BUREAUCRATS AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS: THE RESPONSES OF EU CIVIL SERVANTS TO PRESIDENT JUNCKER'S 'POLITICAL COMMISSION'

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Michael W. Bauer, Sara Connolly, Hussein Kassim, Brigid Laffan, and Andrew Thompson

Abstract
What explains the attitudes of bureaucrats to reform? Does where you stand depend on where you sit? Taking the responses of recent changes enacted by the European Commission as a case study, this paper tests key hypotheses from the public administration and political science literatures. Approaching the changes introduced in 2014 as a programme of administrative reform, this paper examines the attitudes of staff in different parts and at different levels of the organisation. It draws on original data from a project conducted in 2018 (online survey n=6500, interviews n=209), and augments a research design applied by the same authors to the Kinnock reforms in an earlier study, which sampled the views of senior managers, middle managers and policy officers only. Unlike earlier studies, it does not only focus on senior bureaucrats, but looks at staff in varied functions with a range of responsibilities.

Introduction

How do bureaucrats view change? Much of the scholarship takes a negative view of bureaucrats in general and of their preparedness to respond positively to change in particular. The literature presents civil servants as remote, conservative and self-interested. It also posits that an asymmetry of information and expertise works to the benefit of bureaucrats in the face of efforts by politicians to introduce change, especially those that threaten to increase bureaucratic accountability. Although a newer literature rates more highly the ability of politicians to enact change, scholars tend to make the same assumptions about the motivations and interests of bureaucrats.

Yet, whether scholars are pessimistic or optimistic about administrative reform, the empirical testing of the attitudes of individual bureaucrats is vanishingly rare. The studies by Gains et al (2008) and John and Gains (2010) on the views of local officials on their preferred form of local government and Bauer (2010) and Kassim et al (2013: chapter 8) on policy officers in the European Commission to the Kinnock reforms are exceptions. The scholarly literature on reform whether examining the meaning of a particular reform, the extreme difficulty of engineering change, or the high barriers confronted by reforming politicians, focuses on the bureaucracy or organisation that is the reform target, the institutional or cultural obstacles to change, or the aims, ambitions and ambitions of the reformers tends either to overlook the views of individual bureaucrats or to rely on a theorised or stylised model of what they assumed bureaucrats believe. Moreover, the few empirical studies that do address the views of individual bureaucrats tend to focus on the attitudes or responses of a relatively narrow (and demonstratively unrepresentative) stratum of senior or middle managers.[1]

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[1] Focus in the literature on the higher civil service. However, unaccompanied by examination of extent to which their views can be generalised across staff in the middle or lower levels of the organisation. Yet, studies that have been conducted of bureaucrats at all levels in an organisation show that managers are outliers on many issues, including reform. See, e.g. Connolly and Kassim (2018).

This paper takes a different approach to administrative reform. It places the attitudes of bureaucrats front and centre. Like Downs (1967), it assumes that officials have 'a major stake in the design of political institutions they occupy' (John and Gains 2008: 642), but in contrast to Downs it does not assume that only senior officials identify with the short- and long-term future of the organisation for which they work. It looks at staff across the organisation. Such a broad-ranging approach not only enables a wider range of hypotheses to be tested, but makes it possible to assess the extent to which views vary across staff with different functions, in different parts of the organisation, or on different contractual status.

Indeed, by taking EU civil servants working in the European Commission as a case study, the paper is able to test in addition to the classic variables, such as department, prior professional experience, length of service, function, position, place of work, gender, and age, that apply in most national bureaucracies, others that may be relevant in a national administration, such as nationality. Drawing on a dataset of responses to an online survey administered to staff in 2018, the paper is able to undertake an analysis of the views of individual bureaucratis that is unusual in the literature. The survey posed a number of questions to staff on their understanding of and views on the organisational and procedural changes introduced by Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker in 2014 in order to operationalise his view of a 'political Commission'. It also collected detailed data on staff, including information not only on their present position and responsibilities, but their professional history, profile and ideological beliefs and values. Whether or not the reform ultimately succeeded, the changes were widely heralded (Christensen and Laegreid 2003, Christensen et al. 2007), and affected the work of most staff in the organisation

The discussion below is organised into four sections. The first reviews the existing literature on bureaucrats and administrative reform, considers the lack of empirical investigation of the attitudes of bureaucrats to reform in wider public administration, and proposes an approach that builds on theoretical approaches used in earlier research on the European Commission. The second briefly summarises the changes introduced by the Juncker Commission as administrative reform. The third relates discussion of those theoretical approaches to the change programme in the European Commission and derives a series of hypotheses. It also introduces the database. The fourth section discusses the findings and their implications.

Administrative reform: everything but the bureaucrats?
Administrative reform has attracted broad and intense interest among scholars. A wide-ranging literature investigates multiple aspects of reform. Scholars have looked at the motivation for undertaking reform, the varying scope and ambitions of reform programmes, reform leadership, and the implementation of reform measures. They have considered ways of evaluating the success of reform, why some kinds of reform generate counter-measures and roll-back, and the unintended consequences of reform.

The overall tenor of the literature is pessimistic (Wright 1993). Scholars note how although declarations of reform intent are generally met with acclaim and approbation, the process itself typically leads to disappointment. Reform runs into obstacles. The initial aims of the reform are revised, undergoing multiple mutations during its implementation. For many reasons, reforms rarely succeed. Investment in the reform effort is insufficient. Leadership is

poor or weak. The ultimate destination is at some distance from the endpoint as originally intended, not least because reform rarely results in the replacement of old structures or processes but in the addition of new layers (Christensen et al. 2007, Olsen 2009; Streeck and Thelen 2005).

Whatever the particular issue addressed, the literature tends to focus on systems, structures and processes. It looks at the implementation of reform programmes, such as the new public management or, more recently, neo-Weberianism. It applies assumptions about bureaucrats from the wider literature, particularly concerning their power and resources vis-à-vis their political masters or overseers (Horn 1995, Brehm and Gates 1997), and typically invokes their permanence, technical expertise, access to information, and experience in manipulating the machine are invoked. The belief that bureaucrats are self-interested is especially widespread, although the particular form in which it is expressed -- straight budget maximisation or bureau-shaping. Sometimes, however, another factor, for example, ideology – 'no matter whether governments are left or right, the liberals are always in power' – is identified as the motivation.

Critically, these assumptions about power and self-interest are combined with another contention or supposition; namely, that bureaucrats are hostile to disruption of their working environment, and especially to changes that threaten the way that they do their job. A strong presumption is that bureaucrats will attempt to obstruct reform policies and programmes that threaten to circumscribe their autonomy or, in the case of the bureau-shaping model, that to increase the time devoted to low-prestige tasks. In debates about the ability of elected politicians to achieve greater accountability on the part of bureaucrats, scholars have often used the principal-agent model. A first wave of literature argued that bureaucrats by dint of better access to information were able to resist (Epstein and O'Halloran 1999; Huber and Shipan 2002; Macey 1992; Moe 1989). Later scholarship (Horn 1995, Brehm and Gates 1997), however, emphasised the ability of politicians to limit agency drift.

Curiously, however, although these discussions are always premised on particular assumptions about bureaucrats – their motivations, their preferences, and their power – an empirical validation of what they believe, how they have responded, and whether their responses conform to theoretical expectations is rarely sought. In short, there has been a strong presumption in favour of modelling and theorising, without an accompanying concern to empirically test assumptions or claims made about individual bureaucrats.

There are some exceptions, however, a number of which explicitly examine the views or attitudes of civil servants in regard to administrative reform. Francesca Gains and Peter John (Gains et al 2008; Gains and John 2010), investigate the preferences of bureaucrats concerning changes in UK level government. Observing that that support from bureaucrats is likely to improve the chances of reform success, Gains and John (2008) investigate whether bureaucrats prefer giving policy advice over managerial responsibilities as the bureau-shaping model assumes. In a somewhat different context, meanwhile, Bauer (2008), Kassim et al (2013: ch 8), and Connolly and Kassim (2015) investigate the views of EU civil servants in the European Commission to episodes of administrative reform. The first two publications consider reactions to the so-called Kinnock reforms, implemented between

1999 and 2004 (Kassim 2004, Bauer 2010, Schon-Quinlivan 2012); the third the 2014 reform to the staff rules.

The investigation undertaken below builds on these earlier studies. It also draws on existing applied work in two areas, where authors have submitted competing theoretical claims about individual bureaucrats to empirical testing. The first examines the views of EU officials and their determinants. In a series of publications on the European Commission, culminating in her 2001 monograph, Liesbet Hooghe examines a series of contentions about EU civil servants and tests empirically whether they hold the preferences or views imputed to them by the proponents of grand theories of European integration. She finds that, as a result of socialisation early in life,[2] nationality has a greater influence on the values of EU civil servants than their experience of working in the European Commission. The second examines whether the behaviour of bureaucrats in international administrations is explained by their nationality, organisational position or political attitudes (Egeberg and Stigen 2018; see also Egeberg 1996).

The Juncker Commission: the 'political Commission' as administrative reform
As *Spitzenkandidat* of the European People's Party, which won the May 2014 elections, and candidate Commission President, Jean-Claude Juncker declared in an address to the European Parliament that his would be a 'political Commission' (2014). Highlighting the uniqueness of his mandate, he proclaimed a 'new approach', following the years of absorption by crisis. His ambition would be to 'renew the European Union on the basis of an Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change' (Juncker 2014a), based on the policy platform on which he had campaigned, but which also incorporated input from parties in the European Parliament and drew on the Strategic Agenda agreed by the European Council (Juncker 2014c). 'An agenda', he added, 'that concentrates on the areas where the European Union is able to make a real difference'.

Following his approval as Commission President by the European Council, Juncker worked with his transition team over the summer of 2014 on his policy programme and selecting the members of the College. Together with the Secretariat General, they also developed a plan for re-organising the Commission and revising its procedures with a view to enabling the incoming President to deliver his policy programme. The President's personal mandate and the implementation of his ten policy priorities, with the emphasis on discipline -- a limited number of targeted objectives, in line with an approach that did not see legislation as the solution to every problem (Juncker 2014a) and that respected subsidiarity -- were guiding considerations.

The operationalisation of the 'political Commission' can usefully be understood in the terms of 'new ways of working' that included both organisational and procedural changes implemented from 1 November 2019, when the Juncker Commission took office. The first took the form of a restructuring of the College. Seven Vice Presidents assumed leadership roles on the Commission President's behalf. They were put in charge of project teams of

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[2] For the further development of the debate on socialisation begun by Hooghe, see Connolly and Kassim (2006) and Murdoch, Connolly, Kassim and Geys (2018).

Commissioners that would coordinate policy and action corresponding to the President's ten policy priorities. Additional structural changes included:

- the designation of DG Communications as a presidential service and the reorganisation of the Spokespersons Service along strongly centralised lines;
- the replacement of the Bureau of European Policy Advisers by a new European Political Strategy Centre;
- an expansion of the Secretariat General to support the Vice Presidents;
- the creation of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board, to improve the preparation of policy initiatives;
- the reorganisation of Commission services, including the creation of FISMA, the merger of the remaining directorates of DG MARKT and DG ENTR to form a DG GROW, and the transfer of consumer protection from DG SANCO, which became DG SANTE, in correspondence with the President's policy priorities
- a re-allocation of staff between Commission Directorates General in alignment with the Commission President's ten policy priorities.

These structural changes were accompanied by an overhaul of procedures that were set out in a communication from the President to the Commission.[3] In the introduction to the document, the President underlined that the central ambition of the Commission would be delivery of the ten priorities set out in his Agenda. Emphasising the importance of working together as 'a strong team, cooperating across portfolios to produce integrated, well-grounded and well-explained initiatives that lead to clear results', he described the role of Vice Presidents to whom 'I have entrusted a number of well-defined priority projects … and asked them to steer and coordinate work across the Commission in the key areas of the Political Guidelines. These Vice-Presidents will help me exercise my presidential prerogatives' and noted that 'They are thus empowered to deliver on the priority projects outlined in the Political Guidelines'.

The President stressed the importance of project teams and the leadership roles of the Vice President: 'I want us to have a clear focus and a very close cooperation amongst Members of the College, with several Commissioners working closely together as teams, each led by one of the Vice-Presidents'. How in practice the role of Vice Presidents and their relations with their teams would work was detailed in the body of the document. Underlining the break from the past, the text noted that: 'As a rule, the President will not include a new initiative in the Commission Work Programme or place it on the agenda of the College unless this is recommended by one of the Vice-Presidents, on the basis of sound arguments and a clear narrative that is coherent with the priority projects of the Political Guidelines.' The document also described the functioning of the reconfigured Spokespersons Service, including the delivery by the latter of 'lines to take' each day, which underlined the move towards centralization.

The introduction of the new structures and procedures can be interpreted as a programme of administrative reform, which sought to overhaul the functioning of the Commission. A new model of operation was thereby introduced, which sharply distinguished the Juncker

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[3] Communication from the President to the Commission (2014) 'The Working Methods of the European Commission 2014-2019', 11 November 2014, C(2014) 9004

Commission from its predecessors (see table 1). Essentially, the Commission's main objective between 2014 and 2019 was to deliver the President's policy priorities. Rather than devising their own policy proposals in collaboration with the services for which they were responsible, which is how the Commission had worked in the past, even under strong Presidents, such as Hallstein, Delors and Barroso, Commissioners would work in project teams led by Vice Presidents, who were charged by the President with particular tasks, seen as an extension of the President, and supported by the Secretariat General. The introduction or strengthening of new structures and mechanisms strengthened the control of the Commission President over the Commission system.

Testimony from the survey data (see below) and interviews conducted as part of 'The European Commission: Where now? Where next?' in 2018, which included a member (usually the Head of Cabinet) of all 28 cabinets and a Director General or deputy Director General of 20+ services, confirmed the significance of the changes. Evidence from the interviews reveals the magnitude, showing that change was registered at every level of the Commission's operation. In short, they:
- affirmed the primacy of the President's cabinet vis-à-vis other cabinets
- increased demands on cabinets, including through the creation of new cabinet-VP interactions
- increased interchange between cabinets and intensified interaction in the early stages of the policy process, reducing tensions and conflict at and around special chefs
- complicated cabinet-services relations
- further strengthened and extended the influence and involvement of the Secretariat General
- altered the role of Directors General

Table 1 – The Juncker Commission compared to its predecessors: a core executive perspective

Theorising the attitudes of bureaucrats to reform
Despite the limited empirical treatment of the beliefs and responses of individual bureaucrats, there is no shortage of theorising. We derive hypotheses from four theoretical approaches, a number of which have several variants. (See table 2 for an overview of theory, hypothesis, and operationalisation).

Utility maximisation
The first is utility maximization, which applied to bureaucrats originates with Downs (1967). From this perspective, 'officials are utility-maximizers, who undertake an individual cost–benefit calculation in regard to proposed action or changes that are likely to affect them. When opportunity structures change, individual preferences adapt to the altered circumstances.' (March and Olsen 1989: 160). The notion of utility maximisation has been subject to various interpretations. For Niskanen (1971) it meant budget maximisation. Dunleavy (1990) interpreted self-interest in terms of a preference for performing high-prestige over mundane, low-prestige tasks. Both are directed to senior officials and have limited application when looking at an entire bureaucratic workforce. However, the notion

of utility maximisation could be thought of in terms of the public administration dictum, 'Where you stand is where you sit'. Applied to staff at different grades, this suggests that the viewpoints of bureaucrats are likely to vary according to their levels of responsibility.

Hypothesis 1: The degree to which bureaucrats are supportive or opposed to a particular reform depends on its anticipated or actual impact on how effectively they can carry out their responsibilities.

We operationalise this hypothesis by testing the attitudes of Commission staff according to whether they are a senior manager, middle manager, or rank-and-file employee.

A second line of self-interested reasoning relates to organisational position. Egeberg and Stigen (2018) argue, for example, that the main expectation from the rational system perspective is that a decision-maker's (formal) organizational position constitutes the most important explanation of his or her actual decision behaviour. In other words, a bureaucrat's position in the organisation – their function or responsibility as a policy maker, administrator, technician, or role in providing logistical support – is a daily preoccupation, shaping their view and behaviour. This suggests the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: The attitudes of bureaucrats to reform are likely to be most strongly influenced by their function and the tasks that they perform within the organisation.

We operationalise this hypothesis by testing the attitudes of Commission staff according to their function within the organisation, distinguishing between policy officers, assistants, technicians, and logistical support staff.

A third line of theorising the self-interest of bureaucrats focuses on their departmental affiliation. Departments may command the strongest loyalty of staff, who interpret their self-interest in terms of what is best for their unit. This suggests the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3: The attitude of bureaucrats to reform is shaped principally by the anticipated or actual impact on the department in which he or she is employed.

We operationalise this hypothesis by testing the attitudes of Commission staff according to the type of Directorate General in which they work. Amending slightly the typology used by the Commission Secretariat General, we distinguish between the following groups of DGs: cabinet, central presidential services, other central services, multilingualism, knowledge management, policy DGs and external relations

Hypothesis 4: The attitude of bureaucrats to reform is shaped principally by the extent to which the department in which he or she is employed is privileged by the reform.

We operationalise this hypothesis by testing the attitudes of Commission staff according to the number of the Commission President's ten priorities in which their Directorate-General is formally engaged. We thereby test whether there is a 'sunshine' effect associated with inclusion in and identification with the Commission President's programme (see Appendix Table 1).

Internal socialisation

A second line of theorising highlights the importance of socialisation within the Commission. Socialisation also has two variants.

The first forefronts the importance of organizational culture and highlights the importance of group identity. Egeberg and Stigen (2018) consider how organisational identity may find instrumental expression. This suggests the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 5: The views of bureaucrats to reform are likely to vary according to whether they believe that the department with which they identify is likely to be advantaged or disadvantaged.

We operationalise this hypothesis by testing the attitudes of Commission staff in different DGs according to the number of staff they gained or lost when the Commission aligned human resources with the Commission President's policy priorities (see Appendix Table 2).

A second variant equates socialisation with identification with the wider groups (Checkel 2005, 2007; Zürn and Checkel 2005); that is, the way in which the norms and values of the in-group are adopted by a (new) individual. The process by which norms are inculcated is usually considered to be automatic and dynamic, that is, views change over time. This suggests three hypotheses:

Hypothesis 6: Staff with a considerable career longevity are likely to react differently to staff who are relative newcomers.

We operationalise this hypothesis by testing the attitudes of three groups: Commission staff who have worked in the organisation for more than twenty years; those who have worked in the institution for between ten and twenty years; and those who joined less than ten years' before the survey was conducted, i.e. in 2008 or after

Hypothesis 7: Staff who are very new are likely to hold different attitudes to those who have worked in the organisation for longer.

We operationalise this hypothesis by testing the attitudes of Commission staff by comparing staff who have worked for the institution for less than three years – 'bambis' in the terminology used by Zürn and Checkel (2005)

We also tested hypotheses 6 and 7 with an alternative – and preferred – specification: the Presidency under which they were recruited to the Commission.

Hypothesis 8: Staff who identify strongly and positively with working in the organisation are likely to respond differently towards reform than those who are less engaged.

We operationalise this hypothesis by testing the attitudes of Commission staff using a staff engagement index, based on attitudes to the workplace. The staff engagement index is a composite measured used by the Commission in its staff survey.

External socialisation

A third theoretical perspective emphasises external socialisation. Theorists from this school highlight the importance of experience prior to joining the organisation, arguing that values are 'shaped primarily through forces external to the organization' Egeberg and Stigen (2018) or that employees entering the workforce 'arrive pre-socialized and "pre-packed" via their social origin' (Hooghe, 2005; Pfeffer, 1982). However, they differ on which socialising experience. A first group emphasises education. This suggests the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 9: The attitudes of bureaucrats towards reform are likely to vary according to their experience of education.

We operationalise this hypothesis by comparing the attitudes of Commission staff to reform according to the subject of their highest educational qualification.

A second variant holds that socialisation at work is the primary source of norms and ethics (Converse 1964; Johnston 2001; Loveless and Rohrschneider 2011; Rohrschneider 1994; Wildavsky 1987). In the case of the Commission, where 97 per cent of staff have prior work experience, staff will have been subject to such a socialising experience. This suggests the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 10: The attitudes of bureaucrats towards reform are likely to vary according to their prior professional experience.

We operationalise this hypothesis by testing the attitudes of Commission staff to reform according to their professional background: public administration; private sector; research or having previously worked in another EU institution.

In the literature on the European Commission, scholars who highlight the importance of early socialising experience, often emphasize the influence of nationality in shaping values and norms (Hooghe 2001). This suggests the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 11: The attitudes of bureaucrats towards reform are likely to vary according to their nationality.

Since our data does not allow comparison by nationality (small sample sizes of some nationalities), we operationalise this hypothesis by testing the attitudes of Commission staff to reform according to the following groupings: Nordic; Anglo/Dutch; Franco/German; Southern; Eastern; and Non-EU

Organisational preferences

A fourth theoretical perspective highlights the role of individual preferences concerning the organisation of the Commission. One line of theorising is that bureaucrats are likely to have general preferences about the type of organisation that they would like the service to be. In the case of the Commission, they may favour a strong Commission that is clearly at the centre of EU decision making. This suggests the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 13: The attitudes of bureaucrats towards reform are likely to vary according to their preferences concerning the role that the Commission should play in the EU system.

We operationalise this hypothesis by testing the attitudes of Commission staff to reform according to whether they consider that the Commission should become the government of Europe, whether the member states should be the central players, where the Commission performs the functions of policy initiator and guardian of the treaties and where the Council and European Parliament share legislative power, or whether they believe the Commission should share its power of policy initiation with the European Parliament.

A second line of theorising highlights more general attitudes towards change and reform. This suggests the following hypothesis

Hypothesis 14: The attitudes of bureaucrats towards reform are likely to vary according to whether they think that the Commission should change and how positively they view the organisational capacity for change.

We control for: gender, location, and mobility within the Commission

Dataset
The dataset was created as part of research undertaken under 'The European Commission: Where now? Where next?' in 2018. A link to the online survey was emailed to all Commission staff to invite them to complete the survey between May and June 2018. The survey was completed by 6,539 respondents, representing a response rate of 15.4 per cent. The actual numbers of staff within each grade was as follows:

- Senior Management AD (Directors General/Deputy Directors General/Directors): 142
- Middle Management AD (Heads of Unit): 440
- Political function: 83
- Adviser: 374
- AD official: 2,974
- AST official: 1,311
- Contract agent: 1,186
- Temporary agent: 250
- Seconded National Expert: 131

The achieved sample was benchmarked against the Commission population. The resulting weighted sample is representative of the 2018 Commission workforce by staff category, location, EU15 or EU13, gender and cohort.

Findings
The descriptive data shows generally strong support among staff for the 'political Commission', especially the identification of political priorities by the Commission President prior to his election', 'the use of the State of the Union speech to set out priorities for the work of the Commission' and the Commission taking 'political responsibility for its actions'.

Figure 1: Views on the 'Political Commission'

On 'The new ways of working', we asked respondents the following question:

'In your view, to what extent have the new working methods, including Vice Presidents leading project teams, contributed towards:
- Ownership of Commission policy by the College as a whole
- The ability of the Commission to speak with a single voice
- Policy proposals that are carefully thought through by all the relevant services
- Better cooperation between services'

Figure 2: Views on the New Working Methods

Responses to the operationalisation of the 'political Commission' in the form of structural and procedural change are less positive. There is also a high proportion of respondents who 'Don't know' or 'Neither agree nor disagree'.

Using factor analysis, the number of variables were reduced by describing the data in terms of linear combinations of the variables that contain the most information. The underlying variables were reverse coded so that 'strongly agree' took the highest value etc. Models were estimated using the principal component strategy in Stata and factors were extracted where the eigenvalues were above 1. In both cases this yielded a single factor which was relatively evenly weighted across the variables. These two factors – one capturing the underlying responses to the questions on the Political Commission and the other the Working Methods - were used as the dependent variables in our regression analysis. (See Appendix – PCA)

Commission staff and the 'political Commission'

Our results are presented in Table 3.

Political Commission

Our findings were as follows:

I.   Utility maximisation/roles
       1)   Level of responsibility (reference group: non-management ADs)

No evidence that attitudes towards the Political Commission are more or less positive by level of responsibility in relation to the reference group non-management ADs.

2) Function (reference group: managerial or advisory responsibilities)
No evidence that attitudes towards the Political Commission are more or less positive by level of responsibility in relation to the reference group those with managerial or advisory responsibilities.

3) DG type (reference group: Central others - BUDG, DIGIT, HR, IAS, OLAF)
No strong evidence that attitudes towards the Political Commission are more or less positive by DG type. Although those working in Policy, legislation and enforcement (CLIMA, COMP, ECFIN, ENV, FISMA, HOME, JUST, SANTE, TAXUD) and in Policy, legislation, enforcement and policy management (CNECT, EAC, ENER, GROW, MOVE, RTD) are marginally less positive than those working in our reference group of other Central DGs.

4) Involvement with top 10 priorities (reference group: No involvement - BUDG, DIGIT, EPSC, EPSO, ESTAT, HR, IAS, OIB, OIL, OP, PMO, SJ)
Support for the Political Commission appears to be related in a non-linear way to the number of the top 10 priorities that a DG is involved in – increasing but at a diminishing rate.

II. Socialisation within the organisation
   1) Allocations to DGs (reference group: no change in responsibility/staff allocations)
   There is evidence that attitudes towards the Political Commission are more positive in DGs which have experienced declines, increases and major change in relation to the reference group of no change.

   2) Time in Commission (reference group: joined the Commission during the Juncker Presidency)
   No strong evidence that attitudes towards the Political Commission are more or less positive by time spent in the Commission in relation to the reference group of those who joined during the Juncker Presidency. Although those who joined pre-Delors are marginally more positive.

   3) Engagement
   Those who are more engaged in their work – have a higher score in the engagement index are more positive towards the Political Commission.

III. External socialisation
   1) Educational and professional background (reference group: law)
   Those with a highest qualification in Politics or IR are marginally more positive and those with a background in STEMM subjects are less positive about the Political Commission than those in our reference group of law. No evidence that attitudes towards the Political Commission are more or less positive by prior professional background.

   2) Nationality (reference group: Anglo/Dutch)
   Those from Southern or Eastern EU countries are more positive about the Political Commission than those in our reference group Anglo/Dutch administrative system.

IV.   Organisational preferences
    1)   Preference for a strong Commission
        Those who agree with statement that the Commission should have a strong role 'The College of Commissioners should be the government of Europe' or agree with the Community Method 'EU where the Commission performs the functions of policy initiator and guardian of the treaties and where the Council and European Parliament share legislative power' are more likely to hold positive views about the Political Commission.
    2)   Attitude to reform
        Those who would prefer to see a more transparent Commission (transparent/guarded) are less positive about the Political Commission. In contrast, perhaps not surprisingly, those who would prefer to see a more political and less neutral approach (neutral/political) are more likely to be positive about the Political Commission. Staff who support change, believe that change is managed well or have confidence in the senior management are also more likely to be positive about the Political Commission.

New working methods

I.   Utility maximisation/roles
    1)   Level of responsibility (reference group: non-management ADs)
        Middle managers, and AST/SC officials seem to hold more positive attitudes towards the new working methods than the reference group non-management ADs.
    2)   Function (reference group: managerial or advisory responsibilities)

Those with Support, policy and enforcement functions hold less positive attitudes towards the new working methods than the reference group those with managerial or advisory responsibilities.

3) DG type (reference group: Central others - BUDG, DIGIT, HR, IAS, OLAF)
Staff working in Cabinet hold more positive attitudes towards the new working methods and those working in Offices (EPSO, OIB, OIL, PMO), Multilingualism DGs (DGT, SCIC), Knowledge management hub (JRC, ESTAT, OP), or Policy DGs are less positive than those working in our reference group of other Central DGs.

4) Involvement with top 10 priorities (reference group: No involvement - BUDG, DIGIT, EPSC, EPSO, ESTAT, HR, IAS, OIB, OIL, OP, PMO, SJ)
Support for the new working methods appears to be greater in DGs that are involved in delivery of the top 10 policy priorities.

II. Socialisation within the organisation
1) Allocations to DGs (reference group: no change in responsibility/staff allocations)
There is evidence that attitudes towards the new working methods are more positive in DGs which have experienced declines, increases and major change in relation to the reference group of no change.

2) Time in Commission (reference group: joined the Commission during the Juncker Presidency)
Attitudes towards the new working methods are more or less positive according to time spent in the Commission in relation to the reference group of those who joined during the Juncker Presidency. Those who joined during the Delors, followed by Santer Presidencies appear most positive.

3) Engagement
Those who are more engaged in their work – have a higher score in the engagement index are more positive towards the new working methods.

III. External socialisation
1) Educational and professional background (reference group: law)
No evidence that attitudes towards the new working methods are more or less positive by education or prior professional background.

2) Nationality (reference group: Anglo/Dutch)
Those from Southern or Eastern EU countries are more positive about the new working methods and those from Franco-German countries are less positive than those in our reference group Anglo/Dutch administrative system.

IV. Organisational preferences
1) Preference for a strong Commission
Those who agree with statement that the Commission should have a strong role 'The College of Commissioners should be the government of Europe' or agree with the Community Method 'EU where the Commission performs the functions of policy initiator and guardian of the treaties and where the Council and European Parliament share legislative power' are more likely to

hold positive views about the new working methods. Those who disagree with the statement 'The member states - not the Commission or Parliament - should be the central players in the EU' are less likely to hold positive views about the new working methods.

2) Attitude to reform
Those who would prefer to see a more transparent Commission (transparent/guarded) or those who would prefer to see a more neutral approach (neutral/political) are more likely to be positive about the new working methods. Staff who support change, believe that change is managed well or have confidence in the senior management are also more likely to be positive about the new working methods.

Our main summary findings with respect to the hypotheses are as follows:

I. Utility maximisation/roles:
- Political Commission – little support
- New working methods – some evidence

II. Socialisation within the organisation
- Political Commission – little support
- New working methods – some evidence

III. External socialisation
- Political Commission – some evidence
- New working methods – some evidence

IV. Organisational preferences
- Political Commission – strong evidence
- New working methods – strong evidence

Discussion

Three main observations concerning the findings are important. The first is that the overall assessment of the 'political Commission' and 'the new ways of working' by staff within the Commission is positive, but perhaps not as high as on the second as might have been anticipated. Second, support for the 'political Commission' is mainly driven by external socialisation and organisational preferences. Utility maximisation and internal socialisation have little impact. Support for 'new ways of working', however, arises through all four mechanisms. Third, the analysis suggests that support for the 'political Commission' and 'new ways of working' arises from several sources, which are complex and defy simplification. However, organisational preferences emerge as the most important, if not the only, driver.

Conclusion

The observation that served as the starting point for the paper is that in a voluminous literature on administrative reform, the views or attitudes of individual bureaucrats are often assumed, asserted, or modelled in the abstract. Although this scholarship has in other respects delivered many important insights and considerably advanced our understanding, what individual bureaucrats think about reform and how they respond to it has been neglected or overlooked. Rarely are they tested empirically.

The above analysis, which examines the attitudes and responses of Commission staff of all categories, functions, levels of seniority, and 28 nationalities, highlights not only the value of empirical investigation, but also the importance. A testing of hypotheses generated from the main four theories shows first and foremost that simple assumptions about bureaucrats, their beliefs and what lies behind their dispositions to administrative reform does not withstand scrutiny. The findings show that, although utility maximization, internal socialisation and external socialisation may exert some influence over where staff members of the Commission stand, they do not tell the whole story. The same is true for organisational preferences, even though it has the strongest effect on support.

A second important finding is that not all bureaucrats the same. Typically, in the literature, assumptions are made about bureaucrats and bureaucratic behaviour as if all bureaucrats shared the same views or the same motivations. The analysis above shows that this approach is problematic. At the very least, it demonstrates the perils of attempting to generalise attitudes on the basis of analysis relating to a single stratum. Even if there is a strong rationale for investigating particular group – Gains and John, for example, look at the tier of bureaucrats who are most likely to be affected directly, while in the Bauer (2008) study middle managers carry brunt of reforms – caution needs to be exercised before extrapolations are made about other groups or groupings. The soundest approach is to sample views across the organisation

The paper suggests a number of future avenues for research. First, the above analysis is based on a study of EU civil servants. It would instructive to compare attitudes within other international administrations or indeed in national bureaucracies to discover whether the same range of drivers are evident. Second, the 'political Commission' and its operationalisation through the 'new ways of working' was a reform of a particular type. It would be interesting to determine how bureaucrats look at other kinds of reform. It is plausible, for example, to imagine that one or more of the drivers may be more predominant in cases where reform engages directly with personnel policy – promotions, salary, pensions or career structure or progression. Third, in the case considered above, ideas in the form of preferences for an organisation of a particular sort were a more important driver than material motivations or norms or values that were the result of socialisation inside or outside the organisation. There may be considerable mileage in testing hypotheses based on ideas or ideology in other reform contexts, or even with respect to other forms of bureaucratic behaviour or conduct, as a driver.

Table 1 – Models of the European Commission core executive

	Collegial/Primus inter pares (the 'impossible job')	**Improvised Presidential** (e.g. Jacques Delors)	**Post-Nice Presidential** (José Manuel Barroso)	**'The political Commission'**
Political resources	• Treaty does not differentiate role of President from other members of the College • Resources evenly distributed within College • Commissioners selected and appointed to portfolios by common accord of governments	• = Treaty does not differentiate role of President from other members of the College (from 1993: nominee Commission President must be approved by European Parliament) • = Resources evenly distributed within College • = Commissioners selected and appointed to portfolios by common accord of governments (from 1993 Maastricht: the Commission President is consulted on appointments) • President has strong support of Paris and Bonn	• Candidate for Commission President is selected prior to College • Candidate Commission President participates in selection of other Commissioners (Amsterdam) • Commission works under President the 'political guidance' of its President (Amsterdam/Rules of Procedure 1999) • Commission President appoints members of the College and allocates portfolios (Nice/Lisbon) • President can request resignation of a member of the Commission, subject to approval of College (Nice) • President can request resignation of member of the Commission (Lisbon)	• Selected candidate of party who wins European elections is nominated Commission President by European Council • = Candidate Commission President participates in selection of other Commissioners (Amsterdam) • = Commission President provides 'political guidance' (Amsterdam) • = Commission President appoints members of the College and allocates portfolios (Nice)
Procedural resources	• Policies and decisions are made collectively by the College (Rules of Procedure, 1963)	• (Maastricht from 1993): the Commission shall adopt an annual programme	• President decides multiannual programme as basis for annual work programme and draft budget (Rules of Procedure 2005)	• The 'new ways of working' affirm the President's centrality, define the roles of the Vice Presidents, and describe College-service interaction
Administrative resources	• Decisions on internal organisation of the Commission made by the College (Rules of Procedure, 1963)	• President creates powerful cabinet • Centralised press office	• Commission President can create groups of Commissioners (Nice/Lisbon) • Decisions on internal organisation made by Commission President (Amsterdam/ Rules of Procedure 1999/Nice/Lisbon) • President converts Secretariat General into presidential service • President strengthens Better Regulation	• = Commission President can create groups of Commissioners (Nice/Lisbon) • Decisions on internal organisation made by Commission President (Nice/Lisbon) • President restructures College, creating seven Vice Presidents to coordinate and steer work of Commissioners • President strengthens the Secretariat General, makes DG COMM a presidential service, and reforms the Spokepersons Service • President further strengthens Better Regulation machinery

Table 2 – Theories, hypotheses and operationalisation of explanatory variables

THEORY	HYPOTHESIS	OPERATIONALISATION
I. UTILITY MAXIMISATION/ROLES		
See Kassim et al (2013) ch. 8 March and Olsen 1989: 'officials are utility-maximizers, who undertake an individual cost–benefit calculation in regard to proposed action or changes that are likely to affect them. When opportunity structures change, individual preferences adapt to the altered circumstances.' Peters: 'Where you stand is where you sit'	1. Level of responsibility (senior manager, middle manager, rank and file)	Q6b What is your current employment function within the Commission? Senior management (Director General, Deputy Director General, Director, Head of Cabinet); Middle management (Head of unit); Political functions or Adviser (Deputy Head of Cabinet, Member of Cabinet, Assistant to Director General, Deputy Director General, Director, Principal Adviser, Adviser, Senior Expert); Non-management AD (Head of sector, Deputy head of unit, Administrator level functions); AST and clerical (Senior assistant; Assistant level functions; Secretarial & clerk functions); Manual or Other; Prefer not to say.
Egeberg and Stigen (2018): the main expectation from the rational system perspective is that a decision-maker's (formal) organizational position constitutes the most important explanation of his or her actual decision behaviour	2. Function (policy maker, assistant, technician, logistics)	Q9 What is your <u>main</u> responsibility? Managers (Management and Advisory Staff) Policy (Policy, Analysis, Advice and Statistics; Planning, Programming and Evaluation; Programmes and Projects; Programmes, Project, Actions and Funds) Support (Team Coordination; AST - Team leader, Senior Assistance Budget, Finance and Contracts; Operational, Administrative and Secretarial Assistance; Technical and laboratory work; Transport, buildings, supplies and catering; Security and Safety; Medical and Social Care; Human Resource Management; Linguistics; Document and Information Management; Communication, Publications and Information; Information Technology; External and Inter-institutional Relations) Enforcement: Legal and Compliance; Audit, Inspection and Control; PNS/DNS Prefer not to say; Other.
Variation by DG: experience of 2014 and optimism/pessimism about impact	3. DG type	Q7 In which department do you currently work? Cabinet; Central Presidential services (SG, SJ, COMM, EPSC); Central other (BUDG, DIGIT, HR, IAS, OLAF); Offices (EPSO, OIB, OIL, PMO); Multilingualism DGs (DGT, SCIC);

		Knowledge management hub (JRC, ESTAT, OP); External relations DGs (DEVCO, ECHO, FPI, NEAR, TRADE); Policy, legislation and enforcement (CLIMA, COMP, ECFIN, ENV, FISMA, HOME, JUST, SANTE, TAXUD); Policy, legislation, enforcement and policy management (CNECT, EAC, ENER, GROW, MOVE, RTD); Policy, legislation, enforcement and shared policy management (AGRI, EMPL, MARE, REGIO); Delegation; Agency; Prefer not to say; Other
Egeberg and Stigen (2018): Organisational position - variation by level of responsibility: Are Cabinet, central services, and senior managers likely to be loyalists?	4. DG in 10 policy priorities	None – BUDG, DIGIT, EPSC, EPSO, ESTAT, HR, IAS, OIB, OIL, OP, PMO, SJ One – COMM, EAC, FPI, JRC, OLAF, TAXUD Two – AGRI, CNECT, DEVCO, ECHO, ENER, HOME, MARE, NEAR, RTD, SANTE Three – COMP, ECFIN, MOVE, REGIO, TRADE Four – EMP, ENV, FISMA, SG Five – JUST Six - GROW
II. SOCIALISATION WITHIN THE ORGANISATION		
Egeberg and Stigen (2018): a natural system perspective/'organizational/instrumental perspective' on the other hand, informal norms and values (organizational culture) play a dominant role in shaping organizational behaviour.	1. DG by staff resource and allocation (real impact of prioritisation, with attendant consequences on work) on group	Major change - EPSC, FISMA, GROW, NEAR, SRSS, ARTICLE 50 Significant change negative – DEVCO, SANTE, EAC, ECFIN, COMM, CAB Minor change negative – PMO, OIB, EPSC, OP, MARE, DGT, SCIC, SJ, OIL, MOVE, AGRI, JRC, RTD, EPSO, CNECT No change – HR, FPI, TAXUD, OLAF, TRADE, CLIMA, ECHO, ESTAT, REGIO, BUDG, ENER, COMP Minor change positive – DIGIT, JUST Significant change positive – EMPL, HOME, SG, IAS
Checkel 2005, 2007; Zürn and Checkel 2005: Socialization is usually equated with 'group dynamic' effects; that is, the way in which the norms and values of the in-group are adopted by a (new) individual. The process by which norms are inculcated is usually considered to be automatic. The norms can be associated with nationality, social class, university education, or training in a particular discipline	2. DG old timers (staff in the organisation for 10 years or longer) 3. Bambis (staff who have joined within last three years) 2 and 3 OR	Q3 - when did you join the Commission? 20 years plus; 10-20 years; Less than 10 years Staff who joined since 2015 Joined Pre-Delors; Delors; Santer; Prodi; Barosso 1; Barosso 2; Juncker

	4. Staff engagement index (composite measure used by Commission)	Engagement Index: following the Commission Directorate General for Human Resources (DG HR) (Commission 2013a), we constructed an engagement index using responses to the following: – I have a clear understanding of what is expected from me at work Q36_2 – My colleagues are committed to doing quality work Q36_3 – I have recently received recognition or praise for good work Q39_3 – My manager seems to care for me as a person Q39_8 – I have the information, material and resources to my job well Q35_3 – At work, my opinions seem to count Q35_4 – My line manager helps me to identify my training and development needs Q39_9
III. EXTERNAL SOCIALISATION		
Egeberg and Stigen (2018): open system perspective, organizational structures and processes are shaped primarily through forces external to the organization. In the demographic version, participants arrive pre-socialized and 'pre-packed' via their social origin (Hooghe, 2005; Pfeffer, 1982). The empirical theory of representative bureaucracy similarly holds that the resulting demographic composition of the organization. The empirical theory of representative bureaucracy similarly holds that the resulting demographic composition of the organization ('passive representation') may translate into 'active representation',(see Meier and Capers, 2012). according to the 'institutionalized environments-school', formal organization structures mainly tend to play the role as legitimating facades, mirroring current organizational fad and fashion, but being relatively de-coupled from actual behaviour within organizations (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).	1. Subject of highest educational qualification	Q13b: What is the subject of your highest qualification? Humanities; Business/economics; politics/IR; law; other social science; computer science or IT; life or physical science; other science; prefer not to say
A second theory is based on the core assumption that preference formation is an endogenous	2. Professional background: public sector, private sector, research, etc	Q4a: Business; civil service; other EU institution; university or research; other professions

process and that individuals develop preferences by internalizing norms and values from their social environment, often early in their lives (Converse 1964; Johnston 2001; Loveless and Rohrschneider 2011; Rohrschneider 1994; Wildavsky 1987). This sociological approach holds that officials are influenced by group dynamics, especially in their formative years, and that they develop attitudes that are shaped by norms and ethics within the environment at home, in education, or at work.	3. Administrative culture: national administrative culture	Nordic; Anglo/Dutch; Franco/German; Southern; Eastern; Non-EU; prefer not to say
IV. ORGANISATIONAL PREFERENCES		
Preferences - Stronger role for Commission and normalization	1. Preference for stronger Commission and location in top 10 PP DG (individual preferences about strong Commission	Q19_1 - The College of Commissioners should be the govt of Europe, agree; Q19_2 - The member states - not the Commission or Parliament - should be the central players in the EU, disagree; Q19_3 - An EU where the Commission performs the functions of policy initiator and guardian of the treaties and where the Council and European Parliament share legislative power, agree; Q19_4 - The Commission should share its sole right of initiative with the European Parliament, disagree;
Preference for particular kind of Commission as organisation – hierarchy	2. Greater consensus/less differentiation than more radical reforms	Q29 The Commission is/should be dynamic/conservative, transparent/guarded, flat/steep hierarchy, decentralised/top down, neutral/political. Measure based on the difference between these scores to indicate where more/less change is desired. Q36_6 I support change where it will improve the performance of the Commission, agree; Q36_7 I feel that change is managed well, agree; Q36_8 - Overall I have confidence in the senior managers in the Commission, agree
CONTROLS		Gender Location Mobility within Commission

Table 3 - Results

			POLITICAL COMMISSION			WORKING METHODS		
			Coef.	Std. Err.	P>t	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>t
		Constant	-0.99	0.17	0.00	-0.52	0.15	0.00
UTILITY MAXIMISATION/ROLES	1. Level of responsibility	Senior management	0.11	0.13	0.39	0.15	0.12	0.18
		Middle management	0.03	0.07	0.68	0.15	0.07	0.03
		Political functions or Adviser	-0.01	0.07	0.89	0.08	0.07	0.23
		Non-management AD (reference)						
		AST and AST	-0.06	0.05	0.24	0.12	0.04	0.01
		Other	-0.11	0.14	0.45	0.11	0.15	0.44
		Prefer not to say	-0.16	0.19	0.42	0.07	0.18	0.70
	2. Function	Managerial and advisory (reference)						
		Policy	0.01	0.09	0.87	-0.15	0.08	0.06
		Support	0.02	0.09	0.83	-0.16	0.08	0.04
		Enforcement	0.00	0.10	0.96	-0.15	0.09	0.10
		Other/PNS	-0.02	0.12	0.84	-0.05	0.11	0.64
	3. DG type	Cabinet	0.06	0.20	0.78	0.38	0.18	0.03
		Central Presidential services	-0.17	0.13	0.17	0.00	0.11	0.98
		Central others (reference)						
		Offices	-0.02	0.14	0.87	-0.34	0.12	0.00
		Multilingualism DGs	-0.02	0.14	0.89	-0.28	0.12	0.02
		Knowledge management hub	-0.14	0.13	0.27	-0.36	0.11	0.00
		External relations DGs	-0.30	0.14	0.03	-0.20	0.12	0.09
		Policy, legislation and enforcement	-0.40	0.13	0.00	-0.27	0.11	0.01
		Policy, legislation, enforcement and policy management	-0.27	0.13	0.04	-0.26	0.12	0.03
		Policy, legislation, enforcement and shared policy management	-0.30	0.14	0.03	-0.30	0.12	0.01
		Agency	0.04	0.10	0.70	-0.06	0.09	0.53

		PNS	0.08	0.15	0.59	0.08	0.13	0.55
		Other	-0.01	0.20	0.96	0.16	0.18	0.36
	4. DG in 10 policy priorities	No						
		Yes				0.29	0.09	0.00
		Number of priorities	0.21	0.07	0.00			
		Number of priorities squared	-0.03	0.01	0.00			
SOCIALISATION WITHIN THE ORGANISATION	1. DG by staff resource and allocation	Significant negative changes	0.19	0.08	0.01	0.11	0.07	0.09
		Minor negative changes	0.11	0.07	0.12	0.19	0.06	0.00
		No change (reference)						
		Minor positive change	0.28	0.10	0.01	0.11	0.09	0.19
		Significant positive change	0.10	0.08	0.22	0.20	0.07	0.01
		Major change to DG	0.24	0.08	0.00	0.09	0.06	0.15
	2. President when joined Commission	Pre-Delors	0.28	0.16	0.08	0.17	0.14	0.23
		Delors	0.05	0.08	0.48	0.31	0.07	0.00
		Santer	0.08	0.08	0.32	0.23	0.07	0.00
		Prodi	0.08	0.07	0.24	0.14	0.06	0.02
		Barroso 1	-0.01	0.06	0.87	0.11	0.05	0.04
		Barroso 2	0.05	0.06	0.43	0.03	0.06	0.54
		Juncker (reference)						
	3. Staff engagement	Engagement index	0.20	0.08	0.01	0.19	0.07	0.01
EXTERNAL SOCIALISATION	1. Subject of highest educational qualification	Humanities	-0.04	0.06	0.50	0.01	0.05	0.89
		Business or economics	-0.03	0.04	0.53	0.02	0.04	0.65
		Politics or IR	0.09	0.05	0.06	0.00	0.04	0.95
		Law (reference)						
		Other social science	-0.08	0.08	0.31	-0.11	0.07	0.12
		STEMM	-0.13	0.05	0.01	0.06	0.05	0.20
		Other or PNS	0.06	0.09	0.50	-0.04	0.08	0.63
	2. Professional background	Private sector	0.02	0.04	0.66	0.04	0.03	0.24

		Civil service	-0.03	0.04	0.46	0.00	0.03	0.99
		Research	0.02	0.04	0.64	0.04	0.04	0.30
		Other EU institution	0.03	0.06	0.60	0.10	0.06	0.06
		Nordic	-0.03	0.08	0.74	0.03	0.08	0.67
	3. National administrative culture	Anglo/Dutch (reference)						
		Franco/German	0.08	0.06	0.18	-0.09	0.05	0.10
		Southern	0.32	0.06	0.00	0.13	0.05	0.02
		Eastern	0.12	0.07	0.07	0.14	0.06	0.02
		Non-EU	0.31	0.26	0.25	0.48	0.23	0.04
ORGANISATIONAL PREFERENCES	1. Preference for stronger Commission	The College of Commissioners should be the govt of Europe, agree	0.23	0.04	0.00	0.14	0.03	0.00
		The member states should be the central players in the EU, disagree	0.03	0.04	0.38	-0.07	0.03	0.03
		Community method, agree	0.19	0.04	0.00	0.15	0.04	0.00
		The Commission should share its sole right of initiative with the European Parliament, disagree	-0.05	0.04	0.21	-0.01	0.03	0.83
	2. Preferences for reform	Dynamic/conservative	0.00	0.01	0.71	0.01	0.01	0.24
		Transparent/guarded	-0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.04
		Flat/steep hierarchy	0.00	0.01	0.69	0.01	0.01	0.12
		Decentralised/top down	-0.02	0.01	0.03	0.00	0.01	0.84
		Neutral/political	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.09
	3. Reform in the Commission	I support change where it will improve the performance of the Commission, agree	0.36	0.07	0.00	0.12	0.06	0.06
		I feel that change is managed well, agree	0.17	0.05	0.00	0.29	0.05	0.00
		Overall I have confidence in the senior managers in the Commission, agree	0.19	0.04	0.00	0.13	0.04	0.00
CONTROLS	Gender	Male (reference)						
		Female	-0.04	0.04	0.35	-0.01	0.03	0.86
		Other/PNS	-0.18	0.12	0.13	-0.10	0.11	0.37

Location	Brussels (reference)						
	Luxembourg	0.04	0.08	0.58	-0.06	0.07	0.43
	JRC sites	-0.27	0.12	0.03	-0.24	0.12	0.05
	Delegation	-0.15	0.10	0.14	-0.04	0.09	0.63
	Representation	0.00	0.16	0.99	-0.10	0.15	0.50
	Grange	0.34	0.25	0.17	0.02	0.22	0.94
	Other/PNS	-0.49	0.30	0.09	-0.50	0.24	0.04
Mobility within the Commission	Moved position	0.13	0.05	0.02	0.11	0.05	0.02
	Moved DG	-0.07	0.05	0.11	0.00	0.04	0.99

Appendix– Table 1: involvement in top ten policy priorities

Policy priorities	Lead DGs
A NEW BOOST FOR JOBS, GROWTH AND INVESTMENT	SG, GROW, ECFIN, JUST, EMPL, TRADE, COMP, CLIMA, ENER, ENV, MARE, SANTE, EAC, AGRI, MOVE, REGIO, RTD, FISMA
A CONNECTED DIGITAL SINGLE MARKET	CNECT, EMPL, ECFIN, MOVE, GROW, JUST, REGIO,
A RESILIENT ENERGY UNION WITH A FORWARD-LOOKING CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY	ENER, CLIMA, ENV, MOVE, RTD, JRC; MARE, AGRI, FISMA
A DEEPER AND FAIRER INTERNAL MARKET WITH A STRENGTHENED INDUSTRIAL BASE	GROW, FISMA, EMPL, REGIO, TAXUD, SANTE, COMP, ENV
A DEEPER AND FAIRER ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION	ECFIN, FISMA, EMPL, GROW, COMP, SG,
A BALANCED AND PROGRESSIVE TRADE POLICY TO HARNESS GLOBALISATION	TRADE, ENV, CLIMA, GROW
AN AREA OF JUSTICE AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS BASED ON MUTUAL TRUST	JUST, HOME, OLAF,
TOWARDS A NEW POLICY ON MIGRATION	HOME, JUST, CNECT, DEVCO, ECHO, NEAR, SG
A STRONGER GLOBAL ACTOR	TRADE, NEAR, DEVCO, ECHO, FPI, GROW
A UNION OF DEMOCRATIC CHANGE	SG, COMM, JUST

Not a DG: Delegation, Agency, Prefer not to say, Other

Appendix – Table 2: changes in staff allocations 2014/5

	2014	2015	%
AGRI	1015	994	-2%
BUDG	419	422	1%
CAB	510	481	-6%
CLIMA	144	143	-1%
CNECT	817	803	-2%
COMM	682	635	-7%
COMP	791	801	1%
DEVCO	1266	1066	-16%
DGT	2406	2350	-2%
DIGIT	477	490	3%
EAC	536	470	-12%
ECFIN	683	626	-8%
ECHO	219	219	0%
EMPL	615	656	7%
ENER	521	525	1%
EPSC	31	30	-3%
EPSO	114	112	-2%
ESTAT	643	644	0%
FPI	82	81	-1%
HOME	280	314	12%
HR	620	612	-1%
IAS	100	159	59%
JUST	278	290	4%
MARE	298	290	-3%
MOVE	335	328	-2%
OIB	393	376	-4%
OIL	142	139	-2%
OLAF	381	377	-1%
OP	657	636	-3%
PMO	180	172	-4%
REGIO	608	609	0%
RTD	1234	1210	-2%
SANTE	791	682	-14%
SCIC	792	774	-2%
SG	483	552	14%
SJ	425	416	-2%
TAXUD	460	455	-1%
TRADE	573	568	-1%
JRC	1878	1840	-2%
Total	24458	24098	-1%

Source: European Commission, Allocation of human resources and decentralised administrative appropriations for 2015, SEC(2014) 615, ANNEX Table 1.

Appendix – PCA

Political Commission: Factor analysis/correlation: principal-component factors (unrotated)

Number of observations=4125
Retained factors=1
Number of parameters=6

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor1	3.56199	2.79623	0.5937	0.5937
Factor2	0.76576	0.27327	0.1276	0.7213
Factor3	0.49249	0.04587	0.0821	0.8034
Factor4	0.44662	0.02792	0.0744	0.8778
Factor5	0.41871	0.10428	0.0698	0.9476
Factor6	0.31443	.	0.0524	1

LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(15) = 1.0e+04 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000

Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances

Variable	Factor	Uniqueness
Linking the election (Q24b_1)	0.719	0.483
Political priorities (Q24b_2)	0.8195	0.3284
State of the Union speech (Q24b_3)	0.7951	0.3678
Political responsibility (Q24b_4)	0.7799	0.3917
Political constraints (Q24b_5)	0.7315	0.4649
Closer to citizens (Q24b_6)	0.7732	0.4021

Average inter-item covariance: 1.040889
Number of items in the scale: 6
Scale reliability coefficient: 0.8641

Political Commission: Scree plot of eigenvalues

Survey questions
- Linking the election of the Commission President and the College with the European elections (Q24b_1)
- The identification of political priorities by the Commission President prior to his election (Q24b_2)
- The use of the annual State of the Union speech to set out priorities for the work of the Commission (Q24b_3)
- That the Commission takes political responsibility for its actions (Q24b_4)
- Recognizing the political constraints on the Commission in order to work better with the European Parliament and the member states (Q24b_5)
- A desire to be present in political debates in the member states and therefore closer to citizens (Q24b_6)

Working Methods: Factor analysis/correlation: principal-component factors (unrotated)

Number of observations=6204
Retained factors=1
Number of parameters=4

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor1	3.03379	2.58577	0.7584	0.7584
Factor2	0.44802	0.14604	0.112	0.8705
Factor3	0.30198	0.08577	0.0755	0.9459
Factor4	0.21621	.	0.0541	1

LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(6) = 1.5e+04 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000

Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances

Variable	Factor	Uniqueness
Ownership of Commission (Q25_1)	0.8475	0.2817
Single voice (Q25_2)	0.8657	0.2505
Policy proposals (Q25_3)	0.8942	0.2005
Better cooperation (Q25_4)	0.8755	0.2334

Average inter-item covariance: 1.707398
Number of items in the scale: 4
Scale reliability coefficient: 0.8934

Survey questions
- Ownership of Commission policy by the College as a whole (Q25_1)
- The ability of the Commission to speak with a single voice (Q25_2)
- Policy proposals that are carefully thought through by all the relevant services (Q25_3)
- Better cooperation between services (Q25_4)