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**“Europe is our future”¹:
Measuring support for European integration
as a tridimensional temporal process**

**- Work in progress -
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On the 2nd of June 1992, a majority of Danish voters said “no” to the Maastricht Treaty. Asked about the same time what they thought of the EC, 56% of Danish people claimed that membership to the EC was a good thing, 61% approved European Unification and 67% acknowledged their country benefited from its membership. At the time of the “No vote” relative to the Nice referendum, the Irish were even more euro-enthusiast with 81% claiming their country membership was a good thing and 83% that it benefited from this membership. Seven years later, still a majority of French and Dutch people considered their country membership as a good thing and declared their country benefited from it when voting “no” for the Constitutional Treaty². Why such a discrepancy between referenda results and measurement of support? Could it be that the measures used since now more than forty years in European studies to grasp people’s support for European integration are deficient? In a European Union in search for legitimacy, being able to evaluate and understand citizens’ opinion appears crucial. Since the end of the 1960s – and particularly since the mid-1990s – opinions and attitudes towards European integration have been largely documented. We however claim in this paper that our usual measuring instruments fail short to answer a certain number of questions relative to citizens’ support for European integration due to their too static nature. European integration being a process without a clear end goal, some recent words emphasized the need to (re-)introduce temporal categories – temporal locations, sequence, speed, duration, etc. - to better understand EU policy and policies (Goetz et al.,

¹ “France is our homeland, Europe is our future”, sentence pronounced in different occasions by François Mitterrand during his campaign in favor of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty.

² Source: Eurobarometer datas (EB 37 - April 1992, EB 55 - May 2001, EB 63 - June 2005). 53% of the French/ 67% of the Dutch thought their country benefited from its membership and 51%/77% that EU membership was a good thing for France/the Netherlands.

2009). In this paper, we claim that temporal categories are also useful tools to comprehend citizens' support for European integration. More specifically, we postulate that to understand citizens' support one needs not only to evaluate what they think about what the Union is (present) but as well their perceptions relative to where it is going (expected and desired future(s)). Our analyses are based both on two sets of qualitative data (interviews and focus-groups collected at ten years distance (mid 1990 and 2006) in France and Britain) and on quantitative data (Eurobarometer).

Measuring support towards European integration: a quick overview

In 2005, the Hooghe and Marks' seminal article places the number of articles written on public opinion about European integration at over one hundred (Hooghe & Marks, 2005). One can easily assume that nowadays this number has doubled. Needless is thus to say that an exhaustive report on the variables and the scales used to evaluate citizens' support is beyond the scope of this paper. Drawing a rough sketch of the main characteristics of this literature helps however to pinpoint its lacks. All studies of opinions and attitudes towards European integration and European institutions take Easton's political system model as a starting point (1965, 1975). In his work, Easton asserts that for a political system to be recognized as legitimate citizens' support is needed. He distinguishes however different forms of support from which derive different kinds of political legitimacy. Following Easton, citizens' support can be either specific – strong support from specific groups of the population, particularly some elites' groups - or diffuse – lighter support shared by larger proportion of the population. Easton discriminates as well input from output support. When the former implies citizens to share a sense of belonging to the political system and a belief in the values carry by this system, the latter ensues from the positive evaluation by citizens of political system's performances.

Till the beginning of the 1990s, most studies on citizens' attitudes towards European integration at the individual level consider that European integration benefited from the diffuse support of a majority of the member states' citizens, a so-called "permissive consensus". Most authors followed Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) who observed at the beginning of the 1970s that opinions on European integration were predominantly positive but based on low levels of knowledge and most expected this support to grow believing in a spill-over from the elite to the overwhelming majority of the citizens. This model lasted for more than two decades. It was challenged in the 1990's by the ambiguous results of the referenda on the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. Support for integration seemed to be on the decline, as shown by Eurobarometer data. These elements were interpreted as a confirmation that no spill over had occurred and that the 'permissive consensus' was falling apart. Thus, some authors conclude that despite other political systems, the EU due to the lack of a European public sphere could only rely on output legitimacy (Majone, 1998 ; Scharpf, 1999). This led in the mid-1990s to growing interest in the evaluation by citizens of EU performances, particularly in the economic field (Gabel & Palmer, 1995 ; Anderson &

Reichert, 1996 ; Gabel, 1998) when at the same time proves were given of the antagonism between input support for the national political system – national identity - and attitudes towards European integration (e.g. Mayer, 1997; Blondel et al. 1998 ; Carey 2002 ; McLaren 2006).

These last fifteen years however, new results blurred this overall perception of EU support as driven mainly by its performances in the economic field. New studies conclude on the importance both of diverse output support and input support to understand attitudes towards European integration. As concerned the output support, authors both outline the declining importance of economic performances when judging the EU, particularly in wealthy countries (Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007 ; Rohrschneider & Loveless, 2010 ; Serricchio et al., 2013) and the growing significance of other performances' evaluations, such as the fight against illegal immigration or crime (Balestrini, 2012). At the same time, new results describe national and European identity as partially cumulative (Duchesne & Frogner, 1995; Diez Medrano & Gutierrez, 2001 ; Risse, 2003) although not appealing to the same sense of belonging (Schild, 2001 ; Bruter, 2005 ; Duchesne & Frogner, 2008) which, together with studies which show that attachment to certain values and trust play a role in support for the European integration (Tillman, 2013 ; Hartevelde et al., 2013) reinforce the interest to study input support.

In parallel, following the “no” vote referenda from the Maastricht Treaty to the Constitutional Treaty, this period of research is dominated by the notion of 'euroscepticism' imported from the study of political parties to the study of public opinion (Franklin, Marsch & McLaren, 1994; Hooghe & Marks, 2007 ; McLaren, 2007 ; Magni-Berton et al., 2009). Rather than observing support, scholars try to understand scepticism towards European integration keeping however mostly the same general frame of research. A new debate recently occurred opposing those who claimed what is measured through euroscepticism is the polarization of attitudes towards European integration - citizens' being able to judge the European Union following the same ideological lines they pursue at the national level (Down & Wilson, 2008; Hooghe & Marks, 2009 ; de Wilde & Zürn, 2012;) - and those who consider that referenda results rather unveiled the ambivalence (de Vries & Steenbergen, 2013; de Vries, 2013 ; Stoeckel, 2013) and even the indifference of citizens towards European integration (Van Ingelgom, 2012 & 2014).

Despite the proliferation of analyses of public support for European integration, fundamental questions remain understudied and unanswered. Part of the problem lies in the fact that like the apocryphal drunk looking for lost keys under a streetlight, researchers have been drawn by the availability of times series of Eurobarometer studies run on the behalf of the European Commission (Ray, 2006; Van Ingelgom, 2010 & 2012). The trend Eurobarometer variable on Opinions on country's membership to the EU is for example used as one of the main measures of support in general and opinion on benefit from membership as one of the main measures of output support. Input support is mostly measured through EB variables on European sense of belonging and trust in the EU and its institutions. These variables are either used as such or combined for building scales and indexes. However they fell short when trying to explain differences in the nature and level of European integration

support between countries or results of referenda such as the French and Dutch on the Constitutional Treaty.

These last years, different initiatives have been taken to offer keys to open the black boxes in our understanding of citizens' attitudes on European integration. A certain number of studies proposed to disentangle the different dimensions of the support for the EU and Euro-scepticism (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2005 ; Wessels, 2007). When most of these studies used the same EB variables, others however build on different variables, such as fears linked with Europe and expectations about Europe, and other sets of data (Binzer Hobolt & Brouard 2010 ; Boomgaarden et al., 2011; Belot, Cautres & Strudel, 2013). At the same time, a *qualitative turn* occurred in European Studies which allow to catch sight of attitudes towards European integration from new angles (Belot, 2000 ; Meinhof, 2004 ; Diez Medrano, 2003 & 2010 ; Favell 2008 & 2010 ; Gaxie, Hubé & Rowell, 2011; White, 2011 ; Duchesne et al. 2010 & 2013 ; Van Ingelgom, 2014). This current piece of research builds on these approaches. Using qualitative data offer us to observe that, if one wants to understand what Europeans think about Europe and whether it matters to them, one needs to focus on their perceptions of European integration as a temporal sequence. We would argue that European integration support depends not only on individuals' judgment of the present of "Europe" but also on expectations for what Europe could be and evaluation of the probability that these expectations would be fulfill or deceptive in the future We would also assert that these judgment and expectations vary according to the national context.

We are not claiming the role plays by citizens expectations in building support was unnoticed before. A certain number of analysis were build on the traditional EB item tapping the desired speed of integration (e.g. Sanchez-Cuenca, 2000 ; Hooghe & Marks, 2005). Others considered citizens' desires for a more or less integrated European Union (e.g. Lubbers & Scheepers, 2005). Studying identification with Europe, Bruter even claimed that to fully grasp it, one needs to understand "*not only what it means for citizens to be 'European' but also what they want it to mean in the future*" (2008: 283). We assert however that when considering the role of citizens' expectations in EU support, scholars do not take sufficiently into account the fact that the EU is a political system permanently in the making, where time is a very accurate variable when trying to understand the functioning of the European political system and the developments of EU politics (Jerneck, 2000; Ekengren, 2002; Goetz & Meyer-Shaling, 2009b). We claim as well that those who took expectations into account did not distinguished between the probable fulfill expectations and probable deceptive expectations which as pointed by Hix (2007) might be a useful key to understand public support.

When putting the case for the reintroduction of Time into the study of politics, Paul Pierson declares: "*the development of actors' mental maps of politics would seem to be promising areas of study*" (Pierson, 2004: 173). In this paper we claim that we should study the "temporal" mental maps of politics that citizens develop towards European integration in order to understand their attitudes.

Analyzing support in a temporal perspective: A Mixed-Method Approach

To test our hypothesis we use three types of data, qualitative data collected at two points in time, 1995-1996 and 2006³, and Eurobarometer data. Data collected in 1995-1996 consist of thorough interviews (one to three hours) with young people (15 to 30 years old) in France and Britain. They were collected in the framework of a PhD devoted to attitudes towards European integration (Belot, 2000). Data collected in 2006 consist of focus groups gathering people with the same social status (working class people or employees or executives or activists) in France, Britain and Belgium. The aim was to study how people discuss, argue, exchange when talking about politics using Europe as a political object common to all three countries (Duchesne et al., 2010 & 2013). Data are presented in appendix 1⁴.

Temporality in the speeches of French and British citizens about the EU

The question of time or temporality was not part of the interviews' and focus groups' guidelines. However, when analyzing our data, we realized that when talking about the European Union, people, whatever their age or their social status, talked more often about what Europe could be or will be rather than what the European Union is⁵. We therefore decided to develop a more systematic study of the role of time in people's opinions towards the EU by doing a content analysis focusing only on time. Using Atlas-Ti, a qualitative data analysis software, we coded all opinions on the EU and European integration focusing on what time they relate to in the interviewees' mind: past, present and future⁶. Looking at European integration in the future, we realized that people talked about two different sorts of future: the future which they expect to happen, a likely future, and the future they hope will happen, a wished for future. We thus used these two codes: likely future and wished future.

Before turning to our analysis as such, a first methodological remark seems important. As table 1 shows, and in terms of reanalyzing qualitative data, it is worth noting that the distribution in 1995-96 and 2006 are quite similar despite the fact that the two studies produced very different data (interviews and focus groups) and were carried out by different researchers at different periods and in different cities. As the coding was undertaken by others

³ This paper is part of the Re-analyse project led by Sophie Duchesne on the re-analysis of qualitative data.

⁴ In both projects, the sample was built with the aim of gathering as many different attitudes towards European integration and kinds of discussion as possible. The samples are thus diversified samples. In this paper, we only use part of the data collected. We decided to focus on only two countries, France and Britain, as Belgium was not a case in the first study. We have coded all interviews at our disposal, that are 31 interviews in 40 (the files of some of the interviews' transcripts are damaged and we haven't find the way to restore them). We have as well coded half of the focus groups, 9 on 16 (for an explanation of this choice, see Duchesne et al. 2013).

⁵ This result was first found out in the research carried out by Céline Belot and the re-analyse of both studies confirmed it as we will demonstrate in this section.

⁶ A code is attributed any time a new idea is developed. Therefore some codes are quite short (a few words, a sentence) while others are as long as a paragraph.

researchers who had not be implicated in the data collection nor in the first analyses⁷, this similarity in the distribution is a guarantee of reliability and replicability, which are often missing in qualitative analyses. Of course, it is difficult from these distributions to assess the evolution of each category in time and this will be outside the scope of this paper. Further analyses would be as necessary as useful in order to further characterize this evolution, both in quantitative and qualitative terms.

Table 1 : How people talk about Europe from a temporal point of view – 1995-96 & 2006

	Total		C. Belot Research 1995-1996		CITAE Research Project 2006	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Past	211	8.4	128	7.5	83	10.4
Present	1137	45.3	681	39.8	456	56.9
Likely future	437	17.4	336	19.6	101	12.6
Wished future	727	28.9	566	33.1	161	20.1
N	2512		1711		801	

Source: Authors' own data. On 31 interviews and 9 focus-groups.

A rough overview of the attributed codes shows that when talking about the European Union and European integration, people talk almost as much about the present of Europe (1137 codes, 45.26%) as about its future (1164 codes, 45.33%) (see table 1). The past of Europe is much less mentioned (8.4%). Considering that rejection of the past was the main justification for European construction at its start, this result is striking. Looking in detail at all the past codes, reference to wars are rare, and mostly cited by older people and some of our most politicized interviewees⁸. The past which people are talking about is mostly the EU's past, from the Rome Treaty to the joining of Britain, from the Maastricht Treaty and Germany's reunification to the CAP and the structural funds⁹. Moreover, when talking about the disappearance of conflicts between European countries such as the ones of the past, not only interviewees don't build links between European integration and the end of European wars but they even use it as a reason not to develop European integration further, as Christelle (Fr)¹⁰ a student who declares "*the old quarrels ... Germany, France, I think that it is over (...) I don't see what it would change a European army or no European army*"¹¹. The main original aim of European integration is therefore not part of all judgments of Europe. The question of Marilyn (Fr) – "*Why did they decide to create Europe, Why? (...) Were we not*

⁷ The coding was realized by Camille Brugier, PhD student at the European University Institute, and Dr. Jessica Sainty in the framework of the Re-analyse project. The authors are very grateful to them.

⁸ The only time the role of European integration in ending conflicts on European soil is extensively discussed and underlined is in the Paris focus-group with activists.

⁹ As these are references which necessitate at least a little bit of knowledge about European integration, no wonder that the past is much more mentioned by the most educated people.

¹⁰ "Fr" stands for "French", "Br" for "British".

¹¹ Christelle (Fr) : « les vieilles querelles... Allemagne, France, je pense que c'est fini (...) je ne vois pas ce que ça va changer une armée unique ou pas d'armée unique. »

*fine as we were?*¹² – echoes the question asked by two British participants to the focus groups: “Who, who, what started the EU, where did it come from?” (Robert), “someone wanted to benefit from it, that’s why they did it” (Brenda). As the EU is currently in search of legitimacy, the fact that some of its citizens are unable to answer the question of its origins could be considered as a problem.

Table 2: How people talk about Europe from a temporal point of view – France & UK

	Total		France		UK	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Past	211	8.4	130	10.3	81	6.5
Present	1137	45.3	585	46.4	552	44.2
Likely future	437	17.4	207	16.4	230	18.4
Wished future	727	28.9	340	26.9	387	31
N	2512		1262		1250	

Source: Authors’ own data. On 31 interviews and 9 focus groups.

As far as the present of the EU is concerned the different words used to qualify the EU and the different visions of European integration which they relate to are striking. Though James, in the Oxford activists’ focus group, considers the EU as a “*collection of nation states*” and Paul (Fr) an employee a “*superior alliance of countries*”¹³, many talk about a “*community*”¹⁴ and a few about a “*union*”¹⁵. Though some use precise terms such as the “*European Community*”, “*the EEC*”, “*the European Union*”, a lot of them express their difficulty in explaining what kind of relationship exists between the different European countries. Karl (Fr), an activist considers that “*we’re trying to do something together*”¹⁶ and for César (Fr), another activist, “*Europe is putting some things together*”¹⁷. While Paul (Br), an employee, considers the EU as a “*superior alliance*”, for Kenneth (Br), another employee, it is a “*wider community*”. Mathieu (Fr), a Baccalaureat student, sums up the vagueness of Europe in these words: “*this is not clear enough ... there are many Europes*”¹⁸. Reading all these different definitions or descriptions of what Europe is, it is crystal clear that when judging Europe, people are not all considering the same political object. For some, it is only a

¹² Marilyn (Fr) : « Ben oui, pourquoi déjà ils ont décidé de faire une Europe, c’est pourquoi ? (...) On n’était pas bien comme on était quoi j’veux dire ? »

¹³ Paul (Fr) : “une alliance supérieure de pays”

¹⁴ The word is used in 9 French interviews and focus groups and in 11 interviews and focus groups with British people. The interviewees using it belong to different age groups and status groups such as employees (Paul and Kenneth from Oxford, Martin and Sophie from Paris), technical pupils (Philip and Heather in Britain), University students (William and Helen in Britain, Patrice in France) or executives (Gabriel in Paris, Ian in Oxford).

¹⁵ The word is used again in French and British interviews and focus groups, by participants from different age and status groups, notably by Nina, an employee, Brenda an Oxford worker and all the participants of the activists’ focus group in Britain, by Claire, a technical pupil, Simon, following vocational business studies, Magali, Sophie and Hadia three employees in France.

¹⁶ Charles : « On essaye de faire quelque chose ensemble ».

¹⁷ César : « L’Europe c’est de mettre en commun des choses »

¹⁸ Mathieu : « c’est pas encore assez clair... y’a plusieurs Europe »

forum of discussion between European countries whereas for others it is an integrated political system, a European Union.

Though both French and British people are considering different kinds of “Europe” when they express their opinions of the current European Union, for British people, Europe is also judged differently whether they believe the United Kingdom is part of it or not. Indeed, listening to a lot of them, whether their country is in or outside the EU is unclear. “*If we don’t join Europe*”, “*if we were to take ourselves along to be into Europe*”, “*if they (the British elites) want to be part of Europe*”, “*when we are part of it*”¹⁹, these are verbatim used by British interviewees. As stated by another: “*The government doesn’t want us to be part of the European Union*”²⁰. The fact that some British citizens, not only the less educated ones, do not consider their country to be part of the EU is a major piece of information that should be taken into account when considering their judgment of the EU, as some may consider the EU badly not for what it does, but for what it does not do and for leaving them behind. More generally, if people judge the EU only for what it is or what it does, these different visions of what the EU is do appear as a relevant element when trying to understand people’s opinions and attitudes towards the EU. Considering that the EU is judged not only for what it does, but for what it would be, this statement appears even more essential.

As stated before, when talking about the EU, people speak as much about its present as about its future. Why do people discuss the EU’s future so much? We might imagine that people talk of European integration as something that is going to happen rather than an already functioning political system depending on their level of knowledge. As shown by many studies, the level of education is one of the main determinants of opinions of European integration. As far as our hypothesis relative to time is concerned, education seems to explain part of the variance. In our sample, people with the lowest level of education talk more about the future of Europe (52.3%) than people with the highest level of education (44%). However what is striking is that all groups talk a lot about the future when they express their opinions of the European Union.

Looking more precisely at the occurrences relative to temporality in our interviews, the fact that European integration appears as a process in the making is striking. Patrice (Fr), a history student uses the metaphor of a train to describe it and concludes: “*Europe has not yet reached its end, far from it*”²¹. The building metaphor is used as well by In the Paris activists’ focus group Deborah talks about a pathway and Dimitri adds “*we need to go step by step*”²². Laurent (Fr), an accountant, declares that “*the further we go, the more we’ll talk about it*” and he adds “*I may end up knowing Europe but not when I’m forty*”²³. Stephanie (Br), a business student echoes: “*everything is going to take time*” and she even adds in the mid-1990s that a European currency would probably happen “*way out of my time (...) I’ll probably be long gone dead*”. On the contrary, for Marilyn (Fr), a hairdresser: “*it’s rather going too fast*”²⁴ and

¹⁹ Words declared by Jonathan an A level student, Charles, an elderly conservative activist, Tina, a young worker and Alison, a young bank executive.

²⁰ Brenda, an Oxford employee.

²¹ Patrice : « l’Europe c’est pas encore achevé, loin de là ».

²² Dimitri : « faut y aller pas à pas ».


²³ Laurent : « plus ça ira, plus on en parlera » - « peut-être que je connaîtrais l’Europe mais ... pas à 40 ans ».

²⁴ Marilyn : « ça va trop vite plutôt ».

Alice, a young bank executive declares: *“it’s changing so much at the moment, that you never really know what is gonna happen. You just wait and see”*. Allison, a British liberal democrat activist asserts: *“over the last ten years perhaps we’ve even gone even further ahead than most people thought”*. In a critical speech Guy (Fr), an environmental activist accuses: *“we have thrown caution to the wind”*²⁵, to which Jonathan (Br), Mathieu (Fr), Nathalie (Fr) and David (Br) answer: *“we’ve got to move on”* *“I don’t know what we are waiting for (...) we need to go faster”*, *“it would be good if it came faster (...) I can’t wait for it to happen”*²⁶ and *“I can’t wait for all the thing to go forward”*.

By carefully examining all the references to temporality in what was said by our interviewees and participants in focus groups, it becomes clear that people’s attitudes towards the EU not only depend on their judgment of Europe in the present, but also on what they expect the EU to be in the future. Precisely, as interviewees talk about a likely future and a wished future, their judgment reflects the closeness of the match between the two (see Figure 1). To say it otherwise, if they wish the EU to stay as it is now and they consider it likely to happen, then they display positive opinions of the EU, we can sum up their attitude by calling them “the satisfied” [1]. On the same vein, if people wish the EU to be a federation and they expect it to become a federation, then again they have a positive opinion of the EU, these are the “forward optimists” [2]. Again, if people expect it to become less integrated than it is now and they wish it to be so, they have positive opinions, these are the “backward optimists” [3].

Figure 1: Temporality in positive judgments on European integration



On the contrary, if they expect the EU to become a different political cooperation or political system to the one they wish for, then their opinions are negative (see Figure 2). If people wish the EU to stay as it is and expect it to be more integrated, then they are “worried” [1-2]²⁷. If on the contrary they wish it to be more integrated and they expect it to stay as it is, then they are “expectative” [2-1]. If they wish it to stay as it is but they believe it


²⁵ Guy : « On continue d’être sans arrêt dans une fuite en avant ».

²⁶ Mathieu : « je ne sais pas ce qu’on attend comme ça (...) faut aller plus vite ». Nathalie : « il faudrait que ça arrive plus vite. (...) vivement qu’elle soit là ».

²⁷ The first number corresponding to a dotted line arrow, the second to a plain arrow (same explanation for all the following numbers).

is becoming less integrated, they will then be “disappointed” [1-3]. On the contrary, if they wish it to become less integrated but they expect it to stay as it is, they will be “unhappy” [3-1]. Finally, if they wish the EU to become more integrated and they expect it to be less, than they will be “frustrated” [2-3] and if they wish it to be less integrated and they expect it to be more, they will be “angry” [3-2]. Of course these are models, in reality dissatisfaction will be more or less emphasized depending on the level of integration the interviewee considers the EU to be at the present time – from a forum of discussion to a federal Europe - and the angle created by the two arrows relative to the expected and wished future, the smaller the angle, the lesser the dissatisfaction.

Figure 2: Temporality in negative judgments on European integration²⁸



We believe that the different models described are not evenly distributed between countries which may participate to the understanding of different types of national Euroscepticism. As already mentioned, when judging the EU at present time people do not all consider the same political object and this may depend on the national public space in which they live, as clearly appears in the British case. Possible expectations and wishes might also be dependent on the national public space. We now propose to test this new measurement model of attitudes towards the EU and European integration using survey data from 2006 (Eurobarometer 66.0)²⁹.

Temporality and attitudes towards European integration: an exploratory analysis

²⁸ Notice that due to the difficulty of showing on one graph all the possibilities of mismatch between the likely future and the wished future, all arrows should be considered as exchangeable. For example, if someone expects the EU to stay as it is but wishes it to be more or less integrated, then to represent his/her opinions, arrow 1 should be a plain arrow and arrows 2 or 3 dotted lines.

²⁹ We choose the 2006 data set as this is the year when the focus groups have been carried out. Moreover the questions of ‘EU role in daily life’ were not asked in 1995 and 1996.

In order to measure temporality and in particular the importance of the perception of the EU's future, we have first chosen to look at the role of the EU in daily life both in terms of expectation and preference for the future using the following questions:

- a) *In your opinion, in five years' time, will the European Union play a more important, a less important or the same role in your daily life?* [EU role in daily life - Expectation]
- b) *And, in five years' time, would you like the European Union to play a more important, a less important or the same role in your daily life?* [EU role in daily life – Preference]

In both cases, responses have been graduated from 1 ('more important') to 3 ('less important'), the value 2 being the median category. This question enables us to operationalize the perceptions of the importance of the EU in the future. An analysis of bivariate correlations between these two questions and the classic membership 'good/bad', country benefit and image of the EU indicators reveals that people's attitudes towards the EU indeed depend on what they expect the EU to be in the future and, even more importantly, about what they desire it to be.

Table 3: Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Different indicators of Support for Integration – France and UK, 2006 (F/UK)

	EU Membership – Good/Bad	EU Membership – Benefit	EU Membership – Image	EU Role in daily life – Expectation	EU Role in daily life – Preference	European Citizenship Future Feeling
EU Membership – Good/Bad	-	.59 / .70	.71/.72	.20 / .10	.31 / .35	.36 / .29
EU Membership – Benefit	-	-	.57 / .67	.09 / .09	.25 / .32	.22 / .28
EU Membership – Image	-	-	-	.21 / .07	.31 / .37	.34 / .30
EU Role in daily life – Expectation	-	-	-	-	.38 / .43	.20 / .12
EU Role in daily life – Preference	-	-	-	-	-	.24 / .20
European Citizenship Future Feeling	-	-	-	-	-	-

Source: Eurobarometer 66.0, 2006.

Note: All correlations are significant at the 1% level.

As can be seen in Table 3, the Pearson correlations between 'EU Role in daily life – Expectation' and the membership indicators vary by between .07 and .21 whereas the correlations between 'EU Role in daily life – Preference' and these indicators are much higher, around .30 both in France and in UK. In both countries, the results for the latter variable are very similar. However, it is noteworthy that in the British case, the Pearson correlations are very different when speaking of expectation or preference. Indeed, when

looking at both variables of membership ‘Good/bad’ and ‘Image’, the discrepancy between expectation (respectively .10 and .07) and preference (respectively .35 and .37) is very high in the British case. This result echoes our qualitative analysis which underlined the specificity of the UK.

Moreover, it seems that the classic identity indicator (‘European Citizenship future feeling’, ranging from 1 ‘European only’ to 4 ‘National only’) presents very similar results to the ‘EU role in daily life – Preference’ variable. It can be hypothesized that the future belonging variable reveals as much about attitudes towards the future as about a developing European sense of belonging. In the British case, the wished future indicator records an even higher score (.35 versus .29) when comparing Pearson correlations for the classic membership question (‘Good/Bad’). Even if these bivariate analyses require confirmation by a multinomial regression analysis, one can hypothesize that the preference on the role of the EU in daily life is no more imperfect than the identity variable, which has been largely used in the literature. Moreover, in the British case, it seems that the preference variable has a stronger correlation with the membership indicators than the future belonging variable, probably indicating a less emotional relationship in the UK than in the French case.

In order to make sure that the expectations and preferences for the role in daily life are indeed linked to the EU and not simply to the evaluation of personal expectations, we have run a factor analysis. Empirically, the distinction between the personal and national on the one hand and the European level on the other can be accessed through the following factor analysis using the 2006 survey (Eurobarometer 66.1).

Table 4: Factor analysis of expectations for the future – By country, 2006

	<i>France</i>		<i>United Kingdom</i>		
	Component		Component		
	1	2	1	2	3
EU role in daily life – Expectation		0.745		0.732	
EU role in daily life – Preference		0.712		0.759	
European citizenship future belonging		0.624		0.524	
Expectations: life in general ³⁰	0.765		0.678		-0.397
Expectations: personal job situation ³¹	0.749		0.669		-0.353
Expectations : financial situation ³²	0.815		0.729		
Expectations : employment situation ³³	0.770		0.640		0.535
Expectations: economic situation ³⁴	0.756		0.637		0.592
Explained variances (R ² after rotation)	38,35%	19,05%	23,32%	19,16%	18,66%

Source: Eurobarometer 66.0, 2006 (samples weighted by country).

Note: Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis; Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

³⁰ What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve months be better, worse or the same, when it comes to your life in general?

³¹ What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve months be better, worse or the same, when it comes to your personal job situation?

³² What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve months be better, worse or the same, when it comes to the financial situation of your household?

³³ What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve months be better, worse or the same, when it comes to the employment situation in (OUR COUNTRY)?

³⁴ What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve months be better, worse or the same, when it comes to the economic situation in (OUR COUNTRY)?

The factor analysis measures the degree to which items are tapping the same concept. If respondents answer in similar ways to questions related to different level of expectations, it implies that these future situations, here expectations and preferences for a personal, national and European future, are not considered as being distinct by respondents. The factor analysis shows that the eight indicators mentioned above represent two separate attitudinal dimensions in France, whereas in the UK there are three dimensions. The meaning of a factor is, in general, determined by the items which have the most weight. Thus we chose to retain the items linked to expectations about life in general, economic situation, financial situation, employment situation and personal job situation to explain the first factor both in France and in the UK. Their meaning is not ambiguous as they are all related to personal expectations about the future in personal and national terms. The second dimension clearly expresses the expectations about the future of the EU. One can thus conclude that citizens are able to distinguish between personal and national levels and the European level, and isolate their expectations about the future of the EU from their own situation and the economic and employment situation of their countries.

Temporality in positive and negative judgments on European integration: a typology

In this last part, we would like to go back to the typology developed from the qualitative analysis of our data distinguishing between ten profiles of citizens: the forward optimist, the satisfied, the backward optimist, the expectative, the frustrated, the worried, the disappointed, the angry, the unhappy and the uncertain. As a further exploratory analysis, we wish to examine whether variation exists in the distribution of these profiles when comparing our two countries. The distributions of the ten profiles are shown in Table 5.

Table 5: Distribution of the ten profiles – France & UK, 2006

	France	United Kingdom
Forward Optimist (E+ & P+)	28.8	16.9
Satisfied (E= & P=)	23.6	20.6
Backward Optimist (E- & P-)	3.0	6.7
Expectative (E= & P+)	16.7	6.1
Frustrated (E- & P+)	3.1	1.5
Worried (E+ & P=)	6.2	7.9
Disappointed (E- & P=)	0.8	1.5
Angry (E+ & P-)	5.4	16.7
Unhappy (E= & P-)	2.2	5.8
Uncertain (DK)	10.8	16.4

Source: Eurobarometer 66.0, 2006. Authors' own calculation.

If our models offer an accurate way to measure attitudes towards European integration, we should find as in all other studies, that France and the UK present notable differences in their distributions. As expected, the proportion of forward optimists is higher in France where they represent 28.8 percent of the population whereas in the British case, this percentage is only 16.9. The second largest group is the satisfied in both countries followed by the expectative in France and the angry in the UK. In this latter case, this means that a

considerable proportion of the British expect that the EU will become more important but would like the EU to play a lesser role in their everyday life. On the contrary, in France, the expectative are characterized by an expectation of a status quo though they would prefer the EU to take a more important role in the future.

Before turning to our conclusion, we propose to have a look at the link between the ten profiles and the evaluation of membership as it is a classic indicator of support of European integration. The percentages are shown in Table 6. We have distinguished between the positive, neutral and negative preferences for the role of the EU in daily life as we have shown that there is a stronger correlation between this variable and support for European integration than the others.

Table 6: Temporality and positive and negative judgments on European Integration – France & UK, 2006

	Good Thing	Neither Good nor Bad	Bad Thing
<i>Positive preferences</i>			
Forward Optimist (E+ & P+)	76.7	18.0	5.3
Expectative (E= & P+)	51.5	36.3	12.2
Frustrated (E- & P+)	44.9	24.9	30.2
<i>Neutral preferences</i>			
Worried (E+ & P=)	50.7	36.7	12.7
Satisfied (E= & P=)	45.1	40.6	14.3
Disappointed (E- & P=)	35.9	36.4	27.8
<i>Negative preferences</i>			
Angry (E+ & P-)	22.6	24.9	52.5
Unhappy (E= & P-)	14.1	35.7	50.2
Backward Optimist (E- & P-)	25.7	34.7	39.6
Uncertain judgments (DK)	33.5	42.5	24.0

Source: Eurobarometer 66.0, 2006.

Note: Pearson correlation significant at 1%; R=.368

As shown in Table 6 and as expected, the citizens wishing the EU to play a more important role in their daily life are characterized by a higher percentage of positive evaluations of the membership of their country. This percentage declines as the evaluation of the expected situation becomes more negative. This is also true for the citizens who have a neutral position on their preferences for the future role played by the EU. However this is no longer true when considering the negative preferences. Indeed, in this category of response, the most positive respondents are those who expect the EU to play a lesser role and wish this to happen, confirming our qualitative analysis. For a quarter of these citizens, the two negative evaluations of the likely and wished future of the EU lead them to support European Union membership as it is.

Discussion

As the historical sketch has underlined, the evolution of the field has been largely dependent on contextual events such as the difficult ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the French and

Dutch rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 and certainly more recently the Eurozone crisis. In this precise context of constant uncertainty, the Eurozone crisis has made even more unmistakably clear the importance of taking into account the future of the European integration process. Relying on exploratory analysis of both longitudinal qualitative and quantitative data, this paper claimed that temporality is important not only to understand institutions and public policies, as shown by recent studies (Goetz & al., 2009) but also to comprehend citizens' attitudes towards European integration and the different countries' levels of support for the EU. Attitudes towards European integration derive partly from different perceptions of what the Union is but even more importantly of where it is going both in terms of expected and desired future(s).

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Appendixes

Appendix 1: List of British interviewees

	<i>Age</i>	<i>Status</i>	<i>Town</i>
Jonathan	17	High-school pupil, A levels	Durham
Clare	17	Technical pupil, design	Durham
Steven	18	Mechanic, apprenticed	Durham
Helen	18	Student – English studies	Glasgow
Heather	18	Technical pupil, tourism	Guildford
Stephanie	19	Vocational business studies	Guildford
Philip	19	Technical pupil, business	Durham
Benjamin	19	Technical pupil, mechanic for the aerospace industry	Guildford
William	21	Student L3 Political Science	London
Andrew	22	Vocational business studies	Leeds
Debbie	23	Design, vocational training	Guildford
Alice G.	25	Bank executive	Durham
Tina	27	Secretary	Guildford
David B.	29	Mechanic	Guildford
Alexander	29	PhD in Physics, Unemployed	Durham
Jennifer	30	Former worker, catering vocational training	Durham
Christine	30	Unemployed, administrative vocational training	Durham

Appendix 2: List of French interviewees

	<i>Age</i>	<i>Status</i>	<i>Town</i>
Gilles	16	Technical pupil	Vizille
Mathieu	18	High-school pupil, A levels	Grenoble
Kébira	18	No qualification, looking for a training course	Boulogne-sur-mer
Claire	18	Technical pupil	Grenoble
Davy	19	Technical pupil	Vizille
Simon	20	Vocational international business studies	Boulogne-sur-mer
Nathalie	20	Vocational business studies	Courchevel
Mélanie	21	Vocational international business studies	Calais
Christelle	22	Student L3 foreign languages	Grenoble
Patrice	24	Student L3 History	Boulogne-sur-mer
Jessi	24	Employee, non- permanent contract	Boulogne-sur-mer
Marilyn	27	Employee, Hairdresser	Grenoble
Christophe	29	Caterer, self-employed	Grenoble
Laurent	30	Employee, accountant	Grenoble

Appendix 3: List of Focus groups

(Nick)name	Sexe	Age	Education	Profession	Left right	Vote	Referendum	EU belonging	Identity	Origin
PARIS										
PAR Workers 1										
Albert	M	42	Brevet/BEPC	Naturopath (unemployed)	5	NV	NV	G	World	White
Ghislaine	F	26	Brevet/BEPC	Care assistant	4	L. Jospin	NV	G	NE	Afro-Caribbean
Geoffrey	M	33	CAP ou BEP	Print worker	5	NV	No	NGNB	NE	White
Lionel	M	42	Brevet/BEPC	Security officer	DK	O. Besancenot	No	G	EN	White
Yasmina	F	35	Brevet/BEPC	Homemaker	DK	NV	NV	B	NE	Maghreb
Habiba	F	41	Bac général	Homemaker (and secretarial work for family business)	4	L. Jospin	No	NGNB	Other	Maghreb
PAR Employees 1										
Laetitia	F	23	Bac + 2	Sales engineer	6	J. Chirac	NV	B	N	White
Magali	F	28	Bac + 2	Receptionist/telemarketing	DK	J. Chirac	NA	NGNB	NE	White
Victor	M	30	Bac + 2	Higher technician, logistics	2	N. Mamère	N	G	E	White
Patrice	M	33	Bac tech/pro	Butler	DK	NV	NV	NGNB	NE	White
Hadia	F	36	Bac + 3 to + 5	Project leader, advertisement (unemployed)	3	NV	NV	G	NE	Maghreb
Clelia	F	24	Bac + 2	Receptionist/ illustrator	5.5	NA	NV	?	?	White
PAR Employees 2										
Paul	H	35	Bac +2	pharmaceutical sales representative	5	NA	No	B	NE	White
Pablo	M	43	Bac tech/pro.	Secretarial work (unemployed)	7	J. Chirac	No	G	N	Other European
Samira	F	26	Bac +2	Restaurant manager	5	L. Jospin	No	B	N	Maghreb
Aline	F	41	Bac +2	Sales engineer (unemployed)	6	J. Chirac	NV	B	E	White
Martin	M	46	Bac+2	Graphic designer (unemployed)	3	L. Jospin	Y	G	NE	White
PAR Activists 1										
César	M	35	Bac +3 to +5	Lawyer (unemployed)	6	J. Chirac	Y	NGNB	Other	Afro-Caribbean
Karl	M	21	Bac +3 to +5	Student (engineer)	8	NV	N	G	NE	White
Cheik	M	40	Bac tech/pro	Municipal agent	6	J. Chirac	NV	G	NE	Maghreb
Pierre-Antoine	M	23	Bac +3 to +5	Communications manager (party)	4	F. Bayrou	Y	G	NE	White
Déborah	F	30	Doctorat	Doctoral student	5	L. Jospin	Y	G	EN	White
Guy	M	59	Bac +3 to +5	Coach personal development / finance expert	2	N. Mamère	N	G	N	White

Dimitri	M	48	Bac +3 to +5	Principal private secretary, (arrondissement mayor)	3	L. Jospin	Y	G	NE	White
PAR Managers 1										
Francis	M	30	Bac + 3 to + 5	IT professional	7	J. Chirac	Y	G	EN	White
Inès	F	39	Bac + 2	Fashion designer	7	J. Chirac	N	G	NE	White
Fabienne	F	26	Doctorat	Doctoral student	3	M.G Buffet	N	B	World	White
Gabriel	M	59	Bac + 3 to + 5	Printing advisor	3	L. Jospin	Y	G	NE	White
Toufik	M	24	Bac + 3 to + 5	Engineer	4	NV	NV	G	NE	Maghreb
Serge	M	42	Bac + 3 to + 5	Charterer accountant	5	L. Jospin	N	B	EN	White
Céline	C	31	Bac + 3 to + 5	translator	4	NV	N	G	NE	White
OXFORD										
OXF Workers 1										
Mina	F	48	A-Level, AS-Level	Private care assistant	7	Labour	DK	NGNB	World	Black Asian
Robert	M	32	GCSE or O'Level	Tankdriver (disabled)	7	NV	Y	G	NE	White
Ron	M	31	VCE, AVCE, NVQ L3	Technician (car industry)	5,5	Labour	DK	NGNB	N	Black Asian
Mary	F	54	GCSE or O'Level	School cleaner	7	Ind.	Y	NGNB	N	White
Brenda	F	37	GCSE or O'Level	Post person and receptionist	DK	NV	N	NGNB	N	White
OXF Employees 1										
Nina	F	31	Foundation d°, NVQ L4	Care support worker	3	Labour	Y	G	EN	White
Pat	F	37	A-Level, AS-Level	Admin/secretarial work	4,5	Labour	DK	G	N	Black
Mel	F	51	A-Level, AS-Level	Receptionist (part time)	5,5	DK	DK	G	NE	White
Kenneth	M	51	A-Level, AS-Level	Office support worker	5,5	LibDem	Y	G	NE	White
Mike	M	45	A-Level, AS-Level	Office manager	6	NV	N	B	NE	White
Kamal	M	24	BA, BSc, degree	Team leader in catering business	5	Ind	N	G	N	Black Asian
OXF Activits 1										
Bethany	F	79	Foundation d°, NVQ L4	Councillor	5	Labour	Y	NGNB	NE	White
Allison	F	57	Primary school	Housewife and volunteer District councillor (ex IT consultant and finance advisor)	4	LibDem	Y	G	NE	White
Charles	M	71	A-Level, AS-Level		6	Cons	Y	B	N	White
Annabel	F	26	BA, BSc, degree	Campaign manager	3,5	Labour	Y	NA	NA	White
James	M	61	Master degrees	Company director	8	Cons	N	B	Other	White
Lewis	M	70	PhD or Dphil	County councillor (ex health advocacy)	1	Green	N	DK	World	White
OXF Managers 1										
Sundai	M	36	BA, BSc degree	Store manager	7	Labour	Y	G	NE	Black
Alexander	M	39	A-levels, AS level	Bank manager	8	Cons	N	NGNB	N	White

Derek	M	37	PhD or Dphil	Lecturer and researcher	3	Cons	DK	NGNB	NE	White
Ian	M	38	BA, BSc degree	Salesman	7	Cons	N	NGNB	N	White
Bansuri	F	42	VCE, AVCE, NVQ L3	Personal development trainer	5,5	NV	N	NGNB	N	Black Asian
