Public Perceptions of the European Power Hierarchy and Support for a Common Foreign and Security Policy

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Abstract

Prior research on citizen support for European integration has primarily focused on individuals’ evaluations of the process of integration or its institutions, with emphasis on the importance of direct benefits and costs integration can confer. Explanations focus on overall support for integration and little work has been done on explaining public opinion on specific policy areas, such as the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This paper will fill this gap in the research by synthesizing systems theory with social identity theory to produce a core claim that the probability of supporting the CFSP increases with greater levels of political trust in the European Union member-states, most notably France and Germany. This variable is critical since integration’s development is influenced strongly by, and dependent on, the resources of the relatively more powerful European member-states. The results hold even when controlling for other factors. Binary logistic regression analysis using pooled repeated cross-sectional data from the Eurobarometer surveys conducted in 1992 through 1997 among individuals of 11 member-states largely support these claims.

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Introduction: Political community, European integration, and a Common Foreign and Security Policy

The crises in the Ukraine and the Levant, and their impact on the EU, once again raise the issue of formulating a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The idea behind the CFSP is to secure the gains of regional integration from external threats with the goal of having a single European voice on external affairs. It was introduced as one of three pillars of European integration in the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) and then later given a greater institutional framework in the Amsterdam Treaty. The Treaty of Lisbon created the office of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and an intergovernmental approach of the CFSP among the member-states. Given the critical role many EU citizens have in the future of European integration through referenda, it is important to explain their level of support for a CFSP.

The CFSP is part of the overall plan to develop a political community among EU member states. A political community refers to the cohesion that emphasizes individuals being drawn together for the purpose of operating in a common structure. (Haas 1958; Easton 1965; Etzioni 1965). With greater political cohesion we would see greater support for European integration policies such as the CFSP. In the case of the EU, decision-making is primarily in the hands of the member-countries (Moravcsik 1991 & 1993). They, through Intergovernmental Conferences and the European Council, determine the amount of sovereignty given to EU institutions as well as the direction of integration.

However, not all member-states have equal weight in these decisions and an examination of the European power hierarchy is important when explaining integration (Efird and Genna 2002). The European power hierarchy refers to the pattern of power distribution among the
member-states and how decision-making will generally focus on the preferences of the more powerful (i.e., larger and wealthier) member-states. Therefore, when attempting to explain why individuals would support a CFSP, we need to consider how they perceive the motivations of the more powerful member-states. The central argument that we put forward in this paper is that individuals’ support for the CFSP depends on the level of trust given to the more powerful member-states, namely Germany.

The remainder of this paper has four sections. First, we discuss the existing literature on support for European integration. Second, we present the theory of this paper in greater detail and formulate testable hypotheses. Third, we describe the data that we use in order to test our theoretical claims. Fourth, we discuss the results of our statistical analysis. The final section concludes with some practical implications of our findings.

**Self-interest, trust, and cooperation**

Addressing the question of why individuals would support the potential CFSP requires an assessment of work on overall support for European integration. Easton’s (1965; 1975) theoretical work views public support as being either specific (also known as utilitarian support) or affective. This section differentiates the motivations of both types and concludes that given differing motivations, variables that explain one type of support may not be as powerful in explaining the other type. Specifically, motivations for utilitarian support are primarily self-interest in nature while affective support stems from a common interest motivation. Utilitarian support results from an exchange where outputs (which can be economic or non-economic gains for the individual) are provided by the state in order to maintain the system through citizen support (Easton 1965: 157). Utilitarian support is especially popular among researchers in the
context of European integration. They build upon the conceptualization of self-interest, which has long been the cornerstone of understanding political decisions (Olson 1965).

Researchers point to the fact that motivations for utilitarian support arise from evaluations of the EU providing rewards that minimize any negative effects, including the changing role of the EU as integration evolves (Anderson and Reichert 1996). Feld and Wildgen’s (1976) work shows a tie between support levels in the four core countries of the European Economic Community (EEC) to that of welfare increases in the early years of integration. The attempt at explaining support continued with Handley (1981) who descriptively notes that the economic downturns of the 1970s dramatically lowered support levels for the EEC. Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) refined the testing of this argument by looking at the various levels of influence on support levels with similar results. Others have also built upon this method of analysis with similar results (Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996; Duch and Taylor 1997). Moreover, others have taken a more direct approach by examining an individual’s socio-economic position and predict the probability of their support given an individual’s position in the economy and the theoretical outcomes of the effects of market integration (Anderson 1991; Gabel and Palmer 1995; Anderson and Reichert 1996; Gabel and Whitten 1997; Gabel 1998).

Self-interested motivations are not necessary economic. The founders of European integration were driven by the memories of catastrophic wars and hoped that regional integration would be a vehicle for a permanent peace (Deutsch et al 1957; Haas 1958; Etzioni 1965; Mitrany 1966). Europeans supported integration, in its early years, in part for its promise to prevent war (Hewstone 1986). However, with the passing memory of war and the end of the Cold War, physical security is not as strong a factor in supporting integration as it once was (Gabel 1998).
Other benefits include a more effective form of governance that is lacking at the national level due to underdeveloped welfare benefits and high levels of corruption (Sánchez-Cuenca 2000).

These studies provide insights into utilitarian support levels, but answer only a narrow range of questions and provide, at best, short-term explanations. Business cycles and other factors that lead to self-interest motivations help to explain utilitarian support, but may not be able to explain the support that will produce stability in the system in the long term. These models assume that individuals make no other calculations and beg the question if this alone is enough to explain support. While significant in their contribution, it tells us only part of the story behind citizen support. The other half of the story begins by understanding affective support.

Affective support is a “a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effect of which they see as damaging to their wants” (Easton 1965: 273; 1975: 444). It is therefore “an attachment to a political object for its own sake, it constitutes a store of political good will. As such, it taps deep political sentiments and is not easily depleted through disappointment with outputs” (1965: 274). What “an attachment” refers to in this context is not quite clear. Easton does mention that it is associated to a “sense of community” (1965: 325) but this concept also lacks specificity by leaving its definition as “the degree of solidarity” (1965: 184). Affective support enters the picture when the political system has a “communal ideology” that promotes a common interest (Easton 1965: 333).

Explanations for supporting integration by understanding the role of common interests are not new. One of the more cited sets of work in this area is the postmaterialist argument. Inglehart (1971; 1977a; 1977b) claims that Europeans were socialized in an environment of high rates of economic growth. As a result, individuals in the post-war era developed a different set of values
(different from prior generations) that are amiable toward the prospects of regional integration. These individuals personally identify with supranational institutions and thereby give the process their support. However, Janssen (1991) and Gabel (1998) dispute this claim. Their research finds little evidence for the relationship between postmaterialism and support for integration. In fact, the little evidence that does exist indicates that postmaterialists are less likely to support integration. However, the problem here is not in the value of the postmaterialist explanation, but what it was trying to explain. Researchers used the postmaterialist variable in order to explain utilitarian support. However, the postmaterialist argument is not suited for such an explanation. Postmaterialism cannot tell us how postmaterialists or materialists reach their opinions (Rochon 1998). In fact, it may be possible for both value extremes to favor regional integration policy but for different reasons. It is easy to see that materialists would be in favor if they believe that regional integration will provide material and physical security. One can assume that postmaterialists would be in favor if they believe that it is a means to solve trans-national problems (e.g. clean air, water, etc.). Explaining support for an EU policy would benefit from a model that taps into the notion of common interests; in other words a model that conceptualizes individuals’ evaluations of the political community under development within the EU. This is the purpose of the following section.

A power hierarchy trust model for supporting the CFSP

Research that looks at common interest motivations for individual support for integration has mainly focused on the role of factors that would impede the formation of the political community. They echo the claim by Dahl (1989) that an attachment allows for easier rule because it adds legitimacy to the governors by the governed. McLaren (2002) demonstrates that hostility towards other cultures determines attitudes towards the European Union. Likewise, a
strong national attachment lowers the probability that an individual will support regional integration (Carey 2002). In addition, Van Kersbergen (2000) explains support for the EU by examining the role integration has in forming primary national allegiances. His claim is that these attitudes pose a problem in developing a European identity and thereby lowers the chances of supporting the EU. In this paper, we shift attention away from individuals’ direct evaluations of the EU and towards the evaluations of member-states. We emphasize that common interest and self-interest are not mutually exclusive. By being part of a political community, an individual recognizes that one’s self-interest and the common interest are interdependent.

Support for integration requires that individuals think of the project as a group effort and one based on long-term gains. The literature associated with social identity theory helps us understand why this is the case. Piaget (1965) stated that building attachments to groups is part of normal human behavior. These attachments promote cohesion among group members that are associated with the social-psychological phenomena of in-group bias and subjective images. One reason why an individual becomes a group member (the in-group) is due to an affective attachment (Terhune 1964; Winter 1973; Stogdill 1974; McClelland 1975; Bass 1981). An individual forms an emotional attachment because the group fulfills some symbolic value. At the level of national identity, individuals attach themselves because they see the nation as the embodiment of what is important (DeLamater et al. 1969). In the same vein, individuals will cooperate with individuals who are members of an out-group if the out-group’s members share some commonality with in-group members (Brewer 1968).

Cooperation among similar groups is fueled by their trust of each other. One often cited definition of trust is the perceived “probability of getting preferred outcomes without the group doing anything to bring them about” (Gamson 1968: 54). That is, group members will not need
to monitor each other because there is confidence that interests are aligned. Putnam (1993) shows that the level of trust one has for others produces efficient institutional performance because of the higher probability of obtaining cooperation. It lowers the costs of association because of the perception that individuals will not cheat or defect. In paraphrasing Wintrobe (1995: 46), trust thus yields a stream of future returns on exchanges that would not otherwise take place because trust makes behavior predictable and stable. Therefore, groups may overlap to a certain extent to function not only as separate units but also, as an integrated unit when perceived similarities are present. When similarities are not present, overlapping memberships do not occur and group status becomes exclusive. The importance of similarities in building cohesion lies in understanding in-group biases.

In-group bias is a social condition in which individuals tend to favor members of their in-group versus others who are not members (the out-group members). The cause of this bias, as put forth by Tajfel (1981; 1982), is due to positive evaluations individuals have for members of their group. They join and are identified by such groups because, as stated above, the group symbolizes a set of values. By associating with similar-valued individuals, self-esteem improves because values are reinforced. This self-esteem further improves when individuals make favorable comparisons between the in-group and out-group. Not only are they part of a subjectively valued group, the in-group is also subjectively judged as better than the other out-groups. Therefore, by tying an individual’s social identity to the importance of the in-group, group maintenance or cooperation for group survival becomes important. To this end, individuals will tend to give favorable biases to fellow group members.

Since cohesiveness is a function of in-group evaluations associated with identity, it is important to revisit the possible phenomenon of overlapping in-groups. This is important in the
context of Europe because the formation of a supranational identity is not theorized to replace national identities but to coexist with them (Deutsch et al. 1957). This is where the concept of image becomes important. Kelman states that image

…refers to the organized representation of an object in an individual’s cognitive system. The core of an image is the perceived character of the object to which it refers – the individual’s conception of what this object is like. Image is an inferred construct, however, rather than a mere designation of the way the object is phenomenally experienced. (1965: 24)

Scott, more succinctly, defines “…an image of a nation (or of any other object) constitutes the totality of attributes that a person recognizes (or imagines) when he contemplates that nation” (1965: 72). In addition such an image is the “property of the individual who beholds the object” (Kelman 1965: 27) meaning that the image is not objective and may therefore be dependent on various factors. Individuals can therefore use images of other groups to formulate likes and dislikes for and positive or negative stereotypes of out-groups (Druckman et al. 1974; Hewstone 1986; Druckman 1994). Image therefore implies greater cooperation as members of in-groups view the values of out-group members as similar and therefore compatible. Groups can, by this mechanism, tie themselves together. Recall that individuals tend to form groups, in part, because of emotional importance to the group’s symbolic values. If a subset of such values is present in other groups, then cooperation will form without necessarily dissolving in-group affiliations.

In the context of European integration, an individual may support EU actions when s/he has a positive image of other member-states. This perception may result from evaluations of similar preferences on a number of issues leading individuals to view member-states as more in line with their in-group (their country). However, each member-state does not have an equal weight in the decision-making process. Like in many other regions, relative wealth, population, and capabilities (among others) determine which country’s preferences will be enacted within the EU and which
ones will be held in check. Specifically, the more powerful (the largest and wealthiest) countries will tend to have their wishes debated and implemented (Moravcsik 1991 & 1993). Since the EU project is one of voluntary cooperation, countries can and do opt-out of further integration if their preferences are not in line with the more powerful members. The propensity to integrate comes under certain structural conditions: a regional system must include both a set of asymmetrical power relationships and an associated satisfaction with how to develop integration (Efird and Genna 2002). The regional leader of the hierarchy strongly influences the institutional construction jointly through its preferences and its ability to foster stability (Krasner 1976; Keohane and Nye 1977).

Keeping in mind the relevance of the power hierarchy’s influence on integration, individuals’ images of EU member-states should influence the amount of trust they will have in them. Geva and Hanson (1999) have shown in experimental work that individuals’ reactions to events by countries do modify how they think of them. Given the nature of a CFSP, the committed role of the more powerful countries in Europeans’ perceptions would need to be credible. Defection from an established CFSP by smaller member-states would be quantitatively and qualitatively different than a defection by Germany. Therefore, trust in more powerful member-states should have a greater influence in predicting the probability of an individual supporting the CFSP than trust in small and economically weak EU members. Being generally aware of the European power hierarchy, citizen attitudes towards Europe’s defense and foreign policies should be shaped by their diffuse feelings towards those actors that have the greatest influence on the overall course within these policy areas. Faith in the EU’s small but wealthy members (i.e. Denmark and the Benelux countries), should take a middle ground: while these countries are not as powerful and influential as Germany, France and the United Kingdom, their relative wealth allows
them to exert a tangible impact on Europe’s defense and foreign policies. As a result, trust in this group of countries should explain a small but important amount of individual-level variation.

Data description and testing procedures

In order to test these claims, we rely on public opinion data from multiple Eurobarometer surveys (1992-1997). These surveys were selected because they all included the key independent variables, trust in member-states. Given data constraints, the analysis includes only samples from eleven members of the EU, which include the first twelve members except Luxemburg. Some of the samples were collapsed while others were not included: The Northern Ireland sample was collapsed into the British sample and the East German sample was omitted given its unique attributes.\(^1\) We used a weighted variable (the nation weight) so that no sub-national group will be over or under representation and results can be interpreted with attention to variations within country samples.\(^2\)

OLS regression techniques are not permissible because the dependent variables are dichotomous. Applying OLS techniques will produce inefficient coefficients that may lead to type one and two errors. The appropriate technique is to employ binary logit regression models (Long 1997). The evaluations of the coefficients will be based on their significance, direction of signs, and their contribution to predicting the probabilities of the dependent variables.

\(^1\) The East German sample may exhibit questionable results given its early phase of democratic transition and its recent membership at the time of the surveys, which may distort findings. One such fear is an inaccuracy of questionnaire responses due to the public’s long legacy of authoritarianism.

\(^2\) The nature of the hypotheses requires an individual level analysis. While some researchers believe that aggregation of individual level responses to opinion surveys remove random “noise” from the measurements (Page and Shapiro 1992; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995), recent research shows that the error associated with individual level variation may be systemic (Duch, Palmer, and Anderson 2000). Therefore aggregating the data would not remove any associated “noise,” but instead may harm the robustness of potential results due to a lower number of observations.
Dependent variables

The dependent variables are individual support for a common defense and common foreign policies. A question frequently asked in the Eurobarometer surveys is whether a type of policy would be best handled at the national level or the European level of decision-making:

Some people believe that certain areas of policy should be decided by the (NATIONAL) government, while other areas of policy should be decided jointly within the European Community. Which of the following areas of policy do you think should be decided by the (NATIONAL) government, and which should be decided jointly within the European Community.
1. Should be decided by the (NATIONAL) government
2. Should be decided jointly within the European Community [Union]

Security and defense and Foreign policy towards countries outside the European Community [Union] were two policy areas presented to respondents. Responses were recoded so “national level decision-making” has a value of zero and “EC/U level decision-making” has a value of one for each of the two variables.

Independent variables – power hierarchy trust

The main independent variables of this paper measure the respondents’ trust levels in other member-states. Specifically, we rely on the following survey question from the Eurobarometer:

Which, if any, European Community [Union] country or countries do you think can be more trusted politically than others?
0. Not mentioned 1. Mentioned

The respondents go through the list of member-states and indicate which members are more trustworthy than others, including their own. The data was recoded so that all responses

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3 While this question does not directly ask if the member-states can be trusted in the context of the EU or integration, the years in which they were asked (1992 – 1997) were years of the deepening of integration (implementation of the Single European Act and the Maastricht debate). The public discourse in these years would therefore reflect the saliency of the EU.

4 So as to include consistency for the 1992-1997 analysis, only trust in the first twelve members of the EU are included.
indicating trust in the respondent’s own country are considered missing because the independent variable is to measure trust in member-states other than the respondent’s own state.

[Place Table One Here]

This question was not posed to all national samples in all years. Table one indicates which countries’ populations were sampled by year. There is a larger frequency of respondents coming from France, Germany, Britain, Italy, and Spain. The Danes, Irish, Portuguese, Belgians, Dutch, and Greeks were polled only once either in 1994 or 1995. Only the Italians were polled consistently from 1992-1997. Since the Luxemburg respondents were not polled at all, this leaves a total of eleven national samples. This pattern of sampling is not statistical problem for two reasons. First, since the nation weight is employed in the analysis, the results explain within-country variances. Therefore no biases are introduced. Second, since country dummy variables are also employed (see the following section), the analysis will control for country effects.

[Place Figure One Here]

Figure one illustrates the distribution of trust in the four wealthier and large members of the EU by national sample. Almost all the national samples selected Germany as the most trusted among the four. The only exceptions were the Irish and Portuguese samples, which favored France. France was the second most trusted with the exceptions being the Dutch and Danish samples, which favored Britain as their second choice. Although not included in the figure, all other member-states received small percentages.

According to our theory, trust in the more powerful member states has a larger effect on individual-level support than trust in less wealthy countries. In order to capture this dynamic, we created three additive indices for trust in the wealthy and powerful member states (Germany, France, and the United Kingdom; hereafter “first tier”), trust in the wealthy but small member
states (Denmark, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg; hereafter “second tier”), and trust in the small and less prosperous countries (Ireland, Portugal, Greece, Spain, Italy; hereafter “third tier”). Specifically, we add up the number of member states within each country group that an individual trusts and divide this sum by the overall number of states per group. By dividing the additive term by the appropriate number, the range of the variable is restricted to between zero and one, thereby allowing comparability.

In order to estimate the reliability of these scales, we calculated alpha scores for each of these three indices. While the results for the second and third tier country indices are respectable (.71 and .72, respectively), the first tier alpha of .51 is unacceptable (DeVellis 1991). As a result, we keep the index for the second and third tier countries and rely on three separate variables to measure trust in Germany, France, and Britain.

Control variables

The analysis requires the use of control variables so that the results are understood in the light of some prevailing hypotheses. In the following analysis, we account for a standard set of covariates employed in the literature on public opinion and European integration.

Education. To measure this variable, we use a standard question found in all Eurobarometer surveys:  How old were you when you stopped full-time education? The responses are then collapsed into 9 groups: values from 1 to 8 begin with the age of 14 and end with the age of 21, with the value 9 assigned to those who finished after the age of 22. Individuals who are still studying are coded missing. This may introduce error into the measurement because the hypothesized link with the dependent variable is in regard to the amount of education and not when the individual finished formal schooling. Anyone who is still
studying may have already been in school for some time and have reached a hypothetical threshold of having had enough education to influence support for the CFSP. Unfortunately they will not be included because it is unknown where they are in their education.

**Age.** This information, measured in years, is included in the regular set of demographic variables found in the *Eurobarometer* surveys. The variable was recoded into five categories representing specific age cohorts. An alternative argument would be that memories of war would influence older Europeans to favor the CFSP, more so than younger Europeans. Prior research on support for integration demonstrated that this factor has diminished as the memory of the war fades (Gabel 1998). However, it may still prove important in the context of this analysis.

**Income.** Respondents were asked to choose from among four categories that approximates their annual household income in each survey. An alternative hypothesis is that respondents’ with higher incomes are more likely to support for a CFSP.

**Ideology.** Prior research demonstrates the negative association nationalism has on support for integration (McLaren 2002; Carey 2003). One method to measure this possible effect is through left-right self-evaluations. The respondents were asked to place themselves on a left-right continuum. The range is one to ten with ten being the most extreme rightist ideology. An alternative hypothesis is that the higher values of this variable will be negatively associated with supporting the CSFP.

**Country and year effects.** Country and year dummies are included in each of the models but the results are not reported due to space constraints. These dummy variables control for effects that are specific to either the countries in the analysis or the year of the surveys. In each regression the base country is Belgium and the base year is 1992.
Explaining support for the Common Foreign and Security Policy

In order to test our hypotheses about member-state trust and support for the common foreign and security policy, we introduced the variables described above in a series of six statistical models. This approach is necessary since trust in Germany, France, and Britain is measured with three separate variables. Introducing all of these covariates into the same regression model would lead to a significant drop in the number of observations. As mentioned earlier, trust in one’s own country is coded as “missing.” Therefore, simultaneously controlling for trust in Germany, France, and Britain would lead to an exclusion of survey responses from all of these countries which would likely introduce systematic bias into our statistical results.

[Place Tables Two and Three here]

In Models 1-3 we estimate the effect of trust in Germany (Model 1), France (Model 2), and Britain (Model 3) on the common defense and security policy while controlling for trust in second- and third tier countries.\(^5\) In Models 4-6, the dependent variable is support for the EU’s common foreign policy. The overall results of the analysis show that member-state trust is an important factor in explaining support for the CFSP. Specifically, trust in the most powerful member-state, Germany, improves the likelihood that the respondent would favor a common set of security and foreign policies.

Moving to a more detailed discussion of the results, Model 1 indicates that trust in Germany and the second tier member-states are statistically significant in predicting support for a common defense and security policy. However, the third tier index is not significant. These findings are in line with the main hypothesis of this paper: the further down the power hierarchy, the less significant in predicting support. The second column of results in table two shows the

\(^5\) The country and year dummy variables were included in the regression but not listed due to space constrains. Also, the postmaterialist, cognitive mobilization, and satisfaction with EU level democracy were also included in separate regressions with no effect on the key trust variables.
marginal changes in the predicted probabilities. Each value is the change in the probability associated with each independent variable as it moves from its minimum to its maximum value while holding the other variables constant at their median values. A respondent is about 10 percentage points more likely to support a common defense and security policy if s/he perceives Germany as being politically trustworthy than if s/he does not. The probability increases less, about 7 percentage points, if the respondent trusts all four second tier member-states instead of none. The larger value for the Germany-trust variable compared to the second tier variable indicates that individuals’ trust in Germany explains a larger amount of change in the likelihood that respondents will support a common defense and security policy.

Model two substitutes the Germany-trust variable with the France-trust variable. Of the three trust variables, only the France-trust and second tier trust variables are significant. However, this time the second tier trust variable explains a greater amount of change in the dependent variable. Trusting all four of the second tier member-states improves the probability of support by 8 percentage points. By contrast, the France-trust variable only improves the same probability by 4 percentage points.

Model three completes the analysis of support for the common defense and security variable. This time the Britain-trust variable is substituted. In this model, the Britain-trust and third tier trust variables are not significant, leaving only the second tier trust variable as predictors of support. When the average respondent trusts all four second tier member-states, the probability that s/he will support a common policy increases by 8.2 percentage points, which is similar to the probability established in model two.

In sum, trust in Germany explains the largest amount of change in the probability that the respondent will support a common defense and security policy. Also, recall that model one
includes national samples from the eleven member-states expect Germany. Therefore trust in the most powerful EU member-state, among the non-German national samples, explains the largest change in the likelihood of support. This stands in stark contrast with the results of the non-French national samples, which did not uncover a strong association between support and trusting France. The worst performer of the three top European powers was Britain: trusting Britain has no statistically significant association with support for a common defense policy and is therefore no different than the third tier member-states in this regard.

Table three presents the results of the binary logit regression with support for a common foreign policy as the dependent variable. The results are slightly different from the ones presented in Table two. While the Germany-trust variable still explains a larger change in the probability for support, trust in the second tier member-states loses its statistical value. Model four’s results show that only the Germany-trust variable has statistical significance: trust in Germany increases the probability to support a common foreign policy by about 4 percentage points. Model five indicates that trusting France increases this probability by 2.2 percentage points and trusting all four second tier member-states similarly increases the probability by 2 percentage points. However, both the variables in model five are weakly significant. Model six indicates that trust in Britain is very weakly significant and does not change the probability much, relatively speaking. In fact, the second tier trust variable has a larger marginal change, 0.033 vs. 0.014. As before, trust in Germany predicts the largest change in the probability for supporting a CFSP among individuals in the non-German national samples. It also has greater significance than the other trust variables.

Conclusion
The political cohesion model can be an aid in explaining the probabilities for supporting the CFSP. Trust in the member-states among individuals is significantly associated with higher probabilities of support. However, not all member-states have the same impact. Three distinct groupings exist with each grouping determined by country size and wealth. The smaller and less wealthy a country is, the less of an impact it has on influencing support for a CFSP. But when it comes to the top powers in Europe (Germany, France, and Britain) clear distinctions are made among the respondents. Trust in Germany has more importance among individuals than trusting the other larger and wealthier powers, namely France and Britain. Trust in France does give us some explanation for support, but values are not as large as those associated with Germany. Britain proves to be statistically not significant.

Two important issues must be considered with regard to these results. Neither of these issues would necessarily put into question the results found in this paper, but are important enough to consider. First, given that the earliest surveys used in this analysis are about twenty years old, we would need to obtain up-to-date data that indicates that the association between trust and support has not changed. However, there is nothing in the model’s logic that makes the arguments any less salient today. Year dummy variables were not significantly different from the base year, which indicates that there is a lack of temporal influence. However, more current data is an important way to determine if the findings of the 1990s hold today.

Second, the EU’s eastward expansion adds complexity to model. The security and foreign policies of countries such as Poland and the Baltic states are not in line with those of Germany. Decisions on troop deployments to Iraq, heated disagreements at EU Council meetings over the Iraqi war, and debates about the most appropriate foreign policy towards Russia are evidence of
If our results hold, less trust in Germany in the post-Cold War membership expansion may lead to less support for a CFSP.
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
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</table>
Table 2. Logit model: Support for EU defense and security policy on trust in member-states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trust variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Probabilities</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Probabilities</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Probabilities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Germany</td>
<td>.437***</td>
<td>.095</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.044)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(       )</td>
<td>(.050)</td>
<td>(       )</td>
<td>(       )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in France</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.162***</td>
<td>.037</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(       )</td>
<td></td>
<td>(       )</td>
<td>(       )</td>
<td>(       )</td>
<td>(       )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Britain</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-.025</td>
<td>-.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(       )</td>
<td></td>
<td>(       )</td>
<td>(       )</td>
<td>(.053)</td>
<td>(       )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in second tier</td>
<td>.304***</td>
<td>.067</td>
<td>.365***</td>
<td>.080</td>
<td>.402***</td>
<td>.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.082)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(       )</td>
<td>(.078)</td>
<td>(       )</td>
<td>(       )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in third tier</td>
<td>-.087</td>
<td>-.021</td>
<td>-.092</td>
<td>-.022</td>
<td>-.095</td>
<td>-.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.143)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(       )</td>
<td>(.136)</td>
<td>(       )</td>
<td>(       )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Control variables

| Age                     | .007    | .009          | .010    | .012          | .004    | .004          |
|                        | (.013)  | (           ) | (.013)  | (           ) | (.013)  | (           ) |
| Education              | .089*** | .162         | .088*** | .154         | .088*** | .150         |
|                        | (.008)  | (           ) | (.008)  | (           ) | (       )| (           ) |
| Income                 | .058**  | .041         | .081*** | .057         | .034*   | .023         |
|                        | (.019)  | (           ) | (.019)  | (           ) | (.018)  | (           ) |
| Left/Right self-placement | -.052*** | -.111       | -.045*** | -.093        | -.027***| -.054        |
|                            | (.010)  | (           ) | (.016)  | (           ) | (       )| (           ) |
| Constant                | .230    | .239          | .385    | .385         |
|                        | (.226)  | (           ) | (.226)  | (           ) | (       )| (           ) |

χ² (degrees of freedom) 1025.34*** (21) 1016.97*** (21) 802.58*** (21)
log likelihood -8905.95 -8995.30 -8847.17
N 13,811 13,938 13,584

Notes: Standard errors for coefficients are in parentheses. Estimates for country & year dummies omitted due to space constraints.

***p ≤ .000; ** p ≤ .010; * p ≤ .050
Table 3. Logit model: Support for EU common foreign policy on trust in member-states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 4 Probabilities</th>
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<th></th>
<th>Model 5 Probabilities</th>
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<th></th>
<th>Model 6 Probabilities</th>
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<td>Trust variables</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Germany</td>
<td>.333*** (.055)</td>
<td>.038</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in France</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.186** (.062)</td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Britain</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.115* (.066)</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in second tier</td>
<td>.118 (.096)</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>.196* (.092)</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>.297** (.094)</td>
<td>.033</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in third tier</td>
<td>-.152 (.164)</td>
<td>-.020</td>
<td>-.212</td>
<td>-.028</td>
<td>-.216</td>
<td>-.029</td>
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<tr>
<td>Control variables</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.049* (.015)</td>
<td>-.032</td>
<td>-.028</td>
<td>-.018</td>
<td>-.010</td>
<td>-.006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.028*** (.009)</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>.037*** (.009)</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>.047*** (.009)</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.077*** (.022)</td>
<td>.031</td>
<td>.098*** (.022)</td>
<td>.038</td>
<td>.107*** (.023)</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left/Right self-placement</td>
<td>-.026* (.011)</td>
<td>-.030</td>
<td>-.023</td>
<td>-.026</td>
<td>-.012</td>
<td>-.013</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.64*** (.293)</td>
<td>1.57*** (.290)</td>
<td>1.36***</td>
<td>(21)</td>
<td>(21)</td>
<td>(21)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2$ (degrees of freedom)</td>
<td>519.02***</td>
<td>509.08***</td>
<td>342.76***</td>
<td>(21)</td>
<td>(21)</td>
<td>(21)</td>
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<tr>
<td>log likelihood</td>
<td>-6957.65</td>
<td>-7032.91</td>
<td>-6477.84</td>
<td>13,242</td>
<td>13,376</td>
<td>13,066</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Standard errors for coefficients are in parentheses. Estimates for country & year dummies omitted due to space constraints.
***p ≤ .000; ** p ≤ .010; * p ≤ .050
Figure 1. Percentage of trust in European powers by country samples
References


