

Bicameralism and the Balance of Power in EU Legislative Politics¹

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The transformation of the European Parliament (EP) from a consultative assembly to legislative decision maker has been well documented (Rittberger, 2003, 2008; Kreppel, 2002; Priestly, 2008). The impact of successive treaty revisions on its absolute and relative powers is also well established (Hix, 2002; Tsebelis, 1994). What has been less thoroughly explored, however, is the broader effect of the institutional evolution of the EP, and in particular the impact on the other key actors in the EU policy process. This research analyzes the influence of the developing bicameral structure of the EU on the character of inter-institutional relationships and legislative success of the EP, Council and Commission. In particular, the role of inter-institutional policy preference congruence and coalition formation on the policy process is examined to gain new insights into the EU policy process.

Although the European Parliament has been the institution most often and most directly impacted by past treaty reforms, the changes to the institutional balance of power in the EU have not affected it alone. Indeed, changes to the legislative processes of the EU are generally understood to have forced increased collaboration between the EP and the Council (Costello and Thomson, 2013; Kreppel, 2011; Farrell and Héritier, 2004) and to have reduced the agenda setting powers and legislative influence of the Commission (Kreppel and Oztas, 2016; Garrett and Tsebelis, Garrett, 1995). However, the extent to which shared preferences and policy coalitions between these three institutions impact their likely success in obtaining their preferred policy outcomes remains largely unexplored.² This research aims to fill this lacuna by directly examining the impact of policy preference (in)congruence between the Commission, EP and Council on legislative success.

To place this analysis in context I first provide a short review of the evolution of the EP and the history of its transformation from 'talking shop' to legislative chamber. This is followed by a survey of existing research on this transformation and its implications for the role of the EP and the EU's decision-making process more generally. This is followed by a theoretical interpretation of the results of the EP's institutional evolution, including the development of several hypotheses regarding the changing character of inter-institutional relationships. The hypotheses are then tested empirically in the empirical analysis section after the data and methods employed are presented. The final section concludes.

The Emergence of Bicameralism in the EU

When the European Economic Community (EEC) was created in 1957 it largely borrowed the institutional structures of its predecessor, the European Coal and Steel Community,

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² Most analyses focus on the relative increase/decrease in legislative influence of one or the other institution, rather than the impact of collaboration or coalitions between the three institutions.

albeit with some notable adjustments.³ This meant that the Assembly of the ECSC was adapted to serve as the new ‘Common Assembly’ – recognizing that this single institution would serve as the consultative assembly for the ECSC as well as the new EEC and Euratom. There were a few significant changes to the Assembly, however. Foremost among them was the decision to include a provision in the new treaty requiring the direct election of its members (Art. 138(3)).⁴ Though it ultimately took more than 20 years to fully implement this treaty requirement, its importance in the transformation of the EP from consultative assembly to legislative chamber cannot be over stated.⁵ Since 1979 the European Parliament has been the only directly elected institution of the European Union, providing it with a unique claim to democratic legitimacy and in many occasions resulting in pressure on the other institutions and the member states to increase its relative powers.

As the European Economic Community evolved to become the European Communities (Single European Act) and eventually the European Union (Maastricht Treaty) the breadth and depth of the policy domains being integrated at the European level increased substantially. This led to increasing concerns regarding what has come to be known as the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’ (Neunreither, 1994; Katz, 2001; Anderson and Eliassen, 1996, Lodge, 1994). While the true extent of the democratic deficit and indeed even its actual existence have been debated (Majone, 1998; Moravcsik, 2002; Cromez, 2003; Coultrap, 1999), concerns regarding the democratic character of the EU have had a significant impact on decisions regarding the evolution of the EP. The Parliament’s unique claim to a direct link with voters has led to a linkage between its legislative empowerment and a reduction in the democratic deficit.

The first clear example of the importance of EP elections came in 1980 when the European Court of Justice ruled in support of the EP’s right of consultation holding that when consultation was called for by the treaties (Art. 173 EEC; now Art. 263 TFEU) the Council had to wait for the EP’s opinion prior to taking a decision (*Roquette Frères v Council*, Case 138/79). This decision came just after the first direct EP elections and underscored the new legitimacy of the EP.⁶ The so-called *Isoglucose* decision effectively granted the EP an

³ In particular, the EEC transformed the ‘High Authority’ of the ECSC into the less grandiose ‘Commission’ of the EEC and today’s EU. It also modified the previous ‘Special Council’ into the more mundane, though ultimately more powerful ‘Council of Ministers.’

⁴ Previously, under the ECSC Treaty member states could opt to have their members to the Assembly directly elected rather than appointed by the national parliaments (Art. 21), but no state ever chose to implement that option.

⁵ Despite the fact that the Rome Treaty called for the direct election of the new Assembly, and repeated efforts by the EP to push for their implementation, it took the member states until 1976 to adopt a procedure to implement this requirement (OJL 278, 8.10.1976). Elections were ultimately delayed until 1979 to allow for full ratification and implementation of the new procedure by all member states.

⁶ The text of the judgment includes the statement that the consultation provided for in Article 173 “*is the means which allows the Parliament to play an actual part in the legislative process of the Community. Such power represents an essential factor in the institutional balance intended by the Treaty. Although limited, it reflects at Community level the fundamental democratic principle that the peoples should take part in the exercise of power through the intermediary of a representative assembly.*” (*Roquette Frères v Council*, Case 138/79) as cited in Teasdale, 2012, *The Penguin Companion to European Union* (2012).

indirect power of legislative delay in certain policy areas (Kreppel, 2002). Although only a negative power, this signaled the beginning of the EP's direct legislative authority.

The next increase in the legislative role of the EP came with the introduction of the Cooperation Procedure in the Single European Act (1987). Though initially applicable only to single market initiatives, and relatively short lived as a core legislative procedure, the Cooperation Procedure was a critical innovation in that it gave the EP the ability to directly offer amendments to legislative proposals.⁷ The policy domain of the Cooperation procedure was expanded by the Maastricht Treaty (1993), but more importantly, this treaty introduced the Codecision Procedure. As the name implies, the Codecision Procedure increased the decision-making authority of the EP granting it veto power over policy by granting it the ability to reject proposals definitively (requiring that the Commission re-initiate) and creating a conciliation committee to manage differences between the EP and the Council. Though there were some questions regarding the relative effective policy influence granted by the two legislative procedures initially (Tsebelis, 1994, 1996; Moser, 1996; Tsebelis and Garrett, 1997; Scully, 1997), in the end the codecision procedure became dominant, eventually being transformed into the 'Ordinary Procedure' in the Lisbon Treaty.⁸

While the expansion of the cooperation procedure and its eventual replacement by the Codecision (now Ordinary) Procedure undoubtedly had direct positive effects on the relative legislative power of the EP, in the end, it may be the inclusion of the 'conciliation' stage under the Codecision procedure that truly altered the character of the EU legislative branch. Until its introduction, up to and including under the Cooperation Procedure, the EP was generally required to deal with the Council indirectly through collaboration with the Commission in its role as 'honest broker.' The Commission's intermediary role granted it a mechanism for direct engagement in the legislative decision making process after initiation, despite the fact that it lacks any formal decision making powers.⁹ The introduction of a formal conciliation process during which the EP and Council engage directly helped to facilitate greater interaction between the two chambers of an increasingly symmetrical bicameral legislative body. Direct engagement between the EP

⁷ It should be noted, however, that EP amendments were only difficult for the Council to ignore if the Commission took them up, thus requiring unanimity in the Council to change them.

⁸ En route to this transformation the Codecision procedure was modified by the Amsterdam Treaty to create what is known as Codecision II. The primary difference between the two versions of the procedure was the removal of the ability of the Council to simply reconfirm its previous 'common position' during the conciliation process. See Hix, 2002 for additional details regarding the evolution of the codecision procedure.

⁹ The Commission does have the negative power of withdrawal, as upheld in the recent (2015) decision of the European Court of Justice (Case C-409/13). This allows the Commission to withdraw a bill from consideration before the Council has acted up on it (Art. 293(2) TFEU). In general, the expectation is that the Commission will do this only when there is no feasible winning coalition for the proposal, but recent events suggest that the Commission may also try this path when it feels the Council and EP are straying too far from the goals originally intended in its proposal. The potential impact of early agreements (discussed below) remains unclear. In particular, whether or not an early agreement 'counts' as Council action.

and the Council was further encouraged by the inclusion of the possibility of definitively adopting legislation after the first reading if the Council fully supported the EP's position.¹⁰

The possibility of first-reading adoption of legislation opened the door to what have come to be known as 'early agreement' decisions. Early agreements are achieved when informal trilogues between representatives from the EP and the Council (with representation from the Commission present as well) negotiate a final agreement on the details of a proposal prior to the formal first reading in the EP. This allows the EP to introduce the agreed compromise during its first reading and the Council to adopt it without amendment, resulting in the bill being adopted at first reading. Over time recourse to early agreements has increased substantially, with recent analyses suggesting that nearly 85% of all decisions under the ordinary procedure are achieved through the early agreement process (Bressenelli, Koop and Reh, 2015: 92). While there are a number of different interpretations of the impact of the current use (abuse) of the early agreement procedure in terms of its impact on transparency and the democratic legitimacy of the EU legislative process (Reh, 2014; Costa, Dehousse and Trakalova, 2011; Rasmussen, 2011; Reh, Héritier, Bressanelli, 2013), there is little debate regarding its effect on inter-institutional relations. The development of strong institutional and personal links between the Council and the EP, in conjunction with the formal changes to the legislative procedure, have resulted in a European Parliament that is much less dependent on the Commission for the achievement of its policy goals. The bulk of legislative bargaining now formally and informally occurs directly between the Council and the EP. The question is whether or not this has had any effect on policy preference congruence and coalition strategies between the three legislative institutions.

Understanding Inter-institutional Relations in the EU

Analyses of inter-institutional relations within the EU have historically focused on the ideological character of the institutions rather than relative power dynamics. The implicit assumption in the literature has generally been that the EP and the Commission form coalitions because of their shared supranational character and subsequent pro-integration policy preferences, while the Council, and later the European Council, represent the interests of the member states, and are, therefore, more skeptical of initiatives to increase integration. Thus, alliances form on the basis of the supranational and intergovernmental character of the institutions themselves. This assumption is evident in most spatial models/representations of EU decision-making, which explicitly place the Commission between the Council and the EP along an axis of more or less integration (Tsebelis 1994, 1997; Kreppel, 1999; 2000; Thomson, 2009, 2011).¹¹

¹⁰ The development of a mechanism to allow early agreements was introduced by a resolution within the European Parliament in 1995 and eventually included in the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 (now Art. 294 TFEU). Recourse to first reading or early agreements did not really begin to grow until after 2004 however.

¹¹ There have been some efforts to examine decision making from a more partisan perspective based on the standard left-right ideological axis, however, most of these look at behavior within institutions, rather than between them. See for example Hix et al, 2007 on the EP and Hageman and Hoyland, 2008 on the Council.

This interpretation, however, has both implicitly and explicitly been based at least in part on the mediating role of the Commission in the legislative process. As the ‘guardian of the treaties’ and an ‘honest broker’ between both member states and EU institutions, The Commission has historically had a legislative role that extended well beyond the technical introduction of policy initiatives, despite the absence of any formal role in the decision-making aspects of the policy process. The declining importance of the honest broker role and reduction in direct engagement after a proposal has been initiated has fundamentally undermined these interpretations of inter-institutional coalition behavior (Kreppel and Oztas, 2016; Costello and Thompson, 2013; Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000).

As a result, the character of inter-institutional relationships, within and beyond the legislative process, has become the focus of a spate of new research. For the most part these analyses tend to focus on the various possible dyadic relations (e.g. EP-Commission, EP-Council) rather than examining the nexus of relations between all three legislative institutions. Those that reflect on the changing character of EP-Commission relations tend to focus on the changing power dynamic between the two, and in particular the relative increase in the power of the EP (Farrell and Héritier, 2007; Moury, 2007; Stacey, 2003). Others, however, underscore the natural affinity between the policy interests of the EP and Commission (Rosén, 2016; Ebeberg, Gornitka and Trondal, 2014). These analyses reflect early interpretations that focus on the supranational character of the two institutions and their general support for more, rather than less integration. What distinguishes these analyses, however, is that they interpret the empowerment of the EP as a possible net benefit for the Commission. Thus, the Commission is understood to have an incentive to encourage EP empowerment within specific issue areas in which the EP is likely to support Commission initiatives during negotiations with the Council (Stacey, 2003), particularly if doing so will serve to increase the perceived legitimacy of EU decisions (Rosén, 2016). From this perspective, the formal empowerment of the EP, even potentially at the expense of Commission power, is in the interests of the Commission if the two institutions share policy preferences and if the EP can serve as a valuable ally vis-à-vis the Council.

Analyses of the changing relationship between the Council and the EP are fewer, and tend to focus on the development of increased formal and informal linkages between the two institutions. In most cases the underlying question is why member states have decided (repeatedly) to increase the EP’s legislative powers, despite the likely preference divergence between the EP and the Council. The answers range from discussions of ‘logic of appropriateness’ arguments focused on reducing the democratic deficit and engaging with social norms regarding democratic governance to analyses of ‘incomplete contracts’ and unintended consequences (Pogge, 1997; Hix, 2002; Katz, 2001, Crum, 2005) Regardless of the explanations provided for why the EP has been granted increased legislative influence, the conclusion is that its empowerment has resulted in a necessary increase in direct formal and informal collaboration and cooperation between it and the Council.

The most visible reflection this is the emergence of early agreements as the de facto norm of the EU legislative process (Farrell and Héritier, 2004; De Ruyter and Neuhold, 2012; Reh

et al, 2013; Bressanelli et al, 2015).¹² Efforts to explain the high level of apparent consensus between the Council and the EP (as evidenced by the dramatic increase in the use of early agreements) are largely institutionalist in character (Mühlböck and Rittberger, 2015). These generally focus on the pragmatic need of both institutions for decision-making efficiency and the costs of failure for the individual institutions and the EU as a whole. Both legislative chambers benefit from successful policy initiatives and are harmed by public failures to agree on mechanisms for pursuing the best interests of the EU. Thus, despite the long history of inter-institutional contestation and their diverse representational interests the Council and the EP have incentives to work cooperatively to achieve those policy outcomes that are feasible as efficiently as possible.

The long history of formal and informal increases to the legislative powers of the EP leads naturally to the general expectations that the EP will be both more involved and more influential in the policy making process of the EU. The impact of this expansion of EP power on the other legislative institutions is less obvious, particularly in terms of the relations between all three, as opposed to a specific dyad. Despite the general, though not universal, interpretation that increased EP powers have led to a decrease in Commission influence, it is not all clear what this result might mean in terms of inter-institutional coalition dynamics between the EP and the Commission.¹³ If the EP and the Commission continue to share policy preferences as a result of their general supranational characteristics then it may not matter where the relative balance of power lies, as long as they work together cooperatively. On the other hand, if the ability of the EP to make the most of its increased legislative powers requires that it work to find agreements with the Council, at the expense of some policy priorities shared with the Commission, then the empowerment of the EP, combined with the concomitant marginalization of the Commission in the decision making stage of policy making, clearly reduces the policy making role of the Commission.

The ramifications of the EP's increased legislative powers on the Council are even less well understood. Though it is clear that there is an increasingly high level of collaboration between the Council and the EP as witnessed by the dominance of early agreements, the impact on the relative decision making powers of the two institutions is less clear. Under the (revised) codecision procedure (now the ordinary procedure) the EP and the Council are formally equals in the legislative process. This would suggest that they are equally able to extract compromises and concessions from each other during the legislative process.¹⁴ However, there is currently little empirical research to test this argument.¹⁵

¹² There are, however, other analyses that examine the development of potential partisan linkages between the two institutions (via national parties) and the potential implications for EP-Council relations and EU policy-making (Mühlböck, 2013; Kreppel, 2013).

¹³ The power dynamic may not need to be interpreted as zero-sum if a broader interpretation of the policy-making process is employed. For example, if the Commission required EP engagement to improve the legitimacy of its policy initiatives then both the EP and the Commission benefit from the increase in EP decision making authority (Rosén, 2016)

¹⁴ There is some analysis that suggests that changes to the rules of the EP that provide greater transparency regarding EP positions during the informal trilogies that proceed early agreements has actually led to information asymmetries that effectively reduce the bargaining power of the EP (Héritier and Reh, 2012).

¹⁵ Because of the informal character of early agreements it is actually increasingly difficult to attempt to evaluate who is 'winning' during the negotiation process. It may be that in the future, because of the EP's

To gain greater insight into the implications of the empowerment of the EP on the influence of the Commission, Council and EP on the policy outcomes of the EU and the patterns of policy preference congruence and institutional coalition formation between them I introduce a series of hypotheses derived from the literature. These focus on the changing power dynamics between the core legislative institutions and their likely implications. The hypotheses are then tested empirically utilizing several existing datasets to evaluate the extent to which increased EP power has altered the character of inter-institutional coalition building in the EU policy process.

Changing Patterns of Inter-institutional Coalition Building

The most obvious conclusion from across the literature is that the direct legislative authority of the EP has increased substantially over the last three decades. As a result of the introduction of an informal power of delay founded in its own interpretation of the *Isoglucose* ruling, through the gradual expansion of its formal legislative powers, and because the concomitant shift in the perception of the EP, it has been transformed from an external observer of the legislative process dependent upon Commission support for its positions to an autonomous policy entrepreneur co-equal with the Council in most policy realms. Thus, the EP is no longer a 'conditional' actor in the policy process and no longer reliant on the good will of the Commission to further its policy preferences.

H1 – The direct legislative power of the EP has increased resulting in greater independent policy influence and autonomy from the Commission. As a result, the EP is less reliant on coalitions based on policy preference congruence with the Commission for its success in achieving its preferred legislative outcomes.

Despite the general shift in the standing of the EP throughout its inter-institutional relations with the Commission and the Council, formal powers do matter. As a result, it is anticipated that the increase in the EP's autonomous policy influence will be greater under those legislative procedures in which it has formal decision-making authority (Codecision and the Ordinary Procedure).

H1a – The policy influence of the EP is higher under the codecision/ordinary procedure leading to a higher probability of achieving its policy objectives under this procedure.

In contrast to the rising independence of the EP, the Commission has found itself in an increasingly contingent position in the legislative process. Though it maintains its unique status as the formal initiator of all EU legislation (including decisions, directives and regulations), its ability to control the character and content of the eventual outcome of policymaking has diminished. The Commission is less able to shape EP policy contributions since the EP can simply offer its amendments directly without the mediating role of the Commission. In addition, the previous centrality of the 'honest broker' role of the Commission has been profoundly diminished by the increasing recourse to informal negotiations and early agreements between Council and EP. As a result, the autonomous

internal rules regarding formally approved EP negotiating positions that it will more feasible to evaluate negotiating positions with final outcomes to assess relative success, at least for the EP.

influence of the Commission, beyond the initial act of initiation, has been reduced leading to a greater reliance on shared policy preferences for the achievement of its policy goals.

H2 – The power of the Commission to obtain its policy objectives is indirect and relies on its ability to form coalitions with the legislative decision makers (the EP and the Council) as a result of policy preference congruence.

This reduction in Commission influence is especially apparent when policies are decided by early agreements between the Council and the EP. Despite the norm of holding informal *trilogues* that include the Commission during negotiations between the Council and the EP prior to the adoption of early agreements, the reduced role of the Commission during this process is evident by the near total absence of any discussion of the role of the Commission in the spate of recent analyses of early agreements (Reh et al, 2013; Bressanelli et al, 2015; see also the discussion in Kreppel and Oztas, 2016).

H2a – Early agreements diminish the legislative influence of the Commission resulting in reduced ability to achieve its policy goals.

In addition to fundamentally restructuring the relationship between the EP and the Commission, the changing character of the EP and its relative legislative powers has resulted in a shift in the inter-institutional relations between the EP and the Council. Despite the moniker of ‘parliament,’ the limited decision making powers of the EP, combined with the somewhat hybrid character of the Council long delayed a general understanding of the EU institutional structure. Despite the broad acceptance of the EU’s legislative branch as bicameral, and largely symmetric today (Konig et al, 2007; Rasmussen, 2011; Kreppel, 2011; Costello and Thomson, 2011), it was not until the late 1990s that the term bicameralism was even applied to the EU (Tsebelis and Money, 1997). The broader institutional effects of symmetric bicameralism are well understood (Diermeier and Myerson, 1997; Tsebelis and Money, 1997; Heller, 2007). Most important among them, of course, is the need for both legislative chambers to agree to adopt policy initiatives. Under the ordinary legislative procedure (and the previous revised Codecision Procedure) neither chamber can formally dominate the other, meaning they must agree or be able to find a compromise or no policy can be adopted (and the status quo remains).

H3 – The EU is bicameral in character thus; the both the EP and the Council will be more likely to achieve their legislative objectives when their policy preferences converge.

Despite the dramatic increases in legislative power obtained by the EP since the late 1980s, it remains in some regards the junior partner in the legislative game. Partially this is the result of some policy areas falling outside of the requirement for fully equal decision-making between the EP and the Council.¹⁶ Given that the EP is generally more in favor of

¹⁶ The most obvious arena is of course foreign policy issues previously housed in the so-called second pillar. But even outside of this limitation, there are specific policy areas not fully governed by the ‘ordinary’ procedure as outlined in Article 294 TFEU. These are decided under ‘special procedures’ (Article 289 TFEU) and include decisions regarding internal market exemptions and competition law, as well as some aspects of intellectual property among others.

integration than the Council this can result in a bargaining advantage for the Council since the EP will generally be willing to accept some (even marginal) integration over no integration (frequently the default status quo position). Thus, the relative proximity of the Council to the status quo creates a power imbalance in spite of the formal decision-making rules. However, both the perceived democratic legitimacy of the EP and the ability of the Commission to use its formal power of initiation strategically suggest that the Council will find it more difficult to obtain its goals when the two supranational actors share policy preferences.

H4 – The Council retains a high level of autonomy in legislative decision-making, but can be negatively impacted by EP-Commission coalitions. The ability of the Council to achieve its policy objectives will be reduced when the Commission and EP share policy preferences that differ from those of the Council.

As policies become increasingly salient, the willingness of either of the two legislative chambers to concede their positions will decrease. As a result policy preference congruence between the EP and the Council will be increasingly important in terms of the likelihood of the two legislative chambers ultimately achieving an agreement on policy outcomes.

H4a – High policy saliency will increase the importance of the EP-Council coalition in determining policy outcomes.

While previous analyses of EU decision-making have tended to assume a natural supranational coalition between the EP and the Commission, this research looks instead at the likely impact of the fundamental change in the character of the EP on its inter-institutional coalition patterns and the impact of policy preference congruence. Rather than assuming that the EP and Commission share policy preferences, and that this policy preference congruence shapes the EU legislative process, this analysis examines preference congruence between the three core legislative actors and the impact of different coalition patterns that result. In particular, this research investigates the potential impact of the need for increased EP-Council collaboration as a result of the increasingly symmetrical character of the EU's bicameral legislative branch. To test the hypotheses outlined above three existing datasets on decision making on the EU are partially merged and employed in evaluating the patterns of inter-institutional coalition formation and their impact on the policy process.

Data on Decision Making in the EU

One of the largest difficulties in measuring the relative influence of political actors on the policy process is evaluating their preferences over outcomes. Formal powers and ideological positions (however measured) provide only a limited ability to impute preferences and evaluate influence.¹⁷ One of the rare exceptions to this conundrum is the

¹⁷ A wide variety of measures including elite surveys (Bakker et al, 2012) and party manifesto data (Merz et al, 2016) are available to infer party positions across a spectrum of policy issues.

Decision-making in the European Union (DEU II) dataset developed by Thomson et al. (2012). This unique dataset provides information on a total of 331 controversial issues included within 125 different legislative proposals that were introduced between 1996 and 2008. For each specific policy issue the dataset identifies the outcome (on a 0-100 point scale) preferred by each of the key legislative actors (e.g. the Commission; the EP and the member states' in the Council of Ministers).¹⁸ Thus, the DEU II dataset provides information on the policy preferences of the institutional actors as well as final outcomes along a unified scale allowing for comparisons between both the preferences of various institutional actors and between the initial preferences of each actor and eventual outcomes.¹⁹

As useful and widely utilized as the DEU II dataset is, there are a number of potential weaknesses and critiques. The most obvious weakness from the perspective of this research is that the dataset does not include any data after 2008, which means there is no information regarding the potential impact of the Lisbon Treaty and the adoption of the 'ordinary procedure' with its concomitant expansion of EP influence across a wide area of new policy areas. As a result the conclusions of this research must be interpreted as preliminary, reflecting the character of inter-institutional relationships and policy influence *before* the changes wrought by the Lisbon Treaty went into effect. Given the substantial expansion of EP influence under the Lisbon Treaty, the results discussed here should be seen as indicative of future trends rather than an assessment of the current situation.

Additional concerns are tied to the character of the dataset itself. These include the selection and dispersion of elites interviewed (very few are from the Council staff and often preferences of actors are imputed by others rather than provided directly). In addition, the 0-100 point scale is loosely assumed to measure degree of integration based on the degree of change from the current status quo position (0 being least and 100 being most change/integrationist), however not all issue areas are easily placed on this axis and the significance of the differences in position between issues may not be consistent. Since zero always represents the least integrationist (least change) position and 100 the most integrationist/changed policy position the relative value of actor positions are intrinsically tied to the dynamics of each specific policy area rather than some absolute measure of pro or anti integration/change position. This makes aggregate analysis more challenging as the relative value of position distances are not consistent across policy areas.²⁰ As this analysis does not focus on the character of the policy preferences of the various actors in terms of relative support for integration/change, but rather the extent and character of inter-

¹⁸ This data was collected through a laborious process that included nearly 350 semi-structured interviews with key actors within the EU legislative process from across the three relevant institutions over a period of several years.

¹⁹ The DEU II dataset includes information for the EP and the Commission as unitary actors and information on the preferences of the major party groups within the EP (though the latter has a higher level of missing data). In addition it provides information on the preferences of each of the member states within the Council rather than a unified position for the Council as a whole (Thomson et al, 2012). In this analysis, following from Kreppel and Oztas, 2016, we use a single measure for the Council derived from the mean of their individual preferences.

²⁰ For a more in-depth analysis of these and other concerns regarding the DEU II dataset see Slapin, 2014.

institutional preference congruence, coalitions and distances between preferences and the eventual policy outcome, this is less of a concern here.²¹

In addition to the information regarding the preferences of the various actors provided by the DEU II data set, this analysis incorporates additional information regarding the character of the policies analyzed and the potential role of partisan ideological proximity. While the DEU II provides information on the legislative procedure employed and the saliency of the issue for the various actors, it does not provide additional information on the character of specific issues or legislative proposals. As an additional measure of the changing character of inter-institutional decision-making several additional variables have been added to the base DEU II data set. In all cases the additional information is available only for policies adopted under the codecision procedure, as a result analyses that include these variables have a smaller N (the exact number depends on the specific variables included (see below)).

Given the increasing importance of early agreements and the expectation that these limit the influence of the Commission a dummy variable is added for all codecision procedure policies indicating if there was an early agreement (or a 3rd reading decision) between the Council and the EP.²² To examine the possible impact of ideological proximity on coalition building between the EP and the Council a variable measuring the ideological distance between the EP rapporteur for the proposal and the median position of the Council devised by Mahr and Ringe (2016) in their analysis of EP legislative influence was included. The saliency data in the original DEU II data is specific to each institution rather than a general measure and includes a large number of missing data points making it difficult to include in this analysis. Instead, an alternative measure of saliency based on number of recitals devised by Wøien Hansen (2014) as part of an analysis focused on explaining the absence of early agreements was utilized.²³

The Impact of Policy Preference Congruence

The information on actor policy preferences across a relatively large number of issues areas and specific policies provided by the DEU II dataset offers a rare opportunity to examine the impact of preference congruence on legislative influence. In particular, this type of information allows for an assessment of the independent decision-making influence of the various actors. A political hegemon would be able to achieve their preferred policy outcomes regardless of the preferences of the other actors or their relative proximity. In contrast, an actor with only limited autonomous policy influence or decision-making authority would be reliant upon preference congruence with other more powerful actors

²¹ See below for a description of how the DEU II dataset is utilized in this analysis through the creation of categories rather than nominal distances.

²² This information was collected from the European Parliament's website on legislative activity (available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/>). Each piece of legislation adopted by codecision in the DEU II dataset was looked up to determine if a decision was reached at first reading. If so it was coded as an early decision.

²³ The respective authors graciously provided these datasets for use in this research.

for the achievement of their preferred outcomes. By providing information about the policy preference of the core legislative actors, as well as the eventual outcome the DEU II data allows for an analysis of the relative dependence of the Commission, EP and Council on each other in the pursuit of their policy goals.

As useful as this dataset is, however, it is not without weakness – as noted above. Of particular concern is the reliance on a 100-point scale for the measurement of the relative positions of all actors. While this approach worked well for the originally intended analysis of relative bargaining power under different decision-making rules on an issue-by-issue basis, it does not easily allow for reliable generalizations across the 331 issues in the dataset. The absolute value of a 20pt distance, for example, may vary significantly from one policy area to the next, making it problematic to interpret results based on absolute distances from ideal preferences. To avoid this potential pitfall, this analysis instead develops a set of dichotomous variables to measure legislative success and inter-institutional preference proximity.

The dependent variable across the analyses presented here is ‘legislative success.’ This is measured in terms of relative proximity to the final outcome. In other words, the ‘winner’ of the legislative game is the actor whose policy preference is closest to the eventual outcome. If multiple actors have the same preference, and this is the closest to the eventual outcome they are all considered winners, thus there can be more than one winner per policy decision if there is agreement between two or more actors. To avoid creating artificial differentiations between ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ any actor whose preference is within ± 5 points of the ‘winner’ on the 100-point DEU II scale is also considered to be a winner.²⁴ Note that utilizing this criterion for winning means that the designated ‘winners’ did not necessarily obtain their ideal outcome; they merely got closer than the other actors.

To determine whether the various actors are ‘winning’ the policy making game as a result of their own independent legislative influence or simply as a result of sharing policy preferences with those who have such power (luck) I include set of dichotomous variables indicating policy preference congruence between actors. For each policy included in the DEU II data set, the relative preferred positions of the actors were compared. Actors were deemed to have congruent preferences (a policy coalition) if they were within ± 10 points of each other on the DEU II 100 point scale.²⁵ Despite the fact that the policy areas selected for the DEU II dataset are supposed to be highly contentious and/or salient, there are a number of cases in which there is a high level of agreement across all three actors, a dummy variable for consensus controls for this when all actor preferences are within ± 10 points of each other.

²⁴ All of the analyses discussed below were also run with a 10-point margin with essentially similar results. The use of a margin for victory is particularly important because while the EP and Commission have unitary scores, the Council score is an aggregate derived from the positions of the various individual member states, resulting in a greater diversity of institutional preference scores.

²⁵ A ± 5 point scale was also created and tested with largely similar results. In the end, however, the decision to utilize the 10-point scale was made because it resulted in fewer omitted cases.

Additional independent variables are included to control for the impact of the legislative procedure (Codecision), early agreements and 3rd reading decisions. These controls also tie in directly to several of the hypotheses described above as they speak specifically to the anticipated relative influence of the various actors. The EP has greater formal power under the Codecision Procedure, while the Commission is largely excluded from decisions made through early agreements. Policy outcomes decided at 3rd reading are likely to be highly contentious and certainly represent cases where there is little policy congruence between the EP and the Council. This may serve to increase the negotiating influence of the Commission and or demonstrate the dominance of the Council. Finally, two additional variables are included measuring the saliency of the legislation (Wøien Hansen, 2014) and ideological distance (left-right) between the EP rapporteur and the Council median (Mahr-Ringe, 2016) datasets.²⁶ These variables provide additional insight into the potential role of saliency on the relative impact of the various actors and the potential impact of ideological distances between the two legislative chambers.

Because the dependent variables used in all cases are dichotomous (winning/not winning) logistic analysis is employed in all analyses.²⁷ For each institution a series of five models are tested to examine the impact of just policy congruence (Model 1), policy congruence and simple controls for procedure and outcome (Model 2), impact of the stage at which a decision was made (Model 3) and two individual models adding the additional measures for saliency (Model 4) and ideological distance between EP and Council (Model 5). These last were run individually because; despite similar claims of comprehensive coverage, each was missing a number of the codecision cases included in the DEU II dataset. Note that models 3-5 include *only* decisions made under the Codecision Procedure either because the analysis is examining the impact of early agreements and 3rd readings (Model 3) or because these were the only cases included in the dataset for the relevant independent variable (Model 4 and Model 5). The results of the statistical analyses are presented in Table 1 (European Parliament), Table 2 (Commission) and Table 3 (Council of the European Union). Each institution will be discussed separately and then some of the patterns that emerge across institutions will be analyzed with reference to Hypotheses 1-4 discussed above.²⁸

While this analysis cannot effectively measure change across time given the limitations of the underlying DEU II data, we can control for the influence of a variety of different variables on the likelihood that the eventual policy outcome will be closest to the

²⁶ Note that the data provided in both cases is for the legislative proposal as a whole rather than the specific policy issues provided in the DEU II dataset.

²⁷ With dependent variables that are discrete (in this case dichotomous) and measure only membership in a group or category standard OLS methods are inappropriate as they can lead, among other things, to predicted values of greater than one and/or less than zero and such values are theoretically inadmissible with a dichotomous (0,1) variable.

²⁸ The number of cases in each model across the three institutions varies based on the inclusion (or not) of non-codecision data (Models 1 and 2) and the level of missing data points for actor preferences in the DEU II dataset. Note that because of the comparatively high level of missing data for the "Status Quo" variable for codecision policies, this is only included in Model 2. The dummy variable for the codecision procedure is of course omitted from Models 3-5, which only include codecision legislation.

preferences of the institution in question. Beginning with the European Parliament (Table 1), the base model (Model 1) demonstrates the positive effect of policy congruence with both the Commission and the Council, even when controlling for generally consensual policy issues. Moreover, the significance of preference congruence with the Commission and Council is true across all models. It should be noted, however, that the positive impact of policy congruence is much stronger for the Council (EP-CEU) than the Commission (COM-EP). In the most basic model the EP is 1.6 times as likely to ‘win’ the policy battle when its preference is within 10 points of the Commission’s, but it is over four times as likely to when there is a similar proximity to the Council’s preferred outcome. The greater impact of preference proximity with the Council is also consistent across all five models - peaking in Model 4 (discussed further below).

These initial results demonstrate that the EP is still more successful when it shares policy preferences with the other institutions, but, as anticipated by Hypothesis 1, its previously theorized reliance on the Commission is no longer as critical. Instead, as should be anticipated, it is preference congruence between the two legislative branches with direct power over decision-making that is more significant, at least for the European Parliament – as predicted by Hypothesis 3. There is however, no support for Hypothesis 1a. Indeed, the magnitude of preference congruence with the Council actually decreases when we control for decisions reached under the Codecision Procedure (thus, less significant for non-Codecision bills) and the dummy for Codecision is not significant. Instead, there is a negative relationship between EP success and an outcome that approximates the previous status quo. Indeed the EP is less than half as likely to ‘win’ the policy game when the result is the maintenance of the status quo (Model 2). This is likely reflective of the longstanding interpretation that the EP, as a supranational institution, is usually supportive of policy change given that in the EU context such change is generally indicative of increased integration. Further indication that Hypothesis 1a is not correct can be seen in Model 3. Although early agreements have a positive impact on the likelihood of EP success, it falls just short of significance. Moreover, there is a negative impact for 3rd reading decisions. Such decisions are increasingly rare and they occur only when no agreement has been possible between the EP and the Council in the earlier stages of the legislative process. The results of Model 3 suggest that when such strong differences between the Council and the EP occur, even under codecision, when the EP has maximal power, the EP loses the battle, with success 65% less likely than decisions reached before the 3rd reading.

Interestingly, the saliency of a policy does not appear to be the cause of such contention between the EP and Council as the EP is more likely to be successful when saliency is higher (Model 4). The saliency variable is borrowed from Wøien (2014) and reflects the number of recitals in the original Commission proposal.²⁹ In the sample analyzed here this ranges from 5 to 49. For each additional recital included in the legislation, the likelihood of the outcome most closely reflecting the preferences of the EP increases by approximately 3.7%. It is also noteworthy that controlling for the saliency of an issue increases the

²⁹ The relative importance of a piece of legislation is assumed to be correlated with the space dedicated to justifying it generally the core function of the recitals within a legislative proposal (Häge, 2007; Häge and Naurin, 2013).

magnitude of the impact of EP-Council policy congruence significantly, with the EP more than 14 times as likely to obtain an outcome closest to its policy preferences when these align with the Council's (Model 4). This would seem to contradict the expectations of Hypothesis 4a.³⁰ In contrast, the impact of ideological proximity between the EP rapporteur and the median Council member is not significant and its inclusion has little impact on the other variables included in the model (Model 5).

The results of the analysis are similar to a certain degree for the Commission (Table 2). As with the EP, the Commission is more likely to be successful when its preferences align with those of the other legislative actors. The effects are, however, more significant in the case of the Commission. While the likelihood of EP success increased 1.6 times when its preferences aligned with the Commission, for the Commission preference congruence with the EP results in a nearly four times greater likelihood of success (and nearly eight times higher when it has policy preference congruence with the Council (Model 1). This high level of policy congruence influence is consistent across all five models (Table 2), underscoring the high degree of Commission reliance on the 'luck' of policy congruence with the other legislative actors in line with Hypothesis 2.

The impact of the Codecision Procedure and resulting increased collaboration between the Council and the EP is less clear, although there is some support for Hypothesis 2a in Model 4 and Model 3 suggests that 3rd reading agreements also result in a decrease in influence for the Commission. The Commission is only about 36% as likely to have policy outcomes reflect its preferences when 3rd reading decisions are necessary (Model 3), thus both the EP and the Commission are less successful when 3rd readings are required.³¹ Interesting, once the saliency of the proposal (as measured through number of recitals) is included in the analysis 3rd readings fail to be significant and instead early agreements have the negative relationship anticipated by Hypothesis 2a. Thus, in Model 4 the Commission is 57% less likely to 'win' the legislative process when the Council and the EP reach an early agreement.³²

Finally, Model 5 presents the interesting result that increases in the ideological distance between the EP rapporteur and the Council median have a negative effect on the success of the Commission. This suggests that the Commission not only relies on policy congruence with the other two institutions individually, but also suffers when they are ideologically distant from each other (Model 5). This is somewhat surprising as it might be expected

³⁰ Most likely I need to introduce an interactive term to look at congruence when salience is high. This will be tested during revisions.

³¹ Although the decline in 3rd reading agreements is usually attributed to the time costs associated with the drawn out nature of the legislative process, it may well be that the EP and the Commission try to avoid 3rd readings because they tend to do less well when the process reaches this stage. Alternatively, it could be that when the EP (and Commission) know they are likely to fail to obtain their policy preferences, they draw out the process for as long as possible in hopes of some change in outcome.

³² Both 3rd reading and early agreement variables are significant only at the 90% threshold and are clearly not robust to changes in the model specifications. Thus, these results should be cautiously interpreted.

that the Commission could use differences between the EP and the Council to its advantage to push its own policy agenda.³³

In contrast to the EP and the Commission, the most notable thing about the Council is its relative lack of reliance on preference congruence with the other two actors (Table 3). In the base model (Model 1), none of the variables measuring preference congruence are significant. Indeed across all five models there is only a positive effect in Model 5 when the Council and the EP have congruent preferences (discussed below). Thus, despite the EP and Commission's reliance on the happy circumstance of sharing policy preferences with the Council, the policy influence of the Council is largely unaffected.³⁴ Interesting, however, the Council is negatively impacted in some cases (Models 2 and 5) by preference congruence between the EP and the Commission. Thus, in non Codecision cases (Model 2) and when controlling for the ideological distance between the EP rapporteur and the Council median (Model 5) coalitions between the EP and Council can hamper the ability of the Council to achieve its policy goals, lending some support to Hypothesis 4.

These results suggest that Hypothesis 3 is only partially true. While the EP is more successful when its preferences are similar to those of the Council (Table 1), such preference congruence has relatively little impact on Council success – suggesting it remains a much more autonomous institution in the policy process.³⁵ Positive preference congruence between the Council and the EP only has a positive effect on Council success when ideological distance between EP rapporteur and Council median is included in the analysis (Model 5).

Finally, as indicated by the discussion of the EP and the Commission, the Council is nearly three times more likely to be successful at obtaining an outcome closest to its policy preferences when the legislation is decided at 3rd reading (Model 3).³⁶ No other variables tested are significant for the likelihood of Council success. This underscores the extent to which the relative influence of the Council over policy outcomes remains largely independent of the policy preferences of the other actors or the salience of the proposal.

Conclusions

The analysis presented here provides a number of insights into the emerging character of inter-institutional decision-making and the impact of policy preference congruence on actor's ability to achieve their preferred policy outcomes. As anticipated, the relative balance of power between the Commission and the EP appears to have shifted from earlier models. Prior to the Codecision Procedure it was assumed that the policy influence of the EP was 'conditional' - effectively reliant upon support from the Commission (Tsebelis,

³³ This result is made more confusing by the fact that the variable is not significant for either the EP or the Council themselves (Table 1 and Table 3).

³⁴ The relationship is positive, but fails to meet significance criteria in all cases.

³⁵ Though, of course, the Council can be negatively impacted by coalitions against it as noted above.

³⁶ This variable falls just short of statistical significance in Models 4 and 5 - likely as a result of the reduced number of cases.

1994). The analysis presented here suggests that this pattern is shifting and it is now the Commission that is more reliant on policy preference congruence with the EP for legislative success based on the magnitude of the odds ratios reported in Tables 1 and 2. Coalitions between the two institutions are still important, however, and it appears that only when they present a united front against the preferences of the Council are they able to effectively constrain the ability of the Council to win the policy game (Table 3).

Though more powerful than in the past, the formal addition of policy ‘codecision’ with the Council does not appear to have been sufficient (at least through 2008) to create truly co-equal branches in terms of relative policy influence. It may be that the EP better able to shift policy outcomes towards its preferences since the introduction of the Cooperation and Codecision procedures, but it is clearly not able to ensure outcomes that are closer to its preferences than the preferences of the Council.³⁷ This analysis demonstrates that EP success remains heavily contingent on preference congruence, however the primary institutional interlocutor has shifted from the Commission to the Council. The emerging relationship appears to be one of informal bicameral asymmetry. Despite increasingly equal decision making powers within the formal legislative procedures, the EP is still the junior partner in the legislative game. Given the strong negative association between EP success and the status quo, as an outcome it may well be that the power imbalance reflects the character of actor preferences. Since the EP prefers some integration to none, it is willing to accept an outcome that is closer to Council preferences if it nonetheless increases EU integration.

The dominance of the Council, and its relative independence from the preferences of the other institutional actors is inline with historical interpretations of the Council as the dominant policy actor in the EU (Table 3). Despite being negatively impacted by a unified coalition against in some cases, the Council appears largely unaffected by the existence of preference congruence in terms of the broad results analyzed here (winning or not winning the legislative game). More over, the clear dominance of the Council in 3rd reading agreements provides some explanation for why the Commission and the EP might work hard to avoid them (providing an alternative explanation for the rise of early agreements).

Overall, this analysis suggests a shift towards bicameral decision-making between the EP and the Council, with the Council continuing as the dominant actor and the Commission an increasingly peripheral actor. The trends highlighted here, however, should be taken only as indicative of the current situation as they do not include any data from the post Lisbon period. Given the uncertain results of the codecision procedure in this analysis it is not clear if the independent influence of the EP is likely to have increased since the implementation of the significantly expanded ‘Ordinary Procedure.’ Though an increasingly contingent role for the Commission seems likely.

³⁷ Because of the difficulty in interpreting absolute distances in the DEU II dataset it is not possible to provide a reliable measure of EP bargaining impact based on the distance between preferences and outcomes. Analyses utilizing absolute distances do suggest that the EP is able to pull the Council towards its own preferences, even when the EP does not ultimately win.

Table 1: Determinants of European Parliament Legislative Success

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
	Logit Coefficient	Odds Ratio	Logit Coefficient	Odds Ratio	Logit Coefficient	Odds Ratio	Logit Coefficient	Odds Ratio	Logit Coefficient	Odds Ratio
COM-EP (10)	0.497* (0.285)	1.644* (0.468)	0.778** (0.358)	2.178** (0.780)	0.757** (0.370)	2.131** (0.789)	0.835* (0.445)	2.306* (1.025)	1.069** (0.447)	2.913** (1.302)
COM-CEU (10)	-0.643 (0.545)	0.526 (0.286)	-0.466 (0.622)	0.628 (0.390)	-0.224 (0.642)	0.799 (0.513)	0.154 (0.778)	1.167 (0.908)	-0.304 (0.741)	0.738 (0.547)
EP-CEU (10)	1.412*** (0.405)	4.106*** (1.663)	1.193** (0.471)	3.297** (1.553)	1.933*** (0.631)	6.912*** (4.362)	2.642*** (0.845)	14.05*** (11.87)	2.066** (0.875)	7.896** (6.906)
Consensus (10)	1.147 (0.962)	3.150 (3.029)	1.562 (1.386)	4.768 (6.607)	0.585 (1.486)	1.794 (2.667)	-0.140 (1.944)	0.869 (1.689)	0.377 (1.628)	1.458 (2.373)
Codecision			-0.187 (0.322)	0.829 (0.267)						
SQ win			-0.780* (0.432)	0.459* (0.198)						
Early Agree					0.259 (0.372)	1.296 (0.482)	0.501 (0.438)	1.650 (0.723)	-0.159 (0.447)	0.853 (0.382)
3 rd Reading					-1.051* (0.565)	0.350* (0.198)	0.212 (0.817)	1.236 (1.010)	-0.260 (0.860)	0.771 (0.664)
Saliency (WH)							0.0367* (0.0190)	1.037* (0.0197)		
Rapp-CEU Med. (MR)									-0.0336 (0.317)	0.967 (0.306)
Constant	-0.580*** (0.194)	0.560*** (0.109)	-0.535* (0.309)	0.585* (0.181)	-0.699** (0.279)	0.497** (0.139)	-1.902*** (0.631)	0.149*** (0.0941)	-0.577 (0.569)	0.562 (0.320)
Observations	274	274	195	195	165	165	118	118	113	113

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2: Determinants of Commission Legislative Success

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
	Logit Coefficient	Odds Ratio	Logit Coefficient	Odds Ratio	Logit Coefficient	Odds Ratio	Logit Coefficient	Odds Ratio	Logit Coefficient	Odds Ratio
COM-EP (10)	1.342*** (0.270)	3.827*** (1.034)	1.491*** (0.335)	4.442*** (1.486)	1.613*** (0.388)	5.017*** (1.945)	1.979*** (0.493)	7.237*** (3.571)	2.039*** (0.493)	7.682*** (3.788)
COM-CEU (10)	2.064*** (0.495)	7.880*** (3.901)	2.291*** (0.586)	9.881*** (5.791)	1.934*** (0.609)	6.919*** (4.217)	1.803** (0.769)	6.068** (4.667)	1.674** (0.712)	5.333** (3.798)
EP-CEU (10)	-0.165 (0.407)	0.848 (0.345)	0.187 (0.459)	1.206 (0.553)	-1.174 (0.856)	0.309 (0.265)	-1.457 (1.184)	0.233 (0.276)	-0.473 (1.042)	0.623 (0.649)
Consensus (10)	-0.265 (0.686)	0.767 (0.526)	-0.795 (0.824)	0.451 (0.372)	0.126 (1.145)	1.134 (1.298)	0.653 (1.532)	1.922 (2.943)	-0.236 (1.332)	0.790 (1.052)
Codecision			-0.234 (0.317)	0.791 (0.251)						
SQ win			-0.366 (0.401)	0.694 (0.278)						
Early Agree					-0.621 (0.417)	0.537 (0.224)	-0.857* (0.501)	0.425* (0.213)	-0.666 (0.514)	0.514 (0.264)
3 rd Reading					-1.027* (0.555)	0.358* (0.199)	-0.806 (0.910)	0.446 (0.406)	0.125 (0.988)	1.134 (1.120)
Saliency (WH)							-0.00423 (0.0205)	0.996 (0.0205)		
Rapp-CEU Med. (MR)									-0.795** (0.363)	0.452** (0.164)
Constant	-1.302*** (0.189)	0.272*** (0.0513)	-1.210*** (0.282)	0.298*** (0.0840)	-1.143*** (0.295)	0.319*** (0.0940)	-1.098* (0.633)	0.334* (0.211)	-0.226 (0.629)	0.798 (0.502)
Observations	317	317	229	229	173	173	122	122	117	117

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3: Determinants of Council of the European Union Legislative Success

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
	Logit Coefficient	Odds Ratio	Logit Coefficient	Odds Ratio	Logit Coefficient	Odds Ratio	Logit Coefficient	Odds Ratio	Logit Coefficient	Odds Ratio
COM-EP (10)	-0.403 (0.251)	0.668 (0.168)	-0.828*** (0.313)	0.437*** (0.137)	-0.221 (0.352)	0.802 (0.282)	-0.438 (0.433)	0.645 (0.279)	-0.743* (0.437)	0.476* (0.208)
COM-CEU (10)	0.570 (0.504)	1.768 (0.892)	0.116 (0.573)	1.123 (0.643)	0.371 (0.599)	1.449 (0.868)	0.339 (0.763)	1.403 (1.070)	0.147 (0.691)	1.158 (0.800)
EP-CEU (10)	-0.213 (0.336)	0.808 (0.272)	-0.459 (0.399)	0.632 (0.252)	0.734 (0.577)	2.083 (1.202)	0.341 (0.675)	1.406 (0.949)	2.124* (1.182)	8.367* (9.887)
Consensus (10)	0.0583 (0.687)	1.060 (0.728)	0.516 (0.822)	1.676 (1.378)	1.160 (1.274)	3.189 (4.063)	- -	- -	0.480 (1.438)	1.616 (2.324)
Codecision			0.431 (0.286)	1.539 (0.441)						
SQ win			0.226 (0.356)	1.253 (0.446)						
Early Agree					0.136 (0.357)	1.146 (0.409)	0.0226 (0.404)	1.023 (0.413)	0.294 (0.438)	1.342 (0.588)
3 rd Reading					1.072** (0.514)	2.921** (1.502)	0.483 (0.759)	1.621 (1.230)	0.655 (0.823)	1.926 (1.586)
Saliency (WH)							-0.0210 (0.0173)	0.979 (0.0170)		
Rapp-CEU Med. (MR)									-0.0340 (0.303)	0.967 (0.292)
Constant	0.411*** (0.159)	1.509*** (0.240)	0.425* (0.248)	1.529* (0.380)	0.105 (0.254)	1.110 (0.282)	0.817 (0.548)	2.264 (1.240)	0.353 (0.557)	1.423 (0.792)
Observations	318	318	230	230	174	174	118	118	118	118

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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