The European Refugee Crisis and Public Support for Development Aid in France, Germany, and Great Britain – A Panel Data Study

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Abstract

The European refugee crisis has been among the most controversially debated issues in Europe in recent years. To respond to the resulting upsurge for right-wing populist parties and comfort immigration critics, policy-makers communicated development aid as tool to reduce refugee inflow. This implies that those who are more critical toward immigration and those who become more critical toward immigration over time become more supportive of development aid. The same holds true for those on the right of the political spectrum as well as those moving further to the right. Using panel survey data from the Aid Attitudes Tracker for France, Germany, and Great Britain covering the years 2013–2018, the study finds that in the survey waves after the peak of the refugee crisis in late summer 2015 the support for ODA is higher. In France and Great Britain individual shifts toward a more critical position on immigration go along with lesser support for ODA, whereas for shifts in political ideology this is not the case. The refugee crisis does not increase this effect. In contrast, in Germany the effect of shifts in attitude towards immigration is positive before the peak of the crisis and vanishes afterwards. In all three countries, those who are on average more critical towards immigration and place themselves to the right of the political spectrum tend to be less supportive of development aid. The paper concludes that promoting development aid may not be a feasible tool to conciliate immigration critics.

Key words: Attitudes; development aid**;** European Union; foreign aid, ODA; panel data; public opinion; refugee crisis.

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1. Introduction

In recent years, the European refugee crisis, which began in spring 2015, has been among the most controversially debated issues in Europe (Haller, 2017). Reports about refugees, human trafficking, refugee camps, and human suffering have been omnipresent in daily news. Likewise, the implications for host country populations have been prominently discussed. Parts of Europe's population feel threatened in terms of increasing financial burdens for the social security systems, increasing labor market competition, and decreasing job security (for Germany see, e.g., Mushaben, 2017; Wiesendahl, 2016). Furthermore. the inflow of refugees poses infrastructural and sociopolitical demands for the hosting countries (Lo, 2011; Ruist, 2015). Besides economic implications, others put forward that immigration of predominantly Muslim males might lead to cultural conflicts and poses a threat for public safety. Both factors have triggered anti-immigrant sentiments (Stephan, Lausanne Renfro, Esses, White Stephan, & Martin, 2005). Right-wing populist parties exploited these sentiments in many European countries, which lead to a deep rift between those considering it as a moral duty to help refugees and those opposing refugee immigration. Subsequently, these parties rose to electoral success (e.g., in Austria, France, Germany, and Hungary).

To keep their right-wing populist competitors at bay and comfort immigration critics, political decision-makers from nearly all political parties urgently searched for policy measures curbing refugee inflows. In the media as well as politically, development aid – or more precisely *Official Development Assistance* (ODA) – is proposed as a possible solution to reduce refugee inflow. Aiming at increasing living standards, employment opportunities, and other dimensions of a decent life in refugees countries of origin, ODA is discussed as a policy tool to increase refugees' perspectives to stay in their home countries (Dreher, Fuchs, & Langlotz, 2019; Lanati & Thiele, 2018; Stöhr & Wichardt, 2016). From a politician's point of view, this public association of refugee immigration and aid giving is likewise a threat and opportunity. On the one hand, if people see ODA as a successful policy tool to tackle refugee inflow, refugee immigration might have a positive impact on the support for ODA. On the other hand, if people see refugee inflow as an outcome of unsuccessful aid provision, their support for ODA could wane. However, if emphasizing the benefits of development assistance and calling for increasing ODA budgets should work as a tool to calm the heated debate, it is crucial that immigration critics and political right-wingers support ODA and that the gaps in support for ODA between left-wingers and right-wingers as well as immigration sceptics and supporters diminish over time.

To study the impact of refugee inflow on public support for ODA, longitudinal studies are needed. Most existing research on attitudes towards aid, in contrast, was based on cross-sectional data and has focused on rather stable socioeconomic and political drivers. Socioeconomic background, ideological positioning, and a feeling of moral obligations are among other factors frequently identified as drivers of aid support (Bae & Kim, 2016; Bauhr, Charron, & Nasiritousi, 2013; Bayram, 2016a; Bodenstein & Faust, 2017; Chong & Gradstein, 2008; Kiratli, 2018; Milner & Tingley, 2013; Paxton & Knack, 2012). Yet, development aid is for most people a rather remote topic. Therefore, time-varying and situational factors such as information available at a given time play an important role in attitude formation. As a growing number of experimental studies shows, issue framing and provided information on amount and purposes of ODA affect attitudes (e.g., Baker, 2015; Gilens, 2001; Heinrich & Kobayashi, 2018; Heinrich, Kobayashi, & Long, 2018; Hurst, Tidwell, & Hawkins, 2017; Kiratli, 2019; Scotto, Reifler, Hudson, & vanHeerde-Hudson, 2017; Wood, 2018). In the same vein, a vigorously debated issue like the European refugee crisis alters the public's information environment and thus may impact citizens' attitudes towards aid.

In this paper, we shed light on the impact of the European refugee crisis on public support for ODA by addressing the following two research questions: 1) *Did the refugee crisis in 2015 alter the public support for ODA?* 2) *Did the crisis change public support among political right-wingers and immigration critics?* To answer these questions, we draw on 10-wave panel survey data (2013–2018) for France, Germany, and Great Britain from the *Aid Attitudes Tracker* (AAT)-project (Clarke, Hudson, Hudson, Stewart, & Twyman, 2018) and mixed effect (multilevel) regression models for longitudinal data. These allow us to separate the effects of cross-sectional differences and individual change on the support for ODA, i.e. *between-* and *within-effects* (Bell, Fairbrother, & Jones, 2019; Bell & Jones, 2015). The paper contributes to the literature on attitudes toward development aid in two ways: First, it is one of the first studies in which longitudinal data on the individual level is utilized. This allows to track the impact of changes in attitudes over time, which complements the large number of existing studies based on cross-sectional data. Second, we investigate the impact of contextual factors on public support for aid by focusing on one of the major political events in Europe in recent years (see Heinrich, Kobayashi, & Bryant, 2016 for a study on the impact of the 2008 economic crisis).

In a nutshell, we find that in the survey waves after the peak of the refugee crisis in August and September 2015 the support for ODA is higher. In France and Great Britain individual shifts toward a more critical position on immigration go along with lesser support

for ODA, whereas for shifts in political ideology this is not the case. The refugee crisis does not increase this effect. In contrast, in Germany the effect of individual shifts in attitude towards immigration on the support for ODA is positive before the peak of the crisis and vanishes afterwards. In all three countries results show that on average those who are more critical towards immigration and place themselves to the right of the political spectrum tend to be on average less supportive of development aid. In sum, these findings indicate that advocating ODA may not comfort immigration critics and political right-wingers.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In section 2, we give a very brief overview of the existing literature on determinants of support for aid and hypothesize how the refugee crisis potentially affects citizens' support. Next, we present our data and methodological approach in section 3. In section 4, we report the empirical results. The paper concludes with a summary and potential policy implications in section 5.

2. Literature Review and Hypotheses

2.1 Public Opinion towards Development Aid

Public support for development aid is important for two major reasons. First, from a democratic perspective all policies should be in line with citizens' preferences. Otherwise, policies might lack legitimacy, provoke opposition, and thus diminishes a policy-makers chances for reelection (e.g., Biglaiser & Mezzetti, 1997; Fiva & Natvik, 2013; Rogoff & Sibert, 1988; Strøm & Müller, 1999). Second, ODA competes with other, predominantly domestic, budget items. The benefit of increasing the budget for domestic policies such as the health sector is much more palpable for citizens. Against this background, citizens' support is even more important for politicians to justify financial contributions to the aid sector, in particular when they aim at increasing it (e.g., to reduce causes of flight).

The last Eurobarometer (2018) survey on development aid from summer 2018 shows that public support for development aid in many EU countries is generally high. Approximately, 90 % of the EU's population considers development cooperation as important. However, there is also considerable variation across countries. While people in France, Germany, and the UK are in line with the EU's average, for instance, people in many East European countries show considerably lower support.

Using cross-sectional survey data, scholars have predominantly looked at temporarily stable (i.e. time-invariant) drivers of attitudes toward development aid (e.g., Bae & Kim, 2016; Bauhr et al., 2013; Bayram, 2016b, 2016a; Bodenstein & Faust, 2017; Chong & Gradstein,

2008; Hudson & vanHeerde-Hudson, 2012; Milner & Tingley, 2013; Paxton & Knack, 2012, 2012). Ideological positioning, moral obligations and socio-demographic are key. Specifically, the more left on the political spectrum an individual positions itself, the more supportive it is towards development aid. The higher the moral obligations towards the global south are, i.e., the more an individual can relate to the problems in the global south, the higher is the support. Other individual level factors, such as age, gender, income. or level of education tend to play an inconsistent role in explaining attitudes.

However, development policy is a remote issue for the public. Compared to, for instance, social policy, education, and health, most people do not face its consequences in everyday life. Thus, attitudes towards aid are susceptible to situational influences from people's information environment and current events (Zaller, 1992). In particular, media reports may convey information-shortcuts, even when they do not address development aid directly. Recently, such situational drivers have started to draw scholarly attention. Studies utilizing survey experiments indicate that such factors affect citizens' attitudes towards aid (Baker, 2015; Gilens, 2001; Heinrich & Kobayashi, 2018; Heinrich et al., 2018; Hurst et al., 2017; Kiratli, 2019; Scotto et al., 2017; Wood, 2018). For instance, information on the financial volume of development aid alters public support (Gilens, 2001; Scotto et al., 2017; Wood, 2018). This leads us to assume that major political events like the European refugee crisis in 2015 affect attitudes towards ODA.

2.2 Theorizing the Effects of the European Refugee Crisis on Support for ODA

The logic why and how refugee immigration is likely to impact citizens' attitudes towards aid is straightforward. Refugee immigration has been among the most salient topics in the media in recent years and was controversially debated (see, e.g., Berry, Garcia-Blanco, & Moore, 2015; Chouliaraki & Zaborowski, 2017; Georgiou & Zaborowski, 2017; Greussing & Boomgaarden, 2017). Some considered helping and accommodating refugees as a moral duty for wealthy European countries, whereas others feared socio-economic and cultural conflicts as well as administrative overload (Braghiroli & Makarychev, 2018; Castelli Gattinara, 2018; Mushaben, 2017; Wiesendahl, 2016). This cleavage in public opinion was exploited by right-wing populist parties, who campaigned against refugees and immigration, in particular after terrorist attacks (e.g., in Berlin, Brussels, Nice, and Paris) and sexual assaults allegedly committed by refugees (Grande, Schwarzbözl, & Fatke, 2018; Green-Pedersen & Otjes, 2017). In the wake of the events, these parties managed to enter the national parliaments (e.g., the

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Alternative for Germany, *National Front/ Rassemblement National*[3] in France), made it to the second ballot of the presidential elections (Marine le Pen from the *National Front* in France) or even share governmental responsibilities (see, e.g., the *Freedom Party* in Austria, *Fidesz* in Hungary, and the *Northern League* in Italy). In the UK, immigration was a key issue in the campaign for the so-called Brexit led by the *UK Independence Party* (UKIP) (Goodwin & Milazzo, 2017). Despite forecasts on positive long-run economic and sociopolitical effects of refugee immigration have been conducted and publicly presented (Bach et al., 2017; Furlanetto & Robstad, 2019; Kancs & Lecca, 2018), doubts and fears among substantial shares of the population remained. For instance, studies show that in Germany – the country that hosted the largest share of refugees in the EU – welfare chauvinistic attitudes rose from 2015 to 2016 (Marx & Naumann, 2018). What is more, the salience of the immigration issue in media reports correlates with public concern (Czymara & Dochow, 2018). The more public attention is drawn to a controversial issue such as the refugee crisis, the more concerns grow in the general public.

Against this background, it is not surprising that policy-makers from all parties had to take a position towards the immigration and refugee issue and urgently searched for remedies to reduce refugee inflow, comfort immigration critics, and in the end win back former supporters and voters (see Grande et al., 2018; Green-Pedersen & Otjes, 2017). In this regard, development aid – or more precisely ODA – has been communicated and discussed as a policy tool to reduce emigration from developing countries (Bermeo & Leblang, 2015; Dreher et al., 2019; Lanati & Thiele, 2018). [4]

Due to the increase in media attention towards refugees' situation and their countries of origin as well as the public debate about feasible remedies to the refugee crisis, people should receive information cues, which affect their emotions and attitudes towards people in developing countries and development aid. Yet, the direction of the effect of the received information cues is still unclear. On the one hand, the refugee crisis reminds people in Europe of the situation in refugees' countries of origin and the need to act. What's more, refugee inflows might signal that the current level of financial contributions is not yet sufficient to keep refugees away and thus, need to be increased. On the other hand, refugee immigration might indicate that development aid has been unsuccessful in increasing quality of life in refugees' countries of origin. From a domestic point of view, the presence of refugees might lead people

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[3] In June 2018 the National Front changed its name to Rassemblement National.
[4] However, within this debate a differentiation between distinct types of migration and causes of flight has been missing by and large, for instance political, safety, economic, and ecological reasons. The rather mixed scientific evidence for the supposed effects of ODA and economic growth on migration (Clemens, 2014; Haas, 2010; Massey, 1988) has also been widely disregarded. Both shortcomings need not necessarily be relevant for the general public.

to expect upcoming distributional conflicts, for instance in terms of labor market competition and public housing (for a similar argument in the context of the European economic crisis see Heinrich et al., 2016). In turn, people could conclude that government should not disburse ODA and use the financial resources for domestic policies instead. Thus, we postulate the following undirected hypothesis:

H1: The European refugee crisis alters the public support for ODA.

From the perspective of governing politicians considering ODA as tool to comfort immigrations critics an increase of public support for ODA would be the preferred scenario. Ideally, immigration critics and people form the ideological right, who usually are more sceptic towards the provision of development aid (Milner & Tingley, 2013, p. 393), must be convinced to support ODA. In the following, we discuss how attitudes towards immigration and political ideology may be key for understanding the impact of the refugee crisis on public support for ODA.

The determinants of immigration attitudes have been studied intensively. In an often cited essay Blumer (1958) argues that big events play a crucial role in developing an attitude towards immigrants (see also Druckman & Leeper, 2012, p. 54). The refugee crisis as such, accompanied by highly vivid events as the events at New Year's Eve 2015/2016 in Cologne, Germany, can surely be seen as a dramatic and influential event. Czymara and Schmidt-Catran (2017) have experimentally displayed the negative effects of these events on attitudes towards immigrants. In the most negative sense refugee immigration is publically associated with terrorism. Media reports framing refugees negatively contribute to these changes in public opinion (Benesch, Loretz, Stadelmann, & Thomas, 2019; Eberl et al., 2018). Moreover, Gadarian (2010) has shown that news on terroristic events shape foreign policy attitudes more generally. Apart from media-conveyed effects, Hangartner et al. (2018) using survey data from the Greek islands provide strong empirical evidence that direct exposure to refugees fosters negative attitudes towards refugees, immigration, and muslims.

Creating a link from pro- and anti-immigrant attitudes to the support for ODA, Haubert and Fussel (2006) have found that people with a more cosmopolitan or global worldview have on average more pro-immigrant attitudes. Similarly, Wood (2015) has shown a positive relation between cosmopolitan worldviews and support for increasing aid disbursements. Since people who are pro-immigration are presumably on average more supportive of development aid provision as they tend to be more aware of global challenges and have a more global understanding of moral behavior and social justice – e.g., have a more cosmopolitan mindset –

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, the question emerges what happens with support for ODA when people become more critical towards immigration. Do they support ODA to a higher degree or does the support diminish? Again, government politicians may hope for a positive effect. However, against the background of several findings on impacts of the refugee crisis and immigration skepticism on policy preferences (e.g., being against further European integration, supporting right-wing populist parties or voting for the Brexit; see, e.g., Boomgaarden, Schuck, Elenbaas, & de Vreese, 2011; de Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2005; Goodwin & Milazzo, 2017; Hangartner et al., 2018; Harteveld, Schaper, Lange, & Brug, 2018; Mader & Schoen, 2019), the more plausible scenario is that when people become more skeptical towards immigration over time, they also become less supportive of ODA. The refugee crisis and the way it is framed in the media presumably boosts this negative effect. Thus, we postulate the following hypothesis:

H2: The refugee crisis increases an already negative effect of intra-individual change towards a more skeptical position towards immigration on support for ODA.

Besides the effect of the attitude towards immigration on the support for ODA, the effect of ideological positioning on support for ODA is also likely affected by the refugee crisis. While the traditional view holds that political ideology is shaped by social background and socialization during adolescence and remains stable during adulthood, younger research has shown that people incorporate the political context in their ideological position (de Vries, Hakhverdian, & Lancee, 2013) and may adjust their ideological position when the political context changes (Kumlin, 2006). The refugee crisis is considered to be such a change in context. As several studies using different data sources indicate, parties, politicians, and the electorate moved to the right in the last years (for Germany see Jankowski, Schneider, & Tepe, 2019; Mader & Schoen, 2019; Schmitt, 2018; for right-wing populist parties in general, see, e.g., Akkerman, Lange, & Rooduijn, 2016; Liang, 2016). Surely, immigration has been the major issue in the last years, but the rise of right-wing populist parties during the refugee crisis was also accompanied by claims regarding nationalism, national sovereignty, and national self-interest, which could also affect support for global cooperation.[5] In turn, this may be reflected in an individual's political ideology, which we consider as a second causal pathway next to the immigration attitudes discussed above.[6] People on the right of the political spectrum – usually

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[5] For instance, the AfD in Germany, the Rassemblement National in France and UKIP in the UK all oppose European integration and champion a Europe of individual completely sovereign national states.
[6] Because immigration attitudes and ideological self-positioning are likely correlated, caution regarding multicollinearity is necessary.

opposing the provision of ODA to a higher degree – might be encouraged to oppose aid provision even more, as radical beliefs became more publically acceptable and presentable since the onset of the refugee crisis. Likewise, people on the left – usually more in favor of ODA (Bodenstein & Faust, 2017; Milner & Tingley, 2013, p. 393) – might be even more encouraged to support ODA. This is tested in hypothesis 3. Again, this scenario stands in stark contrast with the hopes of political decision-makers trying to advocate ODA as a tool to comfort immigration critics.

> *H 3: The refugee crisis leads to an increasing aid support cleavage between the political left and right in the population.*

3. Data and Methods

To test the hypotheses outlined above, individual-level panel data is needed because it allows to assess individual pre- and post-refugee crisis attitudes towards immigration and development aid as well as political ideology.

3.1. Data: the Aid Attitudes Tracker

The *Aid Attitudes Tracker* (AAT) provides a suitable database to study individual-level attitudes towards development aid over time. It is an online panel survey of adults ages 18 years and older on development aid and related topics (e.g., sustainable development, migration, global health) conducted in France, Germany, Great Britain, and the USA covering the time period 2013 to 2018 (Clarke et al., 2018).[7] It is funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and designed by scholars in the USA and England. The first wave was surveyed in 2013 based on a random sample of the polling institute YouGov's online access panel. Since then, the same sample is repeatedly contacted on a biannual basis. Panel dropouts are replenished with new respondents. For each country and wave (10 in total), roughly 6,000 observations are available. Since it covers the years before and after the peak of the European refugee crisis in late summer 2015, it provides an excellent opportunity to trace the impact of this crucial macro-political event on aid attitudes.

Besides being politically influential countries, all three countries included in the AAT are especially interesting to study aid attitudes due to two reasons: First, all four countries are among the main donors of international multilateral and bilateral humanitarian and development aid (Alesina & Dollar, 2000). Germany is the second-largest donor country,

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[7] Because the item gauging the perception of immigration is not included in the US survey, we exclude the US from our study.

spending US$ 25 billion on net official development assistance (ODA) in 2017 (current prices). The United Kingdom (UK) is the third-largest donor country, spending US$ 18.1 billion on net official development assistance (ODA) in 2017 (in current prices). France is the fifth-largest donor country, spending US$ 11.3 billion on net official development assistance (ODA) in 2017.[8] This, stand alone, makes it likely that citizens of these countries are regularly confronted with development aid in the media and accordingly might have developed an opinion on the broad issue. For Germany another argument makes them potentially revealing case studies. Germany is the main refugee hosting country in Europe, accommodating over 1 million refugees (Mushaben, 2017; Wiesendahl, 2016). Many citizens have been directly confronted with the effects of the refugee crisis. In contrast, for citizens in the UK and in France the refugee crisis has been more of a remote issue, but it was still controversially publicly debated (Berry et al., 2015; Chouliaraki & Zaborowski, 2017; Georgiou & Zaborowski, 2017). Interestingly, in all three countries after the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015 defensive measures dominated in the media (Georgiou & Zaborowski, 2017, p. 7). This is important because the fifth wave of the AAT was fielded shortly after. Thus, we assume that significant changes in attitudes become visible with this particular panel wave and those following.

3.2 Operationalization of Key Variables

As our *dependent variable*, we use the following item: "Thinking about overseas aid to poor countries – please indicate the extent to which you think that the [*country*] Government should give overseas aid, where a score of 0 means that it 'should not give aid at all' and a score of 10 means that it 'should give aid very generously'". We treat the response scale ranging from 0 to 10 as quasi-interval scaled. Moreover, it should be noted that the item focuses on development aid in general and not on not on a specific aid modality.

To measure our first *explanatory variable*, attitude towards immigration, we use the item "Using a 0–10 scale, how important a problem is the number of immigrants coming to [country] these days?" Respondents answered on 0 ("Not at all important") to 10 ("Very important") response scale. Note that this item does not capture whether a respondent opposes immigration in general. Furthermore, it does not differentiate between various forms of immigration (e.g., asylum seekers, refugees, immigrant workers, illegal immigration, etc.). We believe that this poses no problem since people on average should have immigration from

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[8] Information retrieved from https://donortracker.org/ [accessed April 23 2019]

outside the EU (e.g., the MENA region, sub-Saharan Africa) in mind when they answer the question. Thus, it is suited to gauge the impact of the refugee crisis.

As a second explanatory variable, we employ the standard item to gauge political ideology ranging from 0 to 10: "In politics people sometimes talk about 'Left' and 'Right'. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means 'Left' and 10 means 'Right'?" Again, we treat both explanatory variables as quasi-interval scaled.

As control variables, we include age, gender (reference category: male), education (reference category: no formal qualifications), and household income (reference category: lowest income group). Due to the peculiarities of the AAT dataset, in which age in years is included, but not in which AAT wave it was recorded, we must treat this variable as time-constant. The same holds true for gender and household income. We do this for the latter because it was measured in several categories in each panel wave, but we neither want to include this variable as quasi-interval scaled due to the varying range of income categories nor overload to the multilevel model for longitudinal data with numerous dummy variables. Detailed information on question wording and descriptive statistics for all variables can be found in Tables 4 and 5 in the appendix to this paper.

3.3 Methodological Approach

We analyze the AAT survey data using the random effects (i.e. multilevel) framework for longitudinal data proposed in Bell and Jones (2015; see also Bell et al., 2019). In this framework, measurement occasions (i.e. panel waves; level 1; denoted i) are nested in subjects (level 2; denoted j). It allows to disentangle "between"-effects capturing general differences between subjects and "within"-effects capturing individual change across measurement occasions over time by including time-invariant characteristics (e.g., education, gender; varying only by j) and the subject means of time-varying characteristics (attitudes toward immigration, ideology; varying by j) as level 2-variables and the subject-mean centered time-varying characteristics as level 1-variables (varying by ij; see Curran & Bauer, 2011; Enders & Tofighi, 2007). Thus, the coefficients for the level 2-variables can be interpreted as general (cross-sectional) differences in support for ODA between subjects – they "explain" their varying intercepts – and those for the level 1-variables as the change in support for ODA when a subject deviates from its average value. Note that the level 1-coefficients are the effects averaged across the whole dataset.[9] In a last step, we check whether time alters the effect of level 1-variables

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[9] The within-effects are identical to the estimates of a fixed effects regression model for panel data (see Bell & Jones, 2015). Fixed effect models are often considered the gold standard for panel data (Bell, Fairbrother, & Jones,

attitudes towards immigration and political ideology. To that end, we include interaction terms between those variables and time measured by a dummy variable separating the panel waves in those before and after the peak of the refugee crisis in August and September 2015 (level 1-variable). Formula 1 summarizes the model outlined above – μ denotes the random intercept varying across subjects and ε the error term.

$$Support_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \left(Immig_{ij} - \overline{Immig}_j \right) + \beta_2 \left(Ideo_{ij} - \overline{Ideo}_j \right) + \beta_3 \overline{Immig}_j +$$
$$\beta_4 \overline{Ideo}_j + \beta_5\, Crisis_{ij} + \beta_6\, Controls_j + \mu_j + \varepsilon_{ij} \tag{1}$$

To utilize all information available, we use the unbalanced panel meaning that respondents need not have taken part in all 10 waves of the AAT.[10] Finally, since we only have data for three countries, we estimate the models separately for each country. In this situation, a 3-level model with measurement occasions at the first level, individuals at the second, and countries at the third is not feasible.[11]

4. Empirical Analyses

Before we delve into the multivariate analyses, a quick descriptive look at the data is in order. This encompasses our outcome variable support for ODA as well as our two key explanatory variables attitude towards immigration and political ideology.

4.1 Univariate Analysis

Looking at the upper panel in Figure 1, in *France* we observe a steady increase in support for ODA with a mean value of about 3.5 in the first wave of the AAT in December 2013 to a mean of roughly 4.5 in wave 8 in July 2017. Afterwards, the indicator remains approximately constant at the same level. Considering the scale of the support for ODA variable (0–10), the shift is substantial. Nevertheless, these values indicate a rather skeptical position towards ODA. In contrast, the attitude towards immigration as well as political ideology shows no clear trend over the 10 waves of the AAT (see Figure 4 and 5 in the appendix).


2019, p. 1052). However, they do not allow to estimate between-effects because time-constant variables drop out of the model equation.

[10] The regression models are based on the following sample sizes: *France:* 15,531 unique respondents 40,286 measurement occasions. *Germany:* 10,412 unique respondents, 41,239 measurement occasions. *Great Britain:* 14,725 unique respondents, 49,783 measurement occasions.

[11] All models were estimated using restricted maximum likelihood (REML) estimation with the package *lme4* in R (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). P-values were calculated using Satterthwaite's method. All regression tables were created with the package *texreg* (Leifeld, 2013).

For *Germany* depicted in the second panel in Figure 1 we find a similar pattern. Starting with an average of 4.4 in the first wave, the values nearly linearly go up to a mean of 5.0 until wave 7 in December 2016. Afterwards, the average decreases slightly but remains at roughly 4.8. Again, this change can be considered as substantial. Turning to the attitude towards immigration and ideology, Germany displays a pattern compared to France. People increasingly consider immigration as a challenge – starting with a mean of 6.5 (measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 10) in the first wave, this indicator peaks with a mean of 7.5 in the fifth wave after the dramatic events in late summer 2015 (see Figure 4 in the appendix). In the subsequent waves, the mean values drop only slightly and remain substantially higher than before the peak of the refugee crisis. At the same time, political ideology moves steadily and substantially to the right – the mean increases from 4.5 in the first wave to 4.9 in the last (also measured on scale from 0 to 10; see Figure 5 in the appendix).

Figure 1: Mean support for ODA by country and AAT waves

Note: 0 'Should not give aid at all' – 10 'Should give aid very generously'.

In *Great Britain* – depicted in the third panel in Figure 1– the mean values go up in wave 4 (June 2015; before the peak of the refugee crisis) and subsequently oscillate between 3.9 and 4.2. The attitude towards immigration is rather skeptical in the first waves (see Figure 4 in the appendix). Interestingly, in the waves after the Brexit referendum in June 2016 the mean values decrease albeit not drastically. In contrast, ideology on the aggregate level remains stable across the 10 panel waves with wave 8 being an outlier (Figure 5 in the appendix).

4.2 Multivariate Analysis

Turning now to the multilevel models for longitudinal data, we first look at the intraclass correlation coefficients (ICC), which partitions the variance explained by the measurement occasion- and subject-level (Snijders & Bosker, 2012, pp. 17–18). Estimating a so-called "empty" model including only a random intercept for the subjects reveals for France an ICC of 0.676, for Germany 0.637, and for Great Britain 0,808.[12] This means that in France between-subject (i.e. cross-sectional) differences account for about 68% of the variance in support for ODA, in Germany 64%, and in the UK 81% – apparently, in Great Britain situational time-varying factors matter less than in the other countries.[13]

Starting with *France* in the first panel of Figure 2, the analysis first shows that controlling for within- and between-effects of the explanatory variables support for ODA significantly (p < 0.001) increases by 0.39 scale points in the AAT waves after the peak of the refugee crisis. Recalling *hypothesis H1*, this finding supports the hypothesis – the crisis may indeed have had a support boosting effect. However, since we do not have a counterfactual (i.e. all respondents underwent the treatment) and other events may account for such changes, we refrain from causal interpretations. Second, the more sceptic an individual across all panel waves is, the lesser the average support for ODA (between-effect). An increase of one point on the 0 to 10 attitude towards immigration-scale goes on average along with a -0.35 decrease of support of ODA. The coefficient is significant at the 0.001-level. The within-effect follows the same direction. If an individual in France becomes more skeptical towards immigration by one unit at a given measurement occasion, the support decreases by about -0.04 points. This effect is statistically significant at the 0.001-level but rather small. Nevertheless, this finding indicates

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[12] Please note that the presented results are preliminary. In future revisions of the paper we will address random slopes and different temporal trajectories of the refugee crisis in the three countries under investigation. First tests indicate that the effect of attitudes toward immigration and ideology varies across respondents in all countries, which might be no surprise in light of at least 10,000 unique respondents per country.

[13] To facilitate easier interpretation, we present coefficient plots in the following. For detailed results we refer to Tables 1 to 3 in the appendix to this paper.

that ODA is probably not the best tool to comfort immigration critics. Regarding political ideology, we find that the more to the right an individual is oriented across all waves, the lesser the average support for ODA. With -0.14 the coefficient is statistically significant at the 0.001-level and considerably smaller than the between effect for immigration towards immigration. In contrast, data shows no significant within-effect for political ideology. Turning to *hypotheses H2* and *H3,* our analysis reveals no significant interaction of the pre-/post-crisis dummy variable with the within-effects of attitude towards immigration and political ideology. Thus, for France both hypotheses must be rejected.

Regarding *hypothesis H1*, in the analysis for *Germany* a similar picture emerges. The coefficient for the refugee crisis again indicates a significantly ($p < 0.001$) and substantially relevant higher support for ODA after the peak of the refugee crisis. This speaks for the positive scenario sketched out in section 2. Looking at the explanatory variables, the models show the same negative between-effects for attitude towards immigration and political ideology. When both variables (the person-averages of attitude towards immigration and ideology) increase by one unit, the average support goes down by 0.09 and 0.27, respectively. Both coefficients are significant at the 0.001 level. Concerning the within-effects, the analysis reveals remarkable findings. Contrary to our expectations, if an individual becomes more skeptical towards immigration, the support for ODA goes up. With a size of 0.01 ($p < 0.001$) the coefficient is rather small. The same holds true for ideology (see model 1 in Table 2). However, when we control for the refugee crisis, the coefficient is not statically significant anymore. Without overinterpreting the small coefficients and without accounting for a potential moderating effect of the refugee crisis yet, the findings may indicate that in Germany those becoming more skeptical towards immigration and moving to the political right over time may indeed be convinced that ODA is a useful policy tool.

Figure 2: Coefficient plot

France

Germany

Great Britain

Note: Unstandardized coefficients. 95% conf. intervals *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. Plots are based on model 2 in Tables 1, 2, and 3, respectively.

However. if we take into account the time by letting the within-effects of attitude towards immigration and political interact with the refugee crisis dummy, this positive effect disappears in the AAT waves after the events of late summer 2015 as the light grey lines in Figure 3 depict. In the case of Germany our hypotheses H2 and H3 thus have to be rejected. This interesting finding may tentatively be interpreted as a sign of resignation.

Figure 3: Interaction terms for Germany

Note: 95% confidence intervals. Plots based on models 3 and 4 in Table 2 in the appendix.

In *Great Britain* we find once more an average positive shift of 0.18 units (p < 0.001) in support for ODA in the AAT waves after the peak of the refugee crisis, which again supports the positive scenario outlined in *hypothesis H1* (see the third panel in Figure 2). Compared to both other countries, the shift is considerably smaller. In terms of the other explanatory factors, the analysis reveals for the between-effects the same findings as in the other countries. If the average for the attitude towards immigration increases by 1 unit (i.e. an individual has on average a more critical stance towards immigration), the average support for ODA diminishes by -0.45 scale points (p < 0.001). For political ideology the between-effects amounts to -0.20 (p < 0.001). Regarding the within-effects, Great Britain resembles France. On the one hand, if an individual increasingly sees a challenge in immigration, the support for ODA declines by -0.05 units. The coefficients fulfill the 0.001 p-value threshold. On the other hand, the within-

effect of political ideology is statistically not significant meaning that changing one's ideological position in Great Britain has no consequences for support for ODA. Regarding the interaction between the within-effects and the time before and after the peak of the refugee crisis, we again find no evidence for *hypotheses H2* and *H3*. Thus, in Great Britain the refugee crisis apparently neither increases the effect of within-individual shift in direction of a more negative position towards immigration nor the effect of moving to the political right-wing.

5. Conclusion

The European refugee crisis in 2015 was presumably the most salient political issue in recent years. Its aftermath still affects politics and policy-making in the EU. Not surprisingly, policy-makers urgently needed tools to on the one hand control refugee inflow and on the other comfort immigration critics and to win back former voters who switched their party preference to right-wing populist parties. One such tool is seen in increasing development aid (ODA) to countries in the MENA region and sub-Saharan Africa in order to reduce the incentives for the people in these regions to migrate to Europe. Irrespective of the true impact of ODA on migration flows, it is important that in particular those who have become more critical towards immigration or moved to the political right become convinced, i.e. more supportive of ODA.

Using panel data from the AAT from 2013 to 2018 for France, Germany, and Great Britain and random effects within-between models for longitudinal data, our paper sheds light on the effects of the refugee crisis on support for ODA. The findings can be summarized as follows: *1)* In all three countries the support for ODA is higher in the survey waves after the peak of the refugee crisis in August and September 2015. *2)* Regarding general differences between individuals (*between-effects*) we find that in all countries those who are generally more critical towards immigration and position themselves to the political right are on average less supportive of ODA. *3)* When we look at the effect of individual changes over time (*within-effects*), we find as expected a negative effect of an increasingly skeptic attitude towards immigration in France and Great Britain. This effect is not moderated by the refugee crisis. For Germany, our analyses reveal a different pattern. Without controlling for the refugee crisis, becoming more skeptical towards immigration over time goes along with higher support for ODA. However, when we account for a moderating effect of the refugee crisis, this effect vanishes.

Before we turn to the policy implications of these findings, the limitations of our study must be addressed. First, our data does not allow us to disentangle the attitude towards different forms of immigration. It is likely that people draw a distinction between refugees from the MENA region, within-EU migration, high- and low-skilled immigrants, etc. (see, e.g., Bansak, Hainmueller, & Hangartner, 2016). Unfortunately, attitudes toward refugees was included in the AAT only after the peak of the refugee crisis. Second, all respondents underwent the "treatment" of the refugee crisis. Thus, we do not have a counterfactual consisting of individuals who were not "treated". Unfortunately, due to the timing of the AAT waves as well as the duration of the events in late summer we cannot exploit varying dates of the interviews to construct a treatment and control group (see Legewie, 2013 for a similar approach). Third and finally, our study currently does not dig deeper into individual variation of effects. In other words, the focus is currently on the population-averaged fixed effects disregarding random slopes for the time-varying variables (see Bell & Jones, 2015). In that regard, there is a chance that the refugee crisis affected the three countries at different points in time, which may account for varying effects of attitude towards immigration and ideology. For instance, while Germany was at the center of attention in late summer 2015, in France the refugee camps in Calais draw media attention in summer 2016. In contrast, Great Britain was only remotely affected.

For policy-makers the findings of our study have somewhat ambivalent implications. On the one hand, support goes up in all three countries investigated. Despite the support is not overtly high (at least on the indicator chosen for this study), this might be a positive sign for those who aim at increasing aid disbursements. On the other hand, our results indicate that advocating ODA as tool to comfort immigration critics and convince former voters likely does not have the intended effect. In general, those being critical towards immigration and those placing themselves towards the political right are less supportive of development aid. This holds true for all three countries. What's more, in France and Great Britain becoming more skeptical towards immigration over time further reduces the support for ODA. At least, the crisis has not boosted this effect. In contrast, for Germany – where we find surprisingly a positive effect of shifts in attitude toward immigration before the peak of the crisis which vanishes afterwards – the results tentatively hint at disillusionment regarding development aid within the population after the peak of the refugee crisis.

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Appendix

Figure 4: Attitude toward immigration per country and wave.

Note: Scale 0 'Not at all important' – 10 'Very important'.

Figure 5: Political ideology per country and wave

Table 1: Mixed effects models France (random intercept)

|	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	7.09***	6.86***	6.86***	6.86***
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Time-varying variables				
Attitudes Immigration (PMC)	-0.04***	-0.03***	-0.03**	-0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Ideology (PMC)	0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Time-invariant variables				
Attitude Immigration (Person Mean)	-0.35***	-0.34***	-0.34***	-0.34***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Ideology (Person Mean)	-0.13***	-0.13***	-0.13***	-0.13***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Female (Ref. Male)	0.26***	0.23***	0.23***	0.23***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age	-0.00**	-0.00**	-0.00**	-0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Junior High School / GCSE (Ref. No Qualifications)	-0.08	-0.08	-0.08	-0.08
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
High School / A-levels	-0.14	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Undergraduate University / Bachelors	0.01	0.06	0.06	0.06
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Postgraduate (Masters / Phd / Adv. Prof. Qual.)	-0.01	0.10	0.10	0.10
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Low-Mid Income (Ref. Low Income)	0.18***	0.14***	0.14***	0.14***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Mid Income	0.34***	0.26***	0.26***	0.26***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Mid-High Income	0.52***	0.38***	0.38***	0.38***
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
High Income	1.32***	1.20***	1.20***	1.20***
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Time indicators				
Post Refugee Crisis (Ref. Pre-Crisis – AAT waves 1-4)		0.38***	0.38***	0.38***
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Interaction terms				
Attitude Immigration (PMC) x Post Refugee Crisis			-0.01	
			(0.01)	
Ideology (PMC) x Post Refugee Crisis				0.03†
				(0.02)
AIC	162116.88	161659.88	161668.54	161665.42
BIC	162263.15	161814.75	161832.01	161828.89
Log Likelihood	-81041.44	-80811.94	-80815.27	-80813.71
Num. obs.	40286	40286	40286	40286
Num. groups: ID	15531	15531	15531	15531
Var: ID (Intercept)	2.62	2.58	2.58	2.58
Var: Residual	1.98	1.96	1.96	1.96

Note: Unstandardized coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. PMC = person mean-centered;
***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Table 2: Mixed effect models Germany (random intercept)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	6.01***	5.91***	5.91***	5.91***
	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)
Time-varying variables				
Attitudes Immigration (PMC)	0.01**	0.01*	0.03***	0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Ideology (PMC)	0.02*	0.01	0.01†	0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Time-invariant variables				
Attitude Immigration (Person Mean)	-0.09***	-0.09***	-0.09***	-0.09***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Ideology (Person Mean)	-0.27***	-0.27***	-0.27***	-0.27***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Female (Ref. Male)	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age	0.00**	0.00**	0.00**	0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Junior High School / GCSE (Ref. No Qualifications)	0.09	0.04	0.04	0.04
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)
High School / A-levels	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.37
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Undergraduate University / Bachelors	0.12	0.16	0.16	0.16
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Postgraduate (Masters / Phd / Adv. Prof. Qual.)	0.35	0.38	0.38	0.38
	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Low-Mid Income (Ref. Low Income)	0.29***	0.28***	0.28***	0.28***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Mid Income	0.48***	0.45***	0.45***	0.45***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Mid-High Income	0.62***	0.56***	0.56***	0.56***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
High Income	0.63***	0.57**	0.56**	0.57**
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Time indicators				
Post Refugee Crisis (Ref. Pre-Crisis – AAT waves 1-4)		0.30***	0.30***	0.30***
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Interaction terms				
Attitude Immigration (PMC) x Post Refugee Crisis			-0.04***	
			(0.01)	
Ideology (PMC) x Post Refugee Crisis				-0.04**
				(0.02)
AIC	167704.57	167411.50	167402.99	167412.65
BIC	167851.23	167566.79	167566.90	167576.57
Log Likelihood	-83835.29	-83687.75	-83682.49	-83687.32
Num. obs.	41239	41239	41239	41239
Num. groups: ID	10412	10412	10412	10412
Var: ID (Intercept)	3.41	3.40	3.40	3.40
Var: Residual	2.16	2.14	2.14	2.14

Note: Unstandardized coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. PMC = person mean-centered;
***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$, †$p < 0.1$

Table 3: Mixed effect models Great Britain (random intercept)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	7.59***	7.48***	7.48***	7.48***
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Time-varying variables				
Attitudes Immigration (PMC)	-0.05***	-0.04***	-0.05***	-0.04***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Ideology (PMC)	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Time-invariant variables				
Attitude Immigration (Person Mean)	-0.45***	-0.45***	-0.45***	-0.45***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Ideology (Person Mean)	-0.20***	-0.20***	-0.20***	-0.20***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Female (Ref. Male)	0.31***	0.30***	0.30***	0.30***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age	-0.00**	-0.00**	-0.00**	-0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Junior High School / GCSE (Ref. No Qualifications)	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
High School / A-levels	0.38***	0.38***	0.38***	0.38***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Undergraduate University / Bachelors	0.78***	0.78***	0.78***	0.78***
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Postgraduate (Masters / Phd / Adv. Prof. Qual.)	0.64***	0.65***	0.65***	0.65***
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Low-Mid Income (Ref. Low Income)	0.13**	0.11*	0.11*	0.11*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Mid Income	0.21***	0.19***	0.19***	0.19***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Mid-High Income	0.24***	0.21**	0.21**	0.21**
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
High Income	0.34*	0.31†	0.31†	0.31†
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Time indicators				
Post Refugee Crisis (Ref. Pre-Crisis – AAT waves 1-4)		0.18***	0.18***	0.18***
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Interaction terms				
Attitude Immigration (PMC) x Post Refugee Crisis			0.01	
			(0.01)	
Ideology (PMC) x Post Refugee Crisis				0.00
				(0.02)
AIC	192986.46	192822.92	192831.83	192831.46
BIC	193136.32	192981.59	192999.32	192998.95
Log Likelihood	-96476.23	-96393.46	-96396.91	-96396.73
Num. obs.	49783	49783	49783	49783
Num. groups: ID	14725	14725	14725	14725
Var: ID (Intercept)	3.71	3.72	3.72	3.72
Var: Residual	1.57	1.56	1.56	1.56

Note: Unstandardized coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. PMC = person mean-centered;
***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$, †$p < 0.1$

Table 4: Question wording key variables.

Variable	AAT variable name	Question wording	Coding
support for ODA	Q6	Thinking about overseas aid to poor countries – please indicate the extent to which you think that the UK Government should give overseas aid, where a score of 0 means that it 'should not give aid at all' and a score of 10 means that it 'should give aid very generously'. Where would you place yourself on this scale?	(0) Should not give aid at all (10) Should give aid very generously (12) Don't know
Attitudes Immigration	Q96	Using a 0–10 scale, how important a problem is the number of immigrants coming to Britain these days?	(0) Not at all important (10) Very important (12) Don`t know
Ideology	Q22	In politics people sometimes talk about 'Left' and 'Right'. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means 'Left' and 10 means 'Right'?	(0) Left (10) Right (12) Don't know

Note: "Don't know" was excluded from the analysis.

Table 5: Summary statistics metric variables

Country	Observations (unique IDs)	Support ODA	Attitude Immigration	Ideology	Age
France	248,360 (24,836)	4.09 (2.50)	6.75 (2.96)	5.42 (3.03)	47.98 (15.87)
Germany	148,480 (14,848)	4.71 (2.46)	7.05 (2.67)	4.77 (2.01)	46.60 (16.34)
Great Britain	224,500 (22,450)	3.87 (2.83)	6.97 (2.98)	4.95 (2.34)	48.90 (17.03)

Note: Observations is the number of total observations. In brackets is the number of unique individuals. For all other variables the mean and standard deviation (in brackets) are shown. Please note that the number of observations in the regression models decreases due to listwise deletion by respondent-wave combinations.

Table 6: Summary statistics for categorical variables (column percentages)

Variable	Category	France	Germany	Great Britain
Gender	*Male*	46.7	47.6	48.3
	Female	53.3	52.4	51.7
Education	*Nor formal qualifications*	1.9	1.4	6.1
	Junior High School / GCSE	19.9	36.9	24.0
	High School / A-levels	35.0	28.0	22.8
	Undergraduate University / Bachelors	24.2	13.9	24.3
	Postgraduate (Masters / PhD / Advanced Professional Qualification)	19.0	19.8	22.7
Household income	*Low*	40.4	30.9	31.8
	Low-mid	40.7	33.1	35.3
	Mid	15.8	25.1	23.7
	Mid-High	2.5	9.5	8.2
	High	0.5	1.5	1.1