Political Parties and the Structure of Political Conflict

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Draft paper (May 2019)

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Paper Presented at the 2019 EUSA International Biennial Conference, May 9-May 11, 2019, Denver CO.

The decline of mainstream political parties and the emergence of nationalist parties raise fundamental questions about the causal bases of voting and the nature of democratic conflict.[1] Are we witnessing a process of destructuration in which political choice becomes short term, oriented to particular issues and personalities? Or are we seeing the development of a cleavage that, like previous ones, structures conflict between distinctive social groups?

Our strategy is to set out two contending approaches to democratic conflict—destructuration theory and cleavage theory—as distinctly as possible and then take some initial steps to evaluate their relative validity. Both theories respond to the decline of the cleavages that structured conflict in the post World War II era, but they do so in contrasting ways. The premise of destructuration theory is that the decline of classic cleavages has produced a flexible terrain of competition in which voters form preferences over an ever-evolving array of issues. Voter attachment to political parties is increasingly individualized as formal group attachments lose their bite and values rather than class or status shape political choice. Cleavage theory, by contrast, conceives a succession of socially structured oppositions to major external shocks that upset the status quo. Party system change resembles a geological process in which socially structured divides overlay each other. In this theory, the formation of cleavages is an ongoing process punctuated by periods of dealignment as prior divides lose their grip and voters switch to new political parties.

In the next section we outline these theories and in subsequent sections we examine their relative validity along three tracks. First, we estimate whether the political parties on the socio-cultural divide are more socially distinctive than political parties on prior cleavages, and whether structuration increases or decreases by age cohort. Using eight waves of the European Social Survey across fourteen countries, we find that cross-sectional variation in the social structure of political parties is broadly in line with cleavage theory. Second, we examine the social bases of vote choice by estimating the effects of education, occupation, rural/urban location, and gender by political party and age cohort. Third, we use panel data from the Netherlands to probe voter volatility, and we find systematic differences between the socio-cultural and left-right divides that are consistent with cleavage theory.

Two approaches to voting and social structure

The theories outlined below draw from a large and diverse literature on voters and political parties. Our aim is not to replicate the ideas of any particular writer, but to set out the basic building blocks that underpin two contending views of contemporary partisanship and democratic political conflict.

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[1] This research received financial support from the project "Bridging the gap between public opinion and European leadership: Engaging a dialogue on the future path of Europe - EUENGAGE" (H2020-EURO-2014-2015/H2020-EURO-SOCIETY-2014, grant n. 649281) funded by the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme.

A point of departure for destructuration theory is the decay of the social cleavages that Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967) diagnosed as structuring political parties in the age of mass democratic contestation in the 20th century (Dalton, Flanagan, Beck 1984; Franklin et al. 1992; Knutsen 2006; van der Brug 2010). In the Lipset/Rokkan model each of the major party families – regionalist, Christian democratic, liberal, and socialist—was mobilized in opposition to the ruling status quo in the context of a major socio-political transformation. Peripheral communities resisted the rise of national states and the imposition of national language, national education, and national culture. Catholics resisted the rise of national churches and the secular control of education. The industrial revolution generated opposition to aristocratic domination on the part of the rising urban middle classes, followed by massive working-class resistance to capitalist exploitation. The result for European party systems was a sequential pattern of cleavages that structured political conflict over an extended time—so extended, in fact, that it could explain party competition right up to the 1960s when Lipset and Rokkan were writing their influential article (Bartolini and Mair 1990).

These conflicts could shape voters' behavior over generations because they were socially rooted. The glue that binds individuals into groups is strongest when it is based on characteristics that are both life-long and inter-generational. The social transformations that produce cleavages affect individuals where it most counts – in the parts of their life that are imprinted on them by the community in which they live and how they work and survive. Nation building and the industrial revolution reshaped the social structure, creating and destroying ways of life and means of subsistence. A person born as Basque or Scots, Catholic or Protestant, manual worker or professional is likely to die that way, and the child of such a person will have a greater than random chance of doing the same.

The oppositions that produced social cleavages involved both ideologies and interests. Lipset and Rokkan note that the conflicts that structure western democracies confront voters with "choices among historically given 'packages' of programs, commitments, outlooks, and sometimes 'Weltanschauungen'" (1967: 2-3). Catholicism, Protestantism, liberalism, conservatism, and socialism are ideologies that instill in their followers what it means to be human and how a society should be governed. These are creeds that cannot easily be compromised. They invoke commitments that their supporters should realize even at considerable personal cost.[2] They are existential as well as instrumental.

The point of departure for the study of voters and parties in Europe from the 1970s was the apparent decay in the foundations of cleavage theory. Most importantly, the structural bases of voting loosened as the closed social milieus that bonded voters to parties evaporated. The decline of religion, the diversification of working life, and greater occupational and spatial mobility weakened the social ties that bound individuals to traditional social strata (Crewe, Sarlvik, and Alt 1977; see Langsæther 2019 for a critical view). Trade unions have declined.

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[2] This line of argument is consistent with Peter Blau's (1986: 271ff) sociology of group particularism: "[F]undamental reforms can occur in a society only if men are inspired by radical ideals for the sake of which they are willing to sacrifice their material welfare. Such ideals also serve as mediating links that bring together men who feel exploited and oppressed and unite them in a common cause."

Fewer people go to church. Because these trends are time-bound, their effect appears to increase with each new generation of voters (Dassonneville and Dejaeghere 2014; van der Brug 2010; Walzcak, van der Brug, De Vries 2012).

Political parties themselves have declined in membership and have lost some of their former functions (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). In most European countries, parties are no longer able to cement loyalty by providing their supporters with patronage and jobs. With the growth of mass media and the internet, their predominant role in providing political cues has weakened. Social democratic and religious parties were once almost closed societies within the broader society, with newspapers, pubs, sports teams, and much besides. A person could live much of their social life within the pillarized setting of a political party and its organizational offshoots. The postwar decades emasculated political parties as lifelong incubators of partisanship.

As the supply of organizational contexts for cleavage politics dried up, so apparently did the demand for them. Several observers point to mass education as a source of increasing political knowledge which would make voters less reliant on the political cues provided by social reference groups (Franklin et al. 1992: 9). Completion of secondary schooling became the norm in Europe in the postwar decades and tertiary education expanded rapidly. Mass education allowed voters to be better informed about politics, and this arguably loosens the effect of social background while enhancing individual choice (Dalton 2007).

The intensity of the class cleavage and religious cleavage has softened as mainstream parties have moderated their ideologies. Religious parties have come to accept that the state is secular. Socialist parties no longer wish to abolish wage labor. Prior to World War I, most socialist parties advocated the nationalization of the means of production, and the modal response of employers was to suppress both socialism as an ideology and workers' efforts to organize in the labor market. After World War II, worker demands moderated, and capitalist resistance became less harsh. As Lipset (1963: 442, 445) noted in an essay entitled the *End of Ideology*: "The fact the the differences between the left and the right in the Western democracies are no longer profound does not mean that there is no room for party controversy … The democratic class struggle will continue, but it will be a fight without ideologies, without red flags, without May Day parades."

An extensive literature points out that the virtue of democracy is that it institutionalizes the expression of contending political preferences, and that it moderates, if not resolves, those differences by the continual adjustment of public policy. The moderating effects of democracy on class conflict are evident both over time and across countries. Where "institutional access expanded, socialist parties were induced to reject revolutionary action in favor of reform. Civil rights—freedom to organize and freedom of expression—were decisive" (Marks et al. 2009: 631; Lipset 1983). Liberal democracy helps to de-pressurize political conflict, and this arguably diminishes socially structured partisanship. "Very gradually, then, to the extent that political solutions were found to social problems, former cleavages will have become increasingly irrelevant to emerging problems and issues. This will in due course have affected the relation between traditional cleavages and voting choice in all systems which were sufficiently

responsive in character as to allow the graduate dissipation of former conflicts of interest" (van der Eijk et al. 1992: 432ff).

The rise of cultural issues can be interpreted as consistent with a theory stressing destructuration. Cultural issues related to postmaterialism, individual choice, and community have produced a dimension of political conflict that is only loosely associated with traditional left-right competition. Whereas preferences on the economic left-right were rooted in a person's class, occupation, and income, cultural preferences tend to be a matter of personal judgement. The same applies with even greater force to the rise of populism. Preferences over people's power or charismatic leaders appear only weakly related to durable ideologies having a socio-structural basis (Gidron and Mijs forthcoming; Inglehart and Norris 2016 for an overview).

Perhaps the most influential approach in the study of voting in the post World War II era is that of Anthony Downs (1957) who considered competition among political parties for votes as akin to competition among firms for consumers. The consumers are voters who evaluate the performance of parties on their short-run performance. Voters choose parties in accord with their utility functions, and political parties are similarly instrumental. Political parties in this schema "have no interest per se in creating any particular type of society" but "seek office solely in order to enjoy the income, prestige, and power that go with running the governing apparatus" (Downs 1957: 141, 137). Ideologies are no longer tied to class or status but are cognitive shortcuts that individuals find useful in a setting of incomplete information. "However, just as in the product market, any markedly successful ideology is soon imitated, and differentiation takes place on more subtle levels" (142).

The Downsian model proved to be an elegant baseline for the study of voting and parties. Voter preferences are conceived as an endogenous field of strategic competition among political parties. Consistent with destructuration theory, the Downsian model theorizes voters as free-floating individuals who make short-run decisions. New issues are continually produced, and political parties respond by adapting their appeal to subsume them (Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Adams et al. 2004; Ezrow 2005). This is an open-ended process weakly constrained by partisan loyalties rooted in social structure.

The common core of these models is the idea that partisan choice is short term, oriented to particular issues and personalities that have little to do with a person's social background. As the social moorings of conflict weaken generation by generation, party-political preferences become a matter of individual choice. Political parties compete to attract voters by strategically emphasizing issues that bolster their reputation, by performing well, or by having appealing candidates.[3]

[3] On party strategies see, eg. Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996; Bélanger and Meguid 2008; Hobolt and De Vries 2015: 1166; de Wardt, De Vries, and Hobolt 2014; Clark 2009; Clarke et al. 2011; Klüver and Spoon 2016; Rovny and Whitefield 2019; Sanders et al. 2011; Poguntke and Webb 2005; McAllister

An alternative theory suggests that the decline of traditional cleavages is part of a process in which some cleavages recede while others come into play (Hooghe and Marks 2018; Rovny 2015). A historical cleavage may persist over an extended period of time, as will a political party founded on that cleavage. However, old divides may lose the capacity to shape human relations as the socializing effect of prior institutions diminishes from generation to generation. As a prior divide exhausts its grip, there is the ever-present possibility that a new cleavage arises to overlay the old (Blau 1986: 301ff).

The decline of the religious cleavage and the class cleavage is not inconsistent with a revised cleavage theory. What matters is whether the political parties competing on the new cultural divide have distinct constituencies with recognizable social characteristics. So a revised cleavage approach builds on classic cleavage theory but relaxes the assumption that cleavages are frozen. Instead, destructuration and restructuration may coexist.

Whereas destructuration theory considers political parties as market participants, cleavage theory conceives parties as rooted in social divisions. If cleavage theory used a market analogy it would emphasize the constraints on a firm that cannot change its brand image in the face of exogenous technological change – as for Polaroid cameras or Kodak film. This would be a story of how the sunk costs of impressing a brand in the minds of voters constrains party adaptability. Whereas destructuration theory conceives of parties appealing to voters as consumers, cleavage theory conceives parties as giving political voice to structurally rooted groups in conflict with one another.

Each of the cleavages identified by Lipset and Rokkan was a reaction to major social change that disrupted the lives of large social groups. Over the past half-century, western societies have seen a great transformation—an information technology revolution—that has displaced industrial employment into the tertiary sector, polarized the returns to professional and manual work, and produced a global shift in the division of labor (Brown et al 2010; Rodrik 2017; Jie Im et. al. 2019; Teeple 2000). The consequences for the structure of conflict are arguably no less transformative than the rise of the national state or the industrial revolution.

Like prior transformations, the effects of the information-technology revolution for the mobilization of oppositions has come in stages. The first was a postindustrial cleavage and the rise of green parties. Underlying this was the emergence of a class of public and professional employees and a widening gap between its market power and that of manual workers (Bornschier 2010; Gidron and Hall 2017). The rising salariat defied the expectation that more privileged employees would find their home on the economic right. Many supported social democratic parties, thereby increasing social heterogeneity across the occupational divide (Kitschelt 1994). In high income democracies with low barriers to party entry, a significant number of educated public and professional employees threw their support to "GAL" parties which raised Green-Alternative-Libertarian issues relating to the environment, democratic participation, and lifestyle choice.

2007; Garzia and De Angelis 2016; Poguntke and Webb 2005; McAllister 2007; Garzia and De Angelis 2016.

The second stage of the informational technology revolution saw a transnational cleavage and the rise of TAN parties stressing traditionalism, authority, and most fervently, defense of the nation (Hooghe and Marks 2018). Underlying this was the globalization of finance and trade driven by a sharp decline in the cost of communication and ever more integrated financial and production networks. As with each prior transformation, technological change went hand in hand with a shift in power relations. Less skilled workers, who had the most to lose from globalization, were severely disempowered by the 1990s when globalization took off. Most educated employees worked in protected sectors. They were spared the threat of international competition, while they benefited as consumers.

National regulatory barriers were lowered in regional and global agreements of the early 1990s. These included NAFTA (1992), the World Trade Organization (1994), and more than thirty regional organizations (Hooghe, Lenz, Marks 2018). The European Union went furthest in overarching national boundaries. The Maastricht Treaty (1993) extended EU authority over wide ranges of public life, made it much easier for people to work in another EU country, created a common currency, and turned nationals into European Union citizens. The net effect was to diminish the cost of international trade and migration while diffusing authority away from national states.

At the core of the contemporary cultural divide is a sharp and prolonged rise in transnational exchange, oriented chiefly around immigration and European integration, with profound social and economic consequences. The commingling of people with diverse beliefs, norms, and behavior increases the potential for group conflict. To this one may add the economic consequences of transnational exchange. Immigration, European integration, and trade tend to benefit those with human and financial capital, while intensifying competition for jobs and housing for those without such capital. Transnational exchange has become politically combustible because immigration, trade, and the reallocation of authority to the European Union are political choices that affect the life chances of clearly defined groups (De Vries 2018a,b; van Elsas et al. 2016; Hooghe and Marks 2009; Rooduijn, Burgoon, van Elsas, van de Werfhorst 2017).

The political consequences of the information technology revolution were first exposed in the cultural shift of educated individuals and the rise of green political parties, initially in Belgium and Germany, and today in most EU countries. However, the effects of advanced capitalism have been no less fundamental for less skilled workers. The organizational defenses of manual workers have weakened, their employment security has diminished, welfare spending has been curtailed, and the market power of blue-collar workers has collapsed.

The info-tech revolution has had a double-effect on the structure of conflict (Beramendi et al 2015: 7ff; Dalton 2018). First, it muddied the established employer-worker cleavage by bringing professionals and tertiary employees into left parties as their blue-collar base dwindled (Kitschelt 1994). Second, political parties were formed along a new dimension of conflict (Bornschier 2010; Hobolt and Tilley 2016; Lubbers and Coenders 2017; Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2016). These parties appear to have distinct constituencies with recognizable social

characteristics (Aichholzer, Kritzinger, Wagner, Zeglovits 2014; Häusermann and Kriesi 2015).[4] So a revised cleavage approach builds on classic cleavage theory but relaxes the assumption that cleavages are frozen. Hence, the destructuration of prior cleavages and the emergence of a new cleavage may arise from a common source.

A broad stream of literature interprets the re-articulation of political conflict along cultural lines (Inglehart 1977; Ivarsflaten 2008; Kriesi 1998; Kriesi et al. 2006; Bornschier 2010). It claims that cultural issues related to postmaterialism, individual choice, and community have produced a dimension of political conflict that is only loosely associated with traditional left-right competition. Inglehart (1971: 991) diagnosed a "transformation … in the political cultures of advanced industrial societies, [which] seems to be altering the basic value priorities of given generations, as a result of changing conditions influencing their basic socialization." Kriesi (1998: 180) highlights "the emergence of yet another new cleavage – the cleavage opposing the new middle-class winners of the transformation of Western European societies to the group of losers of the very same process."

Whereas occupation underpinned the class struggle, education appears to structure the transnational divide (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010; Hakhverdian et al. 2013; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007). Recent research indicates that education seems influential not for what it does, but for what it signifies. Panel studies find that the process of education has little effect on a young person's political affinities over time (Kuhn et al. 2017; Lancee and Sarrasin 2015). Rather, education seems to be a social marker (Goldthorpe 2016). It tells us about a person's station in life, about the benefits that can be conveyed by one's parents, and about how a person was raised—in short, it tells us something important about a person's social and material background. The effect of education reaches into feelings of solidarity and group identity. Highly educated and less educated individuals appear to have distinct identities and divergent group consciousness (Stubager 2009, 2010).

Hence the effect of education for the social structuration of voting on the transnational divide appears to be both cultural and economic. Cultural fears and economic loss are so interwoven that it has proven difficult to determine which is causally prior. Perhaps this is the point. Their joint effect is potentially far stronger than each in isolation.[5]

There are also reasons for believing that a political party competing on the cultural or GAL-TAN[6] divide will be occupationally distinctive (Kitschelt and Rehm 2014; Häusermann and Kriesi 2015). Professionals—e.g. managers, teachers, nurses, doctors, social workers—exercise discretion at work and are engaged in face to face relations with diverse others in which social skills are important. Such people tend to have GAL values. Manual workers, low-grade service workers, and those whose work is chiefly technical tend to be less GAL and more TAN. This is reinforced by an economic logic. Manual workers, in contrast to professional workers, are precariously placed in the international division of labor when they produce traded goods in

[4] An extensive empirical literature on the social bases of TAN and GAL voting focuses primarily on the former; there are only a handful studies on GAL voting. See Tables A.5 and A.6 in the Appendix.
[5] Gidron and Hall (2017) highlight the loss in social status as a driver of rightwing populism.
[6] GAL (green, alternative, libertarian) vs. TAN (traditional, authority, national).

competition with poorly paid workers in third world countries. For those who have financial or social capital, immigration from neighboring countries is a source of cheap labor. For those who sell their labor, immigration increases competition. For these reasons, the transnational divide cuts across social class, producing TAN parties that challenge socialist parties for the allegiance of workers (Oesch and Rennwald 2018). Lipset once noted that a signal attribute of socialist parties was to turn those towards the bottom of society in an internationalist cosmopolitan direction.[7] Political parties have arisen on the new divide that do just the opposite.

These are the chief ways in which social background lies behind the cultural divide. Education and occupation are not merely choices that a person makes. They are related to inherited factors, and they shape a person's life, who one works with, who one's friends are, and in an increasing number of cases, who one marries. While it is true that organizational membership has declined, social networks of friends, family or co-workers may have a similar effect in reinforcing political preferences (Fitzgerald 2011; Kuhn 2009; Zuckerman et al. 2007).

In addition, one might expect political parties on the transnational cleavage to be distinguished by location, gender, and age. Cities have always been known for trade, the flow of ideas, and cultural openness (Maxwell 2019). A nine-country comparative study concludes that "identical social groups living in metropolitan places with distinct interests and lifestyles behave in starkly different ways" (Sellers et al. 2013: 419; 448-9). In Lipset and Rokkan's historical exposition, peripheral localities opposed the centralizing power of the national state. Today rural localities seek national protection from foreign influence. TAN parties do exceptionally well in small towns and suburbs that are ethnically less diverse and economically peripheral, while GAL parties do best in cities.

Gender and age, inert characteristics on the conventional left-right, are clear markers on the transnational cleavage. Positive views on transnationalism tend to go together with positive views on gender and transgender equality, and younger people, on the whole, have been socialized under the conditions of social diversity and multi-level politics that characterize the transnational world.

Expectations

The expectations of destructuration and cleavage theory are starkly different. They can be summarized as a response to three questions. The first concerns the social distinctiveness of the electorates where the unit of analysis is the political party. Here we ask whether political parties on the left-right and GAL-TAN divides attract socially distinct groups. The second question concerns social structuration at the individual level, for it is possible that one or more political parties do indeed have socially distinct constituencies even if voting across the entire population of voters is not structurally conditioned.[8] Hence, the structuration of the entire

[7] Personal communication.

[8] For example, voters for the British Labour party before World War I were predominantly working-class men, although most working-class men voted for the Liberal party. Hence, one might find that a party on a new cleavage is socially structured even if a multinomial logit analysis were to produce a null result

voting population is a higher hurdle for cleavage theory than the structuration of individual political parties. So we next probe the social structuration of individual voting for left-right and GAL-TAN parties and how this varies across generations of voters. Third, we ask how the volatility of party choice varies for left-right and GAL-TAN political parties, and again, how this varies across younger and older voters.

On the first question, destructuration theory predicts that the social distinctiveness of parties' voter bases will be quite weak following the softening of cleavages from the 1970s. With generational replacement, the social bases of partisanship decline as those socialized in traditional cleavages are replaced by those having more individualized preferences. Political parties will tend to become "catch-all," encompassing diverse groups on the basis of cross-class appeals to leadership and competence (Kirchheimer 1966). Correspondingly, on the second question, destructuration theory predicts that as each new generation comes of age in an environment further removed from prior class and religious cleavages, their voting behavior will be detached from their social background. Finally, voting will be increasingly volatile as the social moorings that sustained durable partisanship fade and are replaced by more fluid preferences based on how a party has performed, or might perform, in government.

Cleavage theory, by contrast, expects that the social structuration of GAL and TAN parties will be more marked than for mainstream political parties based on the economic left/right, and that this difference will grow as a new generation comes onto the political stage. Cleavage theory claims that education, occupation, location, and gender are an important part of an explanation for individual voting for GAL-TAN political parties, and that these factors gain causal power for younger generations of voters. It also expects that the electorates of parties on the rising GAL-TAN divide will be less volatile than those for mainstream political parties, and that younger voters, despite their youth, will be relatively stable in their partisanship.

Expectations diverge most strongly on education. Some destructuration theorists argue that the expansion of mass education has empowered a larger proportion of the electorate to step outside their social moorings and evaluate politics on the basis of personalities and performance. Education, therefore, is likely to lead to electoral volatility rather than stability, and this should be particularly apparent among higher educated individuals. Neo-cleavage theory conceives that education is a positional good that predisposes individuals to GAL political parties.

Data and Measurement

We use cross-sectional data and panel data to assess these expectations. We pair individual-level data from eight bi-annual rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS) from 2002 and 2016 with estimates on party positioning from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) over five waves (2002, 2006, 2010, 2014, 2017). To assess structuration across the left-right and GAL-TAN

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for the voting population at the individual level. Conversely, structured voting at the individual level can co-exist with structurally diverse political parties if each political party gains the votes of more than one defined group.

divides we examine party constituencies and voting choice in fourteen countries with political parties on both axes.[9] The unit of analysis for vote choice is the individual who voted in the last national election. Respondents are included only if they declare they have voted in the previous election and are at least 21 years old at the time of the survey to avoid the confounding effect of respondents with incomplete education. This yields a dataset with just under 104,000 respondents who have voted for 112 political parties in fourteen European countries.

We match individual-level information with the individual political party. Political parties are aggregated by ideology. Party family—TAN, conservative, liberal, Christian democratic, social democratic, radical left, and green—is a standard classification to "summarize the accumulated historical experience of cleavages" (Marks and Wilson 1999: 439). Our baseline is the categorization of political parties in party families in the CHES dataset which is consistent with Parlgov's (Döring and Manow 2016) and Knutsen's (2018) classifications (Polk et al. 2017; Bakker et al. 2015; Hooghe and Marks 2018). A simplified operationalization groups the seven party families in four party blocs—TAN, green, left (social-democratic, radical left), and right (conservative, liberal, Christian democratic).

A second source of information consists of ten waves of panel data from the Netherlands (2008-2017). The unit of analysis here is the party choice of a respondent across two consecutive panels. We use the response to the question, "If parliamentary elections were held today, for which party would you vote?" In annual panel data, a vote propensity question can pick up a change of intended support between elections. We treat responses that are missing, non-voting, ineligible to vote, or "do not know yet" as missing. The Appendix details the coding scheme (Kuhn 2009). Respondents are at least 21 years old at the time of the survey. This yields just over 34,000 responses of individuals who intend to vote for one of thirteen political parties.

The key independent variables are five social characteristics hypothesized to structure support for green and TAN political parties: education, occupation, location, age, and gender.[10] For both cross-sectional and panel analyses we transform education, occupation, location, and age into dichotomous measures to test for the existence of the sharp distinctions hypothesized by cleavage theory. This makes the analysis more directly interpretable, though the significance of all results in this paper are robust when we use more refined categorizations where they are available. In the ESS analyses, *higher education* takes on a value of 1 if an individual has completed post-secondary or tertiary education.[11] *Socio-professional* is derived from Oesch's

[9] Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. We impose a minimum number of respondents to reduce the possibility of drawing a biased sample of voters. The unit of analysis for party structuration is the individual political party that is represented by at least 25 voters in one ESS round or 75 voters across ESS rounds and for which we have expert evaluations in the Chapel Hill expert survey.
[10] We exclude the religious cleavage because it does not discriminate between destructuration and cleavage theory. Its inclusion does not affect our empirical findings.
[11] When we examine the effect of education across cohorts, we use the full information on education available in ESS: years of education, a five-category ordinal variable, and a seven-category ordinal measure. We are interested in detecting the commonality across different measures.

ISCO categorization and takes the value of 1 for socio-cultural professionals and managers.[12] *Urban* assigns a value of 1 to those who identify themselves as living in "a big city" or "suburbs or outskirts of a big city" and a value of zero otherwise. *Young* has a value of 1 if the individual is younger than fifty years old, and zero otherwise. *Female* takes on a value of 1 if the individual is female and zero if the individual is male. Multivariate analyses include also controls for religiosity as well as country fixed effects.

Dichotomization in the Dutch panel analyses mirrors this as closely as possible. Hence *higher education* takes on a value of 1 if a respondent has completed higher vocational or university education. *Socio-professional* takes on a value of 1 if a respondent exercises a higher or intermediate academic or independent profession. *Worker* takes on a value of 1 if a respondent is a skilled, sem-skilled or unskilled manual worker.

Are political parties socially structured?

We begin by assessing the social distinctiveness of political parties. Table 1 reports the overrepresentation or underrepresentation of a social group by party family. The first column does this for the 34.1 percent of the ESS sample of respondents who have completed postsecondary or tertiary education. Each row shows the percentage difference in highly educated people relative to the mean for the sample. Hence, higher educated voters are 18.5 percent overrepresented in green political parties. In absolute terms, more than half (55.9 percent) of their voters have postsecondary or tertiary education. By contrast, just 22.3 percent of TAN voters have this level of education. Education produces the largest difference among all social characteristics.[13]

[Table 1: Socio-structural biases by party family]

Consistent with destructuration theory, the social distinctiveness of mainstream party families is very weak. Social democratic, Christian democratic, and conservative parties tend to reflect the social structure of the electorate as a whole. Deviations from the overall mean do not exceed ten percent for any social characteristic, with the partial exception of the liberal party family.[14] The cleavage structure built on class and occupation is now only dimly evident in the party families that motivate Lipset and Rokkan's analysis.

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[12] An alternative dichotomization of occupation, *Worker,* takes on a value of 1 for those who are production workers or service workers. The result is a nearly perfect mirror to the result for *Socio-professional*.

[13] Results are robust when we use more narrowly focused categorizations for education (tertiary educated vs. all others) or occupation (socio-cultural professionals vs. others; production workers vs. others). We prefer more encompassing categories because they divide the population into more equivalently sized groups.

[14] Because their cleavage location in the urban-rural divide arising from industrialization has faded away, liberal parties are the least programmatically grounded party family. While some liberal parties focus primarily on the economic left-right dimension and champion market liberalism, other liberal parties

This is not so for political parties that anchor the GAL-TAN divide, as cleavage theory expects. TAN parties have the lowest concentrations of highly educated voters, socio-professionals and managers, females, and the second lowest concentration of urbanites. Green parties have the highest concentrations of those on all four characteristics. The social-structural gap between green and TAN parties is sharpest on education. Equally notably perhaps, green and TAN parties are more occupationally distinctive than parties that compete on the class cleavage. The gap between green (+11.0) and TAN (–12.0) parties in socio-professionals and managers is 23 percent, compared to 11.1 percent between the next two most dissimilar parties, liberals (8.3) and social democrats (–2.8).

Does the social structuration of political parties vary across generations of voters? To answer this, we split the sample in the ESS dataset into three similarly sized generational groups of voters: those born before 1950, those born between 1950 and 1970, and those born after 1970. Figure 1 compares the distinctiveness of each social characteristic averaged for green and TAN parties (the bars on the left in each frame) and for parties in the remaining party families (the bars on the right) for the pre-1950 generation (light bars) and for the post-1970 generation (dark bars). The figure makes two points. First, as noted above, green and TAN parties have exceptionally distinctive groups of voters. Second, the social structuration of green and TAN parties is greater for the post-1970 generation of voters than it is for the pre-1950 generation of voters. The old cleavage parties have a mixed pattern. Their average social differentiation is generally low; it increases slightly for younger generation voters on occupation and rural-urban and decreases for education and gender.

[Figure 1: Social distinctiveness of political parties across generations of voters]

Overall, these comparisons are in line with cleavage theory and fit poorly with destructuration theory. The social distinctiveness of green and TAN parties is much greater than for parties founded on prior cleavages, and while the distinctiveness of the latter parties has diminished for the post-1970 generations of voters, that for green and TAN parties has increased.

Is voting socially structured?

Our first step in probing the structural basis of voting is to identify combinations of social characteristics that predict party choice using Classification and Regression Trees analysis (CART) (Montgomery and Olivella 2018). We impose the same five dichotomous variables that describe party social structure, and we simplify party families in four blocs. As before we combine seven waves of the European Social Survey for countries that supply each of the party blocs.

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emphasize political rights. Most have moved in a green direction (e.g. the Dutch D66 and the British Libdems) while some previously liberal parties have become TAN (e.g. the Austrian FPÖ).

Table 2 reports the three most distinctive social combinations for voters of each party bloc.[15] The column on the right describes these social combinations, and the column on the left lists the ratio of the observed voters for a party bloc divided by the expected proportion of voters if voting were random. For example, the ratio of 2.19 for radical TAN voters is the ratio of 14.99 (observed proportion of voters in this social combination) to 6.84 (average proportion of radical TAN voters in the sample population).

[Table 2: CART analysis: Social profiles of voters]

Two things stand out. First, the higher ratios for TAN and green parties imply that these parties' electorates are more highly structured than those of left and right parties. TAN and green parties are also the most structurally dissimilar; there is a consistent relationship with strongly TAN structural groups being less green and vice versa.

Second, one can get a handle on the most relevant higher-order interactions by looking at what the top-three combinations or "leafs" for each party family have in common. For TAN parties, this is being young, having limited education, and being a manual or service worker. For green parties, this is being young, urban, and highly educated. The core for left parties consists of older, lower educated, workers. Right parties' core consists of highly educated, rural, men.

The broader implication is that different elements of social structure can combine to create groups with particularly distinctive political allegiances. Competing camps on the transnational cleavage are defined by the layering of individuals' education, occupation, gender, age, and location. Contra destructuration theory, the socio-structural complexity of postindustrial societies is thus associated with sharper, rather than diminished, political divisions between social groups. This is manifested in the form of strong social distinctiveness of parties that articulate the GAL-TAN conflict, while the social constituencies of older parties formed in response to historical cleavages become progressively blurred.

A key question concerns how education interacts with other structural factors, above all occupation, which is the second-most powerful discriminator in the CART analysis. A destructuration account would expect education to dampen the effect of social-structural attributes for voting, while a cleavage account suggests that education is an independent source of social differentiation across the GAL-TAN divide, though not across the left-right divide.

Figure 2 shows the results when we interact education with occupation holding all other social characteristics constant in multinomial logistic regression with country fixed effects.[16] The effect of education and occupation are far stronger for TAN and green voting than for left and right voting. This is evident when one compares the slopes in the frames in the figure. Although the absolute effect of occupational location is greater for the probability that a person

[15] One critique of CART and data mining methods more generally is that they violate the normal assumptions underlying a critical significance level of $p<.05$ because they are the result of multiple comparisons. For this reason, we choose the more stringent significance level cutoff of $p<.01$ before reporting leaves as significant.

[16] Full models will be added to the appendix in a revised version. Models available from the authors.

will vote for a left or right party, the relative effect is much greater for green and TAN voting. A person who is less educated and is not a manager or socio-professional is 3.8 times as likely to vote TAN than a person with the opposite attributes. In reverse, a highly educated manager or socio-professional is 2.0 times as likely to vote green. For left voting and right voting the proportional change in probability produced by education in combination with occupation is just 1.3 and 1.2, respectively.

[Figure 2: Education interacted with occupation]

Moreover, the effects of education and occupation for TAN and green voting are complementary, which is not the case for left and right voting. The parallel fit lines in the frames for TAN and green voting in Figure 2 show that the effect of education does not diminish the effect of occupation, so that their joint effect is considerably greater than the effect of each considered separately. The converging fit lines for left and right voting reveal that education and occupation are partial substitutes. Given a person's occupation, the probability of that person voting for a left or right party is unaffected by that person's level of education.

How does generation bear on the social structuration of voting? Figures 3 and 4 implement a multinomial regression in which we interact education and occupation with cohort.[17] Care is needed in interpreting these results because the scales of the Y-axes vary. Overall, we find increasing destructuration on the left-right divide by generation and increasing structuration on GAL-TAN. As cleavage theory expects, education structures voting more strongly for younger green and TAN voters than for older voters of these parties. The light-blue fit lines tracking those born after 1970 are steeper than the darker lines for older cohorts for green and, especially, TAN voters, indicating that the effect of education in structuring voting for green and TAN parties is greater for more recent generations. The reverse is the case for left and right voters. Education has a weaker effect for each younger generation on the left-right divide. The effect of occupation is also greater for younger TAN voters, while the effect does not reach significance for green voters.

[Figure 3: The structuring effect of education by cohort]

[Figure 4: The structuring effect of occupation by cohort]

Finally, we find partial support for destructuration theory. The left has seen a marked decline in support among less educated voters which is compounded with each cohort, whereas the right has lost highly educated voters. A t-test shows that the difference in education is smallest for the post-1970 cohort, and narrowly reaches conventional levels of significance.[18]

Education has flipped sign between the GAL-TAN and the left-right cleavage. Higher education used to be an asset for the right, while it is now a preeminent marker for voting

[17] Full models will be added to the appendix in a revised version. Models available from the authors.
[18] The t-value is much lower for the youngest group: t=5.14 for the post-1970 cohort against t=13.6 for the 1950-1970 cohort and t=21.7 for the pre-1950 generation.

green. Lower education used to guide voters to the left, but less educated voters are now flocking to TAN.

Voter volatility

We now turn to panel data on volatility in party choice. Destructuration theory predicts that voting becomes more volatile with each new generation. Cleavage theory expects that voters on the new divide will be less volatile than those for mainstream political parties, and that those born in more recent years will tend to be less volatile in their party choice than people in prior generations. Moreover, when voters shift to parties on the new divide, they will not do so at random but engage in social sorting. As the electorate of new parties grows in size, it will retain its social structuration.

Selecting the Netherlands is a methodologically conservative choice for our purpose. After the breakdown of its vaunted system of pillars, the Netherlands became an extreme case of voter volatility. If we find structuration here, it may well exist in less volatile party systems.

We begin by mapping change in party support alongside change in educational and occupational structuration. Political parties on the GAL-TAN divide have gained considerable electoral support in the period covered by the Dutch panel data as depicted in Tables 5 and 6 by the width of the light and dark bars for the PVV, which is a TAN party, and Groenlinks, which is GAL. It would be unremarkable if these parties became more socially diverse as they grew in support, but the change that we detect is small, and these parties remain far more structurally distinctive on both education and occupation than the mainstream VVD and PvdA.[19] Remarkably, the under-representation of PVV supporters having higher education increased from 13.6 percent in 2008-9 to 26.4 percent in 2016-7 while the party increased its share of supporters from 7.2 percent to 13.2 percent.

[Figure 5: Structural bias on education among Dutch parties]

[Figure 6: Structural bias on occupation among Dutch parties]

Cleavage theory suggests that voters who move to parties on a new divide will tend to sort themselves by their social characteristics. This implies that new PVV voters will have low education and a low status occupation, and those who shift away from the party will tend to have higher education and a high-status occupation. Conversely, Groenlinks joiners and leavers should have the reverse characteristics, while political parties on prior cleavages should remain unstructured.

Figures 7 and 8 project this for education and occupation, respectively, over the period covered by the Dutch panel. The PVV, Groenlinks and D66 have the most structurally distinctive leavers, joiners, and loyalists (i.e. those who retain their support for the party across successive

[19] The Y-axis measures the extent of under-representation (negative values) and over-representation of voters having higher education (Figure 5) and higher occupational status (Figure 6) in ratio to the overall sample. A political party that has twice the sample proportion of voters with higher education would score +0.33 on the scale and one that with half as many higher educated voters would score –0.33.

panels). For all political parties but one, leavers and joiners are not statistically different from each other. The exception is the PVV which has been shedding its relatively small contingent of highly educated, socio-cultural professionals and has been attracting less educated non-professionals. Destructuration is present among political parties on the left-right divide, while social sorting has taken place on the TAN side of the GAL-TAN divide.

[Figure 7: Sorting by education]

[Figure 8: Sorting by occupation]

Figure 9 compares the extent to which younger individuals attest support for the same party over consecutive years. The figure helps us answer two questions. First, do levels of volatility on the GAL-TAN divide differ from those on the left-right divide when the age of voters is held constant? The answer for voters aged between 20 and 29 years appears to be yes: young PVV voters have exceptionally high levels of consistency in both the time periods covered in the figure (0.89 ± 0.045 in the first period; 0.81 ± 0.50 in the second period), while young Groenlinks voters have high consistency in 2015-17 (0.78 ± 0.092). Second, how has volatility changed for comparably young voters over time? Consistency among PVV voters and PvdA voters has dropped, though that for PVV voters in the second period is more than twice as high as that for PvdA voters. Consistency among CDA voters appears to have changed little, and the estimated consistency of Groenlinks voters has increased, though not with 95 percent confidence.

[Figure 9: Consistency in party support among young Dutch voters]

The evidence in this section engages the constituencies of political parties and the behavior of voters in an effort to shed light on the extent of social structuration of political competition. Green and TAN parties have distinct constituencies; voting for these parties is much more socially structured than voting for the remaining political parties; and voters tend to be more consistent in their support for green and TAN parties than voters for other parties. These findings are independent from each other, for it would be possible to find that parties are socially structured, but voting was not, or that both parties and voting was socially structured, but volatility was high. Together the findings here suggest that far from being frozen, party systems are subject to exogenous shocks that can generate new political parties and socially structured divides.

Conclusion

The decline of the cleavages that structured political life in Europe raises deep questions about the character of political conflict. Our strategy in this paper is to evaluate two contending approaches to party systems and voting. Destructuration theory perceives the individualization of politics as a facet of modernization. Partisan choice becomes short term and is increasingly divorced from a voter's social background. Cleavage theory conceives destructuration and restructuration as recurrent processes. As the class cleavage has receded a new one has emerged in response to a major exogenous shock.

The evidence that we present confirms that education and occupation have little power in structuring support for parties on the left-right divide, and that destructuration on this divide is particularly marked among younger generations of voters. However, we also find that voters for political parties on the GAL-TAN divide are distinguished by education, occupation, location, and gender. These differences are more pronounced among younger than older voters. Panel data further suggest that voters are less volatile in supporting political parties on the GAL-TAN divide and that this phenomenon has legs across generations. As prior cleavages have softened, another has come into view which, like prior cleavages, divides society into structurally demarcated groups.

Lipset and Rokkan claim that the motive force in the rise of a cleavage lies in opposition to the ruling status quo. Like prior historical transformations, the information-technology revolution has produced two oppositions: first, an educated class that finds no place in the worker-employer world of industrial society, and which demands new personal and political freedoms; and, second, a manual class whose life chances have deteriorated as its market power has declined and its institutional defenses have been shattered. The party-political expressions of this tumultuous transformation, green parties and TAN parties, suggest that restructuration and destructuration go hand in hand.

Table 1: Socio-structural biases by party family

	Education	Occupation	Urban-rural	Gender
	Higher	*Socio-professional or manager*	*Urban*	*Female*
Greens	+18.47	+11.04	+10.55	+7.99
Liberals	+13.07	+8.34	+0.57	−2.46
Radical left	3.37	1.35	+7.71	0.81
Social democrats	−5.68	−2.76	+1.93	+1.40
Christian democrats	−2.44	+0.11	−9.13	0.06
Conservatives	−0.48	−0.83	2.12	−0.21
Tan	−15.10	−11.99	−6.02	−10.06
Overall electorate	*37.38%*	*28.56%*	*31.54%*	*51.39%*

Note: Each cell shows the overrepresentation (+) or underrepresentation (–) of a group having this characteristic in a party family compared to the overall population (21 years or older).
Source: ESS (2002-2016) for fourteen countries.

Table 2: Social profiles of voters

Party bloc	Ratio	Description of the leaf
TAN	2.19	**Lower education, Worker, Younger**, Rural, Male
	1.68	**Lower education, Worker, Younger**, Urban, Male
	1.51	**Lower education, Worker, Younger**, Rural, Female
Green	2.47	**Higher education**, Non-worker, **Younger**, **Urban**, Female
	2.38	**Higher education**, Worker, **Younger**, **Urban**, Female
	1.64	**Higher education**, Non-worker, **Younger**, **Urban**, Male
Left	1.47	**Lower education, Worker, Older**, Urban, Male
	1.35	**Lower education, Worker, Older**, Urban, Female
	1.31	**Lower education, Worker, Older**, Rural, Male
Right	1.25	Higher education, **Non-worker**, Younger, **Rural, Male**
	1.23	Higher education, **Non-worker**, Older, **Rural, Male**
	1.20	Lower education, **Non-worker**, Younger, **Rural, Male**

Note: The ratio summarizes the extent to which an individual with given social characteristics is overrepresented among a party bloc's voters relative to the overall proportion of votes for that bloc. Classification and Regression Trees (CART) analysis with a 0.01 significance level cutoff.
Source: ESS (2002-2016) for fourteen countries.

Figure 1: Social distinctiveness of political parties across generations of voters



Note: 2002-2016 ESS voting data aggregated to the party family. Structural distinctiveness is estimated by averaging the percentage deviation from the population mean on a given social characteristic for each GALTAN party family (left bars) and for each Left-Right party family (right bars).

Figure 2: The interaction between education and occupation



Note: Calculated from a multivariate multinominal logit in which education is interacted with occupation (controlling for gender, age, religion, urban-rural and country fixed effects). The fit lines depict the predicted probability that an individual in a socio-professional occupation (light line) or an individual in a non-socio-professional occupation (dark line) has voted for a left, right, green or TAN party. Source: ESS data for fourteen countries.

Figure 3: The structuring effect of education by cohort



Note: Calculated from a multivariate multinominal logit in which education is interacted with cohort (controlling for gender, religion, urban-rural, and country fixed effects). The fit lines depict the predicted probability that an individual in a particular age cohort has voted for a left, right, green or TAN party. Source: ESS data for fourteen countries.

Figure 4: The structuring effect of occupation by cohort



Note: Calculated from a multivariate multinominal logit in which occupation is interacted with cohort (controlling for gender, education, religion, urban-rural, and country fixed effects). The fit lines depict the predicted probability that an individual in a particular age cohort has voted for a left, right, green or TAN party. Source: ESS data for fourteen countries.

Figure 5: Structural bias on education among Dutch parties



Note: The height of the bars depicts to what extent higher educated voters are under- or overrepresented in a party compared to the overall sample. The metric is a standardized ratio ranging from –1 (no supporter is highly educated) to +1 (all supporters are highly educated), which is calculated as follows:

$$Party's\ education\ bias_{ij} = \frac{Proportion\ higher\ educated\ in\ party_{ij} - Proportion\ higher\ educated\ in\ sample_j}{Proportion\ higher\ educated\ in\ party_{ij} + Proportion\ higher\ educated\ in\ sample_j}$$

The width of the bars reflects the size of a party's voting bloc relative to all voters. Source: LISS data for Dutch voters (21 years or older) comparing wave 1 & 2 (2008–9) with wave 9 & 10 (2016–17).

Figure 6: Structural bias on occupation among Dutch parties



Note: The height of the bars depict to what extent individuals with a socio-professional occupation are under- or overrepresented in the party compared to the overall sample. The metric is a standardized ratio ranging from –1 (no supporter is a socio-professional) to +1 (all supporters are socio-professionals), which is calculated as follows:

$$Party's\ occupation\ bias_{ij} = \frac{Proportion\ socio{-}professionals\ in\ party_{ij} - Proportion\ socio{-}professionals\ in\ sample_j}{Proportion\ socio{-}professionals\ in\ party_{ij} + Proportion\ socio{-}professionals\ in\ sample_j}$$

The width of the bars reflects the size of a party's voting bloc relative to all voters. Source: LISS data for Dutch voters (21 years or older) comparing wave 1 & 2 (2008–9) with wave 9 & 10 (2016–17).

Figure 7: Sorting by education



Note: Education is a dichotomous variable tapping whether respondents have completed higher vocational or university education. For each party we compare four groups: respondents who never intended to vote for party X (no affiliation), respondents who intended to vote for party X at time t-1 and abandon party X at t (leavers), respondents who intended to vote for a different party at time t-1 and intend to vote for party X at t (joiners), and voters who intended to vote for party X at t-1 and intend to vote for that same party at t (loyalists). The symbols represent the proportion of higher educated in each subgroup with 95 percent confidence bands. Source: N=32,927 from LISS (all waves); only parties with at least 1,500 prospective votes are presented here.

Figure 8: Sorting by occupation



Note: Occupation is a dichotomous variable tapping whether respondents have a socio-professional occupation. We compare four groups: respondents who never intended to vote for party X (no affiliation), respondents who intended to vote for party X at time t-1 and abandon party X at t (leaver), respondents who intended to vote for a different party at time t-1 and intend to vote for party X at t (joiner), and voters who intended to vote for party X at t-1 and intend to vote for party X at t (loyalist). The symbols represent the proportion of socioprofessionals in each subgroup with 95 percent confidence bands. Source: N=30,049 from LISS (all waves); only parties with at least 1,500 prospective votes are presented here.

Figure 9: Consistency in party support among young Dutch voters



Note: Logit models. Figures show the effect of past vote on the propensity to vote for the same party in the next round. For each party, the left panel shows this for the first three waves (2008-2010) and the right panel for the last three waves (2015-2017). Source: LISS data for voters aged between 20-29 years old.

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Appendix

Table A.1: Illustration of coding party stayers or party changers

Party choice by a respondent in successive panels								Coding							
A	A	A	B	B	B	A	A	–	S	S	C	S	S	C	S
n	n	n	B	n	n	n	n	–	–	–	–	S	S	S	S
A	A	A	n	A	n	B	A	–	S	S	S	S	S	C	C
n	n	B	x	B	n	x	B	–	–	–	–	S	S	–	S
n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

Note: Party choice: A = Party A; B = Party B; n = No preference; x = Missing information. Coding: S = Stable -no change; C = Change in party preference; – = Excluded from sample or missing observation. This table replicates the procedure used by Kuhn (2009).

Table A.2: The structuring effect of education by cohort: alternative education measures



Note: The left panel employs a five-category scale: primary, lower secondary, upper secondary, postsecondary, tertiary education. The right panel uses the ESS' new seven-category scale: primary, lower secondary, middle secondary, upper secondary, advanced vocational, BA level, MA or higher level. *Source*: ESS (all waves) for fourteen countries.

Table A.3: Structural bias on education among Dutch parties at two time points

Waves 2008–2009				Waves 2016–2017			
Parties	**Higher education (percentage)**	**Higher education (standardized ratio)**	**Vote propensity**	**Parties**	**Higher education (percentage)**	**Higher education (standardized ratio)**	**Vote propensity**
PVV	15.9	–0.38	7.3	PVV	14.0	–0.49	13.1
Verdonk	21.7	–0.24	10.6	50plus	26.9	–0.20	6.3
PvdD	25.9	–0.15	2.7	SP	27.5	–0.19	8.8
SP	26.4	–0.14	13.0	Forum v.D.	27.9	–0.18	3.8
CDA	32.8	–0.04	19.6	CDA	37.1	–0.04	10.1
PvdA	37.1	+0.02	15.2	VVD	45.0	+0.05	17.5
ChristenUnie	38.3	+0.04	4.7	PvdA	46.5	+0.07	8.6
VVD	42.9	+0.10	10.4	PvdD	47.9	+0.09	3.8
D66	58.4	+0.25	7.3	Christenunie	49.1	+0.10	4.6
Groenlinks	62.0	+0.27	7.0	D66	59.5	+0.19	11.0
				Groenlinks	62.3	+0.21	10.2
Overall sample	35.3%			Overall sample	40.4%		

Note: The first column shows the percentage of a party's supporters with higher education. The second column shows a standardized ratio ranging from –1 (no supporter has higher education) to +1 (all supporters have higher education). *Vote propensity* is the percentage of respondents with a party preference indicating that they would vote for this party in an upcoming election.
Source: LISS data for Dutch voters (21 years or older) comparing wave 1&2 (2008–9) with wave 9&10 (2016–17); parties ranked from underrepresentation to overrepresentation.

Table A.4: Structural bias on occupation among Dutch parties at two time points

Waves 2008–2009				Waves 2016–2017			
Parties	**Socio–professionals (percentage)**	**Socio–professionals (standardized ratio)**	**Vote propensity**	**Parties**	**Socio–professionals (percentage)**	**Socio–professionals (standardized ratio)**	**Vote propensity**
PVV	15.3	–0.33	7.3	PVV	16.7	–0.32	13.1
Rita Verdonk	19.4	–0.22	10.6	Forum v.D	26.7	–0.10	3.8
VVD	24.7	–0.10	10.4	50plus	27.8	–0.08	6.3
CDA	27.9	–0.04	19.6	SP	28.5	–0.07	8.8
PvdD	28.0	–0.03	2.7	VVD	28.6	–0.07	17.5
PvdA	29.2	–0.01	15.2	CDA	29.4	–0.05	10.1
SP	30.7	+0.01	13.0	PvdA	35.1	+0.03	8.6
Christenunie	38.6	+0.12	4.7	Christenunie	38.7	+0.08	4.6
D66	45.1	+0.20	7.3	D66	43.3	+0.14	11.0
Groenlinks	54.5	+0.29	7.0	PvdD	44.4	+0.15	3.8
				Groenlinks	54.1	+0.25	10.2
Overall sample	30.0%			Overall sample	32.8%		

Note: The first column shows the percentage of a party's supporters who are socio-professionals. The second column shows a standardized ratio ranging from –1 (no supporter is a socio-professional) to +1 (all supporters are socio-professional). *Vote propensity* is the percentage of respondents with a party preference indicating that they would vote for this party in an upcoming election. *Source*: LISS data for Dutch voters (21 years or older) comparing wave 1&2 (2008–9) with wave 9&10 (2016–17); parties ranked from underrepresentation to overrepresentation.

Table A.5: Models of TAN Voting

	Lubbers et al. (2002: 362) Model V	Kessler & Freeman (2005: 271) Model 3	Lucassen & Lubbers (2012: 562) Model 1	Werts et al. (2012: 194-195), Model 4	Immerzeel et al. (2013 : 277) Model 3
Dependent variable	**Vote intention or past vote for extreme right party**	**Vote intention for extreme right party**	**Far right preference (combination of party closeness and past vote)**	**Vote for radical right party**	**Vote for radical right party**
SOCIAL STRUCTURE					
Education	Years of education*	Education (categories)	Years of education***	Education* (continuous)	Education (categories)***
Demographics	Age* Gender*	Age Gender	Age*** Gender***	Age* Gender*	Age*** Gender***
Rural/urban					Urbanisation (categories)*
Occupation	Service class (ref. category) Manual workers* Self-employed* Routine non-manual* Unemployed* Housewives* Students Retired/other*	Manual Professional* Self-employed Unemployed	Manual (ref.) Technocrats Socio-cultural specialists*** Routine non-manuals Self-employed Others Unemployed	Higher controllers (ref.) Lower controllers* Routine non-manual* Lower sales* Self-employed* Manual supervisor* Skilled worker* Unskilled worker* Farm laborer* Unemployed*	Production workers (ref.) Never had paid job*** Service workers Office clerks* Socio-cultural professionals** Technical professionals Managers & administrators
Religion	Christian (ref.) Other religion* Not religious*		Religiosity***	Religious (yes/no) Church attendance*	Denomination Religious attendance*
SOCIAL NETWORK					
ATTITUDES/ IDEOLOGY	Anti-immigrant* Dissatisfaction with democracy*		Cultural threat*** Economic threat*	Ethnic threat* Subjective victimization* Law and order Attachment to tradition* Political distrust* Euroscepticism*	Nativism*** Having strong leader* Maintaining order important Political interest Political action

OTHER	*Country-level*: Unemp. rate, Non-EU citizen population*, Space for extreme right, Immigrant restriction climate, Party organizational strength*	Income	Migrant	*Individual-level*: Perceived deprivation*, social isolation Divorced*, Widowed, Single *Country-level*: Unemp. rate, Δunemp. rate Immigration rate, Δimmi-gration rate, %Ethnic minorities, Asylum applicant rate*, %Singles*	Marital status Employed (ref.) Self-employed* Inactive/unemployed**
Data source	Eurobarometer 47.1, European Election Study 1994, ISSP 1998	Eurobarometer 1988, 1994, 1997, 2000	European Social Survey 2002	European Social Survey 2002-2008	European Values Survey 2008
Method	Multilevel logistic regression	Probit	Logistic regression	Multilevel logistic regression	Logistic regression
Coverage	16 W. European countries		11 European countries	18 European countries	12 W. European countries

Models of TAN Voting, C'ted

	Coffé (2013: 146) Table 8.1	**Bornschier & Kriesi (2013: 20) Model 3**	**Van der Brug et al. (2013 : 63) Table 6.5**	**Ivarsflaten & Stubager (2012 : 126) Table 7.1**	**Häusermann & Kriesi (2015: 220) Table 8.4**
Dependent variable	**Vote or preference for populist right party**	**Vote or preference for populist right party**	**Self-reported propensity to support radical right party**	**Vote for populist radical right party**	**Vote for right-wing populist parties vs. nonvoters/ nonpartisans**
SOCIAL STRUCTURE					
Education	Education*** (categories)	Education***(categories)	Education (age of leaving)***	Education*** (categories)	Education* (categories)
Demographics			Age*** Gender*	Age* Gender*	Age Gender**
Rural/urban					
Occupation	Self-employed Small business owner Office clerk Technical professional Sociocultural specialist***	Self-employed Small business owner Office clerk Technical professional Sociocultural specialist***	Professional/technical (ref.) Higher administrative Clerical Sales Service	Lower controllers Routine non-manual Lower sales-service Self-employed incl farmers Skilled workers***	Production worker (ref.) Public sector employment Sociocultural professional Self-employed Technical expert

	Service worker Skilled production worker*** Routine operative***	Service worker Skilled production worker* Routine operative***	Skilled worker*** Semi-skilled worker Unskilled worker Farm worker Farm owner/manager** Still in education Never had a job	Unskilled workers***	Manager Office clerk Service worker Small business owner Production worker
Religion			Religious (yes/no) Religious denomination Church-going*		Religiosity
SOCIAL NETWORK					Trade union member
ATTITUDES/ IDEOLOGY	Economic dimension*** Cultural dimension***	Economic dimension*** Cultural dimension*** Political support***	Harsher sentences Children should obey Private enterprise More state ownership No govt intervention Redistribute wealth** Prohibit gay marriage* Pro-choice*** Women should stay home Pro EU referenda*** Immigrants should assimilate*** Decrease immigration***	Economic attitudes*** Immigrant attitudes***	Universalism versus particularism*** State versus market**
OTHER		Income	Subjective social class Standard of living Discontent with institutions*** Salience of immigration***		Income Income*Public Sector
Data source	European Social Survey 2008	European Social Survey 2008	European Elections Study 2009	European Social Survey 2002	European Social Survey 2008
Method	Logistic regression	Heckman probit selection	Multilevel regression	Logistic regression	Logistic regression
Coverage	8 W. European countries with extreme populist right parties	14 W. European countries with extreme populist right parties	17 European countries with RRPs	7 W. European countries with RRPs	5 “status-oriented countries” BE, CH, DE, NL, FR

Models of TAN Voting, C'ted

	Kehrberg (2015 : 566) Model 5a	Rooduijn et al. (2017 : 551) Model 1	Rooduijn & Burgoon (2018) Model 8	Lubbers & Coenders (2017) Model 2	Oesch & Rennwald (2018: App. 14) Model 4	Gidron & Hall (2018, 69) Model II
Dependent variable	**Vote for radical right parties**	**Vote for radical right parties**	**Vote for radical right parties**	**Vote for radical right parties**	**Vote for radical right parties**	**Vote for populist radical right**
SOCIAL STRUCTURE						
Education	Education*** (continuous)	Education*** (continuous)	Education* (categories)	Education (continuous)	Education** (categories)	Education*** (dich: > secondary ed)
Demographics	Age*** Gender***	Age*** Gender***	Age*** Gender	Age** Gender**	Age** Gender**	Age*** Gender*** Non-native***
Rural/urban		Urban	Rural/urban*		Suburbs/Outskirts** (ref.: small city)	(ref: big city) Countryside Suburb** Small city**
Occupation		Semi/Unskilled Manual (ref. category) Skilled manual workers/supervisors Self-employed Routine non-manual Lower controller*** Higher controller***		Higher controllers (ref.) Lower controllers Routine non-manual Lower sales service Self-employed Skilled manual workers/supervisors Unskilled manual* Unemployed	Clerks (ref.) Service workers** Production workers** Socio-cultural professionals** Technical professionals Managers** Large/self empl Small business owner	Socio-cultural professionals (ref.) Managers Office workers*** Self-employed*** Low skill services*** Technicians*** Routine workers***
Religion		Religiosity***	Religiosity***	Church attendance**		Church attendance
SOCIAL NETWORK						
ATTITUDES/ IDEOLOGY	Immigration-econ*** Econ. satisfaction*** Right-wing economics* Immigration-culture*** Social conformity Democratic attitudes***	Egalitarian*** Altruist Support for govt redist Anti-immigration*** Strong govt for safety***	Left-right*** Anti-immigration*** Support for redistr*** Political trust*** Govt satisfaction*** Econ. satisfaction***	Nationalistic attitudes	Pro-redistribution** Pro-libertarian** Redistr* Libertarian**	

OTHER		*Individual:* Subjective income insecurity* Political distrust Economic dissatisfaction***	*Individual*: Economic well-being*** Unemployed *Country level*: Unemp rate***, GDP***, Gini, Social expenditure, Net migration***, Net migration×Econ.well-being	*Individual*: Migrant background *Country-level:* unemployment, % foreign born		*Individual:* Subjective social status**, Income, Unemployed
Data source	2006 European Social Survey	2002-2014 European Social Survey	2002-2014 European Social Survey	2008-2010 European Values Survey	2002-2014 European Social Survey	2009 ISSP
Method	Logistic regression	Logistic regression	Multilevel logistic regression	Multilevel logistic regression	Multinomial logistic regression	Linear probability model
Coverage	17 European countries	23 European countries	21 European countries	20 European countries	9 NW. European countries	15 European countries

Table A.6: Models of GAL Voting (in progress)

	Franklin & Rüdig (1995: 426) Model 1A	Dolezal (2010: 546), Model III	Rüdig (2012: 118), Table 4	Häusermann & Kriesi (2015: 220) Table 8.4
Dependent variable	**Vote for Green party**	**Vote for Green party**	**Vote for German Green party**	**Vote for Green & social-liberal parties vs. nonvoters & nonpartisans**
SOCIAL STRUCTURE				
Education	Educated (dichotomous)*	Years of education (continuous)	Education	Education*** (categories)
Demographics	Young age*	Age*** Gender***	Age** Gender	Age Gender
Rural/urban		Rural/urban***		
Occupation	Public service*	Routine non-manual (ref. cat) Farmers and employers*** Workers*** Managers Technical experts** Socio-cultural specialists*** Retired*** Unemployed Housewife/husband Student***	Social & cultural service professions	Production worker (ref. cat) Public sector employment Sociocultural professional** Self-employed*** Technical expert Manager** Office clerk Service worker Small business owner*** Production worker
Religion		Denomination (ref: none)***	Religiosity	Religiosity
SOCIAL NETWORK			Trade union member*	Trade union member*
ATTITUDES/ IDEOLOGY	Postmaterial* Left-wing* Environment salience*	Economic left-right*** Secular-religious*** Environment*** Authority-liberty*** Anti-immigration*** European integration***	Left-right** Environment salience* Liberal on immigration* Anti-nuclear energy*** Nuclear energy salience***	Universalism versus particularism*** State versus market**
OTHER				Income Income^{x}public sector

Data source	Author's own survey attached to Eurobarometer 1989	European Social Survey 2002-2006	German Longitudinal Election Project 2009	European Social Survey 2008
Method	Logistic regression	Logistic regression	Logistic regression	Logistic regression
Coverage	BE, UK, FR, DE, IE, IT, NL	12 Western European countries	Germany	5 "status oriented countries" BE, CH, DE, NL, F