



EU Political Economy Newsletter



Newsletter of the EUSA EU Political Economy Interest Section

<http://www.eustudies.org/pesection.html>

*The EU Political Economy Interest Section is an official section of the
European Union Studies Association.*

Section co-chairs: Tal Sadeh and David Howarth

Managing Editor: Mitchell P. Smith

Database Review Editor: Patrick LeBlond

Forum Editor: Dermot Hodson

Editorial Assistant: Assem Dandashly

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Greetings from the new co-chairs of the EUSA Political Economy section:

Tal Sadeh, Department of Political Science at Tel Aviv University, Israel,

talsadeh@post.tau.ac.il;

David Howarth, Politics, University of Edinburgh, UK,

d.howarth@ed.ac.uk

Dear Section Members,

EUSA's Political-Economy Section was founded in June 2000 by Amy Verdun and Erik Jones. They ran the Section with the support of a steering committee until 2005, when they stepped down. Their contribution to the Section has been immense and Amy and Erik remain supportive of the Section and its activities. We believe that we speak for all members in conveying to them our gratitude. We would also like to extend our warm thanks for the members' support for us as the new Section co-chairs, expressed at the assembly held at EUSA's ninth biennial conference in Austin, Texas (see the new message from the Section's organizers in its web page). Replacing Amy and Erik is a challenging task and we will do our best not to disappoint you.

In the weeks following the Section's meeting in Austin the editorial staff for the newsletter was replaced and a new steering committee was formed. At the meeting and via correspondence the outgoing members of these bodies expressed their will to be replaced and other member of the section were encouraged to nominate themselves. We thank Mitchell Smith, Dermot Hodson and Patrick Leblond for agreeing to devote some of their time for the benefit of our Section's Newsletter. We made past issues of the Newsletter available on the Section's web page.

Two new responsibilities were added to the steering committee in the spring of 2005. The first is to encourage and coordinate the Section members' contributions to the *EUSA Review*, and the second is to develop and edit the Section's web page. These responsibilities were delegated respectively

to Michelle Egan and Jim Angresano. We thank them, too.

As avid readers of this newsletter you know that one of our first initiatives as co-chairs was to launch a new project, now renamed *Economic Interests and European Integration* (see call for papers in web page). The Section members were invited to submit abstracts of proposed papers dealing with the role of economic interests in European integration. Eleven shortlisted contributions were accepted at the beginning of September and will be presented in a workshop in Edinburgh on 8 April 2006. Section members are welcome to attend but due to limited places please contact David Howarth if you intend to do so. We are currently securing agreement with a leading journal and publisher for the production of a special edition and an edited volume including the conference papers. More details on the progress of this project will be available on the Section's web page, hopefully ahead of the workshop (see preliminary details in the previous issue of this newsletter).

Ahead of EUSA's conference in Austin, the Section facilitated the organization of two panel proposals. The first, on 'Sustaining EMU: Institutional Solutions in the Age of Economic Diversity' was accepted, while the second, 'Sustaining EMU: Institutional Solutions in a Historical Perspective,' unfortunately was not accepted. It is time to start thinking of

panel ideas for the tenth biennial conference to be held in Montreal, Canada in May 2007. Anyone with an idea for a panel is welcome to share it with us. In the nearer future, at the start of September, the UACES (UK-ECSA) annual and research conference takes place in Limerick, Ireland. A couple of panels on EMU have already been formed. Please contact David Howarth if you are interested in contributing a paper on an EU political economy topic for this conference.

With 142 members, the Political Economy Section is EUSA's largest interest section. We want to take advantage of this strength and urge you to be involved in our activities. Contributions to the *EUSA Review*, the Section's Newsletter and its web page, or anything else you think of are most welcome. Good ideas are easy to share – please do so.

With thanks, Tal and David.

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Data Resources Review

POLCON_2005 **Patrick Leblond**

Witold J. Henisz, a professor at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, recently updated his POLCON (Political Constraints) database with data up to 2004, from the original 2002 release with data up to 2001. The

dataset (in Excel and Access formats) and the codebook are available at Henisz's website at <http://www-management.wharton.upenn.edu/henisz/>. All that the author requires to access the data is one's name, affiliation and e-mail

so that he may be able to send those who have already downloaded his dataset a note indicating that a more recent version is now available.

POLCON_2005 essentially offers two indices of political constraints for about 200 countries, covering a period that can extend from 1800 to 2004: POLCONIII and POLCONV.

The first index or variable is called **POLCONIII** and it “estimates the feasibility of policy change (the extent to which a change in the preferences of any one actor may lead to a change in government policy)” or, in other words, “the extent to which a given political actor is constrained in his or her choice of future policies” (POLCON_2005 codebook). It ranges from 0 (no constraints) to 1 (full constraints). It covers 226 countries between 1800 and 2004 (though not necessarily continuously), depending on the age of the country and data availability.

Using the logic of spatial modeling, Henisz calculates the index by, first, identifying the number of independent branches of government—limited to the executive and lower and upper chambers of the legislature because of data limitations on an independent judiciary and sub-federal political entities—having veto power over policy making. The degree of political constraints increases with the number of independent actors with veto power.

Then, the index measure considers the degree to which the different potential veto players are aligned based on the party composition of the different branches of government. The more the branches are aligned partywise, the greater the probability of policy change.

From a discussion on measures of political risk included in a separate document on Henisz’s website, this higher probability of policy change implies an increased

political risk. In this separate document, co-authored with Bennet Zelner from the McDonough School of Business at Georgetown University, Henisz indicates that his political constraint index is superior to existing measures of political risk because it is forward-looking in nature and does not depend on past government actions.

But Henisz goes further than just looking at party composition and alignments. He also considers the degree to which party preferences within a given branch of government are homogeneous. For example, the executive should have greater policy discretion if a non-aligned (i.e. opposition) legislature is polarized (i.e. heterogeneous) rather than united (i.e. homogeneous). So the degree of legislative fractionalization is important. Looking strictly at the number of actors with veto power and the extent to which they are aligned with each other is thus insufficient.

It is important to also note that “each additional veto point (a branch of government that is both constitutionally effective and controlled by a party different from other branches) provides a positive but diminishing effect on the total level of constraints on policy change” (POLCON_2005 codebook). This is a novel feature of this measure in that it allows for the fact that there are diminishing marginal returns to additional veto points.

POLCONV follows the same logic as POLCONIII. The difference is that it includes two additional veto players: an independent judiciary and sub-federal governments. Owing to data limitations on these additional variables, the coverage is less extensive than with POLCONIII. POLCONV covers 200 countries but for a maximum range of 1960 to 2004 rather than 1800 to 2004 in the previous case.

The POLCON_2005 dataset also includes all the underlying variables used to compute the indices so that users can check for themselves how the values were obtained. These values come from reputable sources such as POLITY, The Statesmen's Yearbook, The Political Handbook of the World, and International Control Risk Group (ICRG).

So anyone who needs a measure of political risk or political constraints on policy change should consider the POLCON_2005 dataset. As such, it

provides a highly valuable alternative to the index of political constraints (the variable CHECKS) found in the World Bank's Database of Political Institutions (DPI), which Henisz refers to in his website. As a result, scholars can perform robustness checks on their econometric results by using these different indices. One advantage of the POLCON_2005 measures is that their period coverage is much more extensive than DPI, which is only for 1975 to 2004.

Forum Section

Dermot Hodson, Forum Editor **Introduction**

Monetary policy and central banking have provided a rich vein of research over the last three decades. There are a number of recurring questions in the political economy debate. What is the optimal degree of independence for a central bank? How can monetary autonomy be reconciled with democratic legitimacy? How can institutions be designed to secure a harmonious mix of monetary and fiscal policies?

EU political economists have tended to tackle these questions with Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) squarely in mind. In recent years, this has generated a substantial body of research on the institutional design of the European Central Bank, the credibility and legitimacy of macroeconomic policy making under EMU and the interaction of euro-area monetary policy with Member States' budgetary policies.

As Ivo Maes and Erik Buyst note in their contribution to this issue of the Review Forum, the preoccupation of EU political economists with EMU may be understandable given the novelty of the

euro, but it suffers from two limitations. Firstly, its focus is highly contemporary, thus ignoring important lessons for the history of monetary policy-making, especially prior to World War II. Secondly, analysing monetary policy from the top down diminishes the national experience, particularly in smaller Member States.

Drawing on a recently published history of the National Bank of Belgium,* Maes and Buyst give a general overview of monetary policy-making in Belgium over the last 150 years. They skillfully trace the key stages in Belgian monetary history from the Latin Monetary Union and the Gold Standard through to Bretton Woods and the European Monetary System, before arriving at EMU. This historical *tour d'horizon*, the authors argue, offers a number of lessons for EU Political Economy. Firstly, it illustrates the challenges and achievements of a relatively small player in the international monetary order. Secondly, the changing relationship between the Bank and financial markets brought about by the Internal Market and the euro provides a

neat example of Europeanisation in practice.

Looking forward to future editions, I would like to remind readers that the Review Forum is open to all members of EUSA who wish to share their views on empirical, theoretical and policy questions relating to EU political economy. Further information can be obtained from Dermot.Hodson@cec.eu.int. Contributions to the next Review Forum should be sent no later than 8 September 2006.

* *Buyst E., Maes I., Pluym W. & Danneel M., 2005, The Bank, the Franc and the Euro. A History of the National Bank of Belgium, Tielt: Lannoo.*

Central banking in the EU: a long-term perspective

Ivo Maes (National Bank of Belgium, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven and Robert Triffin Chair, Université catholique de Louvain) and Erik Buyst (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven)

Monetary integration and central banking are important topics in EU political economy. Traditionally, and quite rightly, a lot of attention has been given to post-World War II monetary institutions, especially the Bundesbank (founded in 1948) and the European Central Bank (ECB) (founded in 1998).¹ The purpose of this article is to offer a longer-term perspective on issues of contemporary significance. Drawing on a recent study, *The Bank, the Franc and the Euro: A History of the National Bank of Belgium* (Buyst, Maes, Pluym & Danneel, 2005), we take advantage of the one and a half centuries of history of the National Bank of Belgium. Firstly, we will have a look at

how central banking has been evolving through time. Secondly, we will look at the process of European monetary integration and the Eurosystem through the functioning of a, relatively, small player.

The National Bank of Belgium was established in 1850. It was a reaction against the financial crises of 1838 and 1848. At the time of the 1848 financial crisis, the so-called "compulsory rate" was imposed, suspending the right to exchange banknotes for precious metals. Discount credit decreased dramatically. It was time to reform the financial system. Frère-Orban, the Minister of Finance, saw this as the moment to set up a national issuing and discount institution. His key aims were the unification of banknote circulation and the establishment of an efficient, widely available discount credit

¹ The literature is more than abundant. See, for instance, for the Bundesbank, Heisenberg, 1999 or Marsh, 1993 and for the ECB, Howarth and Loedel, 2003 or McNamara, 2002.

system. In order to ensure that the banknotes issued were convertible at all times, the Bank was not allowed to become involved in equity investments or medium- and long-term lending. Tight restrictions were also imposed on lending to the State. In addition, the National Bank engaged in a number of traditional banking functions, such as transactions in precious metals. It also became the State Cashier.

Just as was the case with other central banks in those days, the Bank performed a mixture of public and commercial functions. That was also reflected in the law and in the Bank's statutes. The National Bank was established as a private limited liability company, and the profit motive was clearly evident in its commercial activities. In 1870 the Bank's market share of the total value of discount transactions in Belgium reached 68%. On the other hand, the government supervised the Bank's activities. Thus, the governor was appointed by the King, and the Bank had a government commissioner, something unknown in neighbouring countries. Moreover, in return for the right of issue, the government received part of the resulting income.

The reasons for the foundation of the National Bank of Belgium contrasted with those of the creation of some other central banks, like the Bank of England. There the initial impetus was more related to the financial advantages the government felt it could obtain from the support of such a bank (Goodhart, 1988). Naturally, this bank had certain privileges conferred on it in return, in particular the monopoly of the note issue.

Over the years, the National Bank of Belgium underwent a metamorphosis. Major determinants were the evolution of the monetary and financial system and new views on the government's role in economic life. The Bank gradually became more of a public institution. Its commercial activities were dismantled and the Bank

changed from being a rival of the commercial banks, to become the bank of banks.

From an international perspective, Belgium together with France, Italy and Switzerland formed a monetary union – *de facto* until 1865, thereafter formalized through the Latin Monetary Union. This construction showed some resemblance with the current euro area. The coins produced in France, Italy, Switzerland and Belgium all had the same weight, content, shape and value. Only the designs differed, so that coins circulated freely among the four countries concerned. This was not true for bank notes, however, but they only dominated the currency in circulation by the end of the 19th century. Nor was there an ECB-like central bank; *de facto* the Banque de France dominated the monetary union. Similar to the EMS-experience of the 1980s and 1990s, the National Bank of Belgium could exert little influence on the monetary policies of the leading central bank (cf. *infra*).

The Latin Monetary Union had only been in existence for a few years when rich deposits of silver were discovered in the American Rockies. As the silver price collapsed, severe speculation waves broke out. In the course of the 1870s a general ban was imposed on the minting of silver coins. By doing so, the Latin Monetary Union *de facto* joined the gold standard.

The gradual breakthrough of banknotes as a payments instrument in the 19th century had far-reaching consequences. With the right of issue and the concentration of the stock of precious metal, the Bank played an increasingly central role in the monetary system. The fact that banknotes could be converted into precious metals formed the anchor of the Bank's discount policy.

World War I led to the general collapse of the old monetary system based on precious metals. In August 1914, the convertibility

of the banknotes was suspended, and Belgium left the gold standard. After the war, the Bank struggled to establish a policy that reconciled the external and internal equilibrium of the Belgian economy. The debates over monetary policy also led to significant internal changes at the Bank, such as the establishment of a strong research department – an important element of a modern monetary authority.

Over the years, the Bank traditionally defended a stable exchange rate as an anchor and as a factor encouraging discipline in the Belgian economy. It was mainly when external shocks hit the Belgian economy and there was no coherent domestic policy that the exchange rate became the subject of debate and controversy. Sometimes, devaluations proved unavoidable.

The severe economic and financial crises of the 1930s marked a break in attitudes towards government intervention in the economy. It also changed people's attitude towards the banking sector, elevating its importance to society. As a result, some radical reforms were carried out. In 1937, at the instigation of Finance Minister de Man, the public character of the Bank was also fundamentally reinforced. The influence of the private bankers was curtailed. Conversely, the powers of the Government Commissioner were extended. The Bank was also authorized to engage in open market operations. It thus developed into a genuine bank of banks and a monetary authority.

In the second half of the 20th century, the Bank was entrusted with a number of new tasks in the public interest, such as the central offices for credits to enterprises and individuals, and the central balance sheet office, plus the work of organizing business surveys and drawing up the national accounts. This illustrates the

Bank's expanding role in providing services for the community.

The fact that Belgium's small, open economy was vulnerable to external shocks was a reason for the Bank's traditional involvement in the development of a stable and open international monetary and financial system. In the 19th century, as already mentioned, Belgium and the Bank made a major contribution towards the creation of the Latin Monetary Union. After World War II the Bank was also active. For instance, the subsequent governor Ansiaux played a leading role in the creation and operation of the European Payments Union, which did much to promote the liberalization of payments in Europe during the 1950s.

In the post World War II period, Belgium followed a policy of a stable exchange rate for the Belgian franc. After the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, the German mark became, *de facto*, the anchor for Belgian exchange rate policy. The Bank very much followed the McKinnon (1963) argument that, for a small open economy, the exchange rate is not an appropriate instrument of macroeconomic policy (Maes, 2002, Ch. 2). McKinnon criticized Mundell's (1961) optimum currency area paper, arguing that a devaluation could endanger the stability of the price-level in a small open economy. Naturally, by taking the German mark as an anchor for its exchange rate policy, the National Bank of Belgium was sacrificing its monetary policy autonomy and had to follow the monetary policy orientation of the Bundesbank.

At the Hague summit in December 1969, Economic and Monetary Union was officially placed on the agenda of the European Community. In comparison with most other central banks, the National Bank of Belgium was strongly in favour of European monetary integration. In the past few decades, it has often had a pioneering

role in the process of European monetary integration.

The Bank influenced the EMU process primarily via two channels: via the Belgian authorities and via the central banks of the European Union. At the national level, it was involved in the formulation of Belgium's ideas and the definition of Belgium's position. The Bank also played a role in the world of the European central banks, primarily because of the expertise built up over the years in the sphere of European monetary cooperation, but also thanks to the Belgian sense of diplomacy and compromise.

Belgium is then an example of how a small country played a significant pace-setting role in the creation of EMU (Maes & Verdun, 2005). A first element was the development of influential ideas and proposals to shape the debate and set the agenda, marking also out the terrain for future EMU discussions. A second element was contributions as 'policy entrepreneur', putting forward concrete proposals to advance European monetary integration. Third, Belgium played a diplomatic role, often contributing to a crucial (Franco - German) consensus on EMU issues.

The recent history of the Bank is also a beautiful example of Europeanisation. The liberalization of capital movements and the integration of the financial markets, driven, in part, by the Internal Market and EMU, also led to changes in relations between the Bank and the financial world. The Bank introduced a new range of monetary policy instruments which were more in line with market forces, and the dual foreign exchange market was abolished, as demanded by the internal market programme. In addition, the more open and competitive financial system brought a further extension of the Bank's functions as the bank of banks. On the basis of its traditional role in handling payments, it gradually began to exercise supervision

over payment systems established in Belgium. Moreover, it increasingly focused on macroprudential issues, especially the stability of the Belgian financial system. Also, the cooperation with the Banking, Finance and Insurance Commission was put on a stronger institutional footing.

The advent of EMU and the introduction of the euro were milestones in the history of the Bank. When the Bank became a founding member of the Eurosystem, a new era was ushered in. Decisions on euro-area monetary policy are totally centralized, as that is the only way of guarding against confusion about the monetary policy signals and preventing distortions of competition. Most of the decisions are taken by the Governing Council of the European Central Bank. The governor of the National Bank of Belgium attends the meetings in a personal capacity. In performing those duties, the governor is strictly independent. He (or she) can neither seek nor take instructions from anyone and must act in the general European interest.

Yet it can be said that Belgium in fact has more influence over monetary policy now than before the introduction of the euro. Then, the Belgian franc was anchored to the German mark and the National Bank had to follow the interest-rate decisions of the Bundesbank. Under EMU, national autonomy was thus exchanged for a share in the supranational decision-making power; this is a practical illustration of how the effect of European integration is actually to restore power of decision, certainly for a small country like Belgium. While monetary decision-making became centralised under EMU, the conduct of monetary policy is decentralised i.e. with the national central banks. The other core functions of a central bank – issuing banknotes, managing the gold and foreign exchange reserves, and organising the flow of payments – take place within a

European framework. Thus, the National Bank of Belgium retains the functions of a central bank although it now shares them with twelve other central banks in a wider area with a common currency. In addition, the Bank plays a key role in Belgium's socio-economic affairs, a role in line with its expertise, its special place between the public sector and the financial world, and a firmly established position in both Belgian and European life. So, the National Bank of Belgium, just like the other national central banks of the Eurosystem, has now become a kind of a "hybrid" institution, performing both European and Belgian functions.

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Members' Recent Publications

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Member News

Ian Bartle, School of Management, University of Bath, announces that The Centre for the study of Regulated Industries at the University of Bath has recently set up a new website at: <http://www.bath.ac.uk/cri/>

Many of the centre's publications since about 2000 can now be downloaded from the site in pdf form. Downloadable documents include occasional papers, occasional lectures, international series, research reports, technical papers, statistical series, industry briefs.

Madeleine O. Hosli, Department of Political Science, Leiden University, Netherlands, has been awarded a Jean Monnet Chair (effective September 2005).

Rafael Leal Arcas, currently a fellow at the European Law Research Center, Harvard Law School, will from August 2006 be Lecturer in International Commercial Law, Queen Mary University of London, Centre for Commercial Law Studies, London, UK.

Philomena Murray, Jean Monnet Chair, Department of Political Science and

Director, Contemporary Europe Research Centre, Jean Monnet European Centre of Excellence, University of Melbourne, has been awarded a Jean Monnet European Union research grant for a Transnational Research Project, "Europe and the Asia

Pacific: Models and Linkages," with partners in Keio University, University of Limerick and Leuven University.

Calls for Papers

The Political Economy of Currency Unions in a Globalizing World. International conference, The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, **Hebrew University of Jerusalem, April 30 – May 1, 2006.**

Deadline for submissions: 28 February 2006.

Recent studies of the politics of exchange rates focus on domestic factors in explaining both policy choices and actual exchange rate behavior. These factors include mostly the political business cycle, interest groups, institutions and partisanship. Employing a variety of quantitative methods such studies have focused on the experience of European and Latin American countries. This literature has developed over the 1990s and 2000s as a complement to the more established Optimum Currency Area literature, which since the 1960s explains currency unions in terms of economic efficiency. Whereas the traditional OCA literature provided strict criteria for efficient unions, recent developments suggest that some criteria can be endogenous to unions. Other studies have offered an international political perspective on currency unions and exchange rate policies. These are based on the distribution of power among the member states, community spirit, the institutional setup, the spillover effect, shared beliefs and ideas among the member states and the activities of transnational epistemic communities.

Can these theories be combined in explaining the phenomena of the establishment, sustainability, and collapse of currency unions (in their broad sense) among sovereign countries? What is the purpose of currency unions? Do they provide economic stimulus or mostly reflect foreign policy? How are exchange rate policies against third parties formulated? Can external anchors provide stability, and if so under what conditions? Specifically, what is the future of Economic and Monetary Union in Europe in the wake of the recent crisis of the Stability and Growth Pact on the one hand and the enlargement of the EU on the other? Is a 'mini Bretton-Woods' system, currently being observed in East Asia? What lessons to draw from the collapse of Argentina's currency board and the disintegration of the Yugoslavian Dinara? What historical lessons do currency unions offer us? These questions and others are at the focus of this conference.

Those interested in presenting a paper should send abstracts of no more than 150 words along with their affiliation, position and contact details to:

Tal Sadeh, Department of Political Science, Tel Aviv University, P.O. Box 39040, Tel Aviv 69978, ISRAEL, preferably by e-mail: talsadeh@post.tau.ac.il

Participants interested in serving as chair or discussant should send their CVs to the above address.

We are happy to confirm the participation of the following distinguished scholars: Benjamin Cohen, University of California Santa Barbara; Mark Hallerberg, Emory University; David Leblang, University of Colorado at Boulder; Helen Milner, Princeton University; Juergen Nautz, University of Amsterdam; Amy Verdun, University of Victoria.

ECPR/CRI conference 2006

FRONTIERS OF REGULATION: ASSESSING SCHOLARLY DEBATES AND POLICY CHALLENGES

An international conference organised by the *European Consortium of Political Research Standing Group on Regulatory Governance* and the *Centre for the study of Regulated Industries, School of Management, University of Bath*

September 7th-8th 2006, University of Bath, England

Deadline: 28 February 2006

The two-day conference aims to foster scholarly exchange on governance through regulation. We will discuss the new challenges of meeting public interest objectives in the context of the increasing fragmentation of public authority and the varieties of regulatory institutions, mechanisms and processes. We hope that debates will connect to the broad issues, concepts and critiques surrounding the rise of the 'regulatory state' and the global order of 'regulatory capitalism'. While organised by political scientists, we hope to stimulate interdisciplinary debate and welcome participants from disciplines such as economics, law and sociology as well as practitioners.

We invite empirical and theoretical papers encompassing a diverse range of sectors and issues which fit into the broad concepts of regulation and the regulatory state. An abstract of up to 300 words should be submitted by email to: ecprconf@management.bath.ac.uk

Participants will be notified around May 1st 2006. At this time a draft programme will be announced.

The following panel themes are indicative only and not yet fixed. Further suggestions are welcome:

- Developments in Social Regulation
- Developments in Economic Regulation
- Europeanisation and Regulatory Reforms
- Regulatory Impact Analysis
- Regulation in Developing Countries
- Meta Regulation
- Law, Courts and Regulation
- Regulating Frontier Technologies
- Enforcement, Compliance and Regulation
- Regulation Beyond the State
- Regulatory Agencies and Delegation
- The Regulation of Intellectual Property
- Democracy in the Age of Regulocracy
- Regulation of Life Sciences
- Veto Players and Regulatory Governance

Third Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, 21-23 September, 2006, Istanbul, Turkey

Deadline: 28 February 2006.

The ECPR Standing Group on the European Union is organizing its Third Pan-European Conference. It will be hosted by Bilgi University in Istanbul, Turkey from 21 to 23 September 2006. The Standing Group's Pan-European Conferences are the largest academic conferences on the European Union in Europe and bring together scholars from all over the world. We call for panel and paper

proposals on all aspects of European integration, governance, and politics. For further information and online paper and panel submissions, please consult the conference website at <http://www.jhubc.it/ecpr-istanbul/>.

**1st ECPR Graduate Conference:
University of Essex, UK. 7-10
September 2006.**

Deadline: 1 March 2006.

Graduate students from all institutions are welcome to submit paper or full panel proposals for the first ECPR Graduate Conference. A call for papers and panels is available to download as a pdf document at:

<http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/graduateconference/documents/poster_004.pdf>
http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/graduateconference/documents/poster_004.pdf

Proposals should be submitted by email to <<mailto:ecpr@essex.ac.uk>>ecpr@essex.ac.uk.

For further information, please see <<http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/graduateconference/index.aspx>><http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/graduateconference/index.aspx>

**E E F S: European Economics and
Finance Society
Fifth Annual EEFS Conference
Heraklion, Crete, 18-21 May 2006.**

*"European Labour Markets, Trade &
Financial Flows and Economic Growth"*

Deadline: 15 March 2006.

The Conference will focus on the changes we observe in the global economy and on the European Integration process. Papers are solicited in such areas as:

- Labour Economics
- International Trade and General Equilibrium
- Analysis of Financial Markets
- Growth and Development
- Factor Mobility
- European Integration
- Economics of Transition
- World Integration
- Economic Geography
- Spatial Economics
- Regional Economics And Policy
- Industrial Economics and Organisation
- International Monetary Economics
- Macroeconomic Issues and Policy
- New Political Economy
- Public Economics
- Topics on The Dotcom/Digital Economy.

It is envisaged that a number of papers from this Conference will be published in special issues of established journals in the forthcoming months.

Paper abstracts of no more than 200 words and/or session proposals should be submitted by to the scientific committee of the conference as attached files (doc or pdf format) at the following address: eefs@eap.gr

Abstracts should contain JEL classification codes. The authors' full name, affiliation, address, phone/fax, and e-mail for correspondence should also be indicated. An entire paper may be submitted, when available, but it must include an abstract.

We welcome equally theoretical, empirical and policy-issues papers. Participants are expected to serve as program chair at Conference sessions.

The conference will take place at the five star resort hotel Candia Maris in Amoudara, Heraklion, Crete, Greece.

For the Organizing Committee,

Dr. George Agiomirgianakis
(gmagios@eap.gr)
Dr. Tina Voulgari (bellevue@otenet.gr)

Dr. Argyro Moudatsou
(moudatsou@ebh.gr)

“The Euro and the Dollar in a Globalized Economy”

A Conference, Research, Briefings and Publications

Sponsored by the European Commission and Organized by the Jean Monnet Chair of the University of Miami, in cooperation with the Miami-Florida European Union Center of Excellence (University of Miami and Florida International University), and the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Miami Branch

To be held at the University of Miami on Tuesday, April 25, 2006; opening address by EU Commissioner for Economic Affairs Joaquín Almunia.

The Euro and the Dollar in a Globalized Economy will involve multiple disciplines (economics, business and political science) in order to facilitate an exchange of ideas among academics, practitioners and the

local business community. Participants and attendees will join a prestigious group of economists, political scientists, business leaders and central bankers as they assess the international role of the euro, discuss its impact on global financial markets, shifting global exchange rate relationships and their implications, recount lessons learned, and identify future challenges.

The conference will cover the following themes, structured in panel sessions:

- * The euro and the dollar: Competing currencies?
- * The euro and the dollar in the globalized economy
- * Enlargement and its effects on the euro and dollar
- * The euro, the dollar and their monetary policies
- * What risks and opportunities does the euro represent for Latin America and the Caribbean?

For more information, please contact Joaquin Roy (Director of EU Center, University of Miami) at jroy@miami.edu or by phone at (305)284-3266.

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Deadline

for submissions to the Fall 2006 issue

Friday, 8 September 2006

Please direct all correspondence concerning the Forum and the Data Resources Review to the appropriate editor. All other correspondence to the Managing editor.

Patrick LeBlond (Data Resources Review): patrick.leblond@hec.ca

Dermot Hodson (Forum Editor): Dermot.HODSON@cec.eu.int

Mitchell P. Smith (Managing Editor): mpps@ou.edu

In particular we are looking for:

- ◇ Members' recent publications (since this issue)
- ◇ Members' news (since this issue)
- ◇ Calls for papers (due dates prior to 1 March 2007)
- ◇ Notice of forthcoming events (taking place prior to 1 March 2007)

