Gender equality promotion in post-communist E.U. member & candidate states:

How do parties matter?

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Abstract

Post-communist democracies present a unique case to examine the interplay between supranational governance and domestic politics when it comes to support and promotion of women's rights at the national level. The parties in these democracies are caught between the need to fulfill their mandates and the need to adhere to the supranational E.U. directives that promote women's rights. I argue that as rational actors who are strategic forward-looking thinkers, the parties try to fulfill their mandates. In other words, if a party campaigned on gender equality issues, one should see some policies reflecting these campaign promises, once the party gains power and enters a government coalition. Given that the E.U. legislation on women's rights, such as equal opportunity and equal treatment of men and women in employment or parental leave directives, are, in essence, minimum standards, any adoption of positive discrimination measures will depend on the parties in the government. I test this argument using original data from eight post-communist E.U. democracies and candidate countries. The data offers evidence in support of the mandate theory in the gender equality policy domain. These findings challenge the views of the Eurosceptics who argue that the E.U. increasingly encroaches into the national policy-making and previous scholarship on limited mandate fulfillment in the region in other policy realms (Lipsmeyer 2009, Roberts 2010).
Introduction

Why do some Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries have chosen to substantively advance gender equality via public policy provisions while others did not move beyond the transposition of the anti-discrimination provisions of the E.U. gender equality legislation? This paper argues that parties and their position on women's rights issues are the answer to this empirical puzzle. The case of positive discrimination policy measures in new democracy represents an excellent empirical case to examine how domestic politics intervenes in the case of Europeanization of public policy. The E.U. CEE member and candidate states allow for the most similar systems research design because they share many similarities, such as conditionality pressures, political systems, communist past, and moderately traditionalist attitudes of their respective citizens on the issues of gender equality. Thus, examination of positive discrimination provisions in the existing gender equality and anti-discrimination policies in a similar environment allows us to disentangle the effects of supranational and local governance. The study focuses specifically on anti-discrimination and positive gender equality promotion in the labor market because other equality directives, such as non-discrimination of pregnant workers and parental leave directive have already been reflected in the legislation of the post-communist member states (Avdeyeva 2015). On the other hand, measures of positive discrimination are about recognizing that women are a structurally disadvantaged group and speak more to the politics of recognition (Fraser 2013), or symbolic politics (Htun and Weldon 2018), often ideationally novel to the region.

Thus, the paper makes an original contribution to the literature of the Europeanization of public policy (Cowels, Caporasso, Risse 2001, Martinsen 2007,
Lombardo and Forest 2012, Avdeyeva 2015) by detailing the role political parties play as agents of democratic legitimacy and social change in an increasingly constrained policy-making environment and by moving away from the top-down approach prevalent in the literature. Drawing on mandate responsiveness theory and using original data on party statements related to women's rights from eight post-communist democracies over 25 years aggregated to the level of the 102 governments, this study shows that political actors have room to be responsive to their constituents and they move forward with the promotion of substantive gender equality if they are sensitive to the women's rights issues to begin with. The paper, thus, is also a response to Anderson's (2015, 33) and Hemerijck (2013, 114)\(^1\) call to fill the gap in this literature by illuminating the precise domestic mechanisms that "filter" the impact of E.U. norms on domestic politics.

Thus, the study brings together two bodies of literature that have been developing in largely parallel fashion, yet when put in dialogue, they shed light on the complex policy making environment that new CEE democratic governments operate in. First and foremost, a number of scholars who work in the "mandate theory of democracy" tradition have been working on assessing the degree of policy responsiveness that exists in post-communist democracies (Lipsmeyer 2009, Roberts 2010, Kostadinova and Kostadinova 2016), largely neglecting the influence of the E.U. supranational norms and the gender policy dimension. The second stream of literature on the Europeanization of public policy, as noted above, assesses the degree of consolidation of the legislative norms and suggests explanations for barriers on the way of this convergence in the forms of

\(^{1}\) For instance, Anton Hemerijck writes: "What the growing importance of European integration justifies is the need to overcome "methodological nationalism" and combine
domestic institutions (Cowles, Caporaso and Risse 2001, Martinsen 2007) and is largely historical institutional in nature.

The third body of knowledge that enters the dialogue relates to the study of gender politics in CEE. Though many notable monographs and edited volumes have appeared detailing women's experiences in post-communist societies (Raciopi and O'Sullivan 2008, Moghadam 1993, Johnson and Robinson 2007) and challenges CEE women have in politics (Rueschemeyer 1998, Matland and Montgomery 2003, Rueschemeyer and Wolchik 2009), very few dedicated their attention to the systematic study of the interplay between E.U. supranational norms and party politics in new democracies (for a notable exception, see Avdeyeva 2015, Falkner et al. 2008, Lombardo and Forest 2012).

What is more, the studies on gender politics in the region did not believe that parties were a significant political actor behind the promotion of women's rights in the region (Kostelecky 2002, 117; Rueschemeyer 1998; Avdeyeva 2015, 95; Einhorn 2006, 53). This is what Marilyn Rueschemeyer writes: "We observe that the expectations and worries of large numbers of women are considered relatively unimportant and that they are not even addressed by most of the major political parties" (1998, 286). "It is still far from standard procedures for gender issues to be included in political party programs", claims Barbara Einhorn (2006, 53). My original data on women's rights statements found in the party manifestos suggest otherwise and challenge these earlier findings in the literature. What is more, not only the data record multiple statements on women's rights issues in post-communist democracies, my analysis also shows that the saliency of gender in a party platform matters for the policy outcome.
The paper proceeds as follows. Next section lays out the theoretical foundations that underpin the study. Section three details research design. Analysis is the focus of section four. The conclusion follows.

**Supranational governance vs. democratic responsiveness: The role of parties**

Two mechanisms are at play if one seeks to understand the variation in policy measures adopted in new post-communist democracies to promote gender equality. On the one hand, the states have to respond to the pressures that are generated from their membership in the E.U., on the other, the parties in the government have to consider their electoral commitments to various issues to appear responsive in the eyes of their constituents. This section details the interplay of these mechanisms in turn and states the formal hypotheses.

Though social policy (and gender policy is often viewed as an extension of social policy) remains within the realm of the domestic politics of the member-states, the E.U. has incrementally increased its presence in this policy domain (Anderson 2015, Hantrais 2007, Hemerijck 2013). Two policy instruments, hard and soft, are available in the European Union to promote its norms and ideals. The hard law includes regulations, directives, and decisions. Recommendations and opinions are examples of the soft law. Most gender equality policy initiatives appear in the form of legally binding directives that require transposition by the member-states, though the use of soft law in the area of gender equality promotion has been on the rise as well (Kantola 2010, Lombardo and Forest 2012). Due to the nature of the European governance, the minimum standards approach along with the subsidiarity principle prevail in the making of directives, which explains a rather limited nature of gender equality legislation at the E.U. level (Kantola...
It remains tied to the labor market, shies away from any substantive mandates for gender quotas in politics or positive discrimination measures, and relies on the soft law when it comes to protection of women from domestic violence.

A number of gender equality directives have been adopted over the years, and all of them had to be transposed by the new members by the time or shortly after accession (Avdeyeva 2015). These directives include Directive 79/7/EEC on the prohibition of discrimination in social security schemes, Directive 2010/41/EU that prohibits discrimination of the self-employed individuals, Directive 92/85/EEC that bans discrimination of pregnant workers along with the Parental Leave Directive (2010/18/EU) and Directive on part-time work (97/81/EC). Directive on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (2006/54/EC) ties and summarizes these earlier directives together.²

Though earlier studies recorded some degree of non-compliance in some policy areas, including gender equality (Avdeyeva 2015), by 2015 all the countries in my sample, namely, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Czech Republic, and Macedonia had either a gender equality law in place or an anti-discrimination policy with the protection against gender discrimination in the labor market, according to the ILO database. What varies among these countries, however, is the inclusion of the measures of positive discrimination in their policies. A closer reading of the E.U. 2006/54/EC directive confirms that positive discrimination is not a required measure to be transposed. It is only "recommended" to the member and candidate states:

In accordance with Article 141(4) of the Treaty, with a view to ensuring full equality in practice between men and women in working life, the principle of equal treatment does not prevent Member States from maintaining or adopting measures providing for specific advantages in order to make it easier for the under-represented sex to pursue a vocational activity or to prevent or compensate for disadvantages in professional careers. Given the current situation and bearing in mind Declaration No 28 to the Amsterdam Treaty, Member States should, in the first instance, aim at improving the situation of women in working life (par 22).³

Thus, the decision to go beyond the minimum requirements set in the E.U. laws lies solely with the domestic political actors, namely political parties, the only formal political actor in parliamentary democracies who has real political power to deliver legislative change and include positive discrimination policy provisions in the policy outputs.

My argument is premised on the mandate theory of democracy that I expect to operate under the tight political constraints of the E.U. governance. Mandate theory, a special case of democratic responsiveness theory, contends that parties compete in the electoral market by offering their policy positions to the voters. Voters, in return, by electing a given party, equip it with an electoral mandate to address a given issue, as the party proposed during their campaign. The congruence between parties' electoral promises and policy outcomes is necessary for the quality of democracy because, as V.O. Key put it: "Unless mass views have some place in the shaping of policy, all we talk about democracy is nonsense" (1961). Therefore, parties remain the key institutions that link public preferences to public policy. Despite some scholars' beliefs in the instrumentalism of political parties when it comes to public policy (Downs 1957; Riker 1962), research on advanced democracies has shown that political parties are maintaining their distinct identities and that they proved to be durable social institutions. In addition, parties must

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follow their ideology and promises to be believed by voters (Robertson 1976; Budge 2001). As Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge (1994) write: "Parties are historical beings. They stand for something. Each party is expected to stand for something that separates it from the competition... Labor cannot rationally pretend to be Conservatives, nor Communists to be Liberals, nor Republicans to be Democrats" (24).

Powell (2005) was one of the first scholars who raised the question of democratic responsiveness and theorized it. Representation of citizens occurs in four stages, according to him. First, citizens express their preferences through their voting behavior, thus selecting their policy makers. For this to happen, parties have to structure citizens' choices. Then through institutional aggregation, representatives deliver public policies.

Following Powell, Budge et al. (2012) further contend:

"Popular control over public policy is a plausible description of contemporary democracies, operating as they do through a mandate-based conception of representation and policy-making. ... accurate representation can be achieved without much effort on the part of voters and without requiring political parties to operate in omniscient and strategic ways. Three modest conditions can do much of the work: (1) divergent and dynamic party policy position-taking that brackets the position of the median voter (and, in a sense, of the modal voter); elections that produce changing partisan policy targets and or composition of governments; and (3) a pace of the policy change that proceeds slowly. ... Testifying to their existence, the results of policy analyses show that national policies with respect to both the size of a central government's political economy and the size of its welfare state become aligned with the partisan choices of voters in the long run by responding to partisan choices in the short run" (191).

Overall, most empirical studies find that modern western democracies are responsive to their voters (Klingemann et al. 1994; Page and Shapiro 1983; Wright, Erikson, McIver 1987; Stimson, Mackuen, Erikson 1995; Erikson, Mackuen, Stimson 2002, Royed 1996, Thomson 2001, Naurin 2011). As Klingemann and others (1994) point out: "To a remarkable extent, the policy priorities of governments in modern democracies reflect the formal programs presented by competing political parties during
Studies on policy responsiveness in newer democracies remain far and few in between. They focus on specific issue areas and rarely take the E.U. constraints into their account, unless they investigate the compliance of domestic legislation with the E.U. norms, which is not a case of democratic responsiveness due to its "top-down" nature. Furthermore, these few studies on democratic responsiveness in new democracies resulted in mixed findings. On the one hand, Susan Stokes (2001) finds presidential mandate non-responsiveness when it comes to economic policies in Latin America in 1980s. Roberts (2010) and Lipsmeyer (2009) report similar weak mandate responsiveness in post-communist democracies when it comes to economic reforms while Kostadinova and Kostadinova (2016) contend that it is issue specific, yet neglecting the gender policy domain in their study.

In order to assess whether mandate responsiveness exists in the gender equality policy domain, one needs to examine party electoral platforms and test systematically whether promises to promote gender equality in the labor market translate into policies that protect women's rights in this area of social life. The electoral platforms of the parties remain highly important both for elections and for further agenda setting, once the party gets to govern. Each statement and each issue is carefully reviewed and examined in its appeal to voters as well as its feasibility in implementation (Volkens et al. 2013) In other words, if parties did not care to act to promote women's rights, they would remain silent on the issue, as some of them do.

Parties in post-communist democracies, indeed, vary when it comes to the

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4 For data collection purposes, I used the Manifesto Project Corpus (https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/) and a team of native speakers research volunteers.
saliency of gender issues. As figure 1 indicates, Left parties in the region, on average, dedicate higher mean share of their electoral programs to gender issues that promote women's rights, such as gender equality in the labor market, political equality, access to prenatal and preventive healthcare specific to women, such as cervical and breast cancer screenings, parental leave (including father's leave), work-life balance, state involvement in childcare, and protection against domestic violence.

**Figure 1.** Mean share of the favorable mentions of gender issues by Left and Right parties over time in 10 post-communist democracies.

Source: Author's calculations.

Once in office, the parties are expected to act upon the promises they made. All countries in the sample are parliamentary democracies, with the exception of Romania, Poland, and Lithuania that are semi-presidential. Governments in parliamentary political systems came to be known as "party governments". Namely, the composition of the
governments and the assignment of the Prime Minister position reflect party majorities in the legislatures. This often results in coalition building and adjustments to the electoral programs, which are, nevertheless, serve as important starting points to negotiate policy priorities. Blondel and co-authors (2007) report that, despite of a coalitional government, "29% of the ministers report that their party was 'very important' and 41% that is was 'important' in setting policy-priorities for the Cabinet" (98). Therefore, one can expect parties that campaigned to promote gender equality and for whom the issue of women's rights is a salient issue (saliency is defined by the inclusion of this issue into a party's electoral platform) will go beyond the minimum required standards of non-discrimination provisions in their policies and include positive discrimination provisions as well. Furthermore, it will not be far reaching to say that parties in government for whom women's rights is a salient issue will also be more likely to transpose the E.U. anti-discrimination provisions than governments who remain silent on gender issues or who have a more traditionalist outlook on the role of women in society and labor market. Though this observation comes with some caveats due to external pressures of formal compliance. Thus, while in government, parties influence policy priorities and the resulting policies by placing the issue on the agenda and seeing it through the policy-making process. I can now state my formal hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1a: Governments with parties that campaigned on gender equality issues are more likely to include positive discrimination provision in their gender equality legislation.

Hypothesis 1b: Governments with parties for whom women's rights is a salient issue are more likely to include positive discrimination provision in their gender equality
legislation.

Hypothesis 1c: Prime-ministers that come from the parties that campaigned on gender equality issues are expected to be associated with the higher probability of inclusion of positive discrimination provisions in their gender equality legislation.

Despite the fact that anti-discrimination provisions are mandatory for transposition, having a formal domestic political actor who favors gender equality may have a positive affect on such transposition, so I also test the following set of hypotheses.

Hypothesis 2a: Governments with parties that campaigned on gender equality issues are more likely to adopt anti-discrimination policies.

Hypothesis 2b: Governments with parties for which women's rights is a salient issue are more likely to adopt anti-discrimination policies.

Hypothesis 3c: Prime-ministers that come from the parties that campaigned on gender equality issues are expected to be associated with the higher probability of adoption of the anti-discrimination policies.

**Research design**

**Data and sample**

To empirically test these hypotheses, I build a dataset of 102 governments nested in eight post-communist E.U. democracies and candidate countries. They are observed between 1991 and 2015, yielding 188 observations. The countries include Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia\(^5\), Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, and Romania. The choice of countries was determined by the availability of the original data on party promises on gender equality and overall gender issues saliency for the parties.

\(^5\) Croatia enters the sample in 2003 after it became a democracy, according to Polity IV rankings (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html).
**Dependent variables**

My key dependent variable is whether a positive discrimination measure was included into the anti-discrimination legislation or policy, coded as one if it was and zero if it wasn't. Out of eight countries in the sample, Romania, Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia have not included any provisions on positive discrimination in their gender equality legislation whereas Macedonia did so in 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2012, Czech Republic in 2001, Croatia in 2003, 2006, 2008, and Bulgaria in 2003. Appendix 1 lists these measures. The dependent variable is constructed via human content analysis of the anti-discrimination pieces of legislation, government decrees, and policies in each respective country, retrieved from the Equality of opportunity and treatment section in the Database on national, labor, social security and related human rights by the International Labor Organization ([https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.byCountry?p_lang=en](https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.byCountry?p_lang=en)).

Positive discrimination clauses are provisions that explicitly seek to alleviate the structural disadvantage of women as a group (Celis 2008) and promote the inclusion of the underrepresented gender group in training, employment and self-employment, decision making positions as well as active labor market programs designed specifically for women.

My second dependent variable records whether a government adopts an anti-discrimination policy or decree in a given year, measured as 1, and 0 otherwise. Anti-discrimination measures include explicit statements referring to the protection against discrimination at work, in employment, sexual harassment, burden of proof, establishment of anti-discrimination institutional arrangements, and definition of discrimination. They do not include legislative acts passed to protect pregnant workers
and ensure work-life balance because, as noted earlier, most post-communist states already had generous parental leaves and protection of pregnant workers in place. Appendix 2 lists all of the coded pieces of legislation.

Figure 2 illustrates that gender anti-discrimination measures were introduced across all eight countries in the sample in various years, signifying the formal compliance with the E.U. gender equality directives. Yet, there are no affirmative action provisions in Poland, Romania, Lithuania, and Latvia.

**Figure 2.** Affirmative action and anti-discrimination policies in 8 post-communist democracies, 1991-2015

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**Independent Variables**

Political, institutional, and structural factors are the key drivers behind policy change. Political will to deliver a certain policy always tops this list. What gets on the political agenda very much depends on what was put in the electoral programs of the
parties now in government, as theoretical section details. The variable that measures political factors is specified in four different ways to check for the robustness of the findings. First, it takes the form of 1 if at least one party in the government campaigned on gender equality issues specifically and, separately, on women's rights issues in general. This operationalization is chosen to capture the differences between the governments for whom women's rights issues are salient and the governments who remain silent on it.\(^6\) I recode my original continuous variable of gender issue saliency\(^7\) for a government to ease the interpretation and comparisons across the two types of governments. Overall, gender was a salient issue for every government in Croatia and for about half of the governments in Latvia, Poland, and Romania, as Figure 3 below demonstrates.

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\(^6\) The variable was constructed in the following way. After content analysis of the original party manifestos, a score was derived for each party in every thematic category that concerns women's rights. These scores were aggregated to obtain a government score in each thematic category and the total saliency score of gender issues for each government calculated as the weighted average of the party gender score by the seat share.

\(^7\) Original data on women's rights issues were collected on 166 parties across ten post-communist democracies over 25 years, using Manifesto Project Text Corpus. Each party statement on gender issues was coded into a number of categories that include gender equality in retirement, health, politics, labor, market, to name a few, parental leave, domestic violence, and childcare. The aggregated score was calculated, using saliency theory that argues that the more salient the issue is, the higher the proportion of the manifesto statements dedicated to each issue is (Budge 2001). Finally, using Seiki and Williams (2014) dataset, I calculated the government's position on gender issues score, using a weighted average of the scores of each party in government.
Another way to specify this variable is to examine whether a Prime Minister comes from the party that campaigned on gender equality issues. This specification also accounts for gender equality being a salient issue for the largest and strongest party in the coalition. This variable is binary, taking the value of one if the Prime Minister comes from a government party for which gender equality is a salient issue and zero if otherwise.

Alternatively, some scholars would argue that it is not important for us to know whether a party in the government made promises to improve gender equality and protect women in the labor market. Rather, a party ideology is a good enough predictor of the positive discrimination policies, with left parties being more likely to support such provisions (Avdeyeva 2015). Ideology being a predictor of policy in the post-communist context has received mixed empirical support when social policy domain was examined.
(see Tavits and Letki 2009, Careja and Emmenegger 2009), but I will test for its effect in a separate model. Again, for the clarity of interpretation, I recode Seiki and Williams (2014) original ordinal government ideology variable that distinguishes between right, center-right, center, center-left and center governments. I code left and center-left governments as 1 and 0 otherwise. Overall, as figure 4 details, leftist governments prevailed only in Romania and Macedonia during the period under observation, with other countries having less than half of their governments being on the left.

**Figure 4.** The relative share of left governments in post-communist democracies, 1991-2015

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8 This variable originates in Woldendorp, Keman and Budge (2000) *Party Government in 48 democracies (1945-1998)* Composition, duration, personnel. It is a 5-point scale that accounts for "the relative strength of parties in government with reference to the Left-Right dimension, … in which the proportional shares of the Left, Center, and Right are transformed into scores (1 to 5) representing the degree of dominance of either party both in parliament and government. It is mostly used to relate the degree of party-control of a government to its policy guided actions (see Castles 1982, Keman 1988, Budge and Keman 1990, Schmidt 1992). It is operationalized as follows: 1 –Right-wing dominance (share of seats in Government and supporting parties in parliament larger than 66.6%, right-center complexion (share of seats of right and center parties in government and supporting parties between 33.3 and 66.6, 3- balanced situation share of center parties larger than 50% in government and the parliament or left and right parties form the government together, not dominated by one side or the other, left center complexion - share of seats of left and center parties in government and supporting parties is between 33.3 and 66.6 percent each; left – left party dominance is 66.6 percent or more)” (19).
Besides political will to enact a given policy, institutional constraints play a big role in constraining policy innovation. As early as 2000, Tsebelis persuasively argues that policy innovation effectively decreases as the number of veto players increases in a political system. Institutional constraints have been named to be a leading mediating factor for the (non-)compliance with the E.U. norms (Cowles et al. 2001; Avdeyeva 2015).

To measure the strength of the institutional constraints in a given political system, I borrow the political constraints index III variable from the V-Dem project (https://www.v-dem.net/en/). The variable represents an index that varies between 0 and 1, where one indicates no feasibility of policy change due to an extremely constrained institutional environment:

This index measures the feasibility of policy change, i.e. the extent to which a change in the preferences of any one political actor may lead to a change in government policy. The index is composed from the following information: the number of independent branches of government with veto power over policy change, counting the executive and the presence of an effective lower and upper house in the legislature (more branches leading to more constraint); the extent of party alignment across branches of government, measured as the extent to which the same party or coalition of parties control each branch (decreasing the level of constraint); and the extent of preference heterogeneity within each legislative branch, measured as legislative fractionalization in the relevant house (increasing constraint for aligned executives, decreasing it for opposed executives) (2010, 372).

No country in my sample scores one on this variable. The most constrained institutional environment (0.68) existed in Poland in 1992-1993 due to an extremely fragmented legislature (Poland had 29 parties in parliament at the time who were unable to make any policy for two years (Curry 2011) and in Romania in 1993-1996 (for the same reason, Romanian Democratic Convention Alliance that won 34 seats was a coalition of 18 parties and no party obtained a clear majority with Iliescu's party...
controlling 1/3 of the parliamentary seats (Gledhill and King 2011)). The least constrained institutional environment existed in Latvia in 1991-1993 and Poland in 1991. In both cases, it can possibly be due to the remnants of the communist past still clinging for power and awaiting new elections. The average score across the sample is .47. Figure 5 further details the variation in the political constraints variable in each country over time.

**Figure 5.** Institutional constraints in post-communist democracies over time, 1991-2015

Three other factors have been found in the literature to have an independent effect on policy outcomes when it comes to gender equality – women's movements, the presence of female parliamentarians, and the magnitude of the social problem, to the discussion of which I now turn.

Women's movements, despite their relative unpopularity in the post-communist world, have been advocates and supporters in raising awareness and working closely with the political actors to place women's rights issues on the political agenda. In fact, in a recent seminal study that spans all world regions and four decades, Htun and Weldon (2018) find that it is the women's movements and not formal political actors, such as political parties, that drive the change in most policy domains that concern women's
rights. Avdeyeva (2015) records a sizable effect of women's movements on gender equality legislation in post-communist countries as well. Other small-N studies further substantiate these claims (Banaszak 2006 (the cases of U.S. and Switzerland), Gelb 2003 (U.S. and Japan), Hantrais 2000 (established E.U. democracies), Einhorn 1993 (the cases of Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Germany)).

Due to the lack of reliable and comparable cross-country data on women's movements in post-communist democracies, I have chosen a proxy for this variable from the Varieties of Democracy project (2017). The variable measures political empowerment of women defined as "a process of increasing capacity for women, leading to greater choice, agency, and participation in societal decision-making" (67). It ranges from 0 to 1. The higher the score, the more politically empowered the women are and the more policies that promote and protect women's rights one is expected to see. The index includes three equally weighted dimensions: "fundamental civil liberties, women’s open discussion of political issues and participation in civil society organizations, and the descriptive representation of women in formal political positions" (68).

Figure 6 details the variation of this variable in the sample. With the exception of Macedonia and Croatia after 2012, the data reveals the continuous upward trend of women's empowerment in the countries of interest.
Another factor that can affect gender policies are women in parliament. Though contemporary feminist scholarship recognizes the diversity of groups of women and their interests, it argues that women remain a structurally disadvantaged group, and female representatives serve a dual role as descriptive representatives for all women and as "standing for" women's specific needs as a group (Pitkin 1969, Celis 2008). Studies of advanced democracies have been consistent in pointing out the differences in political behavior and preferences between male and female representatives and showed that women, in general, prioritize social issues more (for a review of these studies see Squires 2007, Henderson and Jeydel 2014). Nevertheless, other studies contend that "female parliamentarians may be less representative of female voters than male parliamentarians are of male voters" (Mateo Diaz 2005, 201). Similar mixed findings have been observed in CEE post-communist states. On the one hand, in Bulgaria, female parliamentarians followed the program of the party they represented (Kostova 1998). On the other hand, early in transition in Romania female parliamentarians saw themselves as specialists on
women's issues and wanted to address women's social and economic problems (Fischer 1998). Thus, I expect having higher numbers of female parliamentarians to be associated with higher probabilities of the passage of both affirmative action and non-discrimination policies. Figure 7 illustrates the steady increase in the number of women in CEE parliaments across all the countries but Croatia, Bulgaria and Latvia after 2010. This decrease may be associated with the rise to power of the populist parties, though some studies contend that populist parties in CEE nominate women in higher numbers and get them elected more than programmatic parties in the region do (Kostadinova and Mikulska 2017), notwithstanding the fact that these conclusions are only based on the analysis of parties in Poland and Bulgaria.

On average, there are about 18.7% of female representatives in CEE parliaments, with the lowest number of representatives recorded at 3.3% in Macedonia in 1997-1998 and the highest (at 34.1%) in Macedonia in 2013. The standard deviation is 6.4%. Furthermore, Romania consistently has the number of female parliamentarians below the sample average. Its score ranges from 7.3% in 1997 to 13.7% in 2015. The data are drawn from the United Nations Human Development Reports (http://hdr.undp.org), and the variable ranges from 0 (no female representatives) to 100% (all parliamentarians are female).
Finally, governments can be responding to the existence of an objective problem once they engage in policy making. Studies on other policy domains such as law and order (Wenzelburger 2014) and economic policy (Roberts 2010) show that parties in the government, indeed, respond to social problems during policy-making. It is reasonable to assume that if there are already plenty of women in the labor market, there is no urgent need to further promote their inclusion through positive discrimination policy measures (therefore I expect a negative relation here), just to protect them from discrimination. Earlier studies show that the integration of women in the labor force was high on the agenda of the transition governments. What is more, it aligned with the desire of most post-communist women to remain in the labor force since "only a minority [of them] want[ed] to become permanent homemakers (Rueschemeyer 1998, 290-291). This variable comes from the World Bank World Development Indicators Database (https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-development-indicators). It ranges from
0 to 100% and measures the share of female employment in the total population. There is not much variation in female employment across the CEE countries. The variable ranges between 38% in Macedonia in various years and 51% in Lithuania in various years, with the sample mean of 45% and a standard deviation of 3%. Having discussed the key dependent and independent variables, I now turn to the discussion of the model and an estimation technique.

Model

To test my hypotheses empirically, I employ a discrete-time event history model, namely logistic regression that models the probability of an event occurrence ($\lambda_i$) and allows estimation of time-variant covariates (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). An event is an adoption of the positive discrimination measures and anti-discrimination policies measured as 1 if a policy was adopted and a 0 otherwise. To account for the mediating affect of the institutional environment, I interact the political constraints variable ($x_1$) with the variable that measures government's position on women's rights issues ($x_2$). The functional form of this model is as follows:

$$\log \left( \frac{\lambda_i}{1-\lambda_i} \right) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{1i} + \beta_2 x_{2i} + \beta_1 x_{1i} \times \beta_2 x_{2i} + \ldots + \beta_k x_{ki} \quad (1)$$

$X_{ki}$ – are control variables discussed above, namely share of female representatives in the parliament, share of female labor force participation, and the strength of women's movements. Equation (1) specifies $\lambda_i$ in terms of the log-odds ratios of the probability of an event occurrence to the probability of its non-occurrence.

All models are estimated using MLE estimation technique with robust standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity and possible autocorrelation, using STATA 13 statistical software package.
Analysis.

The results of logistic regression analyses with robust standard errors are presented in tables one and two. Table one presents the models for the positive discrimination policies and table two for anti-discrimination measures.

**Table 1.** Determinants of the adoption of positive discrimination policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political constraints</strong></td>
<td>4.88</td>
<td>25.65*</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>1.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9.53)</td>
<td>(13.5)</td>
<td>(11.9)</td>
<td>(3.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government's position on gender equality</strong></td>
<td>4.84</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.17)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government's gender issue saliency</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>17.58**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(8.06)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prime minister from a party that campaigned on gender equality</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13.6**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(6.7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Party ideology</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(3.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political constraints</strong></td>
<td>-8.37</td>
<td>-32.07**</td>
<td>-22.9*</td>
<td>-5.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>position on gender issues</td>
<td>(11.2)</td>
<td>(15.5)</td>
<td>(13.3)</td>
<td>(7.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strength of women's movements</strong></td>
<td>46.5*</td>
<td>64.6**</td>
<td>63.7**</td>
<td>37.5**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(25.2)</td>
<td>(30.3)</td>
<td>(28.05)</td>
<td>(14.96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Share of female labor force participation</strong></td>
<td>-.632***</td>
<td>-.792***</td>
<td>-.75***</td>
<td>-.55***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.209)</td>
<td>(.3)</td>
<td>(.285)</td>
<td>(.205)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Women in parliament (seat share in %)</strong></td>
<td>.047</td>
<td>.08(.103)</td>
<td>.071</td>
<td>.069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.104)</td>
<td>(.102)</td>
<td>(.087)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>-20.5</td>
<td>-41.1</td>
<td>-39.62</td>
<td>-14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(23.7)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>142</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wald chi2</strong></td>
<td>14.94</td>
<td>11.23</td>
<td>18.30</td>
<td>13.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Probability</strong></td>
<td>.0207</td>
<td>.0815</td>
<td>.0055</td>
<td>0.0313</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries are logit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

*p<.1, ** p<.05, ***p<.01
Table 2. Determinants of the adoption of anti-discrimination policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political constraints</td>
<td>-2.92</td>
<td>-2.95</td>
<td>-3.51</td>
<td>-4.74**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.61)</td>
<td>(2.69)</td>
<td>(2.47)</td>
<td>(2.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government's position on gender equality</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.45)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government's gender issue saliency</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.29)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime minister from a party that</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>campaigned on gender equality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party ideology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.66 (2.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political constraints*government position</td>
<td>-8.83*</td>
<td>-6.61</td>
<td>-6.84</td>
<td>-2.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on gender issues</td>
<td>(5.33)</td>
<td>(4.95)</td>
<td>(5.59)</td>
<td>(5.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength of women's movements</td>
<td>-13.6**</td>
<td>-12.3**</td>
<td>-10.04</td>
<td>-8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.05)</td>
<td>(5.81)</td>
<td>(6.1)</td>
<td>(6.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of female labor force participation</td>
<td>.174*</td>
<td>.149</td>
<td>.112</td>
<td>.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.103)</td>
<td>(.100)</td>
<td>(.105)</td>
<td>(.108)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women in parliament (seat share in %)</td>
<td>.12***</td>
<td>.113***</td>
<td>.098**</td>
<td>.094**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.045)</td>
<td>(.043)</td>
<td>(.045)</td>
<td>(.046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>2.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald chi2</td>
<td>10.79</td>
<td>10.85</td>
<td>8.74</td>
<td>8.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability</td>
<td>.0952</td>
<td>.093</td>
<td>0.1886</td>
<td>0.1926</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries are logit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01

The coefficients from the logistic regression output are not very telling and require additional calculations for substantive interpretation. Long and Freese (2014) recommend to present the results in the form of predicted probabilities, which are discussed below. The raw coefficients in tables one and two, however, indicate the direction of a variable's effect. For instance, negative coefficients on female labor force participation variable mean that higher levels of female labor force participation are associated with lower probability of the inclusion of positive discrimination provisions in gender equality legislation, in line with my expectations.
To examine the magnitude effect of the key variables of interest – government's position on gender equality in its various specifications, government's ideology, role of women's movements and female parliamentarians as well as female labor force participation, I calculate predicted probabilities for each independent variable of interest, and the findings are quite interesting.

To recall, hypotheses 1a through 1c posit that for governments with gender issue saliency the probability of adopting positive discrimination policies is expected to be higher. On average, the probability of the inclusion a positive discrimination clause by the government in which at least one party campaigned specifically on gender equality issues in a moderately constrained political environment increases the probability of the inclusion of affirmative action clause in the gender equality legislation by 0.037, but this relation is not statistically significant (p=0.195). This absence of an effect can be attributed to the variable specification that does not convey the strength of a party that campaigned on gender equality issues in the government coalition. Significant results for alternative specifications of this variable substantiate this explanation. Thus, as hypothesis 1c predicts, having a prime minister from a party that campaigned specifically on gender equality issues increases the probability of adopting the measures of positive discrimination into the gender equality legislation by 0.08, and this relationship is statistically significant (p=0.022). Besides, the predicted probabilities of the adoption of the positive discrimination measures increases by 0.06 if the government contains at least one party that prioritized women's rights issues in their electoral platform in comparison to governments that do not have any parties for whom gender issues are salient, and this relationship is statistically significant (p=0.045). On the other hand, the government
ideology on the left has no significant effect on the probability of the adoption of positive discrimination measures, an interesting finding that requires further investigation beyond the scope of this study.

Figures 8-10 further detail the relationship between women's rights issue saliency for parties in the government and positive discrimination measures. They show that without any institutional constraints, governments that have made promises on gender equality as well as governments for whom gender issues are salient have higher probabilities of adopting the provisions on positive discrimination. In line with the veto player theory, as the number of political constraints in the system increases, the probabilities begin to converge, aligning at the maximum of .68. Indeed, no positive discrimination provisions were adopted under such constrained institutional environment neither in Poland, nor in Romania. Nevertheless, even at the moderate levels of institutional constraints (the sample mean score is .47) the probability of governments for whom women's rights is a salient issue to adopt the measures of positive discrimination is still slightly higher than for governments who ignore these issues.

**Figure 8.** Predicted probabilities of the adoption of positive discrimination provisions by governments that made promises on gender equality vs. governments that did not, conditional on the institutional constraints.
Note: 95% confidence interval.

**Figure 9.** Predicted probabilities of the adoption of positive discrimination provisions by governments with favorable position on gender issues vs. those who remain silent, conditional on the institutional constraints.

Note: 95% confidence interval.

**Figure 10.** Predicted probabilities of the adoption of positive discrimination provisions by governments if prime minister comes from a party that campaigned on gender equality issues vs. from a party that did not, conditional on the institutional constraints.
Note: 95% confidence interval.

When it comes to the adoption of anti-discrimination legislation, contrary to hypotheses 2a-2c, the data offers no evidence that there are any significant differences between governments with parties and prime ministers for which gender equality is a salient issue and those for which it is not. Ideology does not matter, either. This can be explained as a function of supranational pressures. In other words, the countries are given specific deadlines by which the directives have to be transposed, and the position of a government on this issue does not matter much. Where the difference between the governments who care about women's rights and those who do not may lie in this case is in the sphere of implementation, which is beyond the scope of this study.

As to the control variables that have been found to matter in the previous scholarship, a few warrant closer examination. It appears that the mechanisms that drive substantive equality and symbolic equality are different. Positive discrimination measures appear in response to the shortage of female labor market participation. Thus, holding other variables at their observed values, increasing female labor force participation by
one standard deviation (3%) decreases the probability of the inclusion of the affirmative action clauses into the legislation by 0.046 (p=0.001), but has no significant effect on the passage of the anti-discriminatory measures. On the other hand, the presence of female parliamentarians have no effect on the inclusion of affirmative action provisions in the gender equality legislation but one 1% increase in the number of female parliamentarians increases the probability of passing anti-discrimination legislation by .023 (p=.004) and a 6% increase (standard deviation) by 0.156 (p=.005). Finally, in line with the earlier findings, women's movements have an independent and significant effect on the probability of adoption of measures of positive discrimination but are associated with the decreased probability of the adoption of the anti-discrimination policies. This is a rather strange finding that requires further qualitative investigation beyond the scope of this study. My preliminary suggestion is that the presence of strong women's movements and overall female empowerment may get the politicians to question the need to adopt anti-discrimination policies given the presence and vocal advocacy of women in the public space or that women's movements might be of conservative ideological nature, as Wilcox, Stark, and Thomas (2003) insightfully suggest.

Conclusion

The key finding of the study is that parties matter when it comes to the promotion of substantive gender equality in CEE countries. The study argues and demonstrates empirically that the parties have not lost their importance and control over policy making when it comes to gender equality promotion. They retain some room for maneuver due to the nature of the E.U. gender equality directives and do go beyond their minimum requirements if women's rights is a salient issue for them and the institutional
environment is relatively permissive to engage in policy innovation. However, the supranational constraints prevail when directives exist since saliency of women's rights issue has not effect on the adoption of the required anti-discrimination measures.

These findings speak to the broader emerging literature on democratic responsiveness of governments in new democracies and shows that political parties fulfill their mandates to promote gender equality, once in office, while previous studies found only limited effect of such mandate fulfillment in the economic policy domain (Lipsmeyer 2009, Roberts 2010). These findings also challenge the studies that argue that parties play no role in gender equality promotion (Htun and Weldon 2018). To explain the mandate fulfillment in the domain of gender policy over economic policy, I suggest a compensation hypothesis. Since economic policy making remains rather contentious in the region and involves the issues of redistribution, parties may rely on symbolic policies to boost their image in the eyes of the voters. This suggestion can be further tested empirically of how much parties actually use their past accomplishments in their future campaigns. My reading of their programs suggests that they do. The parties, especially in Croatia, do not waste an opportunity to let their voters know of what was done to promote women's rights once they governed.

On the other hand, the finding that parties in CEE fulfill their mandate when it comes to gender issues can be a sign of concern rather than hope, given the rise of the populist parties to power in Bulgaria, Poland, and Hungary in recent years. It means that these parties can also potentially act on their mandate in the symbolic realm of gender politics and in turn initiate policies that promote traditionalist values these parties have been so vocal about, as it happened in 2016 in Poland, when PiS instituted a highly
financially controversial policy of "increasing child benefit payments more than four-fold to 500 zloty (£90) a month" (Financial Times 2016). In the words of the leader of the Polish Law and Justice, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, “E.U. membership was the shortest way for Poland to achieve parity when it comes to living standards with its western allies but that doesn’t mean we should … become infected with social diseases that dominate there (Reuters). Thus, examination of the actual traditionalist promises of the populist parties and how and whether they are acted upon constitutes another promising venue for future research.

Another natural extension of this study, given the paucity of studies on gender policies in a cross-national setting using statistical tools, is to systematically study party promises on women's rights issues and their delivery through policies across all EU-28 countries. This analysis, however, will very likely encounter severe challenges due to the need for the primary data collection in at least 24 languages. One can also extend the analysis to other policy domains, especially the ones less regulated by the E.U. hard law in a smaller sample of countries building on the strengths of the most similar systems research design.

Finally, the study needs to acknowledge its limitations, which can be an inspiration for further research as well. Statistical analysis, while showing patterns in the data and allowing for tests of systematic relationships, tells us little about the actual processes that are going on behind the scene in the gender policy-making process of new democracies. The field studies of the policy making process across post-communist

9 https://www.ft.com/content/8238e15a-db46-11e5-a72f-1e7744c66818
democracies will also involve significant recourses, but it is worth engaging into in order to shed light on the interesting findings in regards to the women's movements and party ideology this study reveals but offers only tentative explanations for.
References


Available online at http://www.systemicpeace.org/


Seki, Katsunori and Laron K. Williams, 2014. "Updating the *Party Government* Data Set", *Electoral Studies.* Available at

http://faculty.missouri.edu/williamslaro/govtdata.html


### Appendix 1. Key affirmative action measures and data sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Data source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Bulgaria | 2003 | Law on Protection Against Discrimination | Article 24  
(1) The employer must, at the beginning of the employment, when this is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Law, encourage persons belonging to under represented sex or ethnic group, to apply for a certain job or position.  
(2) The employer is obliged, in otherwise equal conditions, to encourage the vocational development and participation of workers and employees, belonging to a certain sex or ethnic group, when the latter are under represented among the employees performing certain work or occupying definite position.  
Article 38  
The state and public bodies and the bodies of local self-government shall conduct a policy to encourage the balanced participation of women and men, as well as for the representative participation of persons belonging to ethnic, religious or language minorities in the governance and the decision-making.  
Article 39  
(1) If the candidates for a position in the administration are equivalent in view of the requirements for occupying the position, and men, with the aim of achieving the full equality between women and men. Article 3: //Article 5: Gender equality shall mean that women and men are equally present in all spheres of public and private life, that they have equal status, equal opportunities to exercise all their rights and equal benefit from the achieved results.//Article 9: Article 9  
1) Affirmative actions are specific privileges whereby members of a particular gender are enabled to participate equally in public life, the existing inequality is eliminated or the rights previously denied to them are guaranteed.  
2) Affirmative actions are introduced on a temporary basis with the aim of achieving full equality of women and men and they are not considered acts of discrimination. | https://www.stopvaw.org/Bulgaria2.html |
<p>| Croatia | 2003 | 2003-07-14 (HRV-2003-L-64728) Gender Equality Act of 14 July 2003 (Text No. 1585). | All government bodies, legal entities vested with public authority and legal entities whose majority shareholders are the state and units of local and regional self-government, in all phases of planning, adopting and implementing a decision or an action, shall be obliged to estimate and evaluate the effects of that decision or action upon the position of women, and men, with the aim of achieving the full equality between women and men. Article 3: //Article 5: Gender equality shall mean | ILO |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Document Title</th>
<th>Text Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>National policy for the promotion of gender equality</td>
<td>2.2.5. Subsidies will be provided for employment of target groups of unemployed women according to the National Employment Action Plan for the period from 2005 to 2008 and annual employment promotion plans for the years 2006, 2007 and 2008. 2.3.2. Women will be singled out as a separate target group in the Operational Plan for the Promotion of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises for the current year, and funds will be provided and increased specifically for financing women entrepreneurial activities. Implementing subjects: the Ministry of the Economy, Labour and Entrepreneurship, the Croatian Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Time frame for implementation: 2007. 2.3.3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Gender Equality Act 2008 (Text No. 2663)</td>
<td>Article 9  (1) Specific measures are specific benefits enabling persons of a specific gender to have equal participation in public life, eliminating existing inequalities or ensuring them rights they were denied in the past. (2) Specific measures shall be introduced on a temporary basis with a view to achieving genuine equality of women and men and they shall not be deemed to be discrimination. (4) With a view to ensuring full equality of men and women in practice, the principle of equal treatment shall not preclude maintaining or adopting specific measures to prevent or compensate for disadvantages on the grounds of sex in the area of access to and supply of goods and services. Articles 9,10,11,12  The implementation of specific measures shall serve to promote equal participation of women and men in legislative, executive and judicial bodies, including public services, and to gradually increase the participation of the underrepresented sex in order for its representation to reach the level of its percentage in the total population of the Republic of Croatia. 4.2.2.-4.2.4. promotion of equal representation in government bodies 4.2.2. Pursuant to the Gender Equality Act, in appointments to state bodies, bodies of local and territorial (regional) self-government units and other legal persons with public authority account will be taken of even representation of both sexes. Implementing subjects: state bodies, state administration bodies, legal persons with public authority, local and territorial (regional) self-government units. Time frame for implementation: 2006-2010 4.2.3. Even representation of women and men in managerial positions at universities and higher education institutions will be systematically promoted. Implementing subjects: the Ministry of Science, Education and Sports, universities. Time frame for implementation: 2006-2010 4.2.4. An analysis of the share of women in management boards of state-owned enterprises will be made and submitted to the Office for Gender Equality. Implementing subjects: the Central State Office for State Property Management, the Croatian Privatisation Fund. Time frame for implementation: 2006/200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ILO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Document</td>
<td>English Text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Government resolution CZE-2001-R-63368</td>
<td>Provides for establishment of Government Council for Equal Opportunities for Women and Men. Main function of Council is to draw up proposals aiming at promotion and achievement of equal opportunities for men and women. Also regulates composition (inter alia, a representative of trade unions, a representative of employers and representatives of NGOs) and internal procedures of Council. Available in English.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Macedonia               | Act of 23 May 2006 on equal opportunities for women and men (Text No. 899) | **Article 6**  
(1) Special measures are measures aimed towards the establishment of equal opportunities, as well as for the promotion and improvement of equal opportunities in special areas of social life.  
(2) The special measures from Paragraph 1 of this Article are aimed towards the removal of objectives barriers that lead to the establishment of the principle of equal opportunities of women and men or unequal status of persons of one gender in relation to persons from the other gender, as well as to give a special contribution in the form of promotion of participation of the underrepresented gender, or to remove the possibilities that contribute to unequal status based on gender.  
(3) The special measures from Paragraph 1 of this Article, amongst other, include:  
**Positive measures** which give priority, in case of unequal participation of women and men in Governmental bodies of all levels, including the judiciary, legislative and the executive, the local Government, as well as all other public services, political functions, commissions and boards, including the participation in bodies that represent the state in the international level, until equal participation is not achieved. Unequal participation of women and men exists when the representation of women or men in Governmental bodies of all levels, including the judiciary, legislative and executive, local Government, as well as all other public services, political functions, commissions and boards, including the participation in bodies that represent the state in the international level, is lower than 40%. |      |
| 2007                    | The National Action Plan to Promote Gender Equality                       | Detailed measures and indicators in the positive promotion of women in decision-making positions  
Suggesting separate measures for promotion and advancement of equal opportunities of women and men in the separate areas of social life  
Support of women's entrepreneurship with measures of financial and non-financial support for a) making the access to loans easier, and b) developing solidarity schemes |      |
## Appendix 2. List of reviewed anti-discrimination policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Anti-discrimination policies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Bulgaria      | Law 2005-06-12 Regulation on the organization and activity of the Commission for Protection against Discrimination (consolidated version).  
| Croatia       | Regulations of 12 April 1996 on jobs that cannot be occupied by women. (Text No. 858). National policy for the promotion of sex equality, with the programme for the realization of the national policy for the promotion of sex equality in the Republic of Croatia from 2001 to 2005 (Text No. 1853) 2001-12-18.  
Act of 28 September 2012 to amend and supplement the Anti-Discrimination Act (Text No. 2430).                                                      |
| Czech Republic| Act No. 198/2009 on Equal Treatment and Legal Protection Against Discrimination (Anti-Discrimination Act).                                                                                                                   |
| Lithuania     | Act No. VIII-947 of 1 December 1998 on equal opportunities for men and women (Text No. 80).  
Law No. IX-1826 of 18 November 2003 on Equal Treatment.                                                                                                          |
Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 3 November 2005 to suspend the Government Plenipotentiary for Equal Status of Women and Men (Text No. 1913). Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of May 16 2006, regarding the women and the military service (Text No. 660).  
Ordinance of the Council of Ministers of 22 April 2008 regarding the Government Authority for Equal Treatment (Text No. 450). Act of 3 December 2010 to implement some EU regulations concerning equal treatment (Text No. 1700). |

Source: ILO