Security, Civilisation and Modernisation: Continuity and Change in the Russian Foreign Policy Discourse

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This study analyses official Russian foreign policy discourses to contribute to our understanding of how Russia portrays its role in the world politics and vis-à-vis neighbouring states. Building on previous studies, we offer a new, comprehensive analysis of Foreign Policy Concepts and the annual Presidential Addresses to the Federal Assembly during President Vladimir Putin's third term. By systematically coding these documents, counting references to particular discourses, and careful interpretation of the texts, we provide insights about three broader discourses related to foreign policy: (1) the world order and sovereignty; (2) civilisation, identity and values; and (3) economics and modernisation.

Keywords: Russian foreign policy; discourses; world order; sovereignty; security; civilisation; modernisation

Russia's place in the world through the lens of official discourses

The return of Vladimir Putin to the Russian presidency in 2012 saw a renewed interest in official foreign policy discourses. Commentators claimed that the beginning of Putin's third term marked a turn in Russian foreign policy discourse away from the pragmatism that was often seen as the hallmark of his first two terms as president from 2000 to 2008 (Light 2015, p. 18; Lo 2003, pp. 104-6; Tsygankov 2016b, pp. 167-172). This new turn has been variously described as civilisational (Linde 2016, pp. 622-3) or conservative (Tsygankov 2014, p. 60). We examine whether official discourses in foreign policy doctrines and speeches from 2012 to 2018 actually reflected more continuity than change, and identify which themes became prominent within these discourses during Putin's third term.

Official foreign policy discourses are a valuable source of information about Russia's international ambitions and the image it wants to project to external audiences (Ambrosio & Vandrovec 2013, pp. 439-40). Official documents do not always overlap with the actions of the Russian elites of course (Stent 2008, p. 1090), nevertheless they show how Russia wants to present its role in the world and the region, and how it wants to develop its relations with neighbours (e.g. Ambrosio & Vandrovec 2013; Foxall 2019; Light 2015; Mathers 2012).

We provide a systematic analysis of two types of documents from Putin's third term: the Foreign Policy Concepts (FPC) and annual Presidential Addresses to the Federal Assembly (henceforth, Addresses), which have been identified by scholars as important sources of official foreign policy discourses (Light 2015, pp. 13-14; Sinovets 2016). A focus on this time period allows us to conduct a new extensive study of these primary sources. Our study differs from previous research on foreign policy in terms of scope, as it involves coding and analysis of 200,000 words of text, and in terms of approach. Rather than picking and choosing only those documents or their parts that provide examples of discourses that fit any preconceived notions, we use a comprehensive approach by hand-coding and analysing the sources in their entirety. This approach allows us to contribute to the literature in three ways: (1) we provide quantitative data on how the different discourses are distributed within and across the official sources, i.e. we show the proportions of text devoted to the different themes, concepts and narratives; (2) we identify continuities and changes over time in these proportions, i.e. we show how the emphasis on different foreign policy discourses changes over time; and (3) through careful reading of the sources by two coders, we provide illustrative examples of how the different discourses are formulated and re-formulated over time.

The paper proceeds as follows: in the next section we discuss existing studies of Russian foreign policy discourses and summarise their arguments as a reference point for our approach in this paper. We distil the main discourses identified by these studies in Russian foreign policy and use the main concepts, themes and narratives within these discourses as a basis for our coding strategy. We proceed with explaining our methodology and outline the design of the content analysis. The second part of the paper analyses our findings from the FPCs and Addresses, and especially focuses on where they differ from the prevalent trends observed in the literature, highlighting new developments and providing illustrations of how the discourses are articulated. Our findings show that while civilisational discourses are present throughout Putin's third term, they have been invoked less over time. Moreover, we discover that discourses about Russian as a potential economic pole of attraction have often been just as prominent. In practice, by 2018 it is clear in both sources studied that discourses marked by the themes of security and military power have in fact come to the fore far more.

Russian Foreign Policy Discourses: The Main Themes, Narratives, Actors, and Concepts

To avoid the concept of foreign policy discourses becoming a catch-all term (Müller 2008, pp. 323-4), we define them as the 'public articulations and narrative codifications … used by politicians and practitioners of foreign policy' (O'Loughlin, Tuathail & Kolossov 2005, p. 324-5). Following this definition, we understand discourses as clusters of recurring themes, narratives, actors, and concepts in official communications and documents that present a particular understanding of how the world works. As a starting point for the coding of Russia's foreign policy discourses, we organise the existing literature on Russia's foreign policy into three clusters. The first cluster focuses on themes and concepts such as security, power, and sovereignty in the world order. The second – and largest – cluster of studies analyses the role of civilisation, values and identity in Russia's official foreign policy discourse. The final cluster sheds light on economics and modernisation in foreign policy discourses. We acknowledge, of course, that these clusters are not mutually exclusive and frequently complement each other. For example, successful regional economic integration can be also perceived as an important signifier of Russia's 'great power' status (Dragneva & Wolczuk 2015, p. 9). We briefly outline scholarly debates identifying the different clusters and their content, which we subsequently use to systematically code and analyse recent FPCs and Addresses.

Cluster 1: The world order

A major discourse about Russia's place in the world throughout the 2000s has been about restoring its position as a great power in a multipolar world (Svarin 2016, p. 131). The initial positioning of Russia in the world order after the collapse of the Soviet Union assumed its engagement with Western countries and integration into Western organisations. Since the turn of the century there has been a focus on other actors and on developing new avenues for cooperation in the post-Soviet space, such as the Customs Union (CU) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in economic matters and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) for security matters. At the same time, closer relations with other rising powers – China in particular – have been developed through bodies including the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and BRICS.

Research suggests that the important concept within the world order discourse is sovereignty. Sovereignty, however, is understood in a particular way and the narratives linked to sovereignty show that Russia uses it in an instrumental manner. On the one hand, in the post-Soviet space, Russia can use post-Westphalian arguments that invoke 'responsibility to protect' in order to intervene on the territory of other sovereign states (Deyermond 2016, pp. 967-71; Lo 2015, pp. 71-3). On the other hand, the rest of the world is expected to adhere to a Westphalian principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states, including the Russian Federation (Deyermond 2016, pp. 961-7). This instrumental emphasis on different understandings of sovereignty suggests that only a few great powers, in particular the U.S., China and Russia, are truly sovereign enough to 'to exercise genuinely independent choices' (Lo 2015, pp. 41-2). These countries, in turn, should be recognised as powerful centres in the multipolar world that replaced the unipolar domination of the U.S. in the 1990s. These powerful centres have their own 'spheres of influence' or 'spheres of interest' upon which they can exert power (Lo 2015, p. 178; Smith 2016, p. 175).The narrative about multipolarity and spheres of influences is a common feature of the world order discourse.

Cluster 2: Civilisation

Analyses of Russian foreign policy discourses give great prominence to identity issues (Duncan 2005; Hopf 1999; Kassianova 2001; Koldunova 2015). Many of these studies trace the debates about what kind of state Russia is and aspires to be, what its place in world politics is, and with what values and norms it identifies (Light 2003, p. 44). This self-identification (defining what you are) is simultaneously a process of differentiation from the 'Other' (defining what you are not) (Kassianova 2001, p. 822; Tsygankov 2007, p. 376). Discourses on

Russian identity reflect a persistent dilemma: whether Russia wants to be perceived as 'a part of Europe or apart from Europe' (Baranovsky 2000, p. 443).

In the early 1990s, the so-called 'Westernisers' supported liberal ideas and oriented towards the reconstruction of links with Europe and the West in general, in the belief that there was a congruence of Russian and Western values (Kassianova 2001, p. 824; Light 2003; Svarin 2016). Meanwhile, the so-called 'Eurasianists' have tended to see Russia as a distinct civilisation (Duncan 2005, p. 288; Tsygankov 2016b pp. 65-7). Although Eurasianism is not a uniform ideology and there exist various strands within it, they share several main tenets. These are the criticism of universalism and European values, the distinctiveness and superiority of the Russian values, glorification of the Russian past, the importance of religion and spiritualism, and emphasis on Russia as a great power on the Eurasian continent (Laruelle 2004).

In between these two identity ideas there is a group referred to as 'pragmatic nationalists' or 'statists' (Light 2003, p. 45; Tsygankov 2016a, p. 149). They do not negate Russia's links to the West, but postulate an assertive position towards it, development of relations with other states, and protection of the Russian values. Russia should be sovereign in the matters of domestic and foreign policy and immune to external influences (Surkov 2009). Some scholars have identified a turn towards 'moral sovereignty' based on traditional Russian values (Sharafutdinova 2014), while others argue that a sovereign Russia is seeking to represents a true, 'authentic', traditional European civilisation in its discourse (Laruelle 2016).

In addition, there is a debate about the construction of the Russian nation itself. The ambiguity of the distinction between ethnic (*russkii*) and civic (*rossiiskii*) nation-building agendas has never been completely resolved by the Russian authorities (Shevel 2011; Smith 2016, p. 171). The discourses on nationhood usually offer three options for defining the Russian nation on the basis of ethnicity: as a community of ethnic Russians, as a community of Eastern Slavs (which would include Belarusians and Ukrainians), or as a community of Russian speakers including the so-called 'compatriots' living beyond Russia's borders (Shevel 2011, p. 180). These different definitions of the Russian nation have significant consequences for relations with neighbours in the post-Soviet space that often have large Russian-speaking minorities. The neighbouring countries also have to contend with the concept of a vaguely-defined 'Russian World' (*Russkii mir*), one which embraces an ethnic and cultural definition of the Russian nation in its broadest context and has the potential to undermine the sovereignty of neighbouring states (Zevelev 2016 p. 12-16).

In summary the discourse on civilisation includes the concept of identity with different narratives about what Russian values are and whether they are distinct from the European values or their true expression, and what makes someone Russian and thus belonging to the 'Russian world'.

Cluster 3: Economics and modernisation

The emphasis on the modernisation of the Russian economy was particularly pronounced under President Dmitri Medvedev from 2008 to 2012. Deep social and political reform was supposed to improve the status of Russia as a global player competing with other powers, including the U.S., EU, and China, and to become 'one of the most influential global centres' (Freire & Simão 2015, p. 129). The discourse of the modernisation of Russia's economy coupled with high GDP growth rates generated even more ambitious plans, such as the possible reform of the international financial institutions to grant stronger influence to non-Western powers, such as Russia (Lo 2015, p. 82-3).

Similarly Russia might appeal to its neighbours more in the economic sphere rather than through political or cultural discourses (Smith 2016, p. 180). For many years Moscow placed a strong emphasis on promoting the integration of Ukraine into Russia-led regional economic bodies. For example, Russia presented the idea of Customs Union as an opportunity to generate growth and support modernisation, rather than appealing to historical or civilisational arguments (Dragneva & Wolczuk 2015, pp. 66-73). Russia's integration project in the post-Soviet space, the EAEU, affects the political choices of countries. It divides them in terms of what paths of developments they commit themselves to, such as Armenia's rejection and Ukraine's implementation of an Association Agreement (AA) with the EU.

With a few exceptions (e.g. Gould-Davis 2016; Lo 2003, pp. 51-71; Trenin 2011, pp. 144-73), previous studies of Russian foreign policy discourses seem to have paid far less attention to the self-ascribed role of Russia in the global economy and as a potential economic pole of attraction than they have to the issues of sovereignty or identity. This could be caused by the Russian foreign policy elites putting less emphasis on economic development and modernisation in their discussions of international affairs. It might also result from the choice of texts usually analysed by scholars, although it has been noted that 'international and intermestic economic concerns' do feature in the Addresses (Ambrosio & Vandrovec 2013: 457). The scepticism of experts towards Russian economic plans might be a part of the explanation as to why Russian discourses on economic integration seem to have been neglected in many analyses.

In summary, the third discourse of Russian foreign policy—the discourse on economics and modernisation—includes the narrative of Russia as an economic global player and a 'pole of attraction', and the themes of regional economic integration and the promise of modernisation.

The analysis we present in this paper builds on these three discourses in Russian foreign policy. We look at how the documents position Russia in the world order. We assess whether the civilisational discourse dominates the analysed foreign policy from Putin's third term. Finally, given the limited attention paid to the economic discourse in earlier studies of Russian foreign policy documents, we investigate the place of this discourse, which presents Russia as an economic pole of attraction and a leader of regional economic integration. The next section will outline how we use all of the above to code and analyse the selected foreign policy documents.

Method and Approach

For the purpose of this analysis we have focused on two types of data sources that communicate foreign policy discourses. The first are the three most recent official FPCs of the Russian Federation in 2008,[1] 2013[2] and 2016[3] that have been in force since Putin returned to the presidency in 2012. The second group of sources comprise the six annual Addresses during Putin's third term (Putin 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2018). These are usually delivered every December, however the final Address in Putin's third term was postponed to March 2018, coinciding with his re-election campaign. We acknowledge that these are not the sole sources of foreign policy discourses. There are the daily press releases and speeches by a huge range of actors in the Russian foreign policy apparatus – including the presidential administration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committees, prominent politicians and publicists, and think tanks with ties to the Kremlin (Gvosdev & Marsh 2013, pp. 27-59). For the purposes of this structured analysis however, we decided to focus

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[1] Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, available at http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/4116, accessed 1 December 2016.

[2] Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved by the President of the Russian Federation V. Putin on 12 February 2013), available at http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/122186, accessed 1 December 2016.

[3] Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016), available at http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248, accessed 2 December 2016.

on certain recurring high-profile sources that we can compare over time in a consistent manner. We chose the FPCs that were in place during Putin's third term to arrive at an overview of official priorities set out for Russian foreign policy. An analysis of Putin's annual Addresses complemented these findings by demonstrating the relative importance of particular foreign policy discourses on a year by year basis.

We manually coded the texts with a pre-determined, but flexible code book. We developed the codebook on the basis of the clusters of themes, concepts, actors, and narratives derived from the literature discussed above. The codes we used are presented in Table 1.

[Table 1 near here]

We developed these literature-driven codes (more commonly these codes are called 'theory-derived', see DeCuir-Gunby, Marshall & McCulloch 2011, p.141) following a typical procedure (Boyatzis 1998). Coding was conducted by two coders: one analysed the texts in English and the other in Russian. Each coder analysed nearly 100,000 words in their set of texts. Initially, we assigned the codes to the first analysed text; subsequently, we reviewed, revised, and added codes where necessary in the context of the data; finally, to assure reliability of coding we compared all the coded texts with each other. The coders discussed every paragraph of each document after coding them separately. Where the text was coded differently, the coders compared their interpretations to reach agreement and assure inter-coder reliability. Where necessary, this included discussing meaning of the original Russian text to ascertain the intention of the authors. Percentages were calculated based on word counts using the English texts. A full breakdown of the coding and the calculations of word counts for each category in every document can be found in Supplementary material to this article.

We conducted a comprehensive analysis of the entire texts without focusing on one specific aspect of foreign policy, attempting to avoid any bias or preconceived notions, which has been identified as a risk in such studies (Drozdova & Robinson 2017, pp. 252-3). After identifying the extent to which different discourses were employed, we then noted trends and changes over time during Putin's third term with regard to the issues discussed and their relative prominence. The authors collaborated to then provide relevant examples from the texts themselves to illustrate how the discourses are articulated and presented. The following section will present the results of the analysis of the FPCs, before moving to the analysis of the annual Addresses.

Analysis of the Foreign Policy Concepts of the Russian Federation

The three FPCs developed in use during Putin's third term follow similar templates: basic general principles and provisions, a statement on Russian foreign policy in the modern world, Russia's priorities in addressing global problems, regional foreign policy priorities, and finally foreign policy formation and implementation. Our analysis shows that the frequency of references to the specific categories of foreign policy discourse presented in Table 1 has remained relatively constant across all three FPCs during Putin's third term, as shown in in Table 2.

[Table 2 near here]

Cluster 1: Russia's place in the world order and understanding of sovereignty

We begin with the category that has the most attention devoted to it in the FPCs. Overall, around half of the content of each FPC is dedicated to various issues of the international world order. The balance between the relative sub-categories coded under 'world order' remains similar in each FPC, as can be seen in the Supplementary material. The most significant change is the steady increase in the focus on issues of international security as a sub-category across the three documents, taking up nearly half of the references to world order by 2016. The 2008 FPC predates the conflict between Russia and Georgia over South Ossetia and the 2016 FPC comes in the wake of the ongoing conflicts in both Ukraine and Syria. Discourses about international bodies and law remain the second most prominent, followed by the economic world order.

In the discussion of world order, the 2008 FPC makes it clear that 'a new Russia … has now acquired a full-fledged role in global affairs' and implies that Russia was returning to great power status thanks to its 'strengthening position'. The 2013 FPC suggests that the West's ability to dominate the world economy and politics is diminishing and a new polycentric system is emerging. By 2016, this transition is described as almost complete and there are new references to the failings or decline in power of the U.S. and the EU. The Euro-Atlantic region is described as having systemic problems and posing a threat to regional and global stability. Rather than making the case that deep-rooted ties with Europe should inform Russia's relations with the EU, the 2016 FPC underlines that separate European and Eurasian integration processes need to better harmonise with each other. According to the 2016 FPC, the desire of Western countries to regain their dominant position by imposing their views on others is leading to turbulence and instability in the world.

The amount of space dedicated to building relations with the U.S., which remained stable between the 2008 and 2013 FPCs, was dramatically reduced by 2016. Earlier references to visa liberalisation and preventing the imposition of sanctions are absent in 2016 and the main emphasis is on arms control. The 2016 FPC contains an explicit statement that relations can only be built on a basis of equality, mutual respect of interests and non-interference in the internal affairs of each other. It is made clear that while Russia is interested in good relations, it reserves the right to respond harshly to what it perceives as any attempts by the U.S. to exert military, political, economic or other pressure.

The emphasis on China has not in fact increased in the discourses presented in the FPCs between 2008 and 2016. In the section on 'regional priorities', China is only mentioned after the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, Europe, and the U.S. In 2008, China is only mentioned in the same paragraph as India. The prominence of China slightly increased in the 2013 and 2016 FPCs. The 'common principled approaches adopted by the two countries to addressing the key issues on the global agenda as one of the core elements of regional stability' are referenced in 2016. The discourses in both the FPCs and, as will be shown later, in the Addresses, focuses on the Asia-Pacific region in general rather than China in particular.

Turning to references of Russia's sphere of influence and interests, Table 2 shows that these topics make up around six percent of the entire text of each FPC. In general the three FPCs call for 'good neighbourly relations' with adjacent countries (although these countries are not explicitly named) that are willing to engage in mutually beneficial cooperation while taking into account Russia's 'legitimate interests'. The 2008 FPC, for example, offers the prospect of multilateral dialogue and 'multidimensional cooperation'. The CIS is mentioned in all three FPCs, although it had lost ground to mentions of the EAEU by 2016. The Union State of Russian and Belarus (USRB) is only mentioned in an economic context in the 2008 FPC. The two subsequent FPCs, however, stress the promotion of 'integration in all areas'. Belarus is explicitly mentioned in the second paragraph in the section on 'regional priorities' and earns a paragraph in its own right in the 2016 FPC. This is different from the 2013 FPC, in which the USRB is relegated to a sub-section of a paragraph.

Unsurprisingly, the coverage of Ukraine has also changed. In 2013 there is a call for Ukraine to be a priority partner in extended integration processes. In 2016 a much longer entry calls for the development of a variety of 'political, economic, cultural and spiritual ties' with Ukraine on the basis of mutual respect and their national interests, but no longer links Ukraine to regional integration processes. The 2016 FPC promises that Russia will

make the necessary efforts for a political and diplomatic settlement of what it terms the 'internal conflict in Ukraine'.

An important emphasis in the FPCs since 2008 has been on security in the neighbourhood, making up approximately one half of all the references to Russia's sphere of interest. This includes cooperation through the Russian-led regional security bodies – the CSTO and SCO. Issues of common interest listed include terrorism, extremism, transnational crime, and illegal migration. Russia is presented as a security provider through peacekeeping missions in the post-Soviet space. This is also the only occasion when Moldova is explicitly named in any of the FPCs, in the context of the status of separatist Transnistria. Afghanistan is named as a common security risk for Russia and its neighbours. In the 2008 FPC it is only presented as a threat to the southern CIS countries, but by 2016 it is named as a major threat to Russia and other CIS members, requiring possible input from Eurasian security bodies alongside other international organisations to help resolve it.

Furthermore, any perceived NATO encroachment in Russia's sphere of influence is heavily criticised. The prospect of admitting Ukraine and Georgia to the Euro-Atlantic alliance is directly referenced in the 2008 FPC, but in 2013 and 2016 no specific countries are named. By then, Russia had intervened militarily in Georgia and Ukraine. The 2008 FPC criticises talk of expansion as undermining 'the effectiveness of joint work' between Russia and NATO, whereas the 2016 FPC condemns NATO's 'growing military activity in the regions neighbouring Russia'. Any talk of cooperation with NATO has disappeared by 2016.

Importantly, references to Russia's right (and that of other countries') to be a sovereign state and act in a sovereign manner on the international stage increased across the FPCs between 2008 and 2016. Nevertheless, as Table 2 above shows, the proportion of text dedicated to sovereignty is similar to the proportion of text devoted to other areas, including Russia's economic globalisation, the regional sphere of influence, and Russian and Eurasian identity.

An interpretation of sovereignty that emphasises the exclusive right of each state to decide about its internal affairs and to treat its citizens as they wish can be identified in the 2016 FPC with regard to Syria: 'Russia supports the unity, independence and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic as a secular, democratic and pluralistic State [sic] with all ethnic and religious groups living in peace and security and enjoying equal rights and opportunities.' This interpretation is not applied to all countries, however. References to the inviable sovereignty of Georgia and Ukraine are conspicuous in their absence. Georgia is not mentioned as a country whose territorial integrity was breached when South Ossetia and Abkhazia were recognised as independent by

Russia after a military conflict. Tellingly, Crimea is not even mentioned in the 2016 FPC, although it is referred to in the discussion of Russia's domestic affairs in the annual Addresses, as will be noted in the following section.

Another way in which the FPCs refer to sovereignty concerns the right to act in a sovereign manner in the international arena. On multiple occasions, the FPCs mention Russia's right to pursue its interests in international politics and economy – usually linked with some sort of international legal framework. As an illustration of this, the 2016 FPC states that Russia 'in accordance with international norms and principles, adopts the necessary trade policy measures to protect national interests and effectively respond to unfriendly economic actions by foreign states that infringe upon the rights of the Russian Federation or Russian business entities.'

Cluster 2: Civilisation, identity and values from a Russian perspective

In recent years there has been a growing focus on a possible 'conservative' or 'civilisational' turn in Russian politics (Laruelle 2016; Linde 2016; Robinson 2017; Sharafutdinova 2014). However, based on the analysis carried out here, we do not find any significant increase in references to a special Russian civilisational identity across the three FPCs. Regardless of the importance of such discourses in domestic political discourse, they have not yet taken on extra prominence in the FPCs. Furthermore, when identity, norms and values are invoked, in approximately one third of the cases the FPCs still refer to universal standards rather than any specific Russian ones, even in 2016.

The 2008 FPC makes reference to 'the full universality of generally recognised norms' and 'universal democratic values, including protection of human rights and freedoms'. All three FPCs condemn racial discrimination and anti-Semitism in particular, but do not mention other forms of discrimination. The 2008 FPC notes that the rights of the Russian-speaking population in the Baltic states should be protected in accordance with European norms. All three FPCs contain pledges to support international human rights conventions and agreements, as well as work with bodies such as the Council of Europe (CoE). Nevertheless, each FPC suggests that it is necessary to eradicate 'double standards' in the area of universal human rights.[4] There is a reference to

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[4] While it is not outlined in the FPC, elsewhere officials describe Western double standards as politicising human rights in certain countries, or not living up to the same standards domestically as they expect from other states e.g. 'Russian ombudsperson points out Western double standards on human rights', *TASS,* 8 November 2018, available at http://tass.com/society/1029938', accessed 2 May 2019.

promoting 'Russia's approach to human rights issues' in the 2013 FPC although it is not explained what that means in practice and similar references are absent from the 2008 and 2016 FPCs.

The volume of discourse on Russian civilisation and identity is similar across all three FPCs. Russia reserves the right to provide 'comprehensive protection' for compatriots abroad in the 2008 and 2013 FPCs and this becomes 'comprehensive, effective protection' in the 2016 FPC. The documents promise to expand and strengthen the space for Russian language and culture. Similarly, all three FPCs emphasise the need to promote an objective image of Russian accomplishments across a variety of spheres, and to counter the selective use of history or attempts by (unnamed) outside forces to manipulate public opinion under the guise of 'soft power'. In the later FPCs there is a greater emphasis on the need to 'promote Russian and Russian-language media in the global information space'.

It is interesting to note that the term 'Russian World' is in fact only mentioned once, in 2008. Nor is there any mention of a specific Eurasian identity. The 2013 and 2016 FPCs both mention the need to develop 'interstate cultural and humanitarian ties between Slavic peoples', but how the definition of Slavic peoples should be understood is not stated. The 2008 and 2013 FPCs reference the 'common cultural and civilisational heritage' of the CIS countries and later this becomes their 'common cultural and historical legacy' in 2016. Whether this commonality should be interpreted as Russian, (post-)Soviet, or Eurasian is left unsaid. None of the FPCs place a strong emphasis on the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), although each notes the need for the spiritual education of the population. Where the ROC is mentioned, it is in the context of collaboration with other confessions in a multipolar world of diverse civilisations.

Cluster 3: Economics and modernisation of Russia

Our analysis reveals that the portrayal of Russia as a potential economic pole of attraction is indeed important. Despite having attracted relatively little attention in the extant literature, economic discourses are in fact as prominent in all three FPCs as expressions of a particular Russian identity or civilisation. In all three FPCs just under ten per cent of the text is dedicated to issues that the authors coded as prosperity, while just over ten per cent discussed issues of civilisation and identity, as shown in Table 2. This cautions against an overemphasis of any 'civilisational turn' in Russian foreign policy discourse in these sources.

The projection of Russia as a driver of regional economic integration is a constant and recurring argument, dating back to the 2008 FPC. The focus in the earlier FPC was on relations within the CIS in terms of trade and economics. Particular emphasis is given to Belarus and Kazakhstan as partners, which continues in 2013 and

2016. In later FPCs, the focus shifts away from the CIS and moves to first establishing and then expanding the EAEU. In the 2016 FPC, the foreign policy ambitions of the authorities for the EAEU include harmonisation with Europe and complementary projects in the Asia-Pacific region.

There are also common themes when presenting Russia as a prosperous prospective partner in the world economy. Each has a section on international cooperation in the sphere of the economy, emphasising the modernisation of Russia, the transformation of its economy, and its innovation-based development. Russia is portrayed as possessing 'real capacity to play a well-deserved role globally' (FPC 2008) and an ability to make a 'considerable contribution to ensuring the stability of the global economy and finances' (FPC 2013). Each FPC promises that Russia will integrate with the world economy, develop foreign economic and investment links, and strengthen strategic partnerships. The 2008 FPC proposes that Russia will help develop a 'just and democratic architecture of global trade, monetary and financial relations' through pursuing membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). By 2016, when Russia had become a member of the WTO, the FPC promises to 'contribute to the efficiency of the multilateral trade system'. In the 2013 and 2016 FPCs, the importance of Russia's geographic location is mentioned, highlighting the opportunity to facilitate trade between Europe and the Asia-Pacific region.

One noticeable change over time is the attitude towards international development. The 2008 and 2013 FPCs state that Russia is pursuing active and targeted policies as a donor at both the multilateral and bilateral level. All mention of this has disappeared in the 2016 FPC, implying that the government might be reigning in its ambitions and promises to potential partners in the developing world. This particular topic also demonstrated the importance of checking the English and Russian texts in order to catch and interpret nuances. In English, the 2008 FPC refers to 'donor capacity' while the 2013 FPC references 'donor potential', suggesting a subtle downgrade in importance. The original Russian in both texts, however, refers only to 'donor potential'.

Overall, the emphasis on Russia as a regional economic power is constant in all three FPCs. The focus is on regional integration organisations, with the emphasis shifting from the CIS in 2008 to the EAEU in 2016. There is a slight decline in the amount of text which refers to Russia as an active participant in a globalised economy. The only significant absence in the 2016 FPC is the lack of mention of international development assistance. Otherwise, it appears that the discussion of international economic cooperation is simply presented in a more succinct manner than in earlier FPCs.

Analysis of the Presidential Addresses to the Federal Assembly

The Russian Constitution grants the president the right to define foreign policy guidelines and represent the country in international relations. As such, the language employed in Putin's annual Addresses after his return to the presidency can provide additional insights into Russian foreign policy discourse since 2012. These Addresses are likely to get extensive media coverage in Russia and the region, reaching a wider audience than regular press releases from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or other sources noted earlier. Unlike the FPCs discussed above, there is far less consistency in how much attention is paid to particular foreign policy discourses in the Addresses.

Unsurprisingly, the speech with the largest proportion of time dedicated to the foreign policy discourses analysed in this paper is from 2014, in the wake of the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the response from the West. Issues of sovereignty, regional influence and Russian identity are particularly prominent in that Address. The following year on the other hand, 2015, was the one in which the most emphasis was placed on Russia as a potential economic pole of attraction out of any of the Addresses. This may have indicated a desire to present Russia as prosperous in spite of Western economic sanctions. An overall summary is presented in Table 3.

[Table 3 near here]

Cluster 1: Russia's place in the world order and understanding of sovereignty

In coding these Addresses, we also conducted a frequency count of international organisations and countries mentioned. The full findings can be found in the Supplementary material to this article, and we summarise the key trends here. In terms of mentions of international organisations, bodies in post-Soviet Eurasia predominate during Putin's third term: the CIS, the Customs Union (CU) of Russian, Belarus and Kazakhstan that then transformed into the EAEU, the CSTO and the SCO. Regional economic bodies (CU/EAEU) are mentioned more than twice as often as regional security bodies (CSTO, SCO) over the entire period analysed, however, this gap has narrowed since the EAEU was actually launched in 2015. Similarly, international economic bodies (BRICS, G8, G20, WTO) are mentioned almost twice as often as regional security bodies. References to eastward-facing organisations (ASEAN, APEC, SCO) have outnumbered those to the EU or NATO across all six speeches. These findings corroborate the trends identified in earlier studies of presidential addresses (Ambrosio & Vandrovec 2013, p. 445).

When it comes to the geographic scope of individual counties mentioned, certain trends emerge. Particular attention is paid to Ukraine during Euromaidan in the 2013 Address and after the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of fighting in Donbas in 2014, but since then Ukraine has been ignored. The only countries in Russia's so-called 'sphere of privileged interest' that warrant a specific mention are Belarus and Kazakhstan, reflecting their status in the vanguard of Eurasian integration in the run up to the establishment of the EAEU in 2015.

References to and comparisons with the U.S. are another familiar constant. On the other hand, while references to the Asia-Pacific region and eastward-facing organisations may have been have been increasing, this has not been reflected in direct mentions of China. References to China still lag behind references to the U.S. It should be noted that the references to the U.S. are also influenced by specific events – tensions over Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 for example.

Turning now to the discourses themselves, references to sovereignty and the right to act in a sovereign manner in a variety of ways have appeared in all the Addresses since Putin returned to the presidency. In 2012 he focuses on factors that would guarantee Russia's sovereignty in the 21st century, not only aiming to preserve Russia's geopolitical relevance, but also to generate 'demand among our neighbours and partners'. In addition, the Address emphasises that 'unity, integrity and sovereignty are unconditional' and expressions of separatism were not welcome. Nor is any 'direct or indirect foreign interference in our internal political processes' tolerated. In 2013, Putin promises that Russia also respects the sovereignty of other countries: 'we do not claim to be any sort of superpower with a claim to global or regional hegemony; we do not encroach on anyone's interests, impose our patronage onto anyone, or try to teach others how to live their lives.'

Sovereignty is invoked the most in 2014. Russia had 'supported' and 'facilitated' Ukraine's aspirations for sovereignty in the 1990s. President Yanukovych had been a legitimate head of state, who was perfectly entitled to postpone signing any AA between Ukraine and the EU. The U.S. is charged with meddling 'behind the scenes' in Russia's neighbourhood. European countries are accused of treating sovereignty as 'too much of a luxury', while 'true sovereignty for Russia is absolutely necessary'. Putin speaks of supporters of separatism 'from across the pond' who would have gladly seen the 'dismemberment' of Russia, but Russia had remained a sovereign nation. In the same speech, however, Russia is presented as having the right to support the 'historical reunification' of Crimea with Russia following a 'resolution on sovereignty', even when this went against the indivisibility and integrity of the Ukrainian state.

In 2015 the focus of the Address shifted from Ukraine to Syria, and with it Russia's sovereign right to wage 'an expressly open, direct struggle against international terrorism', which was based on 'an official request from the legitimate Syrian authorities'. This was necessary because other (unnamed) countries had sought to undermine state sovereignty in the Middle East and North Africa though a desire to 'oust unwanted regimes and brutally impose their own rules'. In subsequent Addresses the emphasis on sovereignty has declined. By 2018 it warrants only a passing mention, in the context of technological progress.

In general terms, the Addresses rarely emphasise Russia's regional sphere of influence to the same extent as the FPCs have. Rather than focus on multidimensional forms of cooperation as seen above in the analysis of the FPCs, Putin instead emphasises providing assistance to ensure effective immigration controls. In 2013 he vows to 'preserve our special ties with the former Soviet republics' but wants new regulations for employing foreign workers to control migration flows.

Naturally, the 2014 Address is particularly clear about placing Ukraine within Russia's sphere of influence and Crimea being part of the Russian Federation. Putin suggests that the EU and the West have been unable to provide the assistance Ukraine needed. By contrast, Russia would have been able to offer assistance had there been an attempt to engage in dialogue earlier. Curiously, Ukraine is never mentioned in the following Addresses. We continued to code mentions of Crimea after that speech as examples of re-defining Russia's sphere of influence, rather than domestic politics. The speeches, however, refer to Crimea purely in the domestic politics context of Russia. Crimea is one of only a handful of regions in Russia that get named in Addresses. This is always in the context of the need to create 'favourable conditions' (Putin 2014) in the peninsula through 'projects of national importance' (Putin 2016) that will 'stimulate … the entire Russian Black Sea region' (Putin 2018) such as the construction of a bridge to Crimea. It illustrates the argument that for all the talk of sovereignty described above, this idea of sovereignty did not extend to Ukraine as part of Russia's 'near abroad'.

The regional security of Russia is mentioned in 2015, shortly after Russia had begun its military operations in Syria. Putin stated that 'we must fight and eliminate them [militants] there, away from home' before they potentially return to Russia's sphere of influence. In 2018, the need to develop military infrastructure in the Arctic was mentioned as a regional priority for the first time.

What stands out in the final Address before Putin's re-election is the huge focus on security in the world order, to a far greater extent than previously in this study. Issues around global security exceeded all other foreign policy

discourses combined in 2018. In part this was due to long descriptions of historical context dating back to the Soviet and detailed summaries of what Putin had discussed with U.S. and European partners. In doing so, Russia is portrayed as a reliable partner who want act in the interests of international security, but if its hand is forced by the West, it will respond militarily. These remarks about Russia's security in the world order are made after an extensive presentation of the modernisation and upgrading of the Russian armed forces.

Cluster 2: Civilisation, identity and values from a Russian perspective

Unlike the three FPCs since 2008, in which universal or, to a lesser extent, European identities and values have still found a place in discourse on civilisation and identity, this is not reflected as strongly in the Addresses. Even when they are mentioned, they are usually tempered by certain Russian exceptions. So in 2012 when Putin mentions Russia sharing 'universal democratic principles adopted worldwide', the text immediately proceeds to qualify that by adding that 'Russian democracy means the power of the Russian people with their own traditions of self-rule and not the fulfilment of standards imposed on us from outside'.

Putin devotes the most attention to identity in his first Address after his re-election in 2012: 'We should preserve our national and spiritual identity, not lose our sense of national unity. We must be and remain Russia.' He argues that 'many moral guides have been lost' and there is an 'apparent deficit of spiritual values'. Educational, cultural and youth policies would create 'a responsible Russian citizen'. Furthermore, he urges the simplification of procedures to obtain citizenship for 'the bearers of the Russian language and culture, the direct descendants of those who were born in the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union'.

The 2014 Address devotes significant time to Crimea as 'the spiritual source of the development of a multifaceted but solid Russian nation'. The indivisibility of Russia and Crimea is invoked early in the speech: 'In addition to ethnic similarity, a common language, common elements of their material culture, a common territory, even though its borders were not marked then, and a nascent common economy and government.' Moreover, 'Christianity was a powerful spiritual unifying force that helped involve various tribes and tribal unions of the vast Eastern Slavic world in the creation of a Russian nation and Russian state.'

Elsewhere, there are regular references to the need to defend Russia's 'national interests, history, traditions and values' (Putin 2015) and its 'national civilisational code' (Putin 2018) as well as the 'all-encompassing, unifying role of Russian culture history and language for our multi-ethnic population' (Putin 2013). In the sphere of education in particular, such references are extended to citizens in neighbouring countries and the need to 'strengthen Russia's cultural and intellectual influence', as expressed in 2013. It is actually in this context, with

foreign students coming to study at Russian universities or via distance learning, that compatriots living outside of Russia have been mentioned. A new development in the 2018 Address was a section on improving procedures of granting Russian citizenship that focused on being young, healthy and well-educated, and did not highlight identity or civilisational pre-requisites.

It is interesting to note that in none of these Addresses is the term 'Russian world' explicitly used. Nor do they refer to any form of Eurasianism as discussed in the literature above. By referring to Russia's 'millennium-long history and great traditions, as a nation consolidated by common values and common goals', Putin does refer to spiritual issues and moral standards far more than they are ever raised in the official FPCs. This suggests that the so-called 'conservative turn' in the Russian official discourse is aimed more at the domestic audience than at the international one. This does not mean that elites or publics in neighbouring countries are not paying attention to such statements.

Cluster 3: Economics and modernisation of Russia

We have demonstrated above that the economic dimension of Russian foreign policy discourse is just as prominent in all three FPCs as any discussions of civilisation or identity. In Putin's Addresses, one might anticipate that maybe he prefers to use discourses that would reflect a civilisational turn in foreign policy. However, while that would indeed appear to be the case in the 2012 Address, that trend has not been maintained subsequently. Based on our analysis, issues of prosperity are just as important as civilisation and identity in the annual Addresses from 2013 onwards, mirroring what is seen in the FPCs. By 2016 and 2018, this discourse far outstrips mentions of civilisation and identity in an international context.

Economic integration in the region is the key element of the discourse on prosperity. The goal of the EAEU attracts the most attention in the Addresses leading up to its establishment in 2015. In the 2013 Address, Putin notes that 'the real achievements of Eurasian integration will only enhance our other neighbours' interest in it, including that of our Ukrainian partners' and promises that the process will proceed 'without setting it against other integration projects, including the more mature European one'. However, since the launch of the EAEU in January 2015, its prominence in annual addresses has declined. The 2016 Address mentions strengthening EAEU cooperation with other CIS countries and the 2018 Address emphasises ambitions to develop common markets in areas such as energy and finances within the EAEU. Both speeches briefly acknowledges the idea of a greater Eurasian partnership', which has begun to emerge in Russian discourse more widely, but what it means still lacks clarity (Lewis 2018). Although the implications of this new focus are not yet clear, it might be that the

integration within the EAEU is too narrow (or too shallow) to accomplish the economic goals of both Russia and other members of the organisation without developing stronger economic cooperation with other actors such as China.

When deciding on how to identify examples of Russia's economic globalisation in the annual addresses, the coders agreed that it was not enough to simply code all mentions of the Russian economy. Instead, it was agreed that coding would only be applied to comments that could be seen as portraying Russia as an economic pole of attraction, even though it might not be explicitly expressed as such. Examples of this include references to building a 'rich and prosperous Russia' (Putin 2012) that 'works towards prosperity and affluence' (Putin 2014), a country 'in the group of 20 nations with the best business climate' (Putin 2012) and that 'asserts itself among the world's five biggest economies' (Putin 2018). Calls to welcome foreign investors and educated professionals were coded under this category, as were references to Russia's international competitiveness, global innovation and opportunities for partners to work with the country's modernizing economy. In 2015 in particular, there is an emphasis on 'holding consultations' and to 'open new possibilities' in the Asia-Pacific region, in a bid to 'work out a mutually beneficial agenda for cooperation'. Such ambitious talk of leading an economic partnership in the region is gone the following year, nevertheless the 2016 Address is the first in which Putin directly mentions China, as it 'is about to become the world's largest economy'. By 2018, the focus has moved to connectivity, with reference to Russia's importance for the Northern Sea Route and the overland transport corridors between Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. It remains to be seen whether Russia's success as an economic power will be more explicitly linked to ties with China in the discourse during the coming years.

Conclusions

This paper offers a comprehensive and systematic analysis of the most high-profile sources for Russian foreign policy discourses during Putin's third term as president. Given the centralised and hierarchical nature of the Russian political system, the study provides valuable insights into ongoing trends in foreign policy discourses. It contributes to our understanding of how Russia portrays its role in the world politics and vis-à-vis neighbouring states. By coding and interpreting full texts of the three most recent FPCs and six presidential Addresses, we contribute systematic empirical evidence on the prominence and persistence over time of three different discourses, as well as illustrative examples showing what these discourses entail.

Our main findings are: (1) the FPCs follow a stable template in terms of proportion of space devoted to different issues, while annual Addresses vary more over time; (2) FPCs and Addresses emphasise the theme of security increasingly over time; (3) sovereignty is a core concept used by both documents and continues to be used in a strategic and instrumental way depending on the context; (4) a civilisational turn has not become more prominent in the official discourses over time; and (5) the economic prosperity discourse is just as prominent as civilisational one albeit its focus is mainly on the future aspirations than actual developments.

Our analysis of the FPCs demonstrates that there is a great deal of continuity in the amount of space dedicated to the discourses under investigation in each document. Within the discourse on the world order, there has been a growing emphasis on security issues at both the regional and global level. While our review of the existing studies on Russian foreign policy discourse notes that they have paid particular attention to questions of Russian identity or Eurasian civilisation, this is not especially pronounced in the FPCs in comparison to other categories identified. This could suggest that many of these studies placed too much emphasis on a small sample of sources – such as the 2012 FPC – to justify the importance of any civilisational turn. It can also mean that when evaluating official foreign policy other scholars implicitly incorporate knowledge from other, e.g. Russian TV programmes, propaganda outlets, and interviews with particular politicians or political commentators. Those other sources might give an idea of an overwhelming presence of the discourse that focuses on identity, values, and nationalism. What we discover in our analysis, however, shows that civilisational turn is not that prominent among purely official foreign policy discourses. Significantly, economic foreign policy discourses are no less important than civilisational ones in all three FPCs.

Putin's annual Addresses are less consistent than the FPCs, which is partly an artefact of the type of communication they represent. There is some variance in the proportion of text devoted to foreign policy, which most probably reflects the salience of particular international events for the domestic audiences. At the regional level, there are more references to economic organisations than security ones, and this is mirrored in the discourses employed as well. The issues that are emphasised in discussions of the world order appear to be event-driven. In some years, such as 2013, 2015 and 2018, the world security predominates in the speeches, in others such as 2012 and 2016, it is the world economy. The 2014 Address has the largest proportion of text about foreign policy matters, reflecting the importance of events in Ukraine. Meanwhile the 2018 Address talks about the world order in the context of Russia's military modernisation, shifting the emphasis once again to the hard power.

The importance of sovereignty, in all its forms, is emphasised in both sets of documents and is particularly pronounced in Putin's Addresses. Sovereignty means that Russia has the right to act in a sovereign manner and will not permit outside interference or internal separatist tendencies. Moscow will defend Ukraine's sovereignty in deciding not to sign an AA with the EU, but it will also support Crimea's sovereign right to separate from a Ukraine that is turning towards the West, even at the expense of territorial integrity of the country. While the West meddles in the sovereign affairs of other countries according to this narrative, the discourses presented argue that Russia protects the sovereignty of other states. Moreover, these documents argue that unlike the West, Russia often has long-standing, primordial ties with countries in which it has intervened, and this has been at the invitation of legitimate rulers. This indicates that Russia does not see all state as equally sovereign.

Our analysis of the Addresses over time shows that while at the beginning of Putin's third term there was more emphasis on Russian civilisation and identity, this trend has not been sustained and is almost absent by 2018. Instead these official discourses increasingly focus on security on the world stage and Russia's military power. Similarly, the new FPCs which came into force after 2012 also did not see a noticeable civilisational turn, despite opportunities to include explicit shift in the 2013 or 2016 FPC. All the FPCs analysed show a similar, limited emphasis on the issues of identity. Any shift towards civilisational discourses was limited to the beginning of Putin's third term, and has not remained as a consistent strong narrative in the sources studied for this paper.

Despite the increasingly prominent role of the security within the world order discourse, economic discourses in Russian foreign policy are important, and should not be overlooked. However, the narrative of prosperity within the economic discourse is more about aspirations for future than actual achievements of Eurasian integration project. Less focus is given to what the EAEU has done, and more to rather vague promise of Greater Eurasia and global connectivity. Nevertheless, this discourse is as prominent in the FPCs and Addresses as the discourse on identity, which has been often overlooked in previous studies.

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Table 1. Categories and codes used in the content analysis

General category	Specific codes
World order & sovereignty	*World order:* economic; security; international bodies and laws; global and civilisational multipolarity
	Sovereignty: the state sovereignty of Russia and others countries as well as the right to act in a sovereign manner
	Regional sphere of influence or interest: security; Russia-led regional bodies
Civilisation	*Russian/Eurasian identity and culture*: promoting and protecting Russian culture, common cultural space, compatriots
	Russia as 'authentic Europe': defending traditional values
	European/universal values
Economics and modernisation	*Russia's globalisation and modernisation*: an economic pole of attraction
	Eurasian Economic Union: economic integration in the post-Soviet region

Source: Authors

Table 2. Percentage of total text in Foreign Policy Concepts devoted to each discourse category

Categories	2008	2013	2016
World order & sovereignty			
World order	51 %	47 %	53 %
Sovereignty	4 %	6 %	7 %
Regional sphere of influence	6 %	7 %	6 %
Civilisation			
Russian/Eurasian identity	6 %	7 %	6 %
Universal/European values	3 %	5 %	3 %
Economics and modernisation			
Russia's economic globalisation	7 %	6 %	5 %
Eurasian economic integration	2 %	2 %	2 %
Uncategorised[5]	21 %	20 %	18 %

Source: Authors

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[5] This includes headers, general text about the competencies of institutions in shaping and conducting Russian foreign policy, discussion of climate change and the environment, and references to single countries that did not relate to any of the other categories.

Table 3. Percentage of total text in the Addresses devoted to each discourse category

Categories	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2018
World order & sovereignty						
World order	4.2 %	9.0 %	6. 5 %	3.9 %	9.2 %	16.7 %
Sovereignty	2.9 %	2.3 %	12.3 %	3.2 %	2.0 %	0.2 %
Regional sphere of influence	1.8 %	1.4 %	3.8 %	0.9 %	0.3 %	0.4 %
Civilisation						
Russian/Eurasian identity	13.5 %	5.6 %	5.6 %	3.2%	4.3 %	0.4 %
Universal/European values	0.6 %	0.3 %	0.0 %	0.0%	0.9 %	0.3 %
Economics and modernisation						
Russia's economic globalisation	2.4 %	3.4 %	3.5 %	5.1 %	2.0 %	3.7%
Eurasian economic integration	1.2 %	2.5 %	1.3 %	0.4 %	0.5 %	1.0 %
TOTAL FOR ALL CATEGORIES	**26.5 %**	**24.5 %**	**33.0 %**	**16.7 %**	**19.2 %**	**21.7 %**

Source: Authors

Supplementary material

Table 1S. Complete Results of Coding of the Foreign Policy Concepts

Categories and codes	2008	2013	2016
World order & sovereignty	*5511 (61%)*	*6040 (59%)*	*6774 (67%)*
World Order: general	1419 (26%)	892 (15%)	1289 (19%)
World Order: economic	370 (7%)	513 (9%)	561 (8%)
World Order: security	1543 (28%)	1896 (31%)	2305 (34%)
World Order: international bodies and laws	1062 (19%)	1134 (18%)	997 (15%)
World Order: civilisational multipolarity	170 (3%)	308 (5%)	213 (3%)
Sovereignty	378 (7%)	621 (10%)	761 (11%)
Regional Influence: general	106 (2%)	211 (3%)	95 (1%)
Regional Influence: security	316 (6%)	336 (5%)	362 (5%)
Regional Influence: regional body	147 (3%)	129 (2%)	191 (3%)
Civilisation	*838 (10%)*	*1201 (12%)*	*957 (9%)*
Russian/Eurasian Identity	536 (64%)	699 (58%)	658 (69%)
Russia as 'Authentic Europe: traditional values	42 (5%)	0	0
European/Universal Values	260 (31%)	502 (42%)	299 (31%)
Economics and modernisation	*772 (9%)*	*856 (8%)*	*669 (7%)*
Russia's globalisation: pole of economic attraction	593 (77%)	607 (71%)	456 (68%)
Eurasian economic integration	179 (23%)	249 (29%)	213 (32%)
Total words in document	**8971**	**10173**	**10157**

Table 2S. Complete Results of Coding for Annual Presidential Addresses

Categories and codes	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2018
World order & sovereignty	*994 (9%)*	*1235 (13%)*	*1935 (23%)*	*605 (8%)*	*1051 (11%)*	*2302 (17%)*
World Order: general	233 (23%)	40 (3%)	294 (15%)	0	331 (31%)	128 (6%)
World Order: economic	236 (24%)	39 (3%)	62 (3%)	109 (18%)	310 (29%)	0
World Order: security	0	356 (29%)	*169 (9%)*	155 (26%)	105 (10%)	1972 (86%)
World Order: international bodies and laws	0	225 (18%)	*25 (1%)*	28 (5%)	99 (9%)	129 (6%)
World Order: civilisational multipolarity	0	218 (18%)	*8 (0.4%)*	0	*0*	*0*
Sovereignty	323 (32%)	221 (18%)	*1050 (54%)*	244 (40%)	*180 (17%)*	*21 (1%)*
Regional Influence: general	0	136 (11%)	*313 (16%)*	0	*26 (2%)*	*31 (1%)*
Regional Influence: security	0	0	*14 (0.7%)*	69 (11%)	*0*	*21 (1%)*
Regional Influence: regional body	202 (20%)	0	*0*	0	*0*	*0*
Civilisation	*1589 (14%)*	*579 (6%)*	*475 (6%)*	*240 (3%)*	*396 (4%)*	*96 (0.7%)*
Russian/Eurasian Identity	1525 (96%)	549 (95%)	475 (100%)	240 (100%)	309 (78%)	56 (58%)
Russia as 'Authentic Europe': traditional values	0	0	0	0	0	0
European/Universal Values	64 (4%)	30 (5%)	0	0	87 (22%)	40 (42%)
Economics & modernisation	*402 (4%)*	*574 (6%)*	*412 (5%)*	*413 (5%)*	*227 (2%)*	*547 (4%)*
Russia's globalisation: pole of economic attraction	269 (67%)	329 (57%)	303 (74%)	387 (94%)	182 (80%)	495 (90%)
Eurasian economic integration	133 (33%)	245 (43%)	109 (27%)	26 (6%)	45 (20%)	52 (10%)
Total words in document	**11281**	**9755**	**8540**	**7575**	**9209**	**13327**

Table 3S. Frequencies of references to particular international organisations in Presidential Addresses

NAME	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2018	TOTAL
EAEU/CU	5	4	2	1	1	**2**	**15**
CIS	5	5	1	1	1	**-**	**13**
UN	-	-	2	1	1	**2**	**6**
EU	-	-	2	-	2	**1**	**5**
SCO	-	1	-	2	1	**1**	**5**
G20	1	1	-	-	1	**1**	**4**
BRICS	-	1	-	-	1	**1**	**3**
NATO	-	-	-	-	-	**3**	**3**
G8	-	2	-	-	-	**-**	**2**
ASEAN	-	-	-	2	-	**-**	**2**
APEC	-	-	-	-	1	**1**	**2**
CSTO	-	-	-	-	1	**1**	**2**
IMF	-	-	-	-	-	**1**	**1**
WB	-	-	-	-	-	**1**	**1**
WTO	1	-	-	-	-	**-**	**1**

Source: Authors

Table 4S. Frequencies of references to particular countries in Presidential Addresses

NAME	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2018	TOTAL
United States	2	2	8	-	4	**16**	**32**
Ukraine	1	4	17	-	-	**-**	**22**
Syria	-	7	-	7	1	**1**	**16**
Turkey	-	-	-	6	-	**-**	**6**
China	-	-	-	-	2	**2**	**4**
Kazakhstan	1	2	-	-	-	**1**	**4**
Belarus	1	2	-	-	-	**-**	**3**
India	-	-	-	-	2	**1**	**3**
Germany	-	1	-	-	1	**1**	**3**
Japan	-	-	-	-	1	**2**	**3**
France	-	-	-	1	-	**1**	**2**
South Korea	-	1	-	-	-	**1**	**2**

Source: Authors