‘I’d rather be a poor master than a rich servant’. Brexit as low information politicization

Ben Rosamond

Department of Political Science
University of Copenhagen

br@ifs.ku.dk
@BenRosamond1

Paper presented to the EUSA Sixteenth Biennial Conference,

Very early draft. Comments welcome

(Original) Abstract
Brexit represents the culmination of perhaps the most clear-cut example of the domestic politicization of European integration. Read through the lens of standard accounts of this process, Brexit – the decision to leave the EU and the politics spawned by that decision - might be read as the product of identity (as opposed to distributional) dynamics shaping the character of the domestic contestation of European integration in the UK (or at least key parts of the UK). How and why the cultural/identity logic came to prevail and/or cross-cut the distributional politics of Brexit is, in turn, an interesting question. Post-functional accounts would point to two key factors that affect the nature and character of domestic politicization: (a) the selection of a mass/plebiscitary arena of contestation and (b) weak mediation of the European issue by political parties. This paper builds on this model to suggest that scholarship should pay attention to another key variable, namely the extent to which political contestation is conducted knowledgably. The paper suggests that Brexit is best understood as taking place within a context of ‘low information politicization’ (LIP). LIP both (a) works alongside the arena and party variables to structure the resultant politics of Brexit and (b) is constitutive of key aspects those other two variables. The paper also considers the potential generalizability of this model.
‘I don’t know what to vote for. Both are scary. To me, I think what you have is you’ve now got in Europe a sort of government by proxy of everybody who has now got carried away. And I think unless there’s some extremely significant changes we should get out. Because you say ‘well, we’ll fail’. And you go, ‘well OK, so you fail – get better, work harder, try harder, and then you’ll be a success.’ But you cannot be dictated to by millions … thousands … thousands of faceless civil servants who make these rules and you say ‘ooh, wait a minute, is that right, you know?’ And they argue about financially, but we buy more from them than we sell to them (…) I sort of feel certain we should come out because I’m a middle of the road politician and one of the reasons I’m there is because I’ve been everything. I’ve been poor, I’ve been on the dole, I’ve been on benefits, I’ve worked in factories, and I’m a multi-millionaire, I paid heavy taxes. So I know every problem from every angle and not many people are like that who know all these things.’

‘I voted for Brexit (…) I look at it in the final thing and I tell you what it is with me: is I’d rather be a poor master than a rich servant (…) You know, politics is always chaotic because in politics you’re always going in new areas where you’ve never been before. So you’re gonna get lost. And then you’re going to find your way. And then it’ll be alright.’

These quotations come from two interviews – one before, the other after the 2016 referendum – with Sir Michael Caine, one of Britain’s best known and most enduring cultural figures. There have been many celebrity endorsements of Brexit, but Caine’s remarks were amongst the most prominent, and he has continued to present himself in public as a staunch supporter of leaving the EU. Interviewed on BBC Radio 4’s flagship Today programme in October 2018 (at the height of the UK-EU negotiations), Caine reiterated the central message of his earlier interventions: ‘People say “Oh, you’ll be poor, you’ll be this, you’ll be that”. I say I’d rather be a poor master of my fate than having someone I don’t know making me rich by running it’. He continued: ‘What I see is I’m being ruled by people I don’t know, who no

---

1 Sir Michael Caine, interviewed by Nick Robinson prior to the June 2016 referendum, BBC
one elected, and I think of that as fascist ...In the long run, though, it’ll come around.’

There are, no doubt, papers to be written on the ‘celebrity politics’ of Brexit (see Street 2004 for the classic statement on this phenomenon). The purpose here is simply to reflect on the character of the political discourse reflected in these utterances on the major issue of the day by a well-known public figure. There are some old Eurosceptic tropes, notably the presentation of European integration as rule by unelected, invisible bureaucrats. The recurrent theme of ‘poor master/rich servant’ does a lot of work. It implies that the pros and cons of Brexit should not be subject to material cost-benefit calculus since the bigger issue is about democratic self-determination – at whatever cost. But there is a palliative: the British (it is implied) have a kind of dogged resilience that will pull them through in the long run. Moreover, this is a reasonable (‘middle of the road’) position to take and, in any case, risks are a normal feature of political life. Most strikingly, there is a dismissal of (unspecified) expert authority (‘they argue’, ‘people say’) that would question the wisdom of Brexit either prior to the referendum or two years after. Indeed, these statements are textbook assertions of the virtues of practical over theoretical knowledge. In the first excerpt quoted here, Caine anchors his pro-Brexit position (which, note, emerges in the process of a single answer to an interviewer’s question) in an appeal to his own very practical life experiences.

---

What is expressed ultimately is a normative belief without any standard evidentiary anchoring. That belief is inchoate, incoherent and built on a series of non-sequiturs and irrelevant side-channels. It is emblematic of popular political reasoning in the present day, and represents a very different version of sense making from that used by professional expert observers of the same phenomenon. One of the most urgent puzzles in contemporary political and social science is why claims like these are (a) so resilient and (b) capable of sustaining significant support, despite their all-too-obvious flaws (Hopkin and Rosamond 2018, Oren and Blyth 2018, Schmidt 2017, Wren-Lewis 2018).

--II--

Many things can be said about Brexit, but this paper will work with two core observations. The first is that the immediate Brexit process (the referendum campaign, the decision to leave the EU and the protracted aftermath) offers, on the face of it, one of the most clear-cut examples of the domestic politicization of European integration (Börzel and Risse 2018, Kriesi 2016). The second observation is that much of the politics of Brexit in this period (roughly 2016 to the present) has occurred without visible (or perhaps more accurately, successful) appeal to technocratic or expert knowledge. It is primarily for this reason that Brexit is often held up as an exemplar of the

---

4 There is a strong case for thinking about Brexit as the culmination of a series of long-standing and over-lapping political economy dynamics. The Brexit ‘event’ - the referendum and the subsequent two-level game (Article 50 negotiations and post-referendum domestic politics) - attracts by far the bulk of scholarly attention, but the event cannot be understood in isolation from the process.

To these two highly visible facets of Brexit, we might add a third observation that links them: the referendum campaign and its negotiating and parliamentary aftermath have taken place in an environment of ‘low information’. This seems to be true in both the elite arena of policy-making in the UK and the domestic mass arena of mobilization and contestation.

In many ways these are old stories. There is plenty of evidence to show that, in general terms, the British are poorly informed about European integration and the EU. Most standard polling shows that the British are amongst the least capable in the EU28 in terms of baseline knowledge about the EU, although importantly there is no obvious correlation between higher knowledge and more positive attitudes towards European integration or British membership (Hix 2015). Indeed, on average ‘Leave’ and ‘Remain’ voters seem to have been more or less equally informed about the EU with a tendency, when asked, to answer correctly informational questions about the EU that were ‘ideologically convenient’ (Carl, Richards and Heath 2019). Explanations for low baseline knowledge also point to powerful media framing effects that have always structured political debates about European integration in the UK (Anderson and Weymouth 1999, Deacon and Wring 2015, Diez Medrano 2003). There is also the view, expressed most recently in a series of public speeches by Sir Ivan Rogers, the former UK Permanent
Representative to the EU, that British governments – including, fatally, the May government – have simply failed to comprehend the workings of the EU. Rogers suggests that the UK government embarked upon the Article 50 negotiations understanding neither the process nor indeed the nature of the entity with which it was negotiating (see Rogers 2019). This is not how two-level games are supposed to work.5

More generally, political scientists have for long appreciated that the ‘low information voter’ is a standard fixture in modern democratic politics. As one of the key studies makes clear, ‘voter irrationality is the key to a realistic picture of democracy’ (Caplan 2007: 3). The now familiar story told by survey data is of citizens with under-informed, inconsistent and somewhat capricious preferences (Achen and Bartels 2016), an insight that was already firmly in play following studies conducted more than half a century ago (Converse 1964). From one vantage point citizens have little incentive to develop detailed policy expertise in advance of elections or other ‘voting events’ (such as referendums). If voting is, in and of itself, largely irrational in terms of basic cost-benefit pay-offs, then informed voting is even less so. Moreover, representative democracies are generally built on a social contract that involves delegation of both (a) decision-making to elected politicians and (b) detailed knowledge to acknowledged experts and experienced civil servants. In most cases full suffrage democratic politics in Europe co-evolved with strong political parties that acted as crucial intermediaries between the

5 And this is before we even begin to think about the process of preference formation.
imperatives of government on the one hand and societal impulses on the other (Mair 2013). Ideal typically, political parties would perform two key functions in democratic politics. First, through representation and aggregation, parties would organize the preferences of distinct segments of society into the political system. Second, they would perform the crucial role of feeding back to their societal constituents the imperatives of ‘responsible’ government (such as external and fiscal constraints on governmental autonomy and the need to fulfill long-term or maturing expenditures).\(^6\)

The secular decline of party government thus conceived has become a key theme in the literature on the various crises of democratic politics, with the already seminal analysis of Peter Mair (2013) taking centre stage. The key point for the purpose of this paper is simply to note that the decline of parties and party government un hooks one of the key ways in which the problem of low information voting was managed historically in democracies. The resultant problem is amplified by three further features of the current conjuncture, all of which seem to have been fundamental to Brexit: the resort to plebiscitary modes of democratic decision-making (Innerarity 2017), the rapid growth in the importance of social media platforms to political exchange (Tucker et al 2017) and the proliferation of ‘fake news’ and political bullshit (Hopkin and Rosamond 2018). Put another way, Brexit is a product of ‘low information politicization’ (hereafter LIP) and this moment of LIP has

\(^6\) Given the post-referendum context, it is interesting to note that the classic discussion of the delicate tension between representative and responsible government is to be found in one of the classic texts on the British political system, namely Birch (1964).
occurred in the context of a series of key changes that affect, in quite fundamental ways, how politics is conducted.

As should be clear from the foregoing, LIP might be a useful descriptor of key aspects of the politics of Brexit. Of course it is entirely possible to view Brexit as *sui generis* in so far as it has been driven by a peculiar set of factors largely unique to the UK context. The broader analytical question is thus whether LIP is a phenomenon that is likely to occur in analogous situations, particularly in cases where European integration becomes contested within domestic contexts. Kriesi (2016) makes the familiar but important institutionalist point that the politicization of European integration is properly understood within prevailing domestic structures of political conflict. The absence of a fully-fledged pan-EU institutional space of political contestation (Hix 2008) is a key factor here and has been especially visible in the negotiation of the Eurozone crisis over the past decade. While the crisis yielded an intergovernmental distributive politics (roughly creditors v. debtors within the strictures of Eurozone rules), it was not generative of a Europe-wide *societal* politics of the kind that might be expected in the context of an economic crisis hitting a national political system. Societal contestation did emerge domestically, but in ways that reinforced centre-periphery conflict within the Eurozone itself (e.g. Germany v. Greece) rather than forging bonds among equivalent social groups across member states (e.g. German workers

---

7 And there is a lot to be said about how Brexit is analysed by respective communities of British politics and EU studies scholars and whether the two resultant literatures align sufficiently and/or productively.
& Greek workers in alliance). One upshot might be that the politicization of integration/the EU tends to be disintegrative or at least centrifugal in character because it can only properly occur within national spaces of political contestation that articulate ‘the European question’ to a range of domestic political tropes with very distinctive (and possibly contradictory) results. Brexit may be one such distinctive result.

Indeed, there is an argument that Brexit, while resulting in the possible departure of the UK from the EU, is in fact the consequence of a range of very UK-specific factors that, in and of themselves, have very little to do with European integration. At the very least, ‘Brexitism’ is about considerably more than the radical renegotiation of the UK’s relationship to the EU (Finlayson 2018). The rapidly growing literature on the determinants of voting in the referendum, complex and nuanced as it is, is more or less clear on this (e.g. Clarke, Goodwin and Whiteley 2017, Fetzer 2018, Hobolt 2016, Jennings and Stoker 2019). Put simply, in so far as Brexit is about the politicization of European integration, then this has involved a degree of issue linkage where the referendum became a site for the expression of multiple discontents, many of which had little, if any, relationship to the UK’s membership of the EU. Equally, the referendum seems to have opened a nascent cleavage in British politics: ‘Remainers’ (Rm) v. ‘Leavers’ (Lv). While the descriptors position adherents to each side in relation to the UK’s future status vis-à-vis the EU, they also capture a range of other variables that have the potential to re-structure domestic political competition across a wide
range of issues. In other words, it is not just ‘Europe’ that shapes the political positioning and behavior of both sides of the Rm-Lv divide. Hobolt, Leeper and Tilly (2018) describe the emergence in the wake of the referendum of highly resilient Rm and Lv identities in British politics. These are not only predictors of a range of policy preferences over issues such as immigration, gender equality, education, the environment and criminal justice. There is also evidence that both groups have developed strong ‘we’ feelings, the corollary of which is the development of negative stereotypes of the other side. Traditional governing strategies designed to appeal to and capture the political ‘centre’ are increasingly less effective when the political centre is so thinly populated (Curtice 2019). Moreover, ‘there is also some evidence to suggest that individual interpretations of any new evidence about Brexit are motivated by these emerging identities’ (Hobolt, Leeper and Tilly 2018). Emergent Rm and Lv identities not only cut across standard party alignments; they are also considerably stronger than traditional party identities (Montagu 2018). The Economist (2019) picked up on these tendencies recently when it wrote of the ‘radicalization’ of Remainers.

--III--

To what extent might LIP be a useful additive to existing discussions of the politicization of European integration? The UK story has generic features. For example, the postfunctionalist model developed by Hooghe and Marks (2009) is designed to understand how and why domestic politicization might follow an identity as opposed to a distributional logic. If we accept that the domestic
politics of Brexit have operated more along the gal/tan dimension than the classic left-right dimension (see also Hooghe and Marks 2018), then the postfunctionalist account would be interested in the relatively weak party political mediation of the European issue in the referendum context, particularly in relation to the matter of ‘issue creation’ (i.e. what is the nature of the European question as it applies in British politics?). But it would also focus on the matter of what Hooghe and Marks (2009) call ‘arena choice’ and ‘arena rules’, namely the way in which politics and decision-making around the referendum have been shaped by the use of a (non-deliberative) plebiscite. Indeed, it is worth noting that the plebiscitary mode of Brexit politics was not simply confined to the referendum campaign. It has been part and parcel of the subsequent Brexit process, including aspects of parliamentary decision-making.8

Hooghe and Marks also point to what might be called the co-constitutive relationship between conflict structures and arena choice. This would suggest, not implausibly, that the politics of Brexit has been strongly shaped by the decision to settle the issue domestically in the mass arena through the deployment of a referendum as a key part of the decision process. It also implies that strong identity logics, already in play, were important shapers of that very arena choice. Empirically, this makes intuitive sense. It is hard to explain the Cameron government’s decision to prompt a referendum on the

---

8 The protracted parliamentary struggle over Brexit can be read, in part at least, as a contest between those who would seek to normalize the plebiscitary version of democracy (‘the will of the people’) and others who aim to bring the Brexit issue back within the ambit of standard representative democratic practices.
UK’s membership of the EU without reference to the long-standing and apparently irreconcilable divisions over European integration within the Conservative Party (Baker, Ludlam and Gamble 1993, Hayton 2018). Moreover, the immediate context was the surge in support for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), which not only ‘won’ the European Parliamentary elections in the UK in 2014\(^9\), but also had secured two defections from the Conservative backbenches in the late summer/autumn of the same year.\(^{10}\) UKIP’s success in this period lay in two factors: (a) skillful issue linkage that combined the relatively low salience EU issue with the much higher salience immigration issue (Evans and Mellon 2019), and (b) the political mobilization of a range of relatively marginalized demographic groups around a classically anti-establishment populist account of politics (Ford and Goodwin 2014).

This last point raises the question of what is being politicized. The postfunctionalist model together with a good deal of the other EU studies work on politicization tends to understand the focal point of that politicization to be some or other aspect of European integration. As already indicated, while Brexit is organized – as the name suggests – around the issue of the UK’s membership of the UK, Brexit might be better understood as the clustering of multiple politicizations of varying temporality into a single referendum event. This in turn is showing considerable potential to

---

\(^9\) In those elections UKIP secured 26.8% of the popular vote, winning 24 of the 73 UK seats in the EP.

\(^{10}\) Douglas Carswell, MP for Clacton and Mark Reckless, MP for Rochester & Strood. On defection, both resigned from Parliament and won the subsequent by-elections for UKIP. Carswell retained his seat in the 2015 General Election.
restructure the dynamics of political competition in the UK. Part of this restructuring is about a reconfiguration of the domestic politics of European integration in the UK, but it is quite possibly about rather more than that (see the discussion about Rm v. Lv above).

Pushing this a little further, we could argue that the domestic politicization of European integration is typically and inescapably bound up with the politicization of other issues (e.g. immigration, inequality, austerity, globalization) and that both the likelihood of politicization happening and the form taken by subsequent politics will be heavily conditioned by domestic institutional and discursive path dependencies. The issue of low information clearly fits with the latter, but is also recognizable as a generic feature of the populist style of politics, which itself emerges in the context of a range of long term secular trends common to the mature democracies (the increasing difficulty of reconciling the market and democracy as sources of societal allocation, the decline of party government, the displacement of traditional media by social media, the challenge of ‘permanent austerity’ and so on).

—IV—

A further preliminary point about LIP concerns the domains of politicization and how they interact. Politicization and depoliticization are typically discussed in relation to arenas of decision-making and mass politics/contestation. The bulk of the literature on the politicization of European integration has been interested in the latter, with the puzzle being a question of how the formative period of ‘permissive consensus’ gave way to a
period of contestation within the member-states. At the same time, a good deal of political economy discussion has focused on the EU as a space for the development of non-majoritarian decision-making. The first discussion tends to be about politicization, while the second is normally concerned with depoliticization. But of course, it is easy to hypothesize that the domestic contestation of integration (politicization) represents a societal reaction to the growth of supranational non-majoritarian decision-making (depoliticization). In terms of the stylized representation in Table 1 (below), the politicization of integration can be read as the culmination of a move from a situation where cells 1 and 3 co-exist (a ‘permissive consensus’) to a scenario where there is an ongoing tension between cells 1 and 4 (a ‘constraining dissensus’). In this model, Brexit represents a demand originating in cell 4 for decision-making to move from cell 1 to cell 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Politics as decision-making</th>
<th>Depoliticization</th>
<th>Politicization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Delegation of aspects of policy-making to non-majoritarian institutions.</td>
<td>2. Return of decision-making authority to institutional sites directly responsive to democratic impulses.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics as contestation</td>
<td>3. Issue areas cease to be subject to significant public contestation, debate and conflict</td>
<td>4. Issue areas become subject to public contestation, debate and conflict.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Modes of politicization/depoliticization

This might be a helpful way to think about Brexit in particular and the domestic politicization of integration more generally, but it leaves many
questions unanswered. For one thing, we need to understand how politicization occurs and through what mechanisms. It is fair enough to say that the character of politicization will vary depending on a range of factors such as arena choice, arena rules and prevailing structures of political conflict, and that the framing of the domestic politics of integration will represent the specific national representation/mediation of broader tensions in the EU. But, as argued above, this approach rather tends to isolate the politicization of European integration from a range of other politicization moments, some of which are generic and not necessarily related to the EU and others of which are very particular to domestic contexts in member-states. So Brexit may have emerged from an instance of the domestic politicization of integration, but it cannot be understood solely in those terms. Indeed, what is striking is how the hitherto relatively low salience European issue, which is very poorly understood at both mass and elite level in the UK, has quickly become the central line of cleavage within British politics.

The modest suggestion here is that it is much easier to legitimate Brexit (in whatever form) in a low information political environment. To return to table 1, it becomes hard to articulate positive arguments for supranational delegation (cell 1) when there is little discursive space for the articulation of either causal ideas or normative beliefs that could be used to justify that status quo. The argument for ‘taking back control’, as was well understood by the ‘Leave’ campaigns in the referendum (see especially Cummings 2017), relies upon both the open-endedness of that term and the active suppression of the
types of knowledge that could help to focus the debate or fact check/refute the more egregious claims on behalf of the shift from cell 1 to cell 2. The active prevention of attempts to bring expert or professional-practical knowledge in to play is clearly part and parcel of LIP. But it is also enabled by the arena choice, namely the use of a binary referendum with no accompanying deliberative process. In turn it makes perfect sense from a pro-Brexit point of view to fetishize the democratic moment of the referendum as representative of the solemn will of the people. Again, making this argument has the effect of denying voice to those who would contest the ‘will of the people’ on technical, normative or indeed philosophical grounds.\[^{11}\]

None of this is to imply that the referendum result would have necessarily been different in an environment of ‘higher’ information. Indeed the assumption of many advocates of a second referendum is that a so-called ‘People’s Vote’ would be undertaken by a much more knowledgeable public, which – with more information at its disposal – would in turn most likely opt to remain. While this could well be a factor in any future plebiscite, it remains the case that referendums favor those prepared to pursue low information tactics (not least because the enactment of a referendum by definition suspends standard representative-democratic parliamentary processes).

Finally, LIP reminds us that individuals can develop firm and unyielding preferences even (and perhaps especially) in the absence of authoritative

\[^{11}\text{On the latter see Olsen and Rostbøll (2017) and Weale (2018)}\]
knowledge. This isn’t to say that they lack knowledge. Sir Michael Caine ‘knows’ that the UK should leave the EU and that a ‘no deal’ will be fine in the long term. To the trained eye, his justification for that position is mostly nonsensical. But the trained eye should also realize that he speaks about politics in the way that is probably typical of a sizable proportion of the electorate.

References


Murphy, J. and Devine, D. (2018) ‘Does Media Drive Public Support for UKIP or Does Public Support for UKIP Drive Media Coverage?’, *British Journal of Political Science*, published online ahead of print, 31 July [https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123418000145](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123418000145)


