

# **Language Choice and Career Advancement in the European Parliament**

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## Introduction

In his book on career behavior in the European Parliament (EP), William Daniel (Daniel 2015) investigates the career paths of members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and distinguishes, in particular, between those legislators who seek to build and maintain professional careers within the EP and those who use the EP as a steppingstone toward careers in national politics. We take this differentiation as a starting point to consider if the language in which MEPs choose to make speeches in the EP plenary may be a way for them to signal which of these two career paths they seek. Are MEPs who pursue a career inside the EP more likely to use English, the main shared language of communication inside the multilingual parliament, than their colleagues who hope to move into the national politics of their member states? And is using English associated with advancement to higher office within the EP? We address these questions in two empirical analyses.

The first analysis focuses on the *determinants* of language choice in the EP plenary, by examining the impact of formal and policy leadership, ideology, and MEPs' revealed career goals on the likelihood that they give speeches in English. Using data from the EP's 7<sup>th</sup> legislative term (EP7, 2009-14), we find that MEPs who have served longer tenures in the EP and those who seek to be reelected in the next EP election are indeed more likely to choose English when speaking on the EP floor. Also more likely are those who hold formal leadership positions in the parliament, in their party groups, or in the EP's committee system, as well as MEPs who serve as rapporteurs and who introduce amendments on a greater number of legislative proposals. Less likely to use English are MEPs toward the traditional-authoritarian-nationalistic (TAN) end of the political spectrum.

The second analysis considers the *consequences* of using English. It tests the hypothesis that MEPs who spoke more English on the EP floor during EP7 were more likely to be selected into formal leadership positions in EP8 (2014-19). This proposition is confirmed even when controlling for previous formal and policy leadership, seniority, and party loyalty. Aside from language, only the number of rapporteurships and shadow rapporteurships is positively associated with the outcome.

The paper proceeds as follows. After briefly reviewing relevant previous research on legislative speeches, multilingual politics in the European Union (EU) and career paths in the EP, we theorize language choice in the EP plenary and its consequences for MEPs' career trajectories. Next, we present our data, research design, and results for the two analyses, followed by a conclusion section.

## Literature Review: Languages and Careers in the EP

Three sets of previous research are relevant in the context at hand, on legislative speeches, multilingualism in the EU, and MEP career paths. The analysis of parliamentary debate has been flourishing, with a focus on ideology, content (e.g., topics), and speech as legislative activity (Goplerud 2021). With regard to the EP, the most prominent example is Proksch and Slapin (Proksch and Slapin 2015), who show that MEPs tend to take positions on issues that are important to their constituents when speaking in the EP plenary, and also that their speeches reflect (to some extent) the positions of their political party. Indeed, EP party groups seek to structure parliamentary debate to control the message conveyed by their members when speaking on the floor. The content and sentiment of speeches constitute important research agendas in the analysis of parliamentary debates, and there is a sizeable body of literature on the

former for the EP (e.g., Greene and Cross 2017). The latter, however, has not been fully explored due to the multilingual nature of EP debates, with some exceptions in linguistics (e.g., Honkela et al. 2014). Our research aims to fill this gap in the literature by focusing on speakers' language choice.

The second body of research concerns the EU as a multilingual polity, which has not received much attention from political scientists to date. Notable exceptions are Mamadouh (Mamadouh 1999; 2002), who relates institutional multilingualism to the nature of the EU's supranational political system and examines the growing dominance of English in the EU institutions; Kraus (Kraus 2008), who assesses the implications of cultural and linguistic diversity for the process of constructing a European polity, including its institutional dimension; and Ringe (Ringe 2022), who offers the most extensive analysis of institutional multilingualism to date, which he argues has a depoliticizing effect on EU politics. The overall lack of interest in language and politics in the EU is surprising because language, language choice, and language policy are all inherently political phenomena. Moreover, language choice and proficiency may well be important omitted variables in the analysis of a wide range of outcomes of interest to political scientists studying the EU (in general) and the EP (in particular), such as the inclusion and placement of candidates on party lists for EP elections, the composition of political networks, or the assignment of (shadow-)rapporteurships. Yet, language tends to be excluded from both theoretical consideration and empirical models. Hence, one contribution of this research is that it examines both the *determinants* and *consequences* of language choice in the EP, with a particular focus on the link between languages and career trajectories.

Most of what we already know about careers in the EP is from Daniel (Daniel 2015), whose analysis of MEP career patterns reveals the professionalization of EP membership and the

creation of a European class of politicians. He also carefully considers the determinants of MEPs' career choices, in particular their decisions either to seek and maintain legislative careers in the EP or to use the supranational parliament as a steppingstone toward careers in national politics. Whitaker (Whitaker 2014) highlights one such determinant in particular, namely geographic distance to Brussels, which makes it less likely that lawmakers decide to build careers in the EP, while Aldrich (Aldrich 2018) considers the "supply side" of the equation and demonstrates that established national parties tend to send more experienced politicians to the EP than do newer parties. Finally, van Geffen (van Geffen 2016) shows that legislators' behavior in the EP is, in part, driven by their career ambitions. In what follows, we show that this argument extends to their choice of language when making speeches on the EP floor.

### The Causes and Consequences of English Use

A crucial starting point for theorizing language choice in the EP plenary is the recognition that speeches on the EP floor do not typically play a meaningful role in the political deliberation or negotiation process, as they usually take place after relevant decisions have already been made. They occur, as one political group advisor in the EP explained, when "you've had another debate already that went on for several months in committee; it all has been kind of teased out" (as quoted in Ringe 2022, 41). Making a speech on the EP floor is, therefore, primarily an opportunity for MEPs to engage in (often *post hoc*) position-taking and signaling. The baseline language for such signaling is the MEP's native tongue, as their most likely intended audience is a national constituency (Proksch and Slapin 2015), be it voters, national party officials, the media, or interest groups. Accordingly, most EP speeches are delivered in the speaker's native language (Kruse and Ammon 2013).

There are, however, factors that may increase the likelihood that MEPs deviate from using their mother tongues. The most frequently spoken non-native language is English, which has, over time, replaced French as the primary working language inside the EU's institutions, including in the EP and on the EP floor.<sup>1</sup> This is evident in Figure 1, which shows that between one-quarter and one-third of the overall speaking time in the EP plenary was in English during EP7 (2009-2014), well ahead of German and French as the other two “big” languages.<sup>2</sup>

[FIGURE 1 HERE]

One reason for MEPs to use English instead of their native languages relates to their positions inside the institution. MEPs who hold formal leadership posts – in the parliament itself, in the EP's party groups, or in the committee system – have institutional or organizational responsibilities that encourage communication across linguistic boundaries. After all, their target audience is more likely to be multilingual, be it internal (because they represent organizations composed of colleagues from more than one member state) or external (because they are less likely to address national constituencies only). *We thus expect that MEPs in formal leadership positions are more likely to use English than non-leaders (H1a).*

It also stands to reason that MEPs who are active participants in the legislative process would be more likely to use English, the main shared foreign language inside the EP. When actively engaged in the policy-making process, relying solely on their mother tongues would put

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<sup>1</sup> French was the primary shared language spoken inside the EU institution until the early to mid-1990s, when it accounted for about 60% of the spoken and written communication in the Council, the Commission, and the European Parliament (Schlossmacher 1994). English was already on the ascent at that time, however, and the tide turned decisively after the 2004 eastward enlargement (Ban 2009). The decline of French is also evident in Figure 1, which shows that it was used on the EP floor 15.2 percent of the time in 2008 but only about 9 percent after 2011.

<sup>2</sup> Data made available by the European Parliament's Directory for the Plenary.

MEPs at a comparative disadvantage, even if reliance on English is not strictly necessary for yielding policy influence (Ringe 2022). As in the case of those in formal leadership positions, MEPs who seek to shape the content of legislation have incentives to speak across linguistic boundaries, for the sake of agenda setting, information flow, collaboration, and coalition building. Therefore, *we expect policy leaders to be more likely to use English* (H1b).

Ideology might also factor into MEPs' language choice, as it may lead some MEPs to use their native languages on principle. This is more likely to be the case for MEPs who oppose the EU and the European project and those who lean traditional-authoritarian-nationalistic (rather than green-alternative-liberal) on the GAL-TAN dimension (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002). *We therefore expect Eurosceptic and TAN MEPs to be less likely to use English* (H1c). While one might also expect right-wing MEPs to use less English, it is not clear that this effect would hold when controlling for MEPs' pro-/anti-EU and GAL-TAN positions. We therefore do not have a clear expectation concerning left-right ideology (and only include it in our analyses as a control variable).

Finally, and most importantly in the context of this paper, we suggest that MEPs' choice of language on the EP floor is a way for them to signal their political and professional ambitions. In general terms, using English sends the message that "I am European" (Ringe 2022, 121-22). More specifically, it may be a signal of a lawmaker's *static ambition*, meaning that they seek to "make a long career" (Schlesinger 1966, 10) out of being an MEP (Daniel 2015). But it may also be a signal of *internal progressive ambition*, that is, ambition to advance to higher office *within* the EP, while MEPs who seek careers in national politics – i.e., those with *external progressive ambition* – would likely eschew English in favor of using their native languages. Accordingly,

*we expect MEPs who have either revealed their static ambition by having served multiple EP terms or who actively seek reelection for another term to be more likely to use English (H1d).*

After having identified the factors that help explain MEPs' use of English in the EP plenary, we explore the consequences of language choice by examining whether using English is associated with career advancement inside the parliament. Are MEPs who signal their static and internal progressive ambition by using English at time  $t$  more likely to be selected into leadership positions at time  $t+1$ ? Our expectation is that this is indeed the case: *MEPs who give more speeches in English during one legislative term are more likely to be selected into formal leadership positions during the subsequent term (H2).* We expect this to hold even when controlling for factors such as previous formal leadership, previous policy leadership, seniority, voting loyalty to both the national party and the EP party group, gender, and age.

## Data and Research Design I: Explaining Language Choice

Our analyses focus on MEPs' use of English when making speeches in the EP plenary during the parliament's 7th legislative term (or EP7, 2009-2014). To create this dataset of speeches, we used web scraping to gain access to the plenary proceedings of the EP.<sup>3</sup> From these minutes, we extracted information such as the date, text of the speech, and the MEP's name and ID to create the speech dataset. Each speech tag contains a field with information about the MEP's unique ID, which is used throughout the EP's online system. This ID field was used to link the speech data with other data in the authors' possession to create the dataset used in this

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<sup>3</sup> The template URL to access the individual pages of the European Parliament proceedings is [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-7-yyyy-mm-dd\\_EN.html](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-7-yyyy-mm-dd_EN.html). Using this, we crawl through the pages for each date in the EP7 period.



paper. Descriptions of other variables used as explanatory and dependent variables are provided below.

The determination of whether a speech was in English or not was made as follows. Until 2012, the minutes were published in all official EU languages. This means that all speeches were translated into all official languages, and there was a full version of the minutes in each language. For this period, an indicator in the original language of the speech was placed at the beginning of the speech (e.g., "fr" for French), and we obtained the English version of the minutes to determine the language from the indicator. For speeches after 2012, official translations are no longer available and the speech text is provided verbatim. In these cases, we used `cld2`, a language detection package in R that uses Google's C++ library for Compact Language Detector, to determine the language used.

The language information used in the speeches was aggregated to create two variables related to English use at the individual MEP level: the first is a binary variable indicating whether or not English was used at least once; the second is the percentage of speeches given in English. The first analysis below relies on the former and the second on the latter.

Our first analysis seeks to identify the determinants of MEPs using English when delivering speeches in the EP plenary, thereby testing H1a-H1d. The outcome variable is a dichotomous indicator that equals 1 for MEPs who gave at least one speech in English during EP7 and 0 for all others. Since the dependent variable is binary and categorical, we employ a logistic regression. Our predictors fall into several categories.

First, we construct a variable for *Formal Leadership (EP7)* (see H1a). This is a binary variable that takes a value of 1 for MEPs who served in any of the following positions: members

of the EP's Bureau (EP President, Vice-President, Quaestor),<sup>4</sup> chairs or vice-chairs of their respective party groups, committee chairs or vice-chairs, and committee coordinators.<sup>5</sup>

Second, we use three variables that capture the policy leadership of an MEP (H1b), which we conceptualize as MEPs actively seeking to shape the content of legislation. We thus count the number of times each MEP served as either *Rapporteur* (who is charged with drafting the official committee report on a particular legislative proposal and guiding it through the lawmaking process) or *Shadow Rapporteur* (who serves as lead negotiator for a given party group on a particular legislative proposal and works alongside the rapporteur), as well as the number of reports they amended, *Reports Amend*. Since all these three variables are highly right-skewed, we rescaled them by taking their natural logarithms after adding one.

Third, we employ ideological measures for Euroskepticism and GAL-TAN ideology (H1c): *Party Pro-EU* and *Party GAL-TAN* are MEPs' national parties' scores on the pro-/anti-EU and GAL-TAN dimensions (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002) from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) data (Jolly et al. 2022), which we use as proxies for MEPs' individual-level ideological positions.

Fourth, we include two variables to capture MEPs' professional ambition (H1d): *Seniority*, or the number of terms an MEP has served, and *Seek Reelect*, a binary indicator for whether or not an MEP sought reelection in 2014 for the subsequent EP term (Obholzer and Daniel 2016).

As control variables, we include MEPs' age (and expect that younger MEPs are more likely to use English), gender (no clear expectation), ideological positions on the left-right dimension (no clear expectation), and national party size (MEPs from national parties with fewer

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<sup>4</sup> Quaestors are responsible for administrative and financial matters of direct concern to Members.

<sup>5</sup> The leader and main spokesperson of a party group in a given committee.

members have a greater incentive to use English). The relevant indicators are *Age* (an MEP's biological age at the start of EP7), *Female* (a binary indicator of whether the MEP is female), *Party Left-Right* (MEPs' national party left-right scores from CHES), and *National Party Size* (the number of EP seats held by the MEP's national party).

Significant differences exist between countries in whether MEPs use English in their speeches, as demonstrated in Figure 2. To control for all unobserved heterogeneity within each group, therefore, our main model includes fixed effects for MEPs' member states. We also estimate an additional model with a random intercept at the country level.

[FIGURE 2 HERE]

### Results I: Explaining Language Choice

Table 1 displays the results of our first analyses, in which the use of English in speeches is the dependent variable. Model 1 includes country-specific fixed effects and Model 2 country-specific random effects. The explanatory variables in both models are identical. Each row represents the value of the coefficient, with the standard error of the coefficient in parentheses below it.

[TABLE 1 HERE]

The results generally confirm our expectations. The effect of *Formal Leader* is significant and positive, which supports H1a: an MEP who holds any formal leadership position is more likely to use English in their speech. However, the substantive impact of this result is

inconclusive. In Figure 3, we plot the predicted probability of using English using Model 1. The black dots represent the point prediction with 95 percent confidence intervals around them. Although there is a sizable difference between leaders and non-leaders in the use of English (0.186), the confidence intervals overlap due to the large uncertainty of the model.

[FIGURE 3 HERE]

Being policy leaders also encourages MEPs to use English in their speeches, which confirms H1b. For two of the three policy leadership variables, the coefficients are significant: a greater number of rapporteurships and reports amended is associated with English use. The coefficient for the number of shadow rapporteurships is not statistically significant, however.

Support for H1c is partial. While leaning TAN on the GAL-TAN dimension is negatively associated with the use of English on the EP floor, positions on the pro-/anti-EU dimension are not statistically significant. The lack of significance for the latter cannot be attributed to the collinearity between the two ideological scales, as the results do not change when *Party GAL-TAN* is excluded.

The analysis generally supports our hypothesis regarding the professional ambitions of MEPs (H1d). We find that the effect of *Seniority* is positive, suggesting that MEPs who have revealed their static ambition by serving multiple EP terms are more likely to use English in their speeches (an effect that is also likely driven by senior MEPs having been socialized into a multilingual institution and having improved their English language skills in the process). This effect is both substantial and large, as is shown in the substantive effect plot, in which the horizontal axis is the number of EP terms served (Figure 4). The solid line represents a point

estimate and the shaded area the confidence interval. As before, there is some overlap due to the large confidence intervals, but we can see that first-term MEPs are 50-50 in using or not using English in speech (probability is 0.43), while MEPs with greater seniority are more likely to use English in speech (probability is 0.75 for a fifth-term MEP). The coefficient for seeking reelection is statistically significant in Model 2, but only borderline statistically significant in Model 1. As expected, it is positive, which suggests that legislators with static and/or internal progressive ambition are more likely to give speeches in English than others.

[FIGURE 4 HERE]

For the control variables, we find that, as expected, *National Party Size* has a negative effect. Age, gender, and left-right ideology are not statistically significant.

## Data and Research Design II: Language Choice and Career Advancement

With these results about the determinants of language choice in mind, we now turn to our second analysis, in which we investigate the relationship between MEPs' use of English in speeches in EP7 (2009-14) and subsequent selection for leadership positions in EP8 (2014-19). In other words, we examine if MEPs who used more English during one term are more likely to advance their careers by being selected into leadership positions during the next.

Our sample for this second analysis is limited to MEPs who served in EP7 and were reelected in 2014 to become members of EP8. We define the dependent variable, *Formal Leadership (EP8)*, in the same way before – a dichotomous indicator coded 1 for MEPs who are selected for a formal leadership position in EP8 (member of the EP Bureau, party leader,

committee leader, coordinator) and 0 otherwise. Our main independent variable of interest is *Proportion English*, which represents the proportion of speeches an MEP delivered in English on the floor of EP7. We hypothesize that this variable is positively associated with selection into a leadership position (H2).

Several indicators from EP7 serve as control variables (and were already introduced above): *Formal Leadership*, *Rapporteur*, *Shadow Rapporteur*, *Reports Amend*, *Seniority*, *Gender*, and *Age*. In addition, we include two voting loyalty measures from EP7: *National Party Loyalty* is an MEP's voting loyalty to their national party and *Party Group Loyalty* to their EP party group (i.e., the proportion of votes cast that are identical with the national party line or EP party group line, respectively). In the second analysis, we again include country fixed- or random-effects to address country-specific heterogeneity. Descriptive statistics of the variables in the first and second analyses can be found in Appendix Tables 1 and 2.

## Results II: Language Choice and Career Advancement

Table 2 presents the estimation results of the logistic regression with formal leadership in EP8 as the dependent variable. The results confirm H2: a greater proportion of speeches delivered in English during EP7 makes it more likely for an MEP to be selected into a formal leadership position in EP8.

[TABLE 2 HERE]

Figure 5 visualizes the substantive effect of English use from Model 1. The horizontal axis is the percentage of speeches in English and the vertical axis the probability of obtaining a

leadership position. The confidence intervals on the right and left sides of the figure are large and overlap, but by comparing the point estimates, we can see that the probability of obtaining a leadership position is significantly different between MEPs who do not use English at all ( $p=.35$ ) and those who use English exclusively ( $p=.80$ ).

[FIGURE 5 HERE]

We also observe that policy leadership has a positive effect on subsequent selection into formal leadership positions, as the number of rapporteurships and shadow rapporteurships is positively associated with the outcome. Age is negative and significant. All other predictors are not statistically significant.

## Conclusion

The main finding and conclusion from our two analyses is that MEPs' language choice when speaking on the EP floor not only reflects their career ambitions, it also affects their professional advancement inside the legislature. More likely to forego their native languages in favor of English are MEPs in formal leadership positions and those who are actively involved in policy-making (especially rapporteurs), as their target audience when speaking in the plenary is more likely to be multilingual. GAL-TAN ideology also matters, in that TAN politicians are more likely to avoid speaking English. Finally, MEPs with static and internal progressive ambition – as revealed by longer tenures and future efforts at reelection – use English to signal their career preferences. It is notable that this signaling is at least partially successful, as our second analysis shows: MEPs' use of English during one legislative term correlates positively

with their probability of being selected into a leadership position during the next. Language choice in the EP is, in other words, not only well-structured along organizational and policy-making roles, ideology, and career ambition, but it is also consequential for lawmakers' internal advancement.

Finally, our study focuses on language choice in EP debates, but our findings have implications beyond the EP. In diverse countries with multiple official languages or different dialects, analyzing language choice may be informative not only in predicting legislators' career advancement within their respective parliaments but also in understanding the strength of their constituency ties. Attention to language choice productively expands the scope of research on legislative speeches beyond the analysis of content and sentiment and more broadly contributes to our understanding of the nexus between language and politics.



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Table 1: Logistic Regression of Using English


	Fixed Effect	Random Effect
	(1)	(2)
Formal Leadership (EP7)	0.775*** (0.211)	0.749*** (0.208)
Rapporteur	0.309** (0.137)	0.308** (0.134)
Shadow Rapporteur	0.012 (0.109)	0.012 (0.106)
Reports Amend	0.218** (0.107)	0.200* (0.103)
Seniority	0.347*** (0.103)	0.337*** (0.101)
Seek Reelect	0.354* (0.191)	0.375** (0.186)
Party Pro-EU	-0.128 (0.097)	-0.142 (0.091)
Party GAL-TAN	-0.166** (0.079)	-0.173** (0.076)
Party Left-Right	0.122* (0.073)	0.135* (0.071)
National Party Size	-0.039*** (0.013)	-0.042*** (0.013)
Female	0.178 (0.197)	0.175 (0.193)
Age	-0.018* (0.009)	-0.016* (0.009)
Constant	0.181 (1.016)	1.117 (0.872)
Observations	802	802
Log Likelihood	-374.863	-412.895
Akaike Inf. Crit.	823.727	853.791
Bayesian Inf. Crit.		919.410

Note: \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01


Table 2: Logistic Regression of Formal Leadership in EP8

	Fixed Effect (1)	Random Effect (2)
Proportion English	2.029*** (0.725)	1.233** (0.496)
Formal Leadership (EP7)	0.224 (0.289)	0.312 (0.273)
Rapporteur	0.651*** (0.203)	0.584*** (0.187)
Shadow Rapporteur	0.329** (0.146)	0.287** (0.133)
Reports Amend	0.040 (0.172)	-0.013 (0.153)
Party Group Loyalty	0.0001 (0.020)	0.012 (0.017)
National Party Loyalty	0.004 (0.051)	-0.004 (0.046)
Seniority	-0.171 (0.142)	-0.143 (0.134)
Female	0.320 (0.271)	0.314 (0.256)
Age	-0.029** (0.014)	-0.032** (0.013)
Constant	-1.338 (5.048)	-0.482 (4.593)
Observations	362	362
Log Likelihood	-196.403	-216.150
Akaike Inf. Crit.	468.806	456.301
Bayesian Inf. Crit.		503.001
:	* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01	


Figure 1: Speaking Time in the EP Plenary, 2008-2014




**Figure 2: Variation in the use of English in the EP Plenary (EP7)**




**Figure 3: Effect of Formal Leadership on Using English in Speech**



**Figure 4: Effect of Seniority on Using English in Speech**



**Figure 5: Effect of Using English on Formal Leadership in EP8**





**Appendix Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (Analysis 1)**

Variable	Mean	Median	Min	Max	sd	N
Use English	0.641	1	0	1	0.48	802
Formal Leadership (EP7)	0.309	0	0	1	0.462	802
Rapporteur	5.172	3	0	72	6.957	802
Shadow Rapporteur	14.274	7	0	282	24.118	802
Reports Amend	68.539	58	0	379	53.39	802
Seniority	1.668	1	1	7	1.074	802
Seek Reelect	0.608	1	0	1	0.488	802
Party Pro-EU	5.312	6	1	7	1.535	802
Party GAL-TAN	5.269	5.167	0.167	9.6	2.233	802
Party Left-Right	5.401	6	0.364	9.929	2.09	802
National Party Size	12.862	9	1	36	10.557	802
Female	0.357	0	0	1	0.479	802
Age	55.092	56	26	86	10.713	802

**Appendix Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (Analysis 2)**

Variable	Mean	Median	Min	Max	sd	N
Formal Leadership (EP8)	0.591	1	0	1	0.492	362
Proportion English	0.219	0.027	0	1	0.357	362
Formal Leadership (EP7)	0.315	0	0	1	0.465	362
Rapporteur	1.608	1.609	0	4.29	0.839	362
Shadow Rapporteur	2.243	2.197	0	5.645	1.143	362
Reports Amend	4.026	4.19	0	5.778	0.999	362
Party Group Loyalty	92.7	95.285	43.01	99.29	7.759	362
National Party Loyalty	97.933	98.35	68.57	100	2.575	362
Seniority	1.577	1	1	7	0.959	362
Female	0.37	0	0	1	0.484	362
Age	53.92	55	29	77	9.849	362