**Civilisational narratives in European Studies debates on EU enlargement**

*Richard McMahon*

This paper addresses issues from my current Marie Curie-funded two-year research project at the University of Portsmouth. This project seeks to understand how two types of geography have interacted:

1. the spatial patterns of the transnational scholarly networks which study European integration, known as European Studies (ES) or European Union Studies (EUS)
2. their narratives, and especially their normative narratives, about the geography of European integration

I focus on scholarship of the EU’s 2004 eastern enlargement as a case study and therefore on opinions by scholars about which countries are more or less suitable for EU membership.

The present paper addresses two important questions that my research faces. Any feedback will be greatly appreciated. The questions are:

1. Do EUS scholars produce geographical narratives which suggest that certain countries are more suitable candidates than others?
2. Do these narratives mobilise civilisational thinking?

This paper approaches civilisations as socially constructed discourses, or sets of received ideas and focusses on their mobilisation for political purposes. I am particularly interested in civilisational narratives because these appear so prominently in wider intellectual and political debates about EU enlargement to the east. My supposition is that if EUS experts develop normative geographical narratives, these wider discourses are likely to influence them.

Civilisations are one of a succession of politically influential classification schemes, since modern nationalism first emerged in the Romantic Period, which grouped nations together in broader geographical settings, usually on the basis of some common ancient historical origin. The language families of philology, such as the Slavs and Germanics, for example had a crucial impact on the geopolitics of nationalism. The civilisational school of macro-history then emerged in early and mid-twentieth-century Britain, America and France as these countries abandoned the classification project of race anthropology. Arguably therefore, it filled a gap in the market for large-scale identity geopolitics. Civilisation studies was a loose and very weakly institutionalised interdisciplinary project, centred around international historians but including anthropologists, historical sociologists and political scientists. Following Oswald Spengler in 1918[[1]](#footnote-1), works by Arnold Toynbee, Pitirim Sorokin, Alfred Kroeber and others in the late 1930s and 1940s marked the school’s highpoint, followed by a revival in the 1960s by Fernand Braudel and William MacNeill[[2]](#footnote-2). In 1993, Samuel Huntington controversially resuscitated civilisationism once more, in the form of explicitly realist geopolitics, helping to script the West’s confrontations with both Islam and Russia[[3]](#footnote-3).

Civilisations are largely defined by religion, supplemented by physical geography and shared history. They naturalise and legitimise continental-scale cultural groups by presenting them as ancient, coherent and influential. Political civilisationalism can also sometimes mobilise the passions, solemnity and venerable traditions of religion. Religion is the second national marker of choice after language, and offers European identity useful traditional Others (Islam, Russia).

The strongest reason for imagining that EUS might produce normative civilisational narratives is that these have been important factors in wider intellectual and political debate on EU enlargement. Intellectuals in those former Soviet Bloc countries which had a ‘Western’ religious tradition (Catholic or Protestant) successfully traded on ancient civilisational kin-responsibility to join the EU and Nato after 1989[[4]](#footnote-4). The Czech novelist Milan Kundera launched international debate about this ‘Central Europe’ in a *New York Review of Books* article in 1984, ‘The Tragedy of Central Europe’, which was soon translated into Czech under the more revealing title of ‘The Kidnapping of Europe’. Intellectuals like Kundera, Vaclav Havel and Adam Michnik portrayed Central Europe in the 1980s as returning to complete the West after being abducted by a culturally alien Russia[[5]](#footnote-5). In this discourse, Russia’s civilisational schism with the West went back almost two thousand years to the division of the Roman Empire between Rome and Byzantium. Balkan wars intensified an often essentialist Eastern European obsession with their location in Europe or the ‘east’[[6]](#footnote-6).

The prospect of Turkish membership then mobilised many Austrians and others for whom Europe is fundamentally defined in opposition to Islam and especially Turkey[[7]](#footnote-7). In 1994-2002, several Christian democratic leaders across Europe explicitly rejected Turkey’s accession because it did not belong to Europe’s ‘Christian-occidental tradition’[[8]](#footnote-8). Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel offered Turkey a ‘privileged partnership’ rather than membership, and were able to effectively slow the country accession talks to a halt (Grabbe & Sedelmeier 2010: 375-76).

**EUS research on enlargement: general theory or normative geography**

The historian Mark Gilbert argues that both historians and political theorists of European integration have ‘coincidentally’ but systematically ‘generated… narrative accounts’ (Gilbert 2008: 649). This idea meets resistance however, especially from political scientists who have traditionally espoused an ideology of apolitical application of theory to empirical data. The core corpus of enlargement research is indeed concerned with devising general theories about integration. Researchers are not very interested in the detail of which countries should or should not join the EU. The seven most cited political science texts on ‘EU enlargement’ (according to Google Scholar) all focus heavily on contributing to theoretical debates rather than delineating specific geographies (Schimmelfennig 2001; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004; Lavenex 2004; Grabbe 2003; Moravcsik and Vachudova 2002; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2002; Sjursen 2002). Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier’s 2002 article explicitly seeks ‘definitions, research focuses, and hypotheses [that] can be applied to the enlargement of other regional organizations and are designed to encourage comparative analysis’ (2002: 502-3).

Nevertheless, I have two reasons for thinking that EUS does in fact produce normative geographical narratives about enlargement. These are the inevitability that research becomes politicised and direct evidence.

1. ***The ‘normal’ politicisation of science***

Historians and sociologists of science generally take for granted that scholars are usually serious in their committment to theoretical and methodological rigour, but are nonetheless influenced by social and political context. My previous research found that if scientific work had the potential to support political arguments, at least some of it usually did. The geneticists who try to reconstruct the historical migrations of peoples for example insist on scrupulous scientific standards, but frequently express politicised narratives in implicit subtexts and throwaway remarks (McMahon, forthcoming). The personal background of scholars, competition for funding, academic institutionalisation, transnational organisation, disciplinary traditions, efforts towards popularisation and the interface between the academic and policy-making spheres can all offer incentives for politicised narratives. The presentation of results and choices of research topic, evidence, methodology and theoretical framework all offer means to express these narratives.

My perspective is that this kind of politicisation is normal in scholarship. I therefore expect to find politicised narratives in EUS work. Like other scholars, EUS scholars are now officially encouraged, through career and funding incentives in the UK at least, to maximise their extra-academic impact. In the past at least, many were deeply politically engaged. The Oxford Professor Uwe Kitzinger, who founded JCMS in 1962, worked for the Council of Europe and in a European Commissioner’s cabinet, and is a committed pro-European ([Popa, 2007: 128](#_ENREF_17) & 139). Discovering whether the professionalisation of EUS in intervening years has made boundaries between political engagement and academic research firmer and normative work less acceptable is one of my key research aims. However, UACES, the principle British professional society for ES/EUS and leading academic EUS journals like *Journal of European Public Policy* (JEPP) and *Journal of Common Market Studies* (JCMS) still explicitly aim to engage with political actors and link academics with them ([Popa, 2007: 127, 132 & 138-39](#_ENREF_17)). At least one key funding source, the European Commission’s Jean Monnet Programme, meanwhile has an explicit political goal of increasing knowledge of and engagement with European integration. Historians consistently stress the importance of Jean Monnet funding in the growth of EUS (Belot & Brachet, 2004: 149-51; [Georgakakis & Smith, 2004: 9](#_ENREF_8)).

In pre-World War Two race science, another of my previous research subjects, a particular transnational geography of power relations, rancorous divisions, interdisciplinary coalitions, and cultural distinctions clearly shaped the forms of politicised narratives. EUS has a similarly complex concrete geography. It is a series of localised interdisciplinary coalitions, each shaped by the particular political and scholarly traditions of nations and language zones. Influential transnational canons of work, often created by prominent scholars based in powerful institutions, tie these local scholarly communities together. Scholars from the Western ‘core’ of EUS for example established authoritative judgements regarding enlargement towards central and eastern Europe (CEE), though this core is now expanding to incorporate CEE ([Bindi & Eliassen, 2012: 15](#_ENREF_3); [Morata & Ollora, 2012](#_ENREF_15)). Different methodological, disciplinary and epistemological factions struggle to represent themselves as the authoritative experts on European integration, and thereby to gain control of university resources. These factions often map onto spatial and cultural distinctions, and especially those between European research and what scholars universally refer to approvingly or resentfully as the ‘mainstream’ of EUS.



Fig. 1. Marie Curie centres of Excellence 2015. Key: political science (white centres), law, economics, other.

This key localised tradition in EUS has its strongest roots in North America, political science and in rationalist, deductive, quantitative and theory-centred epistemologies, but has very successfully represented itself as the most scientifically advanced and rigorous strand of research on the EU ([Jensen & Kristensen, 2013: 13](#_ENREF_10); [Rosamond, 2007: 11](#_ENREF_18)). It remains strongest in English-speaking countries. Just 26% of Jean Monnet chairs in 2004 were in political science therefore, but 52% of those in Britain (Belot & Brachet, 2004: 152–58; see also fig. 1 above). Assisted by the rise of English as an academic *lingua franca* however, it has gained an important following since the early 1990s among internationally-minded scholars in German-speaking, Benelux and Scandinavian countries, where English language competence tends to be strongest ([Irondelle, 2006: 189](#_ENREF_9)). European and American European studies courses therefore ‘depend heavily on a relatively small number of ‘Anglo-American’ textbooks’ ([Bache, 2006: 245](#_ENREF_2)). My future research will examine whether an existing German and Scandinavian predilection for quantitative and theoretical modelling in political science also shaped the spatial diffusion of the Mainstream. There is some evidence for this, including the particularly strong representation of German scholars on the editorial board of *European Union Politics*, the most rational choice and quantitatively oriented EUS journal ([Rosamond, 2007: 12-13](#_ENREF_18); [Jupille, 2006: 225](#_ENREF_11); Jensen and Kristensen, 2013: 4)

The US European Union Studies Association (EUSA) has meanwhile acquired a global membership, and functions as something like a Mainstream parallel body to the less political science and rationalist-dominated European Community Studies Association (ECSA), the world umbrella body for EUS scholarly societies. Only 53% of EUSA’s 2006 membership was US-based, and 43% were European, with the biggest contingent from the UK (119 members, or 14% of the total), followed by Belgians and Germans (each with 59 members) ([Rosamond, 2007: 11](#_ENREF_18)). At the 2011 EUSA conference meanwhile, 69% of participants were European-based and only 25% were American-based ([Andrews, 2012: 758](#_ENREF_1)). In 2006, EUSA members accounted for 42% of all national ECSA members throughout the world ([Rosamond, 2007: 10-11](#_ENREF_18)). Political scientists made up 78% of EUSA members, 50% in the British society, 30% of the German ECSA, but just 18-20% of the French and Italian ECSAs ([Rosamond, 2007: 10](#_ENREF_18)).

The rationalist Mainstream is without doubt the most transnationally powerful research community in EUS, and is characterised by a sublime confidence in its theoretical sophistication. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier for example complain that ‘theoretical neglect’ caused ‘weaknesses’ in most research on enlargement, which ‘consists of descriptive and often policy-oriented studies of single cases’ (2002: 501). Leading representatives often represent non-Mainstream European ES traditions as a nationally-minded atomised fringe, tinkering with mere descriptive research and the vocational training of public servants, while looking to America ‘for leadership, ideas and conceptual tools’ ([Keeler, 2005: 574](#_ENREF_12); [Wallace, 2000: 96 & 110](#_ENREF_22)).

However the Mainstream should not be considered ‘proper science’, in contrast with inferior local traditions. It is itself one particular scholarly tradition, and no less fallible than any other normal science. Despite a central justification of rationalism being its claim to produce predictive theories for example, the Mainstream consensus incorrectly presumed that eastern enlargement would so increase diversity within the EU that its decision-making would be paralysed (Falkner & Trieb 2008: 294-95). Eventually ‘most authors’ had to accept that decision-making continued to function quite effectively after the 2005 enlargement, even under the heavily criticised Nice Treaty voting rules (Bailer, Hertz & Leuffen 2009: 164). Despite real care to follow scientific procedures, scholars are not immune to the normal human dynamics of authority, cliquishness and bandwagoning that commonly produce consensus.

From a history of science perspective therefore, the Mainstream is just one of several competing traditions within EUS. Joseph Jupille found in 2006 that the typically Mainstream interest in ‘regional integration theory’ remained essentially confined to the US and that within EUS as a whole, qualitative work still overwhelmingly dominated over the Mainstream’s formal and quantitative methodologies ([2006: 219 & 228](#_ENREF_11)). An important competitor to the Mainstream, though losing ground since the 1970s, has been the area studies approach, which is more associated with the term European Studies (ES) than EUS ([M. L. Smith, 2003: 24-25](#_ENREF_20) & 26; [Milward, 1975: 76](#_ENREF_14)). This tradition is also largely of Anglophone origin. ES scholars criticise the parsimonious theories favoured by the rationalist Mainstream as unable to capture the rich social, political and cultural context which shapes European integration ([Rosamond, 2007: 15](#_ENREF_18); [Wallace, 2000: 99](#_ENREF_22)). Historians level a similar critique against key political science theories of European integration, which convert interesting patterns and ‘partial interpretations’ into ‘comprehensive accounts’, while ignoring historical contingency or the agency of individuals (Gilbert 2008: 647 & 650-53; [Rosamond, 2007: 16](#_ENREF_18)). Non English-natives meanwhile criticise the Mainstream for ignoring foreign-language work ([Wessels, 2006: 235](#_ENREF_24)). In France for example, political study of European integration has largely emerged in the framework of an interpretavist political sociology, whose post-structuralist cultural origins makes it deeply critical of Mainstream rationalism ([Irondelle, 2006: 188-89](#_ENREF_9); [A. Smith, 2000: 665](#_ENREF_19); [Costa, 2012: 197-98](#_ENREF_7)).

1. ***Direct evidence of geographical narratives in EUS work on enlargement***

Normative narratives are particularly common in certain fields of EUS and ES. Historians like Wolfram Kaiser, Antonio Varsori and Mark Gilbert identify an intensely normative pro-integrationist thread in much of the historiography of European integration, especially but far from exclusively intense among early works from the original six member states, like Jean-Baptiste Duroselle’s 1990 history of integration (Kaiser 2006: 193; Varsori 2010: 7; Gilbert 2008: 642). These historians received material support from the European Commission, including to establish the only journal devoted to the history of European integration, and were often committed supranationalists, representing integration as ‘profoundly desirable’ and ‘the most successful peace movement ever’ (Gilbert 2008: 642; Kaiser 2006: 193). As late as 2006, Michael Gehler, a prominent Austrian historian of integration, worried that the 2004 enlargement would ‘water down’ the EU into nothing more than ‘a de luxe free trade zone with only limited ambitions as a world power’ (2006: 282).

Fig. 2. Huntington 1998: 159.

The ‘return to Europe’ debate of the late 1980s and early 1990s was a highpoint of explicitly normative scholarly commentary on European geography. Samuel Huntington borrowed his map of the eastern border of Western civilisation (see fig. 2) from a 1990 book by William Wallace, a leading Oxford political scientist of European integration (Huntington 1998: 159). Wallace’s 1992 discussion of EC enlargement fell ambiguously between description and advocacy. He warned of the ‘immense dangers in defining ‘Europe’ as Christian’ but accepted there was ‘good historical justification’ for this (Wallace 1994: 40-41). Greece and Turkey were meanwhile ‘arguably outside the framework of ‘Western’ values, shared history and culture, which gave the Community a sense of community’. Wallace offered a hierarchy of likely accession candidates, from Catholic Central Europe ‘with established claims to be ‘rejoining the West’’, to the Balkans, ‘historically less closely associated’ and Turkey, ‘like Russia, a Euro-Asian country in geography, history and culture’ (1994: 42). It might therefore be necessary to ‘devise some acceptable gradation of privilege and access (and subsidy) to satisfy Western Europe’s client states’ (Wallace 1994: 42).

European integration specialists were however relatively weakly engaged in this normative return to Europe debate. In an article a year after Wallace’s, on precisely the same subjects, Wolfgang Wessels, a prominent German EUS political scientist, clearly derived his hierarchy of likely accession countries from policy-makers, made no judgements about countries’ qualifications for membership and advocated a unitary federal polity rather than differentiated integration (1993: 308-9 & 313-14). The rationalist historian of integration Alan Milward meanwhile disparaged the incorporation of a country’s ‘so called ‘culture’, at best its history and politics’ into European studies courses ([Milward, 1975: 69-70](#_ENREF_14)).

The most prominent normative scholarly geographies in of this period came in fact from contemporary historians of Europe[[9]](#footnote-9) like Timothy Garton Ash. In a 1991 article entitled ‘Let the East Europeans In!’, he and his co-authors appealed to European Community leaders that it ‘makes plain, practical sense’ to begin enlargement with Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, the ‘nearest’ countries ’geographically, historically, and culturally’ as well as in progress towards ‘democracy, the rule of law, and a market economy’; they ‘belong to Europe’ and excluding them was ‘historical nonsense’ (cited in Neumann 1999: 156).

Another prominent contemporary historian, Tony Judt, advanced the opposing cultural argument. He wrote that ‘from the very beginning of its modern history, western Europe was bound by cultural and commercial links that transcended its internal divisions’, giving it ‘a common and distinctive history’ (1997: 50). East of the Trieste-Gdansk line that served as the border of Charlemagne’s empire, the internal Austro-Hungarian border and the Soviet bloc, he placed ‘a no less distinctive if less fortunate eastern Europe’ (1997: 51). The nearest part of this zone, west of Riga and Lviv and north of the Balkans, were the small, provincial, ‘overwhelmingly Catholic, rural’ squabbling nations of central Europe (1997: 52, 57 & 68). Judt’s argument that liberalism and civil society had ‘no roots’ in Central Europe’s ‘political culture’, even before the Communist takeover, suggested a real barrier to its EU integration (1992: 96).

However Mainstream rationalist work on EU enlargement also expresses normative sentiments. A 1999 article by the former deputy president of the Polish ECSA, the economist Renata Stawarska, blatantly lobbied for Poland’s accession, noting for example that its WWII exile government ‘established their credentials’ as ‘among the founding fathers of a united Europe’ (1999: 823). Accession candidate scholars may produce particularly normative work, but this is by no means confined to them. JEPP, a leading international EUS journal, was content to publish Stawarska’s article, despite its politicised appeals. Richard Rose of Strathclyde University and Christian Haerpfer of Vienna meanwhile began their analysis of survey statistics by stating that before 1945, ‘Prague, Budapest and Warsaw were as much European cities as Rome, Madrid and Lisbon’ (1995: 428). They recognise that pre-communist CEE was not, as a whole, very democratic, but immediately offer the caveat that post-1945 Germany also lacked a democratic past and that the 1990s transition to democracy can be favourably compared to that of post-war Western Europe (1995: 428-29).

I identify geographical narratives in work on two of the principle theoretical EUS questions on enlargement.

1. Why and how did the EU decide to enlarge?

The advantages of EU accession for eastern candidates appeared quite obvious to most scholars (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2002: 519; Moravcsik & Vachudova 2005: 203). However the existing EU’s willingness to accept enlargement, despite a distinct lack of enthusiasm among most member states and citizens, was harder to explain. In the 1990s therefore, this became a key early research question in enlargement studies (Grabbe & Sedelmeier 2010: 378; Moravcsik & Vachudova 2005: 203-4).

1. How will enlargement affect the EU?

After politicians had largely decided the sequence of CEE accessions and actual membership loomed closer, attention turned in the 2000s to the effects on enlargement on the EU (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2002: 507; Friis & Murphy 1999: 212-13). The most prominent issue here appears to have been whether enlargement would harm the EU by blocking the deepening of integration, undermining governance and European identity or paralysing Brussels decision-making.

Four different kinds of explanation, distinguished by their use of culture, each had different implications for the production of geographic narratives.

1. Non-cultural, rationalist explanations

Unsurprisingly, given the prominence of the Mainstream in EUS, rationalist assessments of cost and benefits in terms of economics, security or geopolitical influence are extremely important in studies of enlargement. Heather Grabbe and Kirsty Hughes for example recognised ‘moral’ motives of democracy promotion in member state decisions about enlargement, but believed ‘this is unlikely to override political and economic interests’ (1998: 5-6). Similarly, in Lykke Friis and Anna Murphy’s analysis of EU decisions about which countries to negotiate with, culture was a purely negative factor (1999: 221). Member states rejected a smaller eastern enlargement to avoid being accused of ‘redrawing the old cultural boundary of Western Christendom’ (1999: 225).

It is quite possible for rationalist studies to identify characteristics of particular accession candidates which make their EU entry advantageous or disadvantageous for member states. Rose and Haerpfer for example use statistical analysis to highlight the superior democratic preparedness of Visigrad states (Poland, Hungary, the Czech and Slovak republics) over other CEE states for EU accession (1995: 443). Heinz Kramer identified the same geography of ‘more justified’ optimism about democratic transition in ‘central European states’, compared to the ‘nationalist and traditionalist movements’ that threaten democratisation in Russia, Hungary and the Balkans (1993: 218-19). He added that EC policy towards Central Asian and Caucasian post-Soviet republics should ‘be inspired by’ its ‘policy towards developing countries’ rather than towards CEE (Kramer 1993: 233). Helen Wallace in 2005 placed Romania on the ‘hard-to-draw’ boundary with countries like Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine, which were ‘less plausible EU candidates’, due to ‘vastly lower levels of economic and political development’ (2005: 291).

The effects of enlargement were also largely addressed through rationalist analyses of preferences and institutional design (Bailer, Hertz & Leuffen 2009: 163; Grabbe & Sedelmeier 2010: 381). These problems were often connected with diversity. Kramer thus argued in 1993 that without ‘fundamental’ institutional reforms, an enlarged EC would be ‘totally unworkable’ and its ‘25 economically and politically rather heterogeneous member States’ could hardly ‘move beyond… an ‘upgraded’ free trade zone’ (1993: 239). Accession countries threatened to add a quotient of diversity out of proportion to their size, creating enormous differences to be reconciled in policy-making.

Research on Europeanisation, or national application of EU politics and policies, lent itself particularly well to normative geographical narratives about CEE’s incompatibility with EU norms. There were widespread fears among both politicians and scholars that once the Commission could no longer use the accession carrot, new member states ‘could significantly slow down or even halt the implementation process’, threatening the legitimacy of European governance as a whole (Falkner & Trieb 2008: 295). The controversial ‘match or missmatch’ theory of German political scientist Adrienne Héritier, who pioneered Europeanisation research after 1995, was central to these arguments ([Börzel & Heinze, 2012: 230 & 236](#_ENREF_4)). She argued that Europeanisation depended heavily on ‘compatibility between European policies and institutions and their domestic counterparts’ ([Börzel & Heinze, 2012: 236](#_ENREF_4)). Gerda Falkner and Oliver Treib in Vienna employed this insight to identify different ‘worlds of compliance’ with EU legislation in the old member states. In 2008, they extended this analysis to some new member states, discovering that they were in the least compliant of their four ‘worlds’, but that they shared this distinction with two older member states, Ireland and Italy (see fig. 4 below).



Fig. 4. Falkner and Treib’s four ‘worlds of compliance’ (2008). Numbers run from darkest to palest

1. Law observance: compliance ‘typically overrides domestic concerns’.
2. Domestic politics: cost/benefit debates in domestic politics can delay transposition.
3. Transposition neglect: typically ignores the duty to transpose.
4. Dead letters: transposition occurs but the measures are poorly enforced.
5. Constructivism: universal rights

In the twenty-first century however, a ‘surprisingly strong consensus’ emerged in the literature that ‘a rationalist, materialist framework’ could not explain the EU’s decision to enlarge[[10]](#footnote-10) (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2002: 521; Sedelmeier 2001: 14). Constructivists argued convincingly that European norms heavily influenced the decision to enlarge. One of their arguments, advanced by Ulrich Sedelmeier (2001: 16) and Karin Fierke and Antje Wiener (2005: 108-9), was that promises made by Western Europeans to encourage anti-Soviet dissidents had become a cornerstone of EU identity. These writers emphasised that Europeans, especially through their previous engagement with the Soviet satellite states, had developed a self-conception as champions of democracy, rule of law and human rights beyond their borders. This shamed member states, in spite of their rational preferences, into accepting a civic duty to expand Europe’s community of wealth and security.

Of my four types of explanation, discussions of civic norms seem the least likely to produce normative and geographically specific narratives of enlargement. They instead tend to imply a roughly equal duty to any of the EU’s troubled neighbourhoods. This may partly be because they arise more from an intense theoretical engagement with normative philosophy, rather than with ideographically oriented disciplines like history. Fierke and Wiener for example accepted that Western values had quite deep historical roots, going back to the Enlightenment, but that ‘the ideal healthy state was a ‘normative’ category, rather than ‘primarily… geographical or physical’ (2005: 107-8).

Nevertheless, these ‘universal’ rights are very regularly claimed as the specific heritage of a liberal, modern Western civilisation, associated with Enlightenment rationalism and civic nationalism. The West’s future prospects have historically been the central concern of civilisation studies. Geographical definitions of Western civilisation leave out Russia[[11]](#footnote-11), the arch stalwarth of conservative autocracy and chief Other of the Cold-War West[[12]](#footnote-12). Huntington claimed Western Europeans ‘overwhelmingly support sotto voce, and… intellectuals and political leaders have explicitly endorsed’ a purely Western (Catholic and Protestant) Europe, leaving out Russia and the Balkans[[13]](#footnote-13). Heather Grabbe and Sedelmeier argued that ‘the EU’s normative agenda’ will tend to work against the future accession of Turkey, Serbia and formerly Soviet republics, as candidate-state ambivalence, ‘tied up with major questions about national identity’, combines with EU reluctance (2010: 387-89). For example, the EU’s democracy and human rights agenda, which is central to constructions of European identity, controversially interacted with Turkish debates about secularism, freedom of expression and the rights of women and the Kurdish minority (Grabbe & Sedelmeier 2010: 392). A still more narrowly defined West could even exclude Central Europe. Ralf Dahrendorf warned in 1998 that because of ‘deeper’ cultural divisions separating ‘East from West’, rapid enlargement could dilute EU ‘core values’ like democracy, rule of law, ‘cohesion and justice’ (Laitin 2002: 75-76).

1. Constructivism: kinship-based duty

Helene Sjursen offered a second constructivist explanation. She believed that narratives of ‘kinship-based duty’ to a European community, which appealed to ancient religious and other cultural ties, were a more important driver of enlargement (2006: 12-13). An example was the EU’s indulgent treatment of Poland compared with its harsh strictness towards Turkey. Thomas Risse thought that although ‘elite ideas of modern and enlightened Europe’ (explanation two above) drove ‘Western European support for Eastern enlargement’, this enlargement and even more so, ‘Turkish accession and immigration policies’, ‘put antisecular and antimodern ideas’ about Christianity ‘back on the European agenda’ (2010: 205). Grabbe and Sedelmeier note that for post-2007 eastern and south-eastern accession candidates, even the EU’s democracy and human rights agenda can be a kinship issue that potentially ‘threatens national identity’ (2010: 387).

In civilisation studies, the modern West emerges from this ‘European’ civilisation, which is traced to a medieval Frankish synthesis between Latin church and Germanic aristocracies. These created a feudal Western Christendom centred in the Rhineland-Alpine strip between London and Florence[[14]](#footnote-14). This narrative has long been used to legitimise European integration. Interwar European federalists like Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi appealed to common roots in medieval Rheinish culture[[15]](#footnote-15), and the symbolism of Charlemagne was central to the legitimisation of European integration in the first post-war decades (Larat 2006: 51). Many have noted echoes of medieval Christendom in the geographical extent of the early EEC, its distribution of state power centres and subsequent enlargement[[16]](#footnote-16). Recent controversies over Turkish accession and the campaign by the Papacy and several countries for a reference to Europe’s Christian tradition in the European Constitution’s preamble[[17]](#footnote-17) exploit and promote this nineteenth-century romantic definition of Europe by ‘cultural heritage and Christian tradition’[[18]](#footnote-18).

This conservative stress on Christianity has long distinguished civilisational narratives of Europe from those of the liberal modern West, creating an east-west ideologically-infused tension in civilisational identity[[19]](#footnote-19). Nineteenth-century ‘Western’, French ‘civilisation’ was regularly opposed to Germany’s ‘Eastern’, spiritual, romantic ‘Kultur’ and ethnic nationalism[[20]](#footnote-20). The Hapsburg, Tsarist and Prussian regimes of the east resisted confidently expanding, liberal, modern Westernism in the name of either traditional ‘Europe’ or *Mitteleuropa[[21]](#footnote-21)*. Interwar Catholics and left-wingers meanwhile often used Europe and Occident as rival synonyms[[22]](#footnote-22). European civilisation excludes the US, the acme of liberal modernity and an important Other, against which Europe defines itself[[23]](#footnote-23).

1. Historical sociology

The fourth and rarest EUS approach to enlargement seems the most likely to produce normative and geographically specific narratives of enlargement. This approach also stresses historical cultural legacies, but gives them a very different ontological status. They are not just constructed narratives, but have been deeply embedded in social structure over the *longue* durée. This kind of explanation has a long pedigree in historical sociology (eg. Szúcs 1985) and was undeniably attractive to central European EUS scholars because it validated their *Return to Europe* narrative. In 1996 therefore, the Hungarian politician and sociologist of law, Kálmán Kulcsár, wrote that Soviet socialism, which ‘in practice’, was ‘connected with the Euro-Asian cultural sphere’, created a barrier to the integration of CEE by weakening the ‘historical values and traditions’ that created the ‘base’ of its European ‘cultural and moral identity’ (cited in Laitin 2002: 55).

Mainstream EUS particularly acknowledged historical legacies when it debated democracy, seen as a prerequisite for both the acceptance of candidates and for successful subsequent membership. Schimmelfennig and Hanno Scholtz thus argued that historical legacies shaped democratisation in the EU’s eastern and Mediterranean neighbourhoods, which in turn heavily impacted ‘the EU’s readiness to offer membership’ (2010: 444). They found that a ‘Western’ Christian legacy was the best predictor of high ratings by Freedom House for political rights in 1988-2000, followed by Orthodox Christianity’ and, lastly, Islam (Schimmelfennig & Scholtz 2010: 448 & 454). Former rule by ‘different colonial or multinational empires’, length of ‘independent statehood’ and exposure to ‘Soviet communist rule’ had less clear effects (Schimmelfennig & Scholtz 2010: 447 & 454-55).

Another empirical study, by Dieter Fuchs and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, agreed with Schimmelfennig and Scholtz (2002: 50 & 52), that there was a ‘continuous decline in the extent of a democratic community’ from west to east (2002: 50; see fig. 3 below). Fuchs and Klingemann argued that the ‘cultural gap’ between Western Europe and CEE would therefore make ‘a European demos that conceives of itself as a collectivity’ difficult to achieve, undermining prospects for a ‘viable European democracy’ (2002: 19-20).



Fig. 3. Fuchs & Klingemann identified four groups, with ‘a continuous decline in the extent of a democratic community’ from ‘West’ to ‘East’ (2002: 50).

Peter Mair and Jan Zielonka countered that ‘the map of unity and diversity in the enlarged EU proves to be extremely complex, and does not simply correspond to the old East-West divide’ (2003: 2). David Laitin offered evidence to support this view. He noted that people in both the original six EEC member states and the CEE accession candidates tended to be irreligious and willing to learn the international ‘language’ of English, while 1970s-1990s entrants were more likely to be religious (Ireland) and monoglot (Ireland, UK, Spain) (2002: 61-63). CEE candidate populations also enjoyed the same American films and Anglophone pop music as the rest of the EU, and more so than the French (2002: 70-73).

Zielonka nevertheless accepted that most candidates, despite ‘some important common cultural, economic and political characteristics’, ‘in broader historical perspective’, ‘will long remain very different from the current members in terms of economics, democracy and culture’ (2001: 508 & 511). ‘This cannot but affect their actual implementation of the *acquis communitaire*’ and was ‘bad news’ for the federalist construction of ‘a European super-state’ (Zielonka 2001: 508). Zielonka however argued that ‘divergence, called by another name ‘pluralism’, is Europe’s greatest historical and cultural treasure’ (2001: 515). Enlargement might therefore encourage a ‘more attractive’ neo-medieval, post-Westphalian alternative to ‘the statist thinking dominating the current discourse’ on integration (2001: 529-30).

These historical sociology explanations employ an essentially rationalist epistemology, usually using statistical analysis. It will require further research to investigate whether their sometimes quite narrow and time-limited definition of culture shades into institutionalised practices which rationalist analyses often treat as non-cultural. Rose and Haerpfer’s study seems to lie squarely on this borderline. They analyse opinion poll data on political values in candidate states as an index of democracy and therefore a prerequisite for accession. The political scientist Laitin meanwhile limited his working definition of culture to aesthetic tastes, religion and language, and emphasised that these could change across generations (2002: 65). A particularly interesting avenue for my future research is whether europanisation theories of mismatch mobilised ideas of political and legal culture. In any case, Falkner and Trieb’s definition of ‘culture’ as a ‘shared interpretive scheme’ or ‘set of cognitive rules and recipes’ was very specifically synchronic (2008: 296-97). It defined the ‘socially acceptable’ behaviour that shaped national approaches to compliance.

However concepts of culture as an ineffable ‘civilisational’ background, rooted in ancient tradition and with a powerful sway over a broad range of social and political factors, also appear quite commonly in these analyses, exemplified in Dahrendorf’s challenge to Laitin’s analysis, (Laitin 2002: 75-76). Zielonka meanwhile believed that ‘local legal culture’ affected how ‘laws function’ and that effective EU legislation should be compatible with ‘local habits, tradition, preferences and resources’ (2001: 513). Fuchs and Klingemann agreed that ‘durable cultural traditions’ were ‘perhaps’ the most important factor influencing political ‘values and behaviours’, whose diversity in turn undermined the possibility of creating a European demos (Fuchs & Klingemann 2002: 20 & 27-28). They traced these traditions in CEE from dominant religion, longstanding imperial and then Leninist rule and ‘level of socio-economic modernity’. Schimmelfennig and Scholtz explicitly follow ‘Huntington’s classification of civilisations’ in their references to ‘Western civilisation’ and ‘Muslim civilisation’ and in assuming ‘that *Western countries are most likely to reach high levels of democracy, followed by Orthodox countries, whereas Muslim countries are least likely to democratise*’ (2010: 447 & 454). Civilisations are therefore a key element in discourses of cultural influence on the spatial patterns of enlargement.

**Conclusion**

My hypothesis is that analyses of enlargement are often more than just ‘scientific’ and value-free applications of theory to data. Choice of research question and data, analytical tools, interpretation and presentation all provide (frequently unconscious) opportunities to add a normative spin. Constructivist writers that deconstruct politicised and essentialist narratives like the kidnapped West or Christian Europe may actually be more scientifically rigorous than rationalists, because they are consciously aware of their cultural context and influences. However, even they may be unable to avoid producing conclusion that are open to political instrumentalisation. For example, Sjursen’s deconstructive analysis demystifies and undermines established narratives of Poland’s Europeanness and Turkey’s un-Europeanness. This offers potential political ammunition against the European ambitions of Poland, while benefiting those of Turkey.

Civilisational narratives about Europeanness matter in eastern enlargement in part because they have historically been so strongly structured around an east-west continuum. Whereas civilisational discourse generally takes for granted the Mediterranean border between European and Islamic civilisations, interference between civilisational discourses of Europe and the West and contestation of their Atlantic and eastern borders are central to civilisational debate on European integration.

A third, not quite civilisational Western European category, arising in the Cold War and excluding both CEE and America, may however be the most significant for enlargement and European integration more generally. Post-war western European social democrats and Christian democrats found common ground around a social capitalism that tempered the rampant individualism of Anglo-Saxon Western liberalism with communitarian or social values[[24]](#footnote-24). French elites responded to the definitive passing of Western leadership to *les Anglo-Saxons* by instead aiming for a Paris-led Western Europe. West Germans acquiesced to erase the stain of their Nazi past[[25]](#footnote-25).

Despite excluding the Anglo-Saxon West, this Western Europe however represents itself to an extent as the true inheritor of Western values, advancing them beyond American modernity to the post-modernism of the integration process. It claims to supersede the militarism, statism, nationalism and unrestrained capitalism of the American paragon of modernity, instead promoting Western liberal democratic values through a morally superior strategy of peaceful engagement and sovereignty sharing[[26]](#footnote-26). French anti-Americanism and the pacifism of Germany and the neutrals support scepticism about superpower adventurism. European integration is therefore an expressly civic project, legitimised by contrasting a peaceful, prosperous and secure present and future with the war-torn past[[27]](#footnote-27). This rejects the quasi-ethnic ancient kinship usually implied by civilisational identity. Latin republican parties and Protestant states thus blocked Catholic conservative demands for references to Christianity in Europe’s Constitution.

A rather unenlightened exclusion of the east is nevertheless a key defining feature of Western Europe. Its specific identity built on decades of the familiar, rigid Cold-War division and undifferentiated images of an unfamiliar, bleak, brutish post-communist east. Post-sovereigntist values therefore merged with cultural elitism in a *mission civilatrice[[28]](#footnote-28)*. Centuries of Western European scepticism about Central Europe’s European credentials[[29]](#footnote-29) echoed the stereotypical contrast between boorish, backwardly nationalistic Americans and cosmopolitan, cultured Europeans[[30]](#footnote-30). The opening of Western Europe’s eastern border and the prospect of easterners acceding to the key Western European institution, the EU, has therefore produced intense ambivalence towards Central Europe. Several writers worry that the novel and reflexive identity project of Europeanism, which is geographically vague and opposes peaceful future-oriented norms to Europe’s bellicose past, may be in crisis, as civilisational discourse is exploited to permanently fix EU identity in opposition to spatial others[[31]](#footnote-31). While Peo Hansen sees civilizational narratives as an elite attempt to bolster the thin and elitist neoliberal conception of European citizenship that has prevailed since the 1980s, Thomas Diez notes that the 1999 Kosovo conflict stimulated narratives of an atavistic, warlike east. In 2003, Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida characterised public protests throughout Western Europe against the Bush government’s invasion of Iraq as ‘the birth of a European public sphere’. However Holly Case stresses that these left-wing intellectuals narrowed Europe to a Western ‘Core’, built around the traditionally central geopolitical narrative of the integration movement, Franco-German reconciliation (2009: 112 & 116).

Western Europeans feared the EU’s new members would flood labour markets (with Polish plumbers), challenge the social model by offering cheaper competition within the single market and dilute French influence within the expanded EU. Worse still, Central Europeans specifically demanded ‘Euro-Atlantic’ rather than just European integration and have been conspicuously more positive than Western Europeans about American geopolitical adventures[[32]](#footnote-32). Rumsfeld rubbed salt in this wound by gleefully welcoming ‘New’ Eastern Europe into the American-led West, which would thus surround Old Europe geographically. As Diez notes[[33]](#footnote-33), Rumsfeld’s quip also relegates Western Europe from the locomotive to the caboose of historical progress.

**Bibliography**

* Andrews, D. M. (2012). The rise and fall of EU studies in the USA. *Journal of European Public Policy, 19*(5), 755-775.
* Bache, Ian, 2006, "The Europeanization of Higher Education: Markets, Politics or Learning?" JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 44(2): 231-248.
* Bailer, Stefanie, Robin Hertz, and Dirk Leuffen. "Oligarchization, formalization, adaptation? Linking sociological theory and EU enlargement research." *Journal of European Public Policy* 16.1 (2009): 162-174.
* Bassin, Mark, 2007, ‘Civilisations and their Discontents: Political Geography and Geopolitics in the Huntington Thesis’, *Geopolitics*, 12(3): 351-374.
* Bassin, Mark & Konstantin E. Aksenov, 2006, ‘Mackinder and the Heartland Theory in Post-Soviet Geopolitical Discourse’, *Geopolitics*, 11(1): 99-118.
* Belot, Céline, and Claire Brachet. "Note de synthèse." Politique européenne 3 (2004): 149-163.
* Bindi, Federiga, and Kjell A. Eliassen. 2012, ‘The Development of Europen Integratio Studies in Political science: An Introduction’, in Federiga Bindi and Kjell A. Eliassen, Analyzing European Union Politics, Bologna: Il Mulino: 13-22.
* Börzel, Tanja & Torben Heinze, 2012, ‘German EU Studies *Oder* EU Studies in Germany?’, in Federiga Bindi and Kjell A. Eliassen, Analyzing European Union Politics, Bologna: Il Mulino: 219-69.
* Burke, Peter, ‘Did Europe exist before 1700?’, History of EuropeanIdeas, 1:1 (1980), [pages]
* Case, Holly, 2009, "Being European: East and West." In Checkel, Jeffrey T., and Peter J. Katzenstein, eds. *European identity*. Cambridge University Press: 111-31.
* Costa, O. (2012). The State of EU Studies in France. In K. Eliassen & F. Bindi (Eds.), *Analyzing European Union Politics* (pp. 195-218). Bologna: Il Mulino.
* Delanty, Gerard. *Inventing Europe: idea, identity, reality*. Palgrave Macmillan, 1995.
* Diez, Thomas, 2004, ‘Europe’s others and the return of geopolitics’, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 17(2): 319-335.
* Falkner, Gerda, & Oliver Treib. "Three Worlds of Compliance or Four? The EU‐15 Compared to New Member States." *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 46.2 (2008): 293-313.
* Fierke, Karin M. & Antje Wiener, 2005, "Constructing institutional interests: EU and NATO enlargement." In Frank Schimmelfennig & Ulrich Sedelmeier (eds.) *The politics of European Union enlargement: theoretical approaches*. Abingdon: Routledge: 99-119.
* Friis, Lykke, & Anna Murphy, 1999, "The European Union and central and eastern Europe: Governance and boundaries." *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 37(2): 211-232.
* Fuchs, Dieter & Hans-Dieter Klingemann, 2002, "Eastward enlargement of the European Union and the identity of Europe." In Peter Mair & Jan Zielonka, eds. *The enlarged European Union: diversity and adaptation*. London: Frank Cass: 19-54.
* Gehler, Michael, 2006, "From Paneurope to the Single Currency: Recent Studies on the History of European Integration." *Contemporary European History* 15.02: 273-289.
* Georgakakis, Didier, and Andy Smith. "Enseigner l'Europe." Politique européenne 3 (2004): 5-19.
* Gilbert, Mark. "Narrating the Process: Questioning the Progressive Story of European Integration\*." *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 46.3 (2008): 641-662.
* Grabbe, Heather, 2003, ‘Europeanization goes east: power and uncertainty in the EU accession process’, "The politics of Europeanization", ceses.cuni.cz, http://scholar.google.com/scholar?cites=15335580215613782876&as\_sdt=2005&sciodt=0,5&hl=en&num=20",551,2015-02-14,"PDF
* Grabbe, Heather & Kirsty Hughes, 1998, *Enlarging the EU Eastward*. London: Pinter.
* Grabbe, Heather & Ulrich Sedelmeier, 2010, ‘The future shape of the European Union’, Michelle Egan, Neill Nugent & William E Paterson (Eds.), *Research Agendas in EU Studies: Stalking the Elephant. Houndmills, Basingstoke:* Palgrave Macmillan: 375-97.
* Huntington, Samuel, 1998, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, (London: Touchstone).
* Irondelle, Bastien. "French political science and European integration: The state of the art." French Politics 4.2 (2006): 188-208.
* Jensen, M. D., & Kristensen, P. M. (2013). The elephant in the room: mapping the latent communication pattern in European Union studies. *Journal of European Public Policy, 20*(1), 1-20.
* Judt, Tony, ‘Ex Oriente Lux? Post-Celebratory Speculations’, in Colin Crouch and David Marquand (eds), Towards greater Europe?: a continent without an iron curtain, (Oxford (UK) & Cambridge (MA), Blackwell, 1994): 91-104.
* Judt, Tony, 1997, *A grand illusion?: an essay on Europe*. New York: NYU Press.
* Jupille, J. (2006). Knowing Europe: metatheory and methodology in European Union studies, *European Union Studies. Basingstoke: Palgrave*, 209-232.
* Kaiser 2006: 193;
* Keeler, J. T. (2005). Mapping EU Studies: The Evolution from Boutique to Boom Field 1960–2001. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 43*(3), 551-582.
* Kramer, Heinz. "The European Community's Response to the ‘New Eastern Europe’." *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 31.2 (1993): 213-244.
* Laitin, David D., 2002, “Cultural and National Identity: “The East” and European Integration”, In Peter Mair & Jan Zielonka, eds. *The enlarged European Union: diversity and adaptation*. London: Frank Cass: 55-80.
* Larat, Fabrice. "L'Europe à la recherche d'une figure tutélaire." *Politique européenne* 18(1) (2006): 49-67.
* Lavenex, Sandra, 2004, "EU external governance in 'wider Europe'", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 11(4): 680-700.
* Mackinder, Halford John. "The geographical pivot of history." London: Royal Geographical Society, 1904
* McMahon, Richard, forthcoming, ‘The Races of Europe’, Houndsmills: Palgrave.
* Milward, A. S. (1975). The European Studies Movement: What'S In A Name? *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 14*(1), 69-80.
* Moisio, Sami. "Finlandisation versus westernisation: Political recognition and Finland's European Union membership debate." *National Identities* 10.1 (2008): 77-93.
* Morata, F., & Ollora, A. (2012). European Studies in Spain. In K. Eliassen & F. Bindi (Eds.), *Analyzing European Union Politics* (pp. 485-504). Bologna: Il Mulino.
* Moravcsik, Andrew & Vachudova, Milada,"National interests, state power, and EU enlargement", 2002, Perspectives, [pages & vol, iss]
* Moravcsik, Andrew & Vachudova, Milada, 2005, ‘Preferences, power and equilibrium: the causes and consequences of EU enlargement’, in Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Ulrich Sedelmeier, eds. *The politics of European Union enlargement: theoretical approaches*. Routledge, 2005: 198-212.
* Neumann, Iver B. *Uses of the other:" the East" in European identity formation*. U of Minnesota Press, 1999.
* Orluc, Katiana, 2000, ‘Decline or Renaissance: The Transformation of European Consciousness after The First World War’, in Bo Stråth (ed.), ***Europe and the other and Europe as the other*,** (Brussels : P.I.E.-P. Lang) [pages]
* Pasic, Sujata Chakrabarti, 1996, ‘Culturing International Relations Theory: A Call for Extension’, in Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil (eds.), *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner): 85–104.
* Pogliano, Claudio, 2005, *L’ossessione della razza: Antropologia e genetica nel xx secolo*, (Pisa: Edizioni della Normale)
* Popa, Ioana, 2007, "La structuration internationale des études européennes: un espace scientifique dissymétrique." La nouvelle gouvernance européenne. Les usages politiques d'un concept.
* Reuber, Paul & Günther Wolkersdorfer, 2002, ‘The Transformation of Europe and the German Contribution - Critical Geopolitics and Geopolitical Representations’, *Geopolitics*, 7(3): 39-60.
* Risse, Thomas, 2010, *A community of Europeans? transnational identities and public spheres*, Ithica: Cornell University Press.
* Rosamond, Ben. "The political sciences of European integration: disciplinary history and EU studies." The SAGE Handbook of European Union Politics. London: Sage (2007): 7-30.
* Rose, Richard, and Christian Haerpfer. "Democracy and enlarging the European Union eastwards." *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 33.3 (1995): 427-450.
* Rupnik, J., *The Other Europe (Revised and Updated: August 1989)*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1989);
* Schimmelfennig, Frank, 2001, "The community trap: Liberal norms, rhetorical action, and the Eastern enlargement of the European Union", *International organization*, [pages & vol, iss]
* Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Hanno Scholtz. "Legacies and leverage: EU political conditionality and democracy promotion in historical perspective." *Europe-Asia Studies* 62.3 (2010): 443-460.
* Schimmelfennig, Frank & Sedelmeier, Ulrich, "Theorizing EU enlargement: research focus, hypotheses, and the state of research", 2002, Journal of European Public Policy, 9(4): 500-28.
* Schimmelfennig, Frank & Sedelmeier, Ulrich, 2004, "Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe", Journal of European Public Policy, [pages & vol, iss]
* Sedelmeier, Ulrich. "Accommodation beyond self-interest: identity, policy paradigms, and the limits of a rationalist approach to EU policy towards central Europe." *Politique européenne* 2 (2001): 13-34.
* Sjursen, Helene, ‘Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU’s Enlargement Policy’, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40:3 (2002), 491-513.
* Sjursen, Helene. "Introduction: Enlargement and the nature of the EU polity."In Helene Sjursen *(Ed.): Questioning EU Enlargement: Europe in search of identity. London: Routledge* (2006): 1-15.
* Smith, Anthony D. "National identity and the idea of European unity."*International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* (1992): 55-76.
* Smith, Andy, 2000, ‘French political science and European integration’, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 7(4): 663-669.
* Smith, Anthony D., 1992, ‘National Identity and the Idea of European Unity ‘, International Affairs, 68(1): 55-76.
* Smith, M. L. (2003). Creating a New Space: UK European Studies Programmes at the Crossroads. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 11*(1), 21-34.
* Oswald Spengler, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes: Umrisse einer Morphologie der Weltgeschichte*, (München, DTV, 1979 [1923]).
* Stawarska, Renata. "EU enlargement from the Polish perspective." *Journal of European Public Policy* 6.5 (1999): 822-838.
* Szúcs, Jenó, 1985, *Les trois Europes,* Paris: L'Harmattan.
* Therborn, Göran. *European modernity and beyond: the trajectory of European societies, 1945-2000*. [where] Sage, 1995.
* Todorova, Maria, *Imagining the Balkans*, (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
* Tsygankov Andrei & Pavel Tsygankov, ‘Pluralism or Isolation of Civilisations? Russia's Foreign Policy Discourse and the Reception of Huntington's Paradigm of the Post-Cold War World’, *Geopolitics*, 4:3 (1999): 47-72.
* Varsori 2010: 7 [details]
* Wallace, Helen, 2000, Studying contemporary Europe. *The British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 2*(1), 95-113.
* Wallace, Helen, 2005, ‘Enlarging the European Union: reflecting on the challenge of analysis’, in Schimmelfennig, Frank & Ulrich Sedelmeier, eds. *The politics of European Union enlargement: theoretical approaches*. Abingdon: Routledge: 287-94.
* William Wallace, 1992, “From Twelve to Twenty-Four? The Challenges to the EC Posed by the Revolutions in Eastern Europe”, in Colin Crouch & David Marquand (eds), Towards Greater Europe? A Continent without an Iron Curtain, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers: 34-51.
* Wessels, Wolfgang. "Erweiterung, Vertiefung, Verkleinerung. Vitale Fragen für die Europäische Union." *Europa-Archiv* 48.8 (1993): 308-316.
* Wessels, Wolfgang (2006). Cleavages, controversies and convergence in European Union Studies. *Palgrave Advances in European Union Studies, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan*, 233-246.
* Wolff, Larry. *Inventing Eastern Europe: The map of civilization on the mind of the enlightenment*, Stanford (CA): Stanford University Press, 1994.
* Woodward, Kathryn, ‘Concepts of identity and difference’, in Kathryn Woodward (ed.), *Identity and Difference*, (Milton Keynes: The Open University, 1997) [pages].
* Zielonka, Jan. "How new enlarged borders will reshape the European Union."*JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 39.3 (2001): 507-536.
* Zielonka, Jan & Peter Mair, 2002, "Introduction: diversity and adaptation in the enlarged European Union." In Peter Mair & Jan Zielonka, eds. *The enlarged European Union: diversity and adaptation*. London: Frank Cass: 1-18.
1. Oswald Spengler, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes: Umrisse einer Morphologie der Weltgeschichte*, (München, DTV, 1979 [1923]). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Stephen K. Sanderson, ‘Civilisational Approached to World-Historical Change’, in Stephen K. Sanderson (ed.), *Civilisations and World Systems: Studying World-Historical Change*, Walnut Creek, (London & New Delhi: Alta Mira Press, 1995), p. 15. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. He stressed state interest and power and his civilisations strongly resembled competing Cold-War blocs, though defined by cultural difference rather than ideology (Bassin, ‘Civilisations ‘, pp. 356-57). On Islam, Huntington, ‘Clash’, pp. 209-18. On Russia, Andrei Tsygankov and Pavel Tsygankov, ‘Pluralism or Isolation of Civilisations? Russia's Foreign Policy Discourse and the Reception of Huntington's Paradigm of the Post-Cold War World’, *Geopolitics*, 4:3 (1999), p. 48. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Helene Sjursen, ‘Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU’s Enlargement Policy’, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40:3 (2002), pp. 502-4. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. J. Rupnik, *The Other Europe (Revised and Updated: August 1989)*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1989), p. 20; Tony Judt, ‘Ex Oriente Lux? Post-Celebratory Speculations’, in Colin Crouch and David Marquand (eds), Towards greater Europe?: a continent without an iron curtain, (Oxford (UK) & Cambridge (MA), Blackwell, 1992), p. 92; Moisio, ‘Finlandisation versus Westernisation’, p. 81. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Kathryn Woodward, ‘Concepts of identity and difference’, in Kathryn Woodward (ed.), *Identity and Difference*, (Milton Keynes: The Open University, 1997), p. 10; Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 140-60. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. As the only serious external geopolitical threat to Western Christendom between the Middle Ages and Cold War, the Ottoman Turkish advance made Westerners more conscious of their collective identity. See Peter Burke, ‘Did Europe exist before 1700?’, History of EuropeanIdeas, 1:1 (1980), p. 23; Delanty, ‘Inventing Europe’, pp. 37 & 67. Moslems, with a powerful competing ideology, were the only invaders in this period that Western Christendom could not convert and absorb. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Diez, ‘Europe’s Revenge’, p. 329. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Despite his professional title as professor of European Studies at Oxford. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Andrew Moravcsik remains a prominent rationalist dissenter from this view (Moravcsik & Vachudova 2005: 198). [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Russian intellectuals have themselves often been highly ambivalent about their European identity. Civilisational interpretations of Europe frequently stimulated isolationist conservative counterparts in Russia (Reuber and Wolkersdorfer, ‘Transformation of Europe’, p. 49). Post-1917 conservativeRussian exiles for example rejected European civilisational identity in favour of ‘Eurasianism’ (Bassin and Aksenov, ‘Mackinder’, p. 113). [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Doubts over CEE’s Europeanness also have a long pedigree in the West. Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment*, (Stanford (CA): Stanford University Press, 1994), pp. 10-11. The geopolitician Halford Mackinder asserted in 1904 that Russian land-power and Western sea-power ‘continue the ancient opposition between Roman and Greek’ (‘Pivot’, p. 40). Spengler disliked the term Europe precisely because it included Russia (‘Untergang’, p. 22). The taxonomy of continents quite recently reclassified Russia as European. Ancient Greek geographers included most of present day Russia in Asia, but the eighteenth-century Russian government moved Europe’s frontier to the Urals, and this was generally accepted by the 1830s. See Norman Davies, Europe: A History, (London: Pimlico, 1997), p. 8. Narratives of Russian culture and race alternated between the brute backward autocracy of semi-Mongoloid Asiatic peasants and a minor theme as the land of the future. In race science these referenced European fears of a ‘Yellow peril’ (Kenan Malik, *The Meaning of Race: Race, History and Culture in Western Society*, (Houndmills & London: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 116-18; Pogliano, ‘L’ossessione della razza’, p. 111). [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Huntington, ‘Clash’, p. 158. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Pasic, ‘Culturing’, p. 102; Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, Vol I*, (Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: University of California Press, 1995), p. 313; Perry Anderson, *Les passages de l’antiquité au féodalisme*, (Paris: François Maspero, 1977), p. 137. The interwar Belgian historian Henri Pirenne influentially traced this distinct European civilisation to the recovery of Western European cities after eighth-century Islamic conquests around the Mediterranean caused a critical rupture with the surviving Roman order of Mediterranean civilisation. Henri Pirenne, *Medieval cities: their origins and the revival of trade*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 213-34; Henri Pirenne, *Mohammed and Charlemagne*, (Mineola (N.Y.): Dover, 2001), pp. 284-86. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Anthony D. Smith, ‘National Identity and the Idea of European Unity ‘, International Affairs, 68:1 (1992), p. 74. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Göran Therborn, *European modernity and beyond: the trajectory of European societies, 1945-2000*, (London: SAGE, 1995), p. 188; Delanty, ‘Inventing Europe’, p. 39. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. The Council of Europe’s flag, which the EU adopted in 1985, incited a similar controversy when originally devised in the 1950s. Moslem Turkey vetoed an initial plan for a flag with a cross, like that of Coudenove-Kalergi’s interwar Pan-European Union, but some believe the current flag smuggles in more obscure Catholic symbols. The blue colour and halo of twelve stars appear in Marian iconography. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Katiana Orluc, ‘Decline or Renaissance: The Transformation of European Consciousness after The First World War’, in Bo Stråth (ed.), ***Europe and the other and Europe as the other*,** (Brussels : P.I.E.-P. Lang, 2000), p. 130. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Jan Zielonka, *Explaining Euro-Paralysis. Why Europe is Unable to Act in International Politics*, (London: Macmillan, 1998), p. 66; Smith, ‘National Identity’, p. 74. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Gilbert Weiss, ‘A.E.I.O.U. – Austria Europae Imago, Onus, Unio?’, in Mikael af Malmborg and Bo Stråth (eds.), *The Meaning of Europe*, (Oxford & New York: Berg, 2002), pp. 266-77; Delanty, ‘Inventing Europe’, p. 102. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. In 1815 for example, the three eastern powers organised the Holy Alliance to maintain peace by suppressing liberal or nationalist uprisings. Liberal public opinion influenced Britain and France to oppose this agenda. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Orluc, ‘European Consciousness’, p. 125. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Diez, ‘Europe’s Revenge’, pp. 329-30. De Gaulle’s call for a common European home from Brest to Vladivostok excluded the Anglo-Saxon West for example. Coudenhove-Kalelrgi left out both of these, including Britain, as the map from *Pan-Europa*, his 1923 manifesto, makes clear. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Diez, ‘Europe’s Revenge’, p. 330. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. M. Marcussen, T. Risse, D. Engelmann-Martin, H. J. Knopf and K. Roscher, ‘Constructing Europe? The evolution of French, British and German nation state identities’, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 6:4 (1999), pp. 621-22. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Diez, ‘Europe’s Revenge’, pp. 330-31. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Therborn ‘European modernity’, p. 244. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Marcussen et al., ‘Constructing Europe?’, p. 621. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Wolff, ‘Inventing’, pp. 9-10. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Diez, ‘Europe’s Revenge’, pp. 330-31. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Peo Hansen, ‘European citizenship', or where neoliberalism meets ethnoculturalism: Analysing the European Union's citizenship discourse’, *European Societies*, 2:2 (2000); Diez, ‘Europe’s Revenge’, pp. 326-33. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Jan Zielonka, Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged European Union, (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 142. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Diez, ‘Europe’s others’, p. 328. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)