same variables in the theory. But this is precisely what one cannot do in many macro theories, because the number of cases is fixed and because the key variables vary so little or not at all. Another way to increase observations is in line with approaches relying on identifying mechanisms. Mechanisms do not have to have variable status. They can refer to links between background conditions and outcomes that are more concrete in nature and they do not have to operate in law-like ways.

Third, the within-case design discussed here points to a methodology of process tracing that induces us to identify mechanisms that connect distal claims with temporally removed outcomes. A fine-grained specification of this process will not only increase the number of observations but also enrich our theory by helping us to discover causal mechanisms. Since the generative view of causality requires a mechanism—not just a constant conjunction—the process tracing methodology supports causal interpretations even without a distribution of observations for X and Y. The process tracing approach substitutes the following:

$$X \rightarrow m_1 \rightarrow m_2 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow m_n \rightarrow Y$$

where m is a mechanism, which may or may not have a distribution for

$$rX_{t1\dots n} \rightarrow Y_{t2\dots n+1}$$

where r is a correlation coefficient connecting variables X and Y, both of which have a distribution.

This claim will be puzzling to empirical social scientists from whom the assertion 'no distribution, no demonstrable connection' is ontologically self-evident. Yet, the historian is not philosophically embarrassed when she says that 'the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand by the Serbian nationalist Gavrilo Princip was a cause (precipitant, catalyst) of World War I'. There is no distribution here.<sup>2</sup> Causal status is attributed to an event, not to a covariance structure. Yet, it is infrequent that social scientists use individuals or countries in any but illustrative ways.

These suggestions are in no way intended to downgrade the importance of large-N quantitative research. I simply hope to open up some alternatives that are already being developed by comparative researchers in non-EU contexts.

## References

- Bunge, Mario (1997) 'Mechanism and Explanation', *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 27 (December) 410-65.
- Evans, Peter (1979) *Dependent Development*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba (1994) *Designing Social Inquiry*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Lieberson, S. (1991) 'Small n's and big conclusions: An examination of the reasoning in comparative studies based on a small number of cases', *Social Forces*, vol. 70: 307-320.
- Mahoney, James (2007) 'Qualitative Methodology and Comparative Politics', in *Comparative Political Studies*, vol 42, no. 2: 122-144.
- Przeworski, Adam and Henry Teune (1970) *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry*. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
- Ragin, Charles C. (1987) *The Comparative Method*. Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press.
- Risse, T., M.G. Cowles, and J. Caporaso (2001) 'Europeanization and domestic change: Introduction', in M.G. Cowles, J.A. Caporaso and T. Risse (eds), *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change*. New York: Cornell University Press, pp. 1-20.
- Ward, Peter D. and Donald Brownlee (2000) *Rare Earth: Why Complex Life is Uncommon in the Universe*. New York: Springer Verlag.

**James A. Caporaso** is Professor of Political Science at the University of Washington. Email: [caporaso@u.washington.edu](mailto:caporaso@u.washington.edu)

## The EU in Comparative Perspective: The US as Referent?

*Alberta M. Sbragia*

THE STUDY OF the European Union (EU) has traditionally been bedeviled by the lack of a comparative framework, whether implicit or explicit, within which to place it. Although such a framework is not necessary for some types of 'scientific' work, it could be very helpful in analyzing the European Union from the perspective of comparative politics.

The unique features of the EU have been a well-

known impediment to comparative analysis. The existence of supranational institutions distinguishes its policy-making process from those of other structures of regional governance (such as MERCOSUR, i.e. the Common Market of the South) while the use of qualified majority voting by member state governments in particular sets it apart from traditional international organizations. While the larger member states are more important in the policy process than the smaller, the latter nonetheless have more clout than they do in traditional international fora. Whether the focus is on judicial or legislative decision-making, agenda-setting, monetary policy-making, or even on intergovernmental decision-making processes, the EU's dynamics are not those of a traditional international organization.

When compared to that of its member states, the EU's policy-making system is also distinctive. It lacks the well-organized and cohesive political parties which link the executive and the legislature as well as national and subnational governments which are found in the EU-15. The European Parliament in practice, therefore, plays a more important role as an independent legislative body in many policy areas than do national parliaments in national decision-making.

Although Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) often argue that the lack of the traditional parliamentary relationship between the European Parliament (EP) and the Commission contributes to the 'democratic deficit', that view does not acknowledge the actual power of the EP in the policy process. Since the Commission cannot dissolve the Parliament after a vote of parliamentary censure, the European Parliament is a 'much more independent and threatening institution' at the EU level than are most national parliaments *vis-à-vis* their national executives (Devuyst 2006: 90). National parliamentarians from parties in the majority coalition are typically under strong pressures to keep the executive in office so as not to face re-election themselves, thereby dampening conflict over policy content. Within the EU, however, the standard tension between the 'party in parliament' and the 'party in the executive' does not exist. MEPs, therefore, have the opportunity to shape the actual content of policy outcomes to an extent which might well be the envy of many of their national counterparts.

Finally, and perhaps most glaringly, the EU lacks a 'government' which gives political direction. While the EU exercises public authority, especially through the exercise of its regulatory power, it lacks the kind of 'political' center—which translates into a 'partisan' center—characteristic of traditional parliamentary systems. The EU's lack of fiscal power—with a minuscule EU budget representing roughly one percent of EU Gross Domestic Product—and its reliance on regulatory authority re-

fects the absence of the partisan direction characteristic of national governments, for taxing and spending are central to partisan conflict at the national level. The EU, then, is characterized by governance without government, governance without money, and governance without partisanship.

This type of governance has led to a fragmentation of power within the EU which in turn encourages complex horizontal and vertical relationships at multiple levels among governments, administrators, parliamentarians, party officials, central bankers, and numerous non-state actors. The very term 'governance', as used in Europe, signifies a range of relationships which incorporate non-state as well as state actors. In the case of the EU, the range and complexity of these relationships are extraordinary.

Given the extreme decentralization of public finance in the EU, a starting point for comparison is to focus on that dimension. According to Arend Lijphart's data (1999: 193) on federalism and public finance, the US, Canada, Germany and Switzerland form a group of countries with decentralized public finances. In each of those countries, the central (federal) government receives a relatively low share of total tax receipts.

From an institutionalist perspective the United States is the most appropriate comparative reference point within that group. Canada, while having very powerful provinces and possessing judicial review, is a Westminster-type parliamentary system which, at the federal level, concentrates power in the executive through dominant one-party cabinets. Although German state governments participate in national decision-making and are also subject to judicial review, they act primarily as implementers of federal legislation rather than as independent subnational legislators and are tied to the center as well as to each other through very strong party ties. Switzerland, for its part, while neither presidential nor parliamentary, is not as suitable a comparative referent due to its lack of judicial review and heavy reliance on the referendum.

Systems of governance in both the EU and the US thus face the problem of managing a fragmentation of power which is far more challenging than that found in most established parliamentary systems. Such fragmentation allows us to carry out comparative work which, while obviously imperfect and methodologically tricky, can nonetheless be valuable in moving both the study of the EU and the US out of their respective ghettos (see, for example, Fabbrini, forthcoming, Kelemen 2004, Menon and Schain 2006). At the very least, the inter-institutional politics which characterize the policy-making process in Brussels, with its mixture of competitive supranational and intergovernmental institutions, can be compared to the inter-institutional politics in

Washington in which 'separated institutions compete for shared powers.' (Jones 1994: 16).

A US-EU comparison can be approached through either the lens of 'multi-level governance', with its emphasis on supranational institutions and on the role of various levels of government, or of comparative federalism. While federalism has been a staple of the study of American politics, the concept of multi-level governance has shaped a good deal of work on the EU. Both perspectives could fruitfully be used in comparative work.

In the US case, the study of federalism has often in practice been understood as the study of 'intergovernmental relations', a conceptualization which moves away from the focus on the two levels of state and federal governments which constitutionally make up the US federal system. Studies along this line have focused on the complex relationship between local, state, and federal actors—whether these are administrators or elective officials acting either in their official capacities or as lobbyists trying to influence each other. Scholars of 'multi-level governance' in the EU, for their part, have been interested in the interaction between subnational, national, and supranational levels of government (Hooghe and Marks 2001). Thus scholars of federalism/intergovernmental relations in the US and of multi-level governance in the EU share a variety of questions, assumptions, and theoretical starting-points.

Finally, the US literature in general does not make a distinction between the term 'government' and 'governance.' Scholars tend to use those terms synonymously, probably because of the lack of 'stateness' in the American political system. Public authority in the US is exercised by such a multitude of entities—state and federal regulatory agencies, federal courts, state courts, the Federal Reserve, the Presidency, a bicameral federal legislature, state, county and municipal public authorities which are independent of legislatures, mayors, governors, bicameral state legislatures, that the notion of 'government' as used in Europe is rather different from that typically associated with the exercise of public authority in the US. The US version of public authority involves a diffusion and dispersal of public power with the judiciary playing a critical role. Political parties are important at each level, but are not tightly connected across various levels of government.

Given that 'governance' rather than 'government' is the hallmark of the EU, the lack of a European-style 'state' in the US facilitates at least some kinds of EU-US comparisons. That is not to say that comparisons based on those two systems would meet strict standards of methodological rigor, but thinking of the EU as fitting within a comparative US-EU framework helps make it less 'unique' and more susceptible to the 'nor-

mal' questions of comparative politics.

## References

- Devuyst, Youri (2006) *The European Union Transformed: Community Method and Institutional Evolution from the Schuman Plan to the Constitution for Europe*. Revised and updated edition. Brussels: Peter Lang
- Fabbrini, Sergio (forthcoming) *Compound Democracies: Why the United States and Europe are Becoming Similar*. Oxford University Press.
- Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks (2001) *Multi-Level Governance and European Integration*. Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Jones, Charles O. (1994) *The Presidency in a Separated System*. Washington, DC: Brookings.
- Kelemen, R. Daniel Kelemen (2004) *The Rules of Federalism: Institutions and Regulatory Politics in the EU and Beyond*. Harvard University Press.
- Lijphart, Arend (1999) *Patterns of Democracy: Government Form and Performance in Thirty-six Countries*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Menon, Anand and Martin A. Schain (eds) (2006) *Comparative Federalism: The European Union and the United States in Comparative Perspective*. Oxford University Press.

**Alberta M. Sbragia** is Professor of Political Science, Mark A. Nordenberg University Chair and the Jean Monnet Chair ad personam in Political Science and the Director of the European Union Center of Excellence.

## Paradigm Wars or Scientific Pluralism? A Modest Proposal for EU Studies

Jeffrey T. Checkel

EU STUDIES SHOULD NOT EXIST as a single science. At the same time, all Europeanists—be they theoretically thin rationalists, epistemologically challenged constructivists or Habermasian groupies—would benefit by taking science more seriously. By science, I mean the philosophical underpinnings of our research or, more precisely, its epistemological basis ('how we come to know'). This might seem like a dreadfully boring subject—one more suited to political theorists than students of the EU. However, nothing could be further from the truth.

A quick glance at the work of Europeanists on the two sides of the Atlantic suggests that 'we come to know about the EU' in radically different ways. For many in the US, the European Union is a laboratory for generating and testing hypotheses, and for theory development. Qualitative case studies are used to

establish causality; there is an emphasis on method and design. Simply put, empiricism—or as it is more commonly called positivism—is the epistemology at play. In contrast, many Europeans explore the moral purpose and identity of the EU. Discourse ethics and interpretation aim at the recovery of meaning; there is an emphasis on critical analysis and the productive power of language. The epistemological basis of such work is decidedly post-positivist and interpretive.

For sure, these generalizations miss many nuances, but they do capture an important and enduring philosophical division in how we study the EU. Sadly, division is probably the correct word to use. EU scholars based in the US seem blind to any possible post-positivist epistemological starting point, while many in Europe think that methods are something only positivists need worry about. However, the way forward—defined as better, richer knowledge of the (EU) world around us—is to overcome such divisions. Mine is not a call for epistemological unity, for that would result in conceptual confusion and analytic mush. Rather, the goal should be pluralism—to encourage dialogue, conversation and mutual learning about epistemologies and methods.

I make this case for pluralism by considering how scholars study language and power in the EU—two non-trivial categories of the analysis given both the amount of talk that occurs in European institutions and the EU's increasingly important global role. In all too many studies by European-based scholars, power seems strangely absent or, better said, underspecified. Think of the whole debate over 'normative power Europe,' or of Habermasian researchers examining deliberation's role in EU committees or the (possible) evolution of European-wide public spheres. Reading this work, one gets an eerie feeling that while power is present, it is nonetheless wished away on theoretical or conceptual grounds. This is downright silly, to say the least.

Part of the problem is these scholars are operating with an incomplete and epistemologically narrow understanding of power as the ability of A to get B to do what B otherwise would not do. This is often called coercive or compulsive power, and is the form of power typically invoked by positivists. Yet, interpretive scholars alert us to two other forms of power—institutional and productive. Institutional power is actors' control of others in indirect ways, where formal and informal institutions mediate between A and B; working through the rules of these institutions, A constrains the actions of B. Productive power is generated through discourse and the systems of knowledge through which meaning is produced and transformed.

An incorporation of these latter forms of power would lead to richer and empirically more accurate

studies. For example, Habermasians studying the role of arguing in the EU's 2004 enlargement might come to appreciate better power's ubiquitous presence. These scholars assert that certain—cosmopolitan—values flow naturally from the EU, while failing to ask why others—say, equality before the law—are absent. In the accession process, why did and does the EU promote one conception of minority rights vis-à-vis candidate countries, but refuse to apply this same standard to its own member states?

Perhaps this discrepancy (and hypocrisy) is explained by the exercise of institutional power: the ability to keep certain issues off the EU agenda. Habermas is not wrong to direct our attention to 'the power of the better argument.' Rather, EU scholars drawing upon such insights need more fully to appreciate the multiple ways in which power operates within European institutions—in this case, insuring that some arguments are simply never heard.

American-trained scholars exploring the role of language and talk in the EU would similarly benefit from a healthy dose of epistemological pluralism. In recent years, a good bit of work has been done to operationalize this linguistic turn by examining socialization and persuasion in EU institutions. Consider an example I know well—myself. (for those wondering why a professor at the University of Oslo qualifies as 'American trained,' well, I received my PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology!). I have been concerned with tracking the development of social norms within European institutions. My hunch was that talk—arguing, more formally—played some role in these settings, thus shifting the preferences of individuals. In theorizing such processes, I turned to a laboratory-experimental literature on persuasion taken from social psychology, from which I developed hypotheses on the roles of agent properties and privacy in promoting persuasion. To test these arguments, I relied on a traditional positivist methodological tool kit—process tracing, triangulation across sources and interviews.

When I presented my findings at several meetings, however, interpretivists pointed to a conceptual-methodological gap in the analysis. Particular agents are not only persuasive because they are authoritative or because they argue in private. Their arguments are also persuasive because they are enabled and legitimated by the broader social discourse in which they are embedded. Did a particular agent's arguments in a particular institution resonate with this broader discourse?

Colleagues were thus suggesting that I had lost sight of the (social) structural context. In positivist-empiricist terms, I had a problem of omitted variable bias, while, for interpretivists, the issue was one of missing the

**Can Lisbon Deliver? Credibility and  
Ownership Issues**

*Mehmet Ugur*

broader forces that enable and make possible human agency. Whatever you call it, the point and lesson are the same. To provide a more complete account of persuasion, I will need to supplement my positivist methodologies with others grounded in interpretative techniques.

In sum, to talk of a scholarly community studying Europe is to invoke an oxymoron. The devil is in that word community, for it implies shared standards and identity. Such common community standards—especially at the level of epistemology and methods—do not exist. This state of affairs suggests two ways forward. The first is the path of least resistance: let the EU positivists hang out with fellow positivists, while interpretivists do the same from the other side of the epistemological divide. However, down this path lie group think, closed citation cartels and, most important, intellectual closure.

The second way forward is more ambitious and exciting. It is defined by bridge building across conceptual and philosophical divides. For some, this is a prescription for scholarly disarray, if not disaster. 'You can't do that! You're mixing (positivist) apples and (interpretive) oranges. The result will be pure muddle.' Yet, those of us with our feet firmly anchored in the empirical mud of the EU know that such neat, principled epistemological distinctions blur as soon as we begin to study this amazingly complex beast. For sure, to bring clarity to these blurry, grey zones will require better theory and data, but it will also require a new-found willingness to transgress epistemological boundaries. It is high time to retire one set of isms—positivism and interpretivism—and replace it with a refreshing, intellectually enriching pluralism.

*Jeffrey T. Checkel is Professor of Political Science, University of Oslo, and Adjunct Research Professor, Centre for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute Oslo. Email: j.t.checkel@stv.uio.no*

**Notes**

<sup>1</sup> By 'inferential process' I mean the logical inference that X caused Y or is related to Y. I do not have in mind the probabilistic inference from sample data to population.

<sup>2</sup> The 'no distribution' remark does not imply that one could not imagine a distribution in this case, e.g. one made up of two possible outcomes, one of which materializes and one which does not. Thus, the occurrence of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand could be contrasted to the hypothetical alternative. Such a viewpoint is implicit in counterfactual history.

**Introduction**

IN MARCH 2000, the Lisbon Summit set the European Union the goal of becoming 'the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world' by 2010. This target was set against a backdrop of lacklustre economic performance in the EU despite the fact that the information technology boom was in full swing at the time.

Targets set by the Summit included the following: achieving an average annual growth rate of 3% from 2000-2010, creating 20 million jobs, increasing the employment rate from around 64% to 70% of the population aged 15-64, and increasing private and public research and development (R&D) expenditures to 3% of the gross domestic product (GDP). The underlying assumption in the Commission documents that preceded and followed the Lisbon summit is that these goals would be achieved through increased competition in goods and services markets, and through increased policy coordination between member states.

Although some progress was made towards achieving these goals, it has become evident by 2005 that the goals are not likely to be achieved by 2010. For some, this is mainly due to the slow pace of the required reforms (Sapir et al, 2004). For others, there are multiple reasons, including overloaded agenda, poor coordination, conflicting priorities, and structural reform being used as a codeword for deregulation and weakening workers' rights (Kok, 2004).

Given this state of affairs, at the half-way point in March 2005, the Lisbon Agenda was re-launched with renewed emphasis on job creation and innovation and with a call on the Commission to play a greater coordinating role.

Immediately after the re-launch, in April 2005, the Commission published integrated guidelines for implementing the Lisbon Agenda and specified the relative roles of the Commission and national governments (EU Commission, 2005). One of the main novelties of the second period was the greater emphasis placed on national government reporting on the implementation of their National Reform Programmes (NRPs). In early 2008, the Commission will publish the 3<sup>rd</sup> Community Lisbon Report and the revised integrated guidelines that will cover the period 2008-2011.

It is only fair to indicate that the Lisbon Strategy has been given a new impetus after the mid-term review of 2005. However, serious doubts still exist about whether or not the EU will be able to achieve the Lisbon targets. In fact, various stakeholders are now more sceptical than they had been in the first period. In what follows, I will try to discuss whether these concerns are well-founded and what can be done to address them. In doing this, I begin with the stylised facts that have informed the EU's push for the Lisbon Agenda in the first place. Then I will discuss the main pillar of the Lisbon strategy – namely the market liberalisation reforms that are expected to lead to increased competitiveness, innovation, and job creation. Finally, I will examine some of the reactions from stakeholders, before I conclude with some observations on issues of credibility and ownership that I believe will continue to haunt the Lisbon agenda even beyond 2010.

### **The cost of Non-Lisbon**

The launch of Lisbon in 2000 was based on a familiar presentation format – namely the format used during the launch of the Single Market Programme (SMP). Just as the SMP was justified by referring to *Euro-sclerosis* as the cost of Non-Europe, Lisbon was justified by referring to the cost of not having the reforms that the strategy calls for. This is done by presenting an array of indicators that point to the extent to which the EU economy is surpassed by the United States (US) economy. The table below presents a selection of these indicators for EU-25 and US economies. For all indicators, EU-25 performance is normalised to 100 in order to make the comparison more straightforward.

**Table 1: EU and US average performance indicators: 1995-2005**

insert table 1 here

The table suggests that EU economy has been performing less satisfactorily than the US economy across all of these indicators; and that the relative underperformance of the EU economy has been worsening over time. The relative under-performance of the EU economy with respect to employment has a long history and therefore may not be surprising. However, the relative deterioration in EU labour productivity and total factor productivity (TFP) was alarming as the EU has historically had higher labour productivity growth rates than the US since the 1950s. Higher labour productivity growth in Europe was mainly due to the latter's catching-up in terms of capital deepening after the war. Given that this process has now come to an end, total factor productivity can be increased mainly through innovation. That is why increased R&D expenditures are considered as essential in the Lisbon strategy.

The need to increase TFP growth rates is also related to the main avenue through which Lisbon targets will be met – namely increased competition in product and services markets. The reason is that competition is assumed to be conducive to innovation which, in turn, is the major determinant of TFP growth when the capital-labour ratio is near its equilibrium level. In addition, innovation, TFP growth and competition are also interlinked in terms of their impact on GDP growth. As can be seen from the table above, US GDP growth from 2000-2005 has been 75% higher than the EU-25 average. To close this gap, increased competition is a necessary condition for increased innovation and TFP growth, which would help EU-25 GDP growth rates catch up with those of the US economy.

The Commission tends to derive two policy implications from the relative under-performance captured in the table above. First, the absence of Lisbon-like strat-

egy aimed at increasing competition, innovation and growth has been costly for the EU. Secondly, failure to implement the Lisbon Agenda will increase the cost further by having significant adverse consequences for EU economic growth and employment. The way out is to instigate a virtuous circle of competition-innovation-growth through market liberalisation. Once in motion, the virtuous circle will generate not only higher GDP growth rates, but also higher levels of employment.

The literature on the Single Market reforms provides some support for the Lisbon reforms. For example Griffith et al (2006) report that the product market reforms associated with the SMP lead to a reduction in the economic rents of the companies in European industries. This is an indication of increased competition, which, in turn, has led to increased R&D expenditures. However, the connection between competition, innovation and growth is much more complex than this. Therefore, the rationale for the Lisbon strategy needs to be assessed more critically.

### **Why Lisbon-type reforms may not deliver?**

One reason why Lisbon-type reforms may not deliver is due to the complexity of the relationship between competition, innovation and growth. One aspect of this complexity relates to the question on whether market liberalisation and integration is necessarily conducive to higher levels of competition. The answer to this question is not straightforward because liberalisation and integration do not necessarily lead to the replacement of imperfect competition (i.e., oligopolistic or monop-

olistic competition) with perfect competition where firms are price-takers. Put differently, liberalisation and market integration *a la Lisbon* or *a la SMP* is not necessarily a move from a second-best to a first-best situation – it is merely a move from one second-best to another second-best state. This is because incumbent firms, many of which are large entities controlling significant market shares in their industries, can always react to the liberalisation reforms strategically.

For example, the introduction of the single currency increases price transparency and may lead to increased inter-firm competition due to increased consumer information about prices. However, as the single currency increases price transparency, firms may react strategically and coordinate their pricing strategies. Which effect dominates is an empirical question and cannot be answered *ex ante*. A similar outcome may obtain in the case of SMP-type market liberalisation reforms too. There is evidence suggesting that the Single Market has increased the competitive pressure on incumbent firms. However, we do not know by how much. In fact, there is evidence indicating that economic rents (mark-ups) that European firms have been able to extract have not declined after the single market. If anything, economic rents (measured as the ratio of value-added to total cost of capital and labour) has increased – as the following table demonstrates.

**Table 2: Mark-up rates in selected countries: 1986 and 2000**

insert table 2 here

What is also interesting is that the mark-up rates in the Anglo-Saxon model that the Lisbon Agenda is suspected of emulating have been historically higher than the continental European countries. Griffith et al (2004) reason that increasing rates of mark-up rates across the board and higher rates in the UK and the US may be related to the business cycle and workers' bargaining power rather than the degree of competition per se. Even if this is the case, two questions remain unanswered: (i) can we be sure that market liberalisation is necessarily conducive to increased price competition? (ii) how can you sell the Lisbon Agenda to non-firm stakeholders given that the Single Market has been associated with higher mark-up rates for companies?

One can refer to further evidence indicating that market liberalisation and integration reforms may be just a move from one second-best state to another. For example, Weugelers et al (2002) examined the determinants of industrial concentration in the EU and found that the SMP reforms have forced leading manufacturing companies to focus on their core activities as access to multiple markets have become easier. This is conducive to increased economic efficiency and welfare. However, their findings concerning the extent to which new entry has occurred and whether the risk of imperfect competition has fallen are not encouraging. For example, the share of the 5 largest incumbents in the manufacturing sector has increased from 17.3% in 1987 to 19.3% in 1997. The increase in concentration was even higher in the computer/office equipment sector, which is one of the leading sectors in terms of innovation. In addition, the identity of the largest 200 firms in the manufacturing industries has remained the same over the period.

Finally, the relationship between competition and innovation as well as that between innovation and growth are not linear.

The debate on the relationship between competition and innovation is quite old: it goes back to the early 1900s when Schumpeter (1912, 1942) proposed two hypotheses. On the one hand, competition may be conducive to innovation as it forces incumbents to innovate to maintain their market positions or new entrants have to enter with superior technology to be able to compete with the incumbents. On the other hand, competition may inhibit competition because increased competition reduces economic rents and thereby reduces the incentive to undertake innovation. This is because innovation is a risky undertaking and it requires higher returns that will compensate the higher risks. A large volume of literature on imperfect competition and endogenous growth tend to support Schumpeter's second hypothesis (See, for example, Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; and Grosman and Helpman,

1991).

Similarly, there is non-linearity in the relationship between innovation and growth. Recent research points out that innovation at the technology frontier is conducive to increased total factor productivity and, therefore, it is conducive to higher levels of sustained growth. However, innovation below the technology frontier (mainly, emulation) has run its course and may not be conducive to higher levels of sustained growth. (See, for example, Acemoglu et al, 2002).

Given these findings, it is difficult to establish a direct and deterministic relationship between market liberalisation reforms of the Lisbon Agenda and the targets for higher innovation, higher growth rates, and higher employment.

### **Conclusion: credibility, ownership and the predicament of the Lisbon Strategy**

The analysis above suggests that the Lisbon Agenda, compared to the Single Market project (SMP), is much more difficult to sell to the European public. One reason is that the SMP was introduced at a time when the tendency towards increasing economic rents captured by firms was not evident. Secondly, the SMP was essentially about reducing barriers to international trade. As such, it was in line with the existing knowledge that trade liberalisation is conducive to increased overall welfare.

The Lisbon Agenda, however, is introduced against a different backdrop. On the one hand, the tendency of increasing economic rents extracted by firms proved to be longer-lasting than what can be associated with the business cycle. On the other hand, the linkage between competition, innovation and growth proved to be more complex than what a standard contrast between perfect and imperfect competition would suggest. In other words, liberalisation reforms and the reactions of firms to liberalisation are endogenous outcomes that depend on the bargaining power of the public policy makers and the recipient of the public policy. In addition, innovation, as an engine of growth, generates different outcomes – depending on whether it is on the technology frontier or below it.

All of these factors combine to render the Lisbon Strategy less credible than the SMP. This credibility problem, in turn, creates an ownership problem for the Lisbon strategy. The ownership problem has three dimensions.

First, consumers, employees, employee organisations, social NGOs, etc. perceive of the Lisbon agenda as a strategy that will maintain the ongoing deterioration in the share of labour income in GDP. Therefore, the European public at large is either indifferent or hostile to the Lisbon agenda.

Secondly, the recent EU enlargement has increased the divergence between member states. Of course, integration may lead to convergence in the long run and this has proved to be case with respect to Ireland, Spain and Greece after 1995. However, at the current state of the play in technological development, the new member states stand to gain less than the core countries from innovation. This is because innovation in the new member states is more likely to be under the technology frontier whereas innovation in the old member states is likely to be closer to the frontier. To the extent this is the case, innovation may not lead to convergence between the 'core' and 'periphery' of the EU. That is why, one would expect the Lisbon strategy to be less attractive for the new member states.

Finally, the EU and the member states, at least in rhetoric, have been forced to balance the drive towards liberalisation reforms with a number of assurances concerning sustainability and job creation. In some countries, the rhetoric is even taking a twist towards 'economic patriotism'. Given these signals, the employer organisations are also sceptical about the extent to which the Lisbon targets can be achieved.

To conclude: the Lisbon strategy is based on less robust evidence compared to the SMP. In addition, it appears to be faced with a serious ownership/credibility problem. This combination is likely to increase the cost of the project and reduce its benefits. Therefore, the net effect of Lisbon will continue to be debatable. In addition, this debate will be inextricably linked to what has happened to the European model and how it should be reformed.

*Mehmet Ugur is Jean Monnet Reader in European Political Economy at the University of Greenwich Business School.*

## EUSA Executive Committee Election Results

The results of the recent EUSA Executive Committee election are in. Neil Fligstein (University of California, Berkeley), Erik Jones (Johns Hopkins University), R. Daniel Kelemen (Rutgers University), and Craig Parsons (University of Oregon) have been elected to serve on the Executive Committee for four year terms running from 2007 to 2011.

## Book Reviews

**Tanya Börzel, ed. *The Disparity of Regional Integration: Revisiting Neofunctionalism in Honour of Ernst B. Haas*. New York: Taylor & Francis, 2006, 177pp.**

ERNST HAAS WAS a complex figure. He pioneered the sub-field of EU studies and received EUSA's first lifetime contribution award, yet famously declared his own approach "obsolescent" at mid-career. He was a normatively-engaged believer in the march of progress, but spent his life in the ivory tower writing some of the most jargonesque analytic theory ever conceived. He was a marvelous teacher, much loved by students, but could be unpredictably harsh or supportive. The terse typed letters he sent to advisees caused much consternation over the years.

This book is a fitting tribute, since it showcases much of this ambiguity. The contributions from an impressive list of EU specialists are partly hagiographic but also very critical. Several chapters celebrate Haas while focusing mainly on the things that he got wrong. Tanya Börzel's introduction allows generously that Haas may have "solved the puzzle" of why states give up sovereignty to supranational institutions, but suggests that the solution was vague in failing to account for the erratic surrender of sovereignty across policy areas. Walter Mattli finds "unmatched brilliance and depth" in Haas's work, but no viable explanation for variations in regional integration around the world. Philippe Schmitter suggests variously that Haas's logic of "spillover" has played a major role in EU history, that it operated until the 1970s but not much since then, and that it operated until recently but is now "exhausted." Even Andrew Moravcsik, in a scorched-earth survey of the errors of neofunctionalism, concludes that Haas was nonetheless "visionary" in his basic functionalist focus on welfare-improving institutions.

Other chapters focus on developing Haas's thinking more positively, and collectively suggest that Haas is all things to all people. Ben Rosamond argues that neofunctionalism has been demonized as the "other" by contemporary theorists, when in fact it overlaps heavily with both Moravcsik's interest-group materialism and with constructivist approaches (in addition to the institutionalism to which it connects most obviously). Henry Farrell and Adrienne Héritier update a Haas-like "rationalist-institutionalist explanation of endogenous regional integration," but follow Haas in leaving ambiguous how important they think such dynam-

ics are in the overall EU story. Thomas Risse finds several mechanisms of identity change in Haas and discusses them alongside some other constructivist mechanisms that might be operating in Europe. In a direct (if implicit) contrast, Gráinne de Búrca salutes Walter Mattli and Anne-Marie Slaughter's application of neofunctionalism to the rise of the European Court of Justice, but hints that neofunctionalism is incapable of capturing the real force of law because it does *not* recognize social construction and the authority of norms.

Precisely because of these different readings, today's students of the EU will find the book very useful. It ultimately does an admirable job of dissecting Haas's complexities. It also effectively turns them into a mirror on more contemporary debates. Each author emphasizes strands of neofunctionalism that highlight their own intellectual commitments. Since almost everyone can find interesting hints in Haas's work that prefigure their own, their broad conclusions all look past his vagueness and contradictions to see him as the brilliant father of EU studies. With hindsight, we can see that Haas's parenting strategy was both highly effective and largely unintended—just as he theorized that the EU would be. He set up a vague and often wrong theory for others to criticize, while seeding the field with a rich mix of insights.

**Craig Parsons**  
**University of Oregon**

**Nicolas Jabko. *Playing the Market: A Political Strategy for Uniting Europe, 1985-2005*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006, 206 pages.**

THE "RELAUNCHING" OF European integration in the mid-1980s is the most studied issue by EU scholars. "EU-101" classes usually present three canonical, alternative explanations of why Europe adopted a broad-based market reform agenda while strengthening its supranational institutions: 1) actors' interests and power; 2) the EC's own institutional dynamics and their unintended consequences; 3) the spread of neo-liberal economic ideology.

Think again about the canon. In this concise yet convincing book, Nicolas Jabko argues that the sudden relaunch can be explained by "strategic constructivism." For Jabko, the role of the market in fostering "Europe's quiet revolution" was crucial. But the market was not in itself the direct trigger. Instead, it provided a strategic repertoire of ideas and justifications, which were skillfully used by the European Commission (mostly by Jacques Delors, his staff, and several key commissioners) to overcome institutional inertia and compensate

for their relative weakness. Their political strategy was to "sell" the market differently to different people depending on the issue at stake and the group to co-opt, which led to strange bedfellows: some saw the EU as a way to promote the free market, even if they did not care for European integration; others saw the EU as a countervailing force against the free market. This polyvalence of meanings and functions attached to the "market" served to cement a heterogeneous coalition and give the European Commission allies in pushing through further European integration. Jabko argues that the idea of the market was sold in at least four different ways. These he then studies in four cases showcasing how the market was instrumentalized by Commission policy entrepreneurs:

- 1) The market is a constraint that undermines existing institutional forms and is often pointless or costly to resist (the case of the single financial area).
- 2) The market is the most legitimate and efficient norm of economic organization (the internal energy market).
- 3) The market is a space for economic prosperity and development (EU structural policy).
- 4) The market is a talisman of political discourse which brings together divergent views of the world (economic and monetary union).

It is not always clear how or why the market as constraint/norm/space/talisman is differentiated in each case. Indeed, the distinction between these four functions sometimes feels contrived and artificial. Moreover, the case-studies are built in such a way as to provide a detailed analysis of the Commission's strategy, but not always of its motives. This is particularly true in the case of the energy sector, where the reader does not understand why the Commission sought to liberalize in spite of the risks involved. Finally, one wishes there was more discussion of why the efforts of Commission entrepreneurs succeeded with business groups and political leaders but not with the European public at large.

Nevertheless, *Playing the Market* is an enjoyable read with two main merits. The first is that it tries to explain two puzzles often ignored in the literature: why didn't the shift towards market-based governance always correlate with the presence of market pressures and why was this shift accompanied by a strong reassertion of central powers at the European level if it was a genuinely neo-liberal revolution? The second merit is that it goes beyond traditional constructivist assertions about the power of ideas and shows instead that it is the politics of ideas, rather than the ideas themselves, that engineered institutional change. Europe's "quiet revolution" was the result of a political strategy,

not neoliberal ideology. In this account, the market was a holy grail carefully constructed in order to defer controversial choices and bring together, without making explicit bargains, actors with diverse motivations—each side thinking that their long-term vision would prevail in the end.

Delors & Co promoted Europe as a generic solution to all the tensions arising from market globalization, but at the same time made Europe a cause of future tensions. *Playing the Market* must be commended for taking a first step in trying to problematize the understudied question of the link between globalization and Europeanization. This often appears to be a chicken-and-egg issue: is European integration a Trojan Horse that helped bring globalization into the heart of Europe, or is the EU Europe's best defense against the negative effects of globalization? Interestingly, many of the issues raised during the relaunching of Europe find echo in subsequent preoccupations with "managing globalization" which were articulated explicitly as the central doctrine of EU trade policy since 1999 by Pascal Lamy (himself a veteran of the Europe 1992 project). By constructing the market as a response to Europe's torpor while bolstering Europe's powers to control the market, Delors and Lamy played with fire. An interesting follow-up to Jabko's stimulating book would be to analyze why and how the market became perceived as the source of Europe's problems instead of their solution in the late 1990s, and why a similar strategy of constructing a focal point with polyvalent meanings did not emerge before the ill-fated debate on the EU Constitution.

**Sophie Meunier  
Princeton University**

**Claire Palley. *An International Relations Debacle: The UN Secretary General's Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 1999-2004*. Oxford, UK and Portland, OR: Hart Publishing Co, 2005.**

IF WE NEEDED more reasons for early and thorough reform of the United Nations, this book provides many. Kofi Annan has much to answer for in his term as UN Secretary General but no episode of UN mismanagement and manipulation has been as clearly and convincingly documented as Claire Palley does in this book. Annan does not stand alone in the dock, however; the EU and the United States are co-defendants.

Palley, a British lawyer and long-time adviser to the Cyprus government, witnessed over five years the UN's

failed attempts to impose a US-UK plan on the tiny island republic. She described in excruciating (and occasionally redundant) detail every misstep taken by the world body under pressure by two of its Security Council members.

The book, therefore, is more than just an account of a UN debacle; it describes how two powerful countries, added by other EU members, misused the organization and, in this case, its pliant chief executive.

Because Palley has been an adviser to the president of Cyprus from 1980, she witnessed closely most of that country's three decades of division into a Turkish-occupied north of about one-third of its territory and a Greek-Cypriot south that constitutes the prosperous (and internationally recognized) Republic of Cyprus where most of the island's citizens live.

This is not, then, a dispassionate or a legalistic account; it overflows with indignation but presented in a meticulous and heavily footnoted manner. I have never met Palley (nor even heard of her until this book appeared) but she presents as an articulate and impassioned witness to the successful attempt by the United States and Britain to override the normal caution of the UN Secretariat and its chief, and to use the international body for their diplomatic goal of getting Turkey admitted to the European Union. Happily, as Ms Palley carefully relates, even the US-UK stranglehold on the UN could not overcome the good sense of the Greek Cypriots who in Spring 2004 rejected by referendum the fifth, and worst, "Annan Plan" in as many years.

Fortunately Claire Palley did not write a lawyer-like brief for her Greek Cypriot client. She is sharper, more focused and less diplomatic than the country for which she worked for over 24 years. She limits herself, however, like a good lawyer to what she knows (every detail of the UN effort to pressure the Greek Cypriots). She does not go into much of the history why the island republic came into such strange existence in 1960 with Britain, Greece and Turkey as "guarantor" powers, why Britain failed in that role in 1974 when first Greece and then Turkey manipulated the island for their national purposes, nor does she attempt to cover the many attempts between 1974 and 1999 to end the island's tragic division. She reviews the EU entry process for Cyprus and its role in the diplomatic maneuvers.

This book, written from Greek Cypriot perspectives and sources, could not and does not have the details on exactly how the American and British governments manipulated Annan and his staff to do their work on behalf of Turkey. Nor does Palley devote much space to the important changes within Turkey which brought it, however reluctantly, to the point of agreeing to a Cyprus settlement which it has resisted for 25 years.

She does make clear that it was the Turkish desire for EU membership, which the US and UK supported strongly for strategic i.e. Middle Eastern reasons, which brought Turkey to the point where its EU application could be considered. These are matters for two or more other books. But her account of the sad debacle of a UN secretariat doing the work of a superpower and its European sheriff is indispensable in the run up to serious thought on where the United Nations, Cyprus and Turkey should go next.

She also relates the role of the European Union and its desire to have the Cyprus issue settled before facing the question of Turkey's EU entry. Although only playing a support role to that of the US and the UK, the EU's earlier commitment to Cypriot membership drove the UN process.

Turkey may or may not enter the European Union. But its major sponsors in Washington and London (not forgetting some other pliant EU members who supported them) have done much damage to the UN system by the debacle Palley describes. Her book should be remembered for its neat if lengthy, account of how the world body was turned on its head in the effort. It is a lesson for the whole world but especially for the European Union that will live for a long time with its consequences.

**Clifford Hackett**

**Francesco Duina. *The Social Construction of Free Trade. The European Union, NAFTA and Mercosur.* Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006, 249pp.**

THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) is different from Mercosur, which in turn differs from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The differences are rooted in the domestic characteristics of each region's member countries. Seems obvious? Not to Francesco Duina, who wrote this book to assert and explain variation across the mentioned regional trade agreements (RTAs).

Duina builds his case against what he calls "the globalization thesis" (p. 10), although he is fighting but a straw man. In claiming that "the local still matters", he argues that RTAs are not undergoing a process of homogenization but, instead, are quite heterogeneous and reflect at the regional level deep cultural differences which are embedded at the national level. Controversially, the author alleges that RTAs have not been studied before in a comparative fashion, what is not as much unjust to scholars such as Ernst Haas, Karl Deutsch or Philippe Schmitter (who are never cited)

as eloquent regarding the background limitations of the author's approach. Furthermore, although the book refers from its very title to the 'social construction' of regional agreements, it is never clear what social is opposed to: the economy –perhaps— or nature itself – as in the pioneering work of Berger and Luckman? If it refers to the former, it is worth remembering that the economy is also a social construction. If it refers to the latter, it would be too obvious to merit discussion.

The main argument of the book is that the internal structure and the legal nature of an RTA depend on the type of law, either common or civil, that prevails in most of its member countries. If common law predominates, as in NAFTA, a minimalist approach is likely to take place: it means a reactive, case-by-case and gradual approach to regulation (p. 88). If civil law preponderates, as in the EU and Mercosur, a more intrusive approach is expected to occur: it entails a propensity for a comprehensive and definitive codification of reality (p. 91). A minimalist approach rests on mutual recognition, standards set by other organizations, and a litigation-oriented conflict-resolution system. An intrusive approach implies that regional officials tend to engage in extensive, a priori regulation and that they view regional-level regulation as the solution to conflicting sets of national-level legal systems. So far so good. The problem arises when the author attempts to measure the degree of standardization by taking regional regulations at face value, i.e., analyzing whether a norm is written on paper instead of working in practice. Duina seems to ignore that half of Mercosur regulations (512 of 1009 in 2004) are not in force, as they have not been transposed into the domestic legislation of all member countries. Neither does he acknowledge that more than half of Mercosur norms contain confidential annexes (235 of 382 between 2003 and 2005), what makes social compliance virtually impossible. He also overlooks the fact that in the EU, in spite of its aprioristic rather than litigation-oriented nature, the European Court issues hundreds of ruling per year (e.g., it dealt with 526 cases only in 2004), while Mercosur dispute-settlement system has issued just 10 rulings... in 15 years! Instead, conflicts are handled through informal, not standardized proceedings which utmost instance is presidential diplomacy. In short, what Duina overlooks is that the difference between Mercosur, on the one hand, and the EU and NAFTA, on the other, might not lay on law structure but rather law strength –or better, on the difference between formal and informal proceedings.

Duina has made a tremendous effort at hand-coding hundreds of Mercosur norms. He might have benefited from the similar –albeit broader— work already done by Roberto Bouzas, Pedro da Motta Veiga and Ramón

Torrent in 2002 in an in-depth analysis of Mercosur commissioned by the European Commission and available online (<http://mkaccdb.eu.int/study/studies/32.doc>). The omission of any reference to this document, to other works by the same authors or to other key experts on Mercosur legal issues such as Luiz Olavo Batista suggests that the feeble comprehension the author has of Mercosur effective operation may derive from his wrong choice of primary sources and bibliography.

In a more general vein, the book would have benefited from considering plausible counter-hypotheses. The author underlines the influence of ideational factors at the expense of hegemony and state power, but it is legitimate to wonder what would happen should Canada have civil law –just like Mexico. In that case, would the US consent to standardizing NAFTA proceedings? A conjecture on the negative would shift the focus from analyzing ‘most states’ towards the role of ‘core states.’

To sum up, Duina makes the case that RTAs are different from one another as regard legal structure but, despite the obviousness of this statement, his independent variable (the type of law prevailing within most member countries) fails to account for the alleged difference. His remarkable effort is worth praising but deserved a better outcome.

**Andrés Malamud**  
**University of Lisbon**

**Michael Burgess and Hans Vollaard (eds.). *State Territoriality and European Integration*. London and New York: Routledge, 2006.**

THE CONCEPT OF STATE territoriality has been a prominent if contested theme in academic debate on European integration and, as this volume illustrates, remains as relevant (and contested) as ever. It is a concept which connects to sensitivities and dilemmas at the heart of the integration process: those of citizenship, democracy, identity, and sovereignty. This collection emerged from the papers given at a conference in Leiden in 2003. The book’s principal purpose is ‘to shed new light upon the evolving relationship between the territorial state in Europe and the process of European integration in a way that both re-examines and reappraises the territorial basis of the state itself’ (p1).

An accessible introductory chapter by the editors provides the collection with a clear structure and focus. Subsequent chapters are diverse – both in perspective and in the extent to which they respond to the challenges set out by the editors. The range of contributions includes van Nimwegen’s chapter analysing the

ways in which the Dutch Republic tried to cope with territorial defence from 1590 until 1750; Teschke’s challenge to the adequacy of theorising about Westphalian sovereignty; Swenden and Brans’ discussion of multi-level governance and the communities in modern Belgium; and Hemerijck’s account of EU social policy beyond national welfare regime. The standard of contributions is very good and, due to space constraints, three of the strongest are highlighted here.

Burgess’s chapter provides an excellent overview of territoriality in the specific context of the governance of the European Union. The writing is clear, crisp and informative. Particular care is taken to define terms and concepts for the non-specialist. How many readers will concur with the conclusion that ‘we are now on the threshold of a federal Europe’ (p117) is uncertain, but it certainly provides plenty of scope for debate in the seminar room and beyond.

Friedrich’s provides another well articulated contribution, this time on the territorial monopoly of force as the ‘hardest case’ for transformation of statehood. While the EU is considered the likeliest regional forum in which internationalisation of the monopoly of force may occur, with a strong functional pull in this direction, states have been famously reluctant to cede sovereignty in this domain. This reluctance has constrained development of the EU, although the argument here is that in the future we can expect ‘a slow stop-go process towards the unbundling of territorial sovereignty’ (p245). Much of the argument developed here is familiar, but it is well delivered.

Last, but certainly not least, van Ham provides a lively and engaging chapter on ‘Europe, war and territory’. The chapter is resplendent with metaphor, managing to include references to ‘stickleback fish’, the ‘Truman Show’, ‘life-cycle’s silly-season’, ‘the EU fairy’ and ‘neutered dogs’ among others. Importantly though, it confronts the dilemma for pro-integrationists presented by the central role of war and violence in state-formation: in defining who ‘we’ are. To date, the EU has not yet embarked upon war, but has restricted itself to conflict resolution duties. This may be preferable, but limits identity formation and the further development of the Euro-polity.

In summary, this is an interesting if diverse collection. As the editors acknowledge in what is a brief conclusion, the book raises more questions than it answers. However, the collection also validates their claim that ‘territoriality remains an important concept and a useful heuristic tool for analysing states and other polities’ (p277).

**Ian Bache**  
**University of Sheffield**

**Frank Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert, Heiko Knobel. *International Socialization in Europe. European Organizations, Political Conditionality and Democratic Change.* New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006, 291 pp.**

THE END OF the Cold War has had an important impact on the European continent, which has allowed for a recent comeback of the neo-functional research agenda. This can be seen particularly, in the field of European studies, however with new and different analytical tools. Schimmelfennig *et al.*'s book represents a milestone for this movement when it comes to academic literature on the European Union (EU). Furthermore, it tackles the question of socialisation in Europe, in the framework of relations with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe (CE), the EU, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). It explores "the causal mechanisms and conditions that have produced (...) uneven outcomes and patterns of international socialization" (p. 1) in European non-member states, on the basis of nine well documented case studies: Belarus, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Turkey (chap. 5-13). It argues that socialisation first mainly depends on the nature of external pressure: While the OSCE and the CE use persuasion and social reinforcement to reach compliance, the EU and NATO have proved more efficient as they concentrate on material incentives and reinforcement by reward. Second, effective socialisation relies on the domestic reaction to these pressures: Countries that had already committed themselves to taking over a liberal agenda were generally quicker to comply with the European (liberal) requirements. The theoretical and methodological tools mobilised to show this (presented in chap. 1-4, chap. 14-15) are particularly solid and build on the habilitation work of Frank Schimmelfennig (2003). As international socialisation in Eastern Europe is described and explained as "strategic action in an international community" (p. 5), the authors combine rationalist and constructivist arguments to show that although the promotion of community norms corresponds to a constructivist agenda, the "process and outcomes of international socialization in post-Cold War Europe are better explained by instrumental and strategic behaviour" (material incentives and domestic costs) (*ibid*). The combination of various qualitative and quantitative methods helps to support and generalise the argument.

When concentrating on the impact of European organisations on the domestic institutions of non-member states, this book clearly complements the

transition studies, which have been criticised for not taking this variable into account (Pridham *et al.*, 1994). However, the analysis presents at least two shortcomings in the way it is designed: It does not take into consideration the possible evolution of the external pressures coming from various European Organisations, and it tends to downplay the role of implementation (or rather the reasons for the non-implementation) of European norms in the analysis of domestic changes. As a matter of fact, by omitting the impact that receiving states – and especially non-implementation – may have on the nature of these external pressures, it neglects the role of recent reforms – at least at the EU level – which now aim at combining persuasion and social reinforcement (OSCE, CE methods) with material incentives, in order to improve conditionality (Tulmets, 2005). However, this book, very rich in information and well constructed, will be of real interest for specialists of the EU/NATO enlargement and democratisation.

**Elsa Tulmets  
Institute of International Relations, Prague**

#### **Cited Works**

Pridham Geoffrey *et al.* (1994), *Building Democracy? The International Dimension of Democratisation in Eastern Europe*, London: Leicester University Press.

Schimmelfennig Frank (2003), *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tulmets Elsa (2005), "The Management of New Forms of Governance by Former Accession Countries of the European Union: Institutional Twinning in Estonia and Hungary", *European Law Journal*, Vol. 11, No. 5, Sept., pp. 657–674.

## EUSA Public Opinion and Participation Interest Section Essay

### If At First You Don't Succeed, Try, Try Again? Prospects for Referenda on the EU Constitution in France and the Netherlands

*Maurits van der Veen*

THE GERMAN PRESIDENCY of the European Union in the first half of 2007 has brought renewed interest in the fate of the European Union's Constitutional Treaty. The treaty had appeared stillborn after the rejection by the French and Dutch publics in referenda on May 29 and June 1, 2005, respectively. However, new polling data from the Fall of 2006 suggested that public opinion in France and the Netherlands had become more favourably disposed towards the treaty. Nevertheless, considerable risks are associated with asking publics to express a second opinion on the same issue. Although the two closest parallels to the present situation — the Danish referenda on the Maastricht Treaty and the Irish referenda on the Nice Treaty — both resulted in positive outcomes the second time, achieving this positive result required a considerable amount of effort on the part of the political elites of the two countries. In both France and the Netherlands, however, the political elite seem ambivalent about asking their public to vote again.

The new coalition government in the Netherlands declared in February 2007 that it would not submit the treaty for another referendum, and that a renegotiated treaty might or might not be subjected to a referendum.<sup>1</sup> Meanwhile, in France the leading candidates for the French presidential elections of summer 2007 disagreed with one another about the advisability of holding another referendum. The UMP's Nicolas Sarkozy wants a slim, renegotiated treaty, to be ratified by the French parliament only, whereas his main opponents, Ségolène Royal (Socialist) and François Bayrou (UDF) have both called for a new referendum, on a more or less renegotiated treaty.

In fact, caution and skepticism are warranted, for two main reasons. First, the Constitutional Treaty is too complex to galvanize voters, which means that any referendum almost inevitably will focus on more general concerns about European integration. Second, the factors that helped produce successful outcomes in the Danish and Irish cases are not likely to be replicated in the Dutch and French cases.

#### I. The Weakness of the Constitution: Analyzing the 2005 Referenda

The margin by which the French and Dutch electorates rejected the EU Constitutional Treaty came as

a surprise to almost all observers. In France, 54.7% voted no, and in the Netherlands 61.5% did the same. The results were all the more striking since both countries are founding members of the European Union and are generally pro-integration. Moreover, in both countries, the decision to hold a referendum was a political choice, not mandated by the national constitution.

France had held two earlier referenda associated with the European integration process, each, similarly, for political reasons. In 1972, President Pompidou had called for a referendum on the first enlargement of the European Communities, forestalling an extensive debate in the parliament, and attempting to divide the political opposition at the same time. In 1992, President Mitterand called for a referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, again hoping to divide the political opposition, as well as to increase his stature as a European leader. In each case, the final vote was positive. However, Mitterand's experience highlighted the risk of opting for a referendum. Although initial polls had suggested the Maastricht Treaty would easily be approved by the public, the expected margin of victory shrank as the date of the vote approached, and Mitterand had to use all political skill and leadership to ensure a victory. In July 2004, President Chirac announced that France would hold a referendum to ratify the Constitutional Treaty. Like his predecessors, Chirac hoped to divide his opposition, as the socialist party (PS) in particular suffered from strong internal divisions on the issue. Initial polls suggested that a comfortable majority of the electorate would vote in favour of the treaty.<sup>2</sup>

In contrast to France, the Netherlands has little experience with referenda, as they are not provided for in the Dutch constitution. As a result, referenda can only be consultative in nature. The initiative for the referendum initially came from the political left, with the express goal of promoting debate on European integration and increasing the legitimacy of the European Union, since a positive outcome was not thought to be in doubt. Though the referendum would be legally non-binding, most political leaders announced beforehand that they would not go against the expressed opinion of the Dutch electorate.

As the date of the vote approached, the expected margin of victory shrank in both nations. Although more than three quarters of the population in the Netherlands and France supports European integration in general, many felt that European integration had proceeded too far and too fast in recent years. In the eyes of most French, the purpose of European integration has been the maintenance and deepening of social policies that could no longer be sustained at the national level. The 'deepening' and enlargement of the European Union from 15 to 25 members, with the new members offer-

ing untapped reserves of comparatively cheap labour, threatened to make this “social Europe” unsustainable. Two key issues which symbolized this growing French discontent were the prospective membership of Turkey and the Bolkestein services directive.

As numerous commentators pointed out, neither of these issues was at stake in the referendum. Nevertheless, they strongly coloured the debate on the referendum. As support for the constitution fell, Chirac, like Mitterrand before him, was forced to use his political position to try to shore up the referendum’s chances. First, he helped push through a change in the French constitution in February 2005 that promised referenda on any future EU enlargements. Next, he made sure the Bolkestein directive was withdrawn at the March 2005 European Council meeting. Although support for the Constitution rebounded somewhat, it never again came close to 60%.

In the Netherlands, opposition to the Constitutional Treaty focused on the threat of European integration to a separate Dutch identity, either culturally or in policy terms, as well as on the perceived high cost of membership.<sup>3</sup> As in France, opponents of the treaty exploited a general sense among the Dutch public that European integration had proceeded too fast and too far in recent years, both in terms of greater EU legislative dominance over Dutch policies and in terms of membership, with the question of Turkey, again, coming to symbolize opposition to further enlargement.

Strategies to reach out to voters directly on the part of the political establishment were largely unsuccessful. Since the referendum legislation had been imposed on the Dutch government by the legislature (and pushed most strongly by opposition parties), the government was slow to take the lead in the campaign for a “Yes” vote. The erosion in of the expected victory margin for the “Yes” side finally galvanized the political leadership into action by the second half of April. By then, however, the terms of the debate had been set by the “No” side. Treaty supporters were able to put forward a strong positive argument for ratification; most of their effort was spent rebutting the claims of opponents.

Moreover, Dutch and French political leaders made important public relations mistakes. They argued, without much evidence, that a “No” vote would undermine European integration and the position of their country within Europe and beyond. The Dutch Minister of Justice, Donner, even argued that rejecting the treaty might lead to the violent disintegration of the European Union à la Yugoslavia; a non-credible threat that almost certainly backfired. Along similar lines, Economic Affairs Minister Brinkhorst claimed that rejection would mean that “the lights go out in the Netherlands.”<sup>4</sup> Other lead-

ers made short-sighted comments and threats of their own. One observer concluded that “the cumulative impact of this litany of miscues and misstatements was little short of devastating.”<sup>5</sup>

In France, President Chirac made a number of pro-treaty appearances on national television in which he came across as out of touch on the issues that most interested younger voters. Worried about his impact, several treaty supporters asked him to reduce his involvement in the “Yes” campaign after these appearances. Moreover, though some political leaders wanted to form a united pro-treaty front, the Socialists and the Greens wished to avoid being associated too closely with an unpopular government and president, and accordingly campaigned separately most of the time. Hence there was no single leader for the “yes” campaign, nor was the campaign itself unified.<sup>6</sup>

Specific provisions of the Constitutional Treaty played a minor role in determining voting patterns. In one poll inquiring into their reasons for voting “Yes”, Dutch voters put general considerations associated with European integration in the top five positions.<sup>7</sup> In another poll, the top two motivations were the broad claims that the constitution was essential to pursue European integration and to strengthen European identity.<sup>8</sup> For “No” voters, no Constitution-specific argument even ranked in the top 10 reasons in one poll, while in the other, lack of information and the loss of national sovereignty were the two leading arguments, with “Europe is too expensive” coming in fourth.<sup>9</sup>

A similar pattern emerges in the French case, although here the Constitution itself was somewhat more prominent, because the pre-referendum debate had also been more salient. As in the Netherlands, the argument that the Constitution was essential for European integration was the highest-ranked reason for voting “Yes”, and none of the top reasons referred to any specific aspects of the treaty.<sup>10</sup> On the “No” side, similarly, the top rankings were occupied by fears about implications for the employment situation in France, which was unlikely to be affected by the Constitution. Many “No” voters also expressed a desire for a renegotiated treaty.<sup>11</sup>

In France, the government was able to convince most of its supporters to support the treaty: 80% of UMP voters and 76% of UDF voters did so. The Socialist (PS) and Green party leaders, who had also campaigned for a “Yes”, however, were unable to convince a majority of their supporters to vote in favour of the treaty. Nevertheless, the fact that more than 40% of the supporters of both the PS and the Greens overcame their strong dislike of Chirac and his government to vote for the treaty suggests that they were expressing an opinion about Europe, not about Chirac.<sup>12</sup> In the Neth-

erlands, similarly, a majority of the supporters of all three government parties voted “Yes”, with 76% of Christian Democratic (CDA) and D66 voters and 57% of liberal (VVD) voters doing so. Dutch labour party voters were more like their French counterparts, however, with only 42% following the recommendation of their party leadership.<sup>13</sup>

The literature on referenda about European integration is largely dominated by two contrasting arguments. Some argue that citizen votes largely reflect (dis-)satisfaction with current domestic government performance,<sup>14</sup> whereas others hold that votes express general attitudes towards European integration.<sup>15</sup> Although both factors undoubtedly played a role, the evidence here supports a different argument. Both the content of the referendum campaigns and the outcome of the votes suggest that the Dutch and French publics used the referendum to express their assessment of recent developments in European integration.

In both countries, the debate in the weeks leading up to the referendum was uncommonly intense and salient, ensuring that votes would be about European integration, even if not about the Constitution *per se*. In both countries, too, turnout was far higher than it had been in recent European Parliament elections, with 69.4% of the French and 63.3% of the Dutch voting, making it unlikely that indirect factors such as dissatisfaction with national government, or diffuse support for the European Union had a dominant influence on the final outcome. In other words, the referenda turned into polls on the ‘performance’ of the European Union, not on the national government in either country, nor on European integration in general.<sup>16</sup>

## II. The Perils of a Second Referendum: Lessons from Denmark and Ireland

In the history of European integration, two countries have held ‘repeat’ referenda: Denmark and Ireland. The Danes rejected the Maastricht Treaty in June 1992 by a very close margin (50.7% to 49.3%), and accepted it in May 1993, with 56.7% of the vote. Turnout increased from an already high 83.1% to 86.5%. Between the two referenda, the Edinburgh European Council Meeting of December 1992 granted Denmark future opt-outs on the euro, common defense, common citizenship policies, and supranational regulation of Justice and Home Affairs issues. Though the text of the Maastricht Treaty remained unchanged, the opt-outs put important limits on the treaty’s possible future implications for Denmark. This was sufficient to assuage the concerns of a small but decisive fraction of the voting public.<sup>17</sup> It is worth noting that a new coalition government had taken power in Denmark by the time of the second referendum.

Franklin et al. have argued that this change may have been a key factor in producing the positive referendum outcome.<sup>18</sup> However, Siune et al. show that the decisive change in public opinion took place before the change in government, nor is it obvious that the new government was in fact more popular than its predecessor had been at the time of the previous referendum.<sup>19</sup>

Ireland held two referenda on the Nice Treaty. The first, in June 2001, resulted in a rejection by 54% to 46%, with turnout a low 35%. The second, in October 2002, brought a much higher turnout, at 49%, and a convincing ratification, with 63% in favour. Almost all of the additional turnout went to the “Yes” side. The first referendum campaign had suffered from some of the same flaws as those in the Netherlands and France four years later. The government and others on the “Yes” side mounted a desultory campaign, which gained momentum only after the terms of the debate had been set by the “No” side. The Nice treaty was seen as largely technical without any real substantive content, and it was difficult to mount a campaign based on specific treaty articles. As a result, the campaign focused on general attitudes towards the European Union, with political leaders counting on the population’s latent support, while the “No” side highlighted unpopular features of European integration, even though many of these were entirely unrelated to the Treaty of Nice.

A number of factors contributed to the difference in outcome between the first and second referenda. First, a key problem of first campaign was low turnout. Evidence suggested that voters who had supported European integration in previous referenda had failed to vote in larger numbers than had those who had voted “No” previously. The second Nice campaign thus mounted a concerted effort to increase turnout. Moreover, since “a significant portion of the electorate was uneasy about casting a vote for a treaty that they did not understand,” providing informational materials and opportunities became a key focus of the government campaign.<sup>20</sup>

As in the Danish case, the Irish government managed to get approval from the other member states for a form of opt-out: the June 2002 European Council in Sevilla affirmed that Ireland was not bound by any mutual defence commitment. Finally, the government took steps to ensure greater parliamentary scrutiny of European Union legislation, which further helped assuage worries about Ireland’s loss of sovereignty as a small state in an ever more integrated Europe. In another parallel with Denmark, a new government oversaw the second referendum, but, again, the new government was not necessarily more popular than the old one. Moreover, the opposition parties explicitly encouraged

their supporters to vote for Europe, rather than against the government.<sup>21</sup>

The Danish and the Irish cases permit us to draw a few conclusions relevant to the current situation in France and the Netherlands. First, changes in government appear unlikely to have a significant impact on referendum outcomes. Second, it is essential to be able to offer a concession of some sort by the European Union that addresses key concerns of the public. Third, European treaties tend to be “too complex and not motivational,” so that any pro-treaty campaign needs a ‘hook’.<sup>22</sup> Fourth, and finally, increased turnout is crucial to a changed outcome.

In light of our discussion of the first referendum campaigns in the Netherlands and France, these conclusions offer little cause for optimism. In both countries, turnout was already unusually high compared to other European elections, so it will be difficult to muster even greater turnout. The European Constitutional Treaty is, if anything, more complex and less ‘motivational’ than the Maastricht and Nice Treaties. Indeed, the referendum campaigns in France and the Netherlands illustrated the difficulty of coming up with any kind of convincing ‘hook’ to galvanize voters. In addition, there are no obvious concessions that might be offered by the other EU member states to assuage the fears of voters. Finally, it seems unlikely that new governments in the Netherlands or France will be able to convince many voters to change their mind absent other changes.

## Conclusion

The 2005 referendum campaigns in France and the Netherlands demonstrated the difficulties inherent in convincing the public to vote for a lengthy and complex treaty whose tangible costs and benefits were less than clear even to their political leaders. The lessons of the Danish and Irish referenda do not suggest that a second referendum in either country would result in a different outcome. This leaves us with the recent poll results suggesting that the French and Dutch publics are now inclined to support the European Constitution. Already in the Spring of 2006, opinion polls suggested that 52% of French and 53% of Dutch supported the Constitution. By the Fall of 2006, these figures had further risen to 56% and 59% respectively.<sup>23</sup>

However, these numbers must be interpreted with caution. A closer examination suggests that many voters support the *idea* of a European Constitution rather than the specific one they already rejected. Indeed, just 14% of the Dutch public supports continuing the ratification process (i.e. submitting the treaty for a second referendum), whereas fully 65% want negotiations for a new treaty.<sup>24</sup> Similarly, in France, support for the principle

of a European Constitution has not fallen below 60% in four years, but only 9% of the public supports continuing the ratification process for the present treaty, and 66% desire renegotiation.<sup>25</sup> The data thus suggest that the new Dutch government was probably wise not to call for another referendum, and that the French presidential candidates should be cautious in adopting their final positions. For the European Constitutional Treaty, “try, try again” seems unlikely to be a successful strategy.

*Maurits van der Veen* is a professor in the School of Public and International Affairs of the University of Georgia.

## References

- EOS Gallup Europe. (2005a). *The European Constitution: Post-Referendum Survey in France (Flash Eurobarometer 171)*. Brussels: European Commission.
- EOS Gallup Europe. (2005b). *The European Constitution: Post-Referendum Survey in Netherlands (Flash Eurobarometer 172)*. Brussels: European Commission.
- Franklin, M., Marsh, M., & Wlezien, C. (1994). Attitudes toward Europe and Referendum Votes: A Response to Siune and Svensson. *Electoral Studies*, 13(2), 117-121.
- Franklin, M. N. (2002). Learning from the Danish Case: A Comment on Palle Svensson's Critique of the Franklin Thesis. *European Journal of Political Research*, 41, 751-757.
- Franklin, M. N., van der Eijk, C., & Marsh, M. (1995). Referendum Outcomes and Trust in Government: Public Support for Europe in the Wake of Maastricht. *West European Politics*, 18, 101-117.
- Geen Referendum Europese Grondwet. (2007). *NRC*.
- Harmsen, R. (2005). *The Dutch Referendum on the Ratification of the European Constitutional Treaty*. European Parties, Elections, and Referendums Network.
- Laffan, B., & Langan, A. (2005). *Securing a “Yes”: From Nice I to Nice II* (No. Policy Paper 13). Brussel: Notre Europe.
- Marthaler, S. (2005). *The French Referendum on the Ratification of the Constitutional Treaty*. European Parties, Elections, and Referendums Network.
- Siune, K., Svensson, P., & Tonsgaard, O. (1994). The European Union: The Danes Said ‘No’ in 1992 but ‘Yes’ in 1993: How and Why? *Electoral Studies*, 13, 107-116.
- Svensson, P. (2002). Five Danish referendums on the European Community and European Union: A Critical Assessment of the Franklin Thesis. *European Journal of Political Research*, 41, 733-750.
- TNS Opinion & Social. (2006a). *Eurobarometer 66: Nationaal Rapport Nederland*. Brussels: European Commission.
- TNS Opinion & Social. (2006b). *Eurobarometer 66: Public Opinion in the European Union. First Results*. Brussels: European Commission.
- TNS Opinion & Social. (2006c). *Eurobarometre 66: Rapport National France*. Brussels: European Commission.

## Notes

- 1 (“Geen Referendum Europese Grondwet,” 2007)
- 2 In fact, from the date Chirac announced the referendum until the first few months of 2005, this majority never fell below 60%. (Marthaler, 2005, p. 5)
- 3 The Dutch were the largest net per capita contributors to the EU.
- 4 (Harmsen, 2005, p. 8)
- 5 (Harmsen, 2005, p. 8)
- 6 (Marthaler, 2005)
- 7 (Harmsen, 2005, p. 10). Even then, these were very general arguments: “The new Constitution is an improvement” and “The Constitution fits with further integration”.
- 8 (EOS Gallup Europe, 2005b, p. 13)
- 9 (Harmsen, 2005, p. 10); (EOS Gallup Europe, 2005b, p. 15)
- 10 (EOS Gallup Europe, 2005a, p. 16)
- 11 (EOS Gallup Europe, 2005a, p. 16); (Marthaler, 2005, p. 9)
- 12 (Marthaler, 2005, p. 5)
- 13 (Harmsen, 2005, p. 10)
- 14 (M. N. Franklin, 2002; M. N. Franklin, van der Eijk, & Marsh, 1995)
- 15 (Siune, Svensson, & Tonsgaard, 1994; Svensson, 2002)
- 16 Unfortunately, post-referendum polls did not distinguish between a respondent’s general attitude towards the European Union and his or her more specific opinion regarding recent developments in European integration. Nevertheless, it is suggestive that in both France and the Netherlands, fewer than 20% of the voters reported that their opinion on the actual text of the treaty shaped their decision, whereas about one third based their choice on their overall opinion regarding the European Union. Moreover, 21% of Dutch voters and 32% of French voters stated the national social and economic situation was decisive. Given the contents of the referendum campaigns, opinions about the impact on that national situation of developments in European integration undoubtedly contributed strongly to their vote. (EOS Gallup Europe, 2005a, p. 20, 2005b, p. 18)
- 17 (Siune et al., 1994)
- 18 (M. Franklin, Marsh, & Wlezien, 1994)
- 19 (Siune et al., 1994, p. 112)
- 20 (Laffan & Langan, 2005, p. 2)
- 21 (Laffan & Langan, 2005) As a final point of note, whereas the Irish Referendum Commission had distributed funds in equal amounts to organizations campaigning for “Yes” and “No” prior to the first referendum, in the second campaign both sides had to rely on private money. With business interests strongly in favour of a “Yes” vote, funding for this side of the issue outpaced that for the opponents almost by a factor of 10.
- 22 (Laffan & Langan, 2005, p. 13)
- 23 (TNS Opinion & Social, 2006b, p. 32)
- 24 (TNS Opinion & Social, 2006a, p. 30)
- 25 (TNS Opinion & Social, 2006c, p. 56)

## Spotlight on Malta

### Important Websites:

<http://www.malta.com> – Tourist information on Malta  
<http://www.travelmalta.com/> - Malta’s travel trade portal  
<http://www.nso.gov.mt/> - Statistics on Malta  
<http://www.yellow.com.mt/> - Maltese Yellow Pages  
<http://www.mbb.org.mt/> - Malta Business Bureau  
<http://www.gov.mt/index.asp?l=2> - Government of Malta Information and Services  
<http://www.politicalresources.net/malta.htm> - Maltese Political Parties

### Missions:

Embassy of Malta  
2017 Connecticut Avenue, NW  
Washington, DC 20008  
Tel (202) 462 3611/2  
Fax (202) 387 5470  
E-mail: [maltaembassy.washington@gov.mt](mailto:maltaembassy.washington@gov.mt)  
Web site: [www.gov.mt/](http://www.gov.mt/)

Malta Tourism Authority  
229 Merchants Street  
Valletta CMR 02, Malta  
Tel: (+356) 2291 5000  
Fax: (+356) 2291 5893  
E-mail: [info@visitmalta.com](mailto:info@visitmalta.com)  
Web site: [www.visitmalta.com](http://www.visitmalta.com)

### Consular Offices:

Consulate of Malta in New York, NY  
249, East 35th Street  
New York, N.Y. 10016  
Telephone: (212) 725-2345; (212) 725-2349  
Fax: (212) 779-7097  
E-mail: [mltun@un.int](mailto:mltun@un.int)

Consulate of Malta in Houston, TX  
2602 Commonwealth Street  
Houston, TX 77006  
Telephone (713)654-7900  
Fax (713)650-6815

Permanent Mission of Malta to the United Nations  
249 East 35th Street,  
New York, NY 10016  
Telephone (212) 725-2345  
Fax (212) 779-7097  
E-mail: [mission-un.newyork@gov.mt](mailto:mission-un.newyork@gov.mt)

Maltese-American Chamber of Commerce  
Exchange Buildings  
Republic Street,  
Valletta VLT05, Malta.  
Phone (+356) 21 233 873  
Fax (+356) 21 245 223  
E-mail: [admin@chamber.org.mt](mailto:admin@chamber.org.mt)

## EUSA Prizes

THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE of EUSA is pleased to announce the recipients of the following EUSA Prizes:

### EUSA Book Prize (Best Book on the EU 2005/2006)

**Gerda Falkner, Oliver Treib, Miriam Hartlapp, and Simone Leiber**, *Complying with Europe. EU Harmonisation and Soft Law in the Member States*, Cambridge University Press 2005

The committee noted that *Complying with Europe* is a milestone in the study of compliance both for its empirical richness and theoretical innovation. The book not only covers compliance with EU (social policy) rules in all member states but, more importantly, it is the only major study (with more than a few cases) that goes beyond the analysis of the transposition of EU law to actual enforcement and application. The study shows that the EU does have a compliance problem. But compliance research has a problem, too. Falkner, Treib, Hartlapp, and Leiber convincingly demonstrate the bias in Commission monitoring and the flaws in compliance studies based on Commission data. On the basis of an impressive body of evidence, they also show the limited explanatory power of the most popular hypotheses on compliance. As an alternative, they put forward an interesting new hypothesis about “worlds of compliance”. In each of these “worlds”, compliance depends on different conditions. In the committee’s view, the book is sure to change our understanding of compliance in the EU and to raise the standards of research in this important field.

### Honorable Mention

**Stefano Bartolini**, *Restructuring Europe. Centre Formation, System Building, and Political Structuring between the Nation State and the European Union*, Oxford University Press 2005

*Restructuring Europe* is a landmark contribution to the theory of European integration. Starting from the Hirschman-Rokkan model of boundary formation and political structuring in the modern nation-state, Bartolini theorizes European integration as the formation of a new center, which partially redraws the boundaries of the nation-state and thereby creates new (partial) exit options for societal and political actors. Bartolini provides a lucid and convincing analysis of the effects that the imbalance and partiality of the political restructuring of Europe has on actor strategies and behaviors, political cleavages and collective action problems as well as the sustainability of the democratic welfare state and

European integration. Although *Restructuring Europe* is not based on primary research, Bartolini is able to integrate a vast body of research and knowledge into his framework and to put it in the wider perspective of historical political sociology. In the opinion of the committee, the book will make a strong impact on the way we think about European integration and provide a fruitful avenue for further research.

### Best Dissertation in EU Studies 2005/2006

**Seth Kincaid Jolly**, Duke University (dissertation advisor: Professor Herbert Kitschelt) *A Europe of Regions? Regional Integration, Subnational Mobilization and the Optimal Size of States*.

The committee was impressed by the sophistication of Seth Jolly’s study of the effect of European integration on subnational mobilization. Marshalling statistical and case-study evidence, the author demonstrates that European integration creates a more favorable opportunity structure for regional political parties to compete in national parliamentary elections. This is so because European integration makes regional autonomy, even independence, more viable. To assess the veracity of the viability theory against competing explanations, the author follows up with a case study of Scotland, in which he lines up evidence which shows convincingly that both regional elites and public opinion perceive Scottish autonomy to be more viable under the EU umbrella. This is a wonderful example of the merits of combining qualitative and quantitative research. It is well-conceived, well-executed, and it constitutes a theoretically important contribution to the study of multilevel governance in EU studies.

### Honorable Mention

**Nils Ringe**, University of Pittsburgh (dissertation advisor: Professor Alberta Sbragia) *Policy Preference Formation in Legislative Politics: Structures, Actors, and Focal Points*.

The committee was impressed by the conceptual ambition and empirical depth of Nils Ringe’s dissertation, in which he examines how policy preferences are formed in the European Parliament. Building on the literature on focal points, Ringe proposes that ideology acts as an informational focal point for legislators seeking to form policy preferences. Ideological frames shift attention toward particular aspects of a legislative proposal, thus shaping the dominant interpretation of its content. Ideological focal points are not fixed by individual predispositions or by institutional rules, but are open to manipulation, especially by rapporteurs, who, in highlighting a particular ideological frame, are able to affect voting. Using both qualitative data (from inter-

views, and content analyses of parliamentary debates) and quantitative analysis of roll-call votes, Ringe shows convincingly the independent causal power of ideology in highly institutionalized settings such as the European Parliament. The findings have implications for the study of legislative decision making and inter-institutional bargaining in the European Union.

#### Honorable Mention

**Adam Luedtke**, University of Washington (dissertation advisor: Professor James Caporaso), *One Market, 25 States, 20 Million Outsiders? Supranational Integration and the Politics of Immigration*.

This dissertation tackles a hot topic in contemporary Europe—immigration—and it does so with an exemplary two-step research design, thoughtful complementary use of qualitative and quantitative evidence, and a sensible analysis of a broad array of evidence. Adam Luedtke asks first when national governments may consider ceding immigration authority to the European Union. Complementing quantitative data across the 25 EU countries with process tracing of national preference formation in France, Belgium and the UK, the author finds that national governments favor EU immigration policy when immigrant-protective national rules prevent a government from responding to populist anti-immigrant pressure. In the next step, Luedtke asks whether national governments can be confident that a supranational shift will restrict the rights of immigrants. The answer is ‘likely not’ since the EU institutional context provides EU institutions, which tend to be protective of immigrant rights, considerable institutional leverage, and the author illustrates this by reconstructing the decision process on three recent EU immigration laws illustrates. This study illuminates cogently the deep interconnections between domestic and EU politics.

#### Ernst Haas Dissertation Fellowships

The winners of this year’s Haas Dissertation Fellowships are **Olivia Hall** (Cornell, Anthropology) and **Timo Weishaupt** (Wisconsin, Political Science).

**Hall’s** research focuses on “Food and Identity in the Europe of Regions,” focussing on the Podhale region of Poland, whose famous oscypek cheese is one of the fundamental symbols of Polish culinary tradition.

**Weishaupt’s** research focuses on “Reforming European Labor Markets” with attention to both the common European policy momentum to adopt active labor market measures and policy variance at the member state level; he examines in depth two paired case studies, Austria and Germany (two continental corporatist welfare states) and Ireland and the UK (two liberal Anglo-Saxon states).

#### Best 2005 EUSA Conference Paper

**Gabriel Swank** (Stanford University) and **Tim Buthe** (Duke University) “The politics of antitrust and merger review in the European Union: Institutional change and decisions from Messina to 2004.”

#### EUSA Award for Lifetime Contribution to the Field of EU Studies

The 2005-2007 EUSA Executive Committee is pleased to announce that **Fritz W. Scharpf** is the recipient of the EUSA Award for Lifetime Contribution to the Field of EU Studies, given in conjunction with the EUSA 10th Biennial International Conference.

Professor Scharpf’s many previous awards include the Johan Skytte Prize in Political Science from the University of Uppsala, an Honorary Doctorate from Humboldt University-Berlin, the Great Cross of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany, and (with Renate Mayntz) the Bielefeld Science Award.

Scharpf’s many works include his most celebrated article in the EU studies field “The Joint Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration” (Public Administration, 1988) and his most cited book, *Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic?* (1999). From his early work through his most recent articles (e.g., *The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity* (JCMS, 2002), Scharpf has arguably done more than any other scholar of his generation to illuminate the implications of European integration for both democracy and social welfare.

#### EUSA Award for Public Service to the Field of EU Studies

The Executive Committee has decided to honor **Jonathan Davidson** with a special EUSA Public Service Award. Davidson, Senior Advisor for Political and Academic Affairs at the Delegation of the European Commission in Washington, will be retiring in 2006 after a distinguished career with the British Diplomatic Service (1963-1981), the University of South Carolina (where he served as Director of the USC Washington Office 1981-1991) and the European Commission.

As Head of Academic Affairs at the Delegation since 1991, Davidson has worked tirelessly to promote the study of the EU and trans-Atlantic relations at universities throughout the United States. He has collaborated with faculty coast to coast to organize scores of events over the years, and has played a pivotal role in the development of the EU Centers program since 1998. Certainly many EUSA members will miss Jonathan’s unique combination of skill, dedication and charm.

(cont. from p. 1) dynamic and devoted European Union Fellow: Kyle Galler, a Permanent Official at the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU (responsible for EMU and economic policy coordination) who had previously served on the UK Treasury's EU Coordination and Strategy Team and also had experience as a Detached National Expert at DG I on antidumping cases. Galler's hands-on experience at multiple levels in the policymaking process made him the ideal person to work with our computer tech, Sean Kellogg, and Wilkerson to adapt LegSim to Euro-purposes.

After six months of work, Galler and his collaborators have just completed EU-LegSim (see eu-legsim.org). Now students of the EU's political system can get a feel online for what it might really be like to be a part of its legendarily complex decision-making procedures. The new software will get a test run in Galler's Spring Quarter Class on reforming the EU economy, where the students can expect to see some real draft EU legislation on economic issues and be invited to debate, amend and finally agree it. After a successful experience in this class, the software is expected to be used more widely from next year in a number of EU courses at the UW, and—if there is demand, as there was for the original LegSim—at other universities as well.

Here's how the simulation works: participants are assigned constituencies to represent—for the EU, this means they can either play the role of a member of the European Parliament, or of one of the EU's 27 Member States negotiating in the Council of Ministers. Once roles are assigned, everything is done online, so everyone can log into the system when it best suits them; the only real time constraint is the deadline to complete voting sessions. To get things going, a moderator plays the role of the European Commission and introduces draft legislation, explaining its purpose and main provisions, just as happens in Brussels. Then the legislative process takes the same twin-track approach as in real life, known as Codecision. First up, the European Parliament gives its views and suggests any amendments it wants. Then it's the turn of the Member States meeting in the Council, taking on board the views already expressed by the Parliament. With a bit of luck and a lot of goodwill, the legislation can be agreed between the Parliament and the Council in this first reading, but if not, we go back through the same sequence again, this time with a clearer understanding of the main points of contention and of any possible trade-offs between the two institutions. If it's not agreed the second time around, then we're into the final phase – the Conciliation, where the divide between Parliament and Council is bridged and everyone negotiates together.

This can get a bit messy on the simulator, but not as messy as it does in real life, where over 50 participants sit around the table thrashing out every detail of the text.

Developing the software, with its numerous adaptations from the US Congress model, has been a huge enterprise, and one which has brought home to all concerned the complexities of legislating in the EU—from the to-and-fro between the institutions, to the calculation of the sliding scale of votes for each country in the Council, to the central role of the Commission, with its sole right of legislative initiative and its power to require unanimous votes in Council for amendments it does not approve. As Galler says: "You try to explain the legislative process to people and they simply can't bring themselves to grasp the complexities. Then you show them the flow chart for how it's done and they run a mile. This simulator gives students of the EU a role right in the middle of it—that's the only way to understand the dynamic of negotiations as they happen. I think this will be great for students, as well as preparing me for getting back to the feel of business in Brussels. It may not fix the EU's democratic deficit, but it will certainly help those lucky enough to use it to get a clearer idea of how the EU legislates—whether it inspires admiration or sympathy for the legislators themselves remains to be seen." Taking the process out of the textbook and into an interactive online scenario should make things more interesting and more realistic. "But," as Galler quips, "let's hope it's not too realistic—the average piece of EU legislation takes over a year to hit the statute books, and most of those using the simulator are hoping to graduate in the summer."

Since this is my last Letter from the Chair, I want to thank the three colleagues who are stepping down with me (Grainne de Burca, Virginie Guiraudon, and Sophie Meunier) for their excellent service and wish the best of luck to the very capable group (Liesbet Hooghe, Frank Schimmelfennig and Amy Verdun) that will serve through 2009 with four newly elected ExCom members, Neil Fligstein, Erik Jones, Dan Kelemen and Craig Parsons. I also want to thank Joe Figliulo, EUSA Executive Director, and his staff at the University of Pittsburgh for the superb support they have provided for the Executive Committee during my tenure. Through an ironic twist, I will be joining them July 1, as I have just agreed to serve as Dean of the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at Pitt. My UW colleagues know that I will miss them greatly and that I look forward to seeing them at future EUSA conferences.

**John T.S. Keeler**  
**University of Washington (Seattle)**

## EUSA Lifetime Membership

### *What is it?*

Simply put, it is a one-time dues payment to EUSA of US\$ 1500.

### *What does it include?*

The Lifetime Membership includes all regular membership benefits for life. Among those benefits currently are subscription to the quarterly *EUSA Review*, receipt of occasional EUSA monographs, discounted registration rates at the EUSA International Conference, subscription to our e-mail List Serve, and the opportunity to join EUSA interest sections.

### *Are there any other benefits?*

By making a one-time membership payment, you not only avoid the task of renewing each year, but gain the twin advantages of securing lifetime membership at today's dollar values *and* avoiding future dues increases.

### *Who should do this?*

Any person wishing to support the endeavors of the European Union Studies Association—the fostering of scholarship and inquiry on the European integration project. For U.S. taxpayers, an additional benefit is a receipt for a one-time \$500 charitable contribution to EUSA, tax-deductible to the extent allowed by law (reducing your tax liability for the year in which you become a Lifetime Member).

### *How do I become a Lifetime Member?*

Simply mail your check, in US\$ and made payable to "EUSA," to the European Union Studies Association, address given at right. (We can not accept lifetime membership payments by credit card.) We will send you a receipt and letter of acknowledgment.

## EUROPEAN UNION STUDIES ASSOCIATION

New Individual Membership Form Only (*Please type or print*)

Name \_\_\_\_\_

Address \_\_\_\_\_

City \_\_\_\_\_

State/Province \_\_\_\_\_ Postal Code \_\_\_\_\_

Country \_\_\_\_\_

Work Telephone \_\_\_\_\_

Work Facsimile \_\_\_\_\_

E-mail \_\_\_\_\_

Your Professional Affiliation \_\_\_\_\_

Do you wish to be subscribed to

EUSA's e-mail List Serve? \_\_\_\_\_ yes \_\_\_\_\_ no

### Membership dues (please check as appropriate):

Individual \_\_\_\_\_ \$90 two-year membership

Student\* \_\_\_\_\_ \$55 two-year membership

Lifetime Membership \_\_\_\_\_ \$1500 (+ credit for \$500 tax deduction)

\* *Students must provide copy of current semester's registration form.*

EU Law Interest Section \_\_\_\_\_ \$10 (2 yrs.)

EU Political Economy Interest Section \_\_\_\_\_ \$10 (2 yrs.)

Teaching the EU Interest Section \_\_\_\_\_ \$10 (2 yrs.)

EU Latin America Caribbean Interest Section \_\_\_\_\_ \$10 (2 yrs.)

EU Economics Interest Section \_\_\_\_\_ \$10 (2 yrs.)

EU Public Opinion and Participation Section \_\_\_\_\_ \$10 (2 yrs.)

EU as Global Actor Section \_\_\_\_\_ \$10 (2 yrs.)

EUSA Public Policy Interest Section \_\_\_\_\_ \$10 (2 yrs.)

EUSA members may wish to make a contribution to support the work of EUSA in any amount over membership dues:

EUSA Grants and Scholarships Fund \$ \_\_\_\_\_

Ernst Haas Memorial Fund for EU Studies \$ \_\_\_\_\_

**Total amount of dues and gifts enclosed** \$ \_\_\_\_\_

We prefer payment by check (payable to "EUSA") when possible. Checks must be in US\$ and drawn on a USA bank. We also accept international money orders and MasterCard or Visa credit cards. Your cancelled check or credit card statement will be your receipt.

MasterCard # \_\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_\_

Visa # \_\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_\_

Expiry \_\_\_/\_\_\_ Last 3 digits from back side of card \_\_\_/\_\_\_/\_\_\_

Signature \_\_\_\_\_

Mail or fax this form (please do not mail *and* fax this form) to:

### European Union Studies Association

415 Bellefield Hall

University of Pittsburgh

Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA

Facsimile 412.648.1168



<b>Inside the Spring 2007 EUSA Review:</b>	
<b>EUSA Review Forum</b>	<b>1</b>
<i>What is Science in European Union Studies?</i>	
<b>EUSA Economics Interest Section Essay</b>	<b>11</b>
<i>Can Lisbon Deliver? Credibility and Ownership Issues</i>	
<b>Mehmet Ugur</b>	
<b>Book Reviews</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>EUSA Public Opinion and Participation Interest Section Essay</b>	<b>21</b>
<i>If At First You Don't Succeed, Try, Try Again? Prospects for Referenda on the EU Constitution in France and the Netherlands</i>	
<b>Maurits van der Veen</b>	
<b>EUSA Prize Recipients</b>	<b>27</b>



## *How to Support the* **European Union Studies Association**

### **Lifetime Membership**

\$1500 for all our materials, for life, and credit for a one-time tax-deductible contribution of \$500

### **EUSA Grants and Scholarships Fund**

to support EU-related scholarship, the EUSA prizes, and travel to the biennial EUSA Conference

### **Ernst Haas Memorial Fund for EU Studies**

to honor the seminal work of Ernst B. Haas and support dissertation research in EU studies

Your gifts are tax-deductible to the extent allowable by U.S. tax law. Include a contribution with your membership renewal, or contact the EUSA Office to make a contribution. Call 412.648.7635 or e-mail [eusa@pitt.edu](mailto:eusa@pitt.edu).