

Martin Moland

**Core state powers, identity, and differentiated support:
Comparing support for foreign and migration policy integration
in the EU**

Martin Moland
ARENA, Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo

Abstract

One of the key features of the post-Maastricht Treaty EU is the increasing contestation of its integration. This is often attributed to the EU's increasing integration of politically salient policy areas core to state functioning, so-called "core state powers" (CSPs). These are often thought to have features making their integration particularly likely to be contested. However, whether this equally applies to all core state powers, and whether those with exclusively national identities express generally identical support for all forms of CSP integration, is under-investigated. Using Eurobarometer data from 2019-2021, this article shows that those with no European identity are more likely to oppose CSP integration where it constrains member states' domestic, rather than external, autonomy. This implies that an emerging constraining dissensus may be less of a challenge for the EU's increasing foreign policy integration, but that it may hinder further integration of domestic core state power integration.

Introduction

Both the EU's decade of crises and the recent invasion of Ukraine (de la Baume and Barigazzi, 2022; Gänzle et al., 2019) have made increasingly clear that many of the largest challenges facing European states are of such a nature that nation-states may be unequipped to handle them on their own. As one of the most politically advanced transnational cooperations currently existing, the EU's member states have responded to this fact by pooling sovereignty in policy areas, known as core state powers, that are both highly salient and key to statehood (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, 2016; Kuhn and Nicoli, 2020). While this development has been investigated from many angles (Blinder and Markaki, 2019; Freudlsperger and Jachtenfuchs, 2021; Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, 2021; Rittberger et al., 2013), our understanding of public preferences towards transnational cooperation in these highly salient policy areas is still comparatively underdeveloped (Bremer et al., 2020). Investigating the preferences for political integration of core state powers among EU citizens can shed an important light on what dimensions help structure support for integration of such policies, help explain why there is still a lack of cooperation in these areas even in a political system as interdependent as the EU (Rittberger et al., 2013), and what type of transnational policy cooperation citizens may find politically acceptable even outside of the EU.

One important source of the different attitudes towards the integration of such highly salient policies is whether they are oriented towards the outside world, as is the case for foreign or border control policies, or if they mainly constrain the member states as domestic actors, as would be the case for fiscal and monetary policy integration. Since EU member states are generally mid-sized countries with limited military budgets, they might use integration in policy areas such as defence and military policies to strengthen their own foreign policy autonomy. In this sense they could use political integration to strengthen their own autonomy

in the foreign policy realm, much as Milward (1999) argued that the founding member states of the EU used the union to strengthen their own economic capacity after the Second World War. On the other hand, transnational integration of policies that primarily relate to domestic powers, such as fiscal and taxation policies, is more likely to impose constraints on nation-states' sovereignty without offering the same benefits to domestic autonomy. This reconfiguration of the nation-state would also be likely to constrain domestic elites in areas where the citizens to which they are accountable would prefer greater autonomy. This would make it more likely for such integration to be contested (Bartolini, 2005; De Wilde and Zürn, 2012) than integration of external core state power. The key question of this study is whether the external, rather than internal, orientation of core state powers makes citizens more likely to support its integration.

Through Eurobarometer data from 2019-2021, I investigate support for core state power integration among individuals that do not identify with Europe, and how this support relates to either the internal or external orientation of integration. As these individuals are more likely to see the nation-state as the legitimate source of political power, they are likely to oppose all integration that shifts national sovereignty over core state powers towards the supranational level (Hooghe and Marks, 2005). They are, in other words, a group that we would not expect to distinguish between the external or internal orientation of integration. My design thus comes very close to a "least-likely case" design (Gerring, 2007).

My paper makes a threefold contribution to the emerging comparing support for these highly salient core state powers: I first show that support for core state power integration of domestic core state powers is lower among those only identifying with their nation-states. This is shown by how they are likelier to oppose integrated migration policies than common foreign

policies. This is in line with the literature connecting politicization to political salience (De Wilde and Zürn, 2012; Hooghe and Marks, 2009). However, the same group expresses greater opposition to common asylum policies than common border controls, two policies that both constrain national autonomy in the contested field of migration policy. This hints that where the salience of two policies is similar, the question of whether integration constitutes a net cost or gain to national autonomy is an important consideration for individuals deciding whether to support or oppose it. I finally find that the effect of national identity varies by regions and is particularly strong in Central and Eastern Europe. This may be because political elites in these countries have increasingly politicized identity, using the EU's decade of crises as an opportunity to posit national identity as incompatible with support for the EU (Börzel and Risse, 2020).

My results suggest that variations in public opinion can contribute to explaining the differentiated EU integration of core state powers (Börzel and Risse, 2020; Bremer et al., 2020; Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, 2018). Greater support for common border controls can for instance explain why the EU has found it much easier to strengthen border controls at the Schengen external border than to reform and implement a common European asylum system during the recent refugee crisis. My findings nuance our ideas about what integration is favoured by those identifying only with their nation-state: These individuals are more likely to support EU integration that pertains to external, rather than internal, core state powers. This may be because the former can be conceptualized as expanding territorial sovereignty by strengthening control over external borders (Basile and Mazzoleni, 2020). The finding that even those most likely to contest integration may express support for integration that is perceived as expanding real autonomy is important for an EU increasingly recognizing the functional benefits of integration in this area.

Public support for core state power integration – conceptualizations and assumptions

A large literature already investigates public support for the EU as a polity as well as its specific policies (Armingeon and Ceka, 2014; de Blok and De Vries, 2020; Gabel, 1998; Inglehart and Rabier, 1978; Leuffen et al., 2020; Magalhães, 2012). This literature typically distinguishes three mechanisms through which support for the EU is created: Citizens can either support the EU because they or their community are expected to benefit (Foster and Frieden, 2021; Gabel, 1998), because political or media elites provide cues that prime their views on integration (de Vreese et al., 2011; Steenbergen et al., 2007) or because they perceive the EU's integration to be a threat to national sovereignty or culture (Hooghe and Marks, 2005, 2009). However, save for some recent contributions (Bremer et al., 2020; Freudlsperger and Jachtenfuchs, 2021), the question of whether and why the same citizens express differing views of the integration of essential functions and powers of government, known as core state powers (CSPs), is under-studied.

This is an important knowledge gap because the integration of such policies represents an important development in recent EU integration. Understanding what CSP integration is most likely to be supported can also help explain their still variable integration (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, 2016; Rittberger et al., 2013). The specific focus of this article is on understanding the preferences that individuals that do not identify with Europe have towards core state power integration. These are more likely to oppose EU integration in most salient policy areas because they fear that the EU will unduly impose on national sovereignty (Hooghe and Marks, 2009). The design constitutes a “least-likely case” as these individuals can be expected to have broadly similar views of all core state power integration (Gerring, 2007). The analytical benefit of focusing on this group design is thus that finding variations in

support for integration even in this group would offer a powerful suggestion that the same variations would exist also in the broader population.

This article investigates whether the external or internal orientation of core state power integration shapes support for its integration. There are theoretical reasons for expecting the orientation of integration to matter for its support, as the particularly instructive cases of common European defence and asylum policies show: While common European defence policies limit the capability of EU member states to set its own course militarily, real autonomy in this area are likely to already be limited by geopolitical considerations and the military capacities of most EU member states. As the Russian military actions against Ukraine has shown, a more unified EU could benefit smaller member states who may not have the military capacity to confront an external threat (de la Baume and Barigazzi, 2022). In this sense, integration of externally oriented core state powers, such as defence, can constitute an expansion of real autonomy, even if constraining formal sovereignty.

Integration of domestically oriented core state powers, like common migration policies, constrain member state autonomy in politicized areas where national political elites and voters have typically enjoyed much greater control relative to the EU level, and where the state's real autonomy has been greater than for external policies. Thus, while both military and asylum policy integration are impositions on national sovereignty in areas that are politically salient and symbolically key to statehood, integration of the two policies differs in how it impacts a state's real autonomy. Whereas common migration policies constrain on national sovereignty in areas where states are used to enjoying a large amount of national discretion and autonomy, common defence policies could allow member states with limited capacities greater autonomy in how they navigate the geopolitical arena compared to if they had to do so

alone. A utilitarian argument would be that this expansion of real autonomy would lead to greater support for external, rather than internal, core state power integration.

To test whether the distinction between external and internal core state power integration produces diverging support among those not identifying with Europe, I compare support for the integration of migration policies and common external policies like trade, defence, and foreign policies. Both sets of policies have typically been foundational competences of the individual states whose integration might be assumed to produce similar levels of opposition. However, I believe support for the two policies will vary for two reasons: The first is that integrated migration policies restructure sovereignty over the answer to a question that is key to the territoriality at the core of modern notions of statehood: Who should be admitted within its borders? It may thus be a reconfiguration of the nation-state that could be considered especially problematic to citizens concerned with both sovereignty and cultural cohesiveness.

Second, integrated migration policies are also likelier than integrated foreign policies to be opposed by this group because losing control over migration policies may produce a perception of cultural threat to the national in-groups with which these individuals are likely to identify (Karstens, 2020a: 56). Common trade and defence policies have also typically enjoyed higher levels of support more broadly, possibly due to their lower salience (Schilde et al., 2019). Even though such differences may be less important for those with a strongly national identity, who would likely favour national autonomy in a broader set of policies, I hypothesize the following:

H1: Among citizens with no European identity, opposition to common migration policies will be greater than opposition to common foreign, trade and defence policies.

However, variations in support for these policies can be attributed to variations in the salience of the policies and elite cues related to the integration of each of them (Harteveld et al., 2013; Steenbergen et al., 2007: 17). To control for this difference in salience, I compare support for a common asylum system and stronger European control of the Schengen border among those identifying only with their nation-state.

These policies are ideal for testing the assumption that the orientation of integration shapes support for it: While centralized border control at the Schengen frontier requires member states to cede some control over national border security to the EU level, the same integration can also strengthen member state control over its own territory by allowing the EU as a collective to better control the Schengen frontier. It can thus more easily be perceived as integration that reclaims territorial sovereignty through strengthening national security (Basile and Mazzoleni, 2020). This is likely to increase support among exclusively national citizens. Integrated asylum governance, on the other hand, potentially weakens the state's previously exclusive purview over what individuals should be admitted to the realm by undermining this control without offering a way for the states to strengthen their own autonomy. As mentioned, such integration can arguably impose rules that threaten the social cohesiveness of the member states. This yields the following hypothesis:

H2: Among respondents with no European identity, opposition to common border policies will be lower than opposition to common asylum policies.

The effect of identity may also be regionally contingent. The refugee crisis has given rise to increasing politicization of national identity, with attachment to the nation-state posited as incompatible with support for European integration. This particularly applies to Central and Eastern European countries like Poland and Hungary (Börzel and Risse, 2020). For example,

Martin Moland

Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán has criticized the EU's mandatory refugee relocation scheme, arguing that it is part of an EU-led plan to change the cultural composition of Europe and Hungary (Plenta, 2020). Central and Eastern European nationalism has also historically been defensive, with national identity mobilized against minorities and external threats.

Euroscepticism has thus been more sovereigntist than in other regions (Brack, 2020; Kriesi, 2016). The strict immigration policies of these countries is another possible reason, as the proposed integration of asylum policies could recalibrate migration policy to a greater extent in Central and Eastern Europe than elsewhere. This yields the following hypothesis:

H3: Among respondents with no European identity, opposition to both common asylum and border control policies will be greater in Central and Eastern Europe than in other regions.

Data and methods

I investigate these hypotheses using Eurobarometer data from 2019-2021. I use Eurobarometer data because it, unlike other national and cross-national surveys that measure attitudes towards the EU, measures both polity-level attitudes towards the EU as well as support for specific existing and proposed EU policies.

Dependent variables

I use two variables comparing support for different instances of core state power integration. The measure of support for common foreign policies is an equally weighted index made up of indicators of support for common *foreign policies*, *defence policies* and *trade policies*. The exploratory factor analysis shows that the correlation coefficients (Brown, 2015: 35) are 0.75, 0.69 and 0.58, indicating that they largely measure the same dimension. The questions share the same phrasing: "What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell for each statement, whether you are for it or against it." The benefit of additive indices is that

Martin Moland

they mitigate the challenge that support for any one policy may not represent an individual's general level of trust in EU institutions. The index has a Chronbach's *alpha* of 0.71.

My second dependent variable measures support for common migration policies. It is an equally weighted index comprising questions about support for a common *migration policy* and a common *asylum policy*. The exploratory factor analysis suggests that these variables, unlike support for stronger European border controls, relate to the same underlying factor. The standardized correlation coefficients are 0.74 and 0.75, with a Chronbach's *alpha* of 0.70. Here the first question asks "What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell for each statement, whether you are for it or against it: A common European policy on migration" and the second "And what is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell for each statement whether you are for it or against it: A common European asylum system". I transform both the indices so that their values fall between 0-10. This lets me compare the effect sizes across models.

After comparing support for common foreign and migration policies among those with non-European identities, I examine support for different facets of an integrated migration policy. To do so, I use support for *stronger European border control* and *common asylum* policies as dependent variables. The question about support for common asylum policies is the same as above. The one about European border control surveys support for "A reinforcement of EU external borders with more European border guards and coast guards". I use these questions because they capture support for instances of external and internal core state power integration that belong to the area of migration policy. I hypothesize, as stated before, that the distinction between external and internal policy integration could help predict what CSP integration will be most likely to produce a constraining dissensus.

Martin Moland

Conceptualizing European identity

The connection between identity and broad support for integration is thoroughly investigated in the literature on support for European integration (Hooghe and Marks, 2005, 2009; Karstens, 2020a; McLaren, 2002; Schoen, 2008; Skinner, 2012). However, whether non-European identities produce a differentiated response to core state power integration is still under-investigated.

To operationalize European identities, I use two questions asking respondents whether they identify with the European Union or Europe, and one asking whether they feel themselves to be EU citizens. The basis of the index are three dummies, coding those who respond that they feel “Not at all attached” to Europe and the European Union and “No, definitely not” to the question of whether they feel themselves to be EU citizens as 1 and everyone else as 0. A factor analysis finds that all dummies correlate strongly with the same latent factor (see A1.3), even though the questions ask about identification with both Europe and the EU. I thus create an equally weighted index called “European identity”.

This index has the benefit, compared to more common single variable operationalizations of territorially exclusive identities, that it captures the absence of affective attachment to either Europe as a social and cultural community and to the EU as a polity. Higher values on this index thus correspond to less European identities. It thus better captures the different aspects of attachment to Europe than single-indicator operationalizations related either to Europe or the EU.

Martin Moland

Controls for economic conditions and trust

As is common in the public opinion literature (Brosius et al., 2020; Gabel, 1998; Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Hartevelde et al., 2013; Hooghe and Marks, 2005; Karstens, 2020b) I control for sociotropic and egotropic evaluations of economic and social conditions at the member state level, as well as trust in national and European institutions.

To control for how respondents perceive the general situation their countries are in I construct an equally weighted index from indicators asking respondents to evaluate their country's general situation, its economic well-being, job market, and the quality of its public services. A factor analysis finds that all variables load strongly on the same factor (see A1.4). This suggests that the four variables measure the same general perception of a country's situation. I then conduct a factor analysis of variables measuring trust in 1) national parties, parliaments, and governments and 2) the European Parliament, Commission and Central Bank (see A1.5-6). Because the two sets of variables load on distinct and separate dimensions, I create equally weighted indices measuring trust in both European and national institutions.

To control for egotropic economic evaluations, I construct an equally weighted index composed of indicators measuring the person's evaluation of one's personal job prospects and household financial situation. Both indices are found by a factor analysis to be likely to measure the same underlying construct (see A1.9).

Sociodemographics

In line with other public opinion literature, I include several socio-political control variables. These are *ideology*, *education*, *age*, and *gender*. To operationalize left- and right-wing political attitudes, I use a variable that uses the self-reported ideology of each respondent on a

10-unit scale. Here 1 signifies far-left beliefs while 10 indicates far-right ideology. Anything below 4 on the scale is coded as left-wing, while 7-10 is coded as identifying as right-wing.

I use these dummies, rather than the full scale, for two reasons: First, previous literature shows that non-centrist political beliefs are most heavily associated with Euroscepticism (Halikiopoulou et al., 2012; van Elsas and van der Brug, 2015). Second, conservatives may be likelier than left-wing citizens to support vertical integration of border controls than integrated asylum policies. Disaggregating the effect of ideology into a left and right-wing effect makes such effects easier to uncover compared to a squared term of ideology. While questions asking about attitudes towards migrants would better capture culturally conservative dispositions, identical questions measuring this only feature in two of the three surveys.

	Mean	SD	Min	Median	Max
Common asylum policies	0.7	0.5	0.0	1.0	1.0
Common border policies	0.8	0.4	0.0	1.0	1.0
Common migration policies	4.7	2.5	0.0	5.0	10.0
Common foreign policies	4.8	2.0	0.0	5.0	10.0
European identity	0.2	0.5	0.0	0.0	2.3
Perception of national situation	7.8	2.2	3.2	7.8	13.0
Trust national institutions	0.8	0.9	0.0	0.3	2.3
Trust EU institutions	1.4	1.0	0.0	2.0	2.3
Personal economy	4.3	1.1	1.5	4.5	6.0
Left-wing	0.3	0.4	0.0	0.0	1.0
Right-wing	0.3	0.4	0.0	0.0	1.0
Education	29.0	24.6	0.0	20.0	99.0
Gender	1.5	0.5	1.0	2.0	2.0
Age	48.8	16.3	15.0	49.0	99.0
Nordics	0.1	0.3	0.0	0.0	1.0
Central and Eastern Europe	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.0	1.0

Table 1: Descriptive statistics of all modelled variables. Missing data omitted from all variables.

Model

To account for the clustering of units within countries I use multilevel modelling with random country intercepts. While the models measuring support for external and migration policies include continuous dependent variables that can be modelled linearly, the dependent variables included in the models of support for common asylum and border control policies are dummies that will be modelled through binomial logistic regression. I use the same model for all analyses, and formalize it as such:

$$Y_{ij} = b_{0j} + bX_{1ij} + bX_{2ij} + bX_{3ij} + bX_{4ij} + bX_{5ij} + bX_{6ij} + bX_{7ij} + bX_{8ij} + bX_{9ij} + bX_{10ij} \quad (1)$$

Support for policy Y for individual i country j becomes a function of a random country intercept b_{0j} , a variable for European identity (bX_{1ij}), evaluations of one's country's situation (bX_{2ij}), trust in national institutions (bX_{3ij}), trust in EU institutions (bX_{4ij}), personal economic evaluations (bX_{5ij}), left- (bX_{6ij}) or right-wing (bX_{7ij}) ideology, education (bX_{8ij}), gender (bX_{9ij}) and age (bX_{10ij}). $H1$ states that the negative effect of identity will be greater for questions about common migration policies than common foreign policies. Similarly, $H2$ states that the negative effect of identity on support for common asylum policies will be greater than for external border control.

The model interacting Central and Eastern European citizenship and European identity is formalized as such:

$$Y_{ij} = b_{0j} + bX_{1ij} + bX_{2ij} + bX_{3ij} + bX_{4ij} + bX_{5ij} + bX_{6ij} + bX_{7ij} + bX_{8ij} + bX_{9ij} + bX_{10ij} + bX_{11ij} + bX_{1ij} * X_{11ij} \quad (2)$$

$H3$ states that the interaction between identity X_{1ij} and a dummy for Central and Eastern European citizenship X_{11ij} will produce a negative effect that is stronger than the independent effect of identity.

Limitations

The clear benefit of using Eurobarometer is that allows us to measure individual-level support for specific EU policies. However, because questions are often dropped or rephrased the time series necessarily span fewer years. This is a general limitation of my study, which makes it more difficult to ascertain whether the results generalize to other time periods. Another limitation is that two of the three surveys used were fielded in 2020-21, during the COVID-19 pandemic. The stated support could thus be subject to a pandemic effect. To account for the different baseline level of support for integration in each country I specify random country intercepts for all models.

A third limitation, relevant to all observational survey data, is that omitted variables may confound the relationships between variables. To somewhat quantify this problem, I run sensitivity analyses (Cinelli and Hazlett, 2020) on fixed effects models for support for both migration and external policies (see A1.10-11). Whether this is a problem is discussed in the section Robustness checks.

The internal-external dimension as a driver of diverging support for CSP integration

I first report the results of the analysis of support for foreign policies and migration policies.

In the second step I compare support for common border control and asylum policies.

	Support for common foreign and migration policies	
	Foreign policy (1)	Migration (2)
Constant	4.96*** (0.09)	4.88*** (0.10)
European identity	-0.20*** (0.02)	-0.25*** (0.02)
Perception of national situation	-0.10*** (0.01)	-0.14*** (0.01)
Trust in national institutions	0.03* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Trust in EU institutions	0.09*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)
Egotropic economic evaluation	0.04*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)
Left-wing	0.10*** (0.02)	0.15*** (0.03)
Right-wing	0.03 (0.02)	0.10*** (0.03)
Education	0.004*** (0.0004)	0.01*** (0.0004)
Gender	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Age	0.002** (0.001)	0.01*** (0.001)
Observations	49,761	49,761
Akaike Inf. Crit.	214,267.30	234,820.80

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 2: Support for common foreign and migration policies. Range of DVs: 0-10. OLS multilevel regression. Random country intercepts.

While table 2 shows the effect of not identifying with Europe on support for common foreign or migration policies, figure 1 shows the predicted values of the same relationship for each value of the index for European identity. The table shows that more territorially exclusive identification is among the variables associated with the greatest decrease in support for common migration and foreign policies.

Even if the effect of identity is larger for common foreign policies than common migration policies, figure 1 suggests that support for common migration policies is still lower among those not identifying with Europe. This suggests that more salient CSP integration faces greater opposition in this group, which is in line with a key assumption of the literature on the politicization of European integration (De Wilde and Zürn, 2012; Hooghe and Marks, 2009). This also confirms *H1*, and offers tentative evidence that external core state power integration will meet greater support than its internal counterpart.




Figure 1: Support for common foreign and migration policies as a function of an index measuring non-European identity (range: 0-2.5). Range of DVs: 0-10. 95% CIs.

However, the results previously shown do not sufficiently answer the research question, precisely because the salience of the policies may be different. Understanding the role that the orientation of integration plays in shaping support for it thus requires us to compare internal and external CSP integration within the same policy area. To do so, I compare support for integrated asylum and border control policies. While both policies constrain national autonomy in the migration field, they differ on one key dimension: Whereas strengthening the EU’s capacity for border control can strengthen its member states against threats to cultural cohesiveness and national security (Schimmelfennig, 2021), common asylum policies come much closer to constraining formal sovereignty in an area where nation-states have typically

enjoyed great autonomy, the regulation of access to the realm, without offering a corresponding benefit.

	Support for common asylum and border control policies	
	Asylum (1)	Border control (2)
Constant	-0.06 (0.15)	1.23*** (0.14)
European identity	-0.59*** (0.02)	-0.26*** (0.02)
Perception of national situation	0.01 (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)
Trust in national institutions	0.10*** (0.01)	-0.03 (0.02)
Trust in EU institutions	0.45*** (0.01)	0.10*** (0.01)
Egotropic economic evaluation	0.08*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)
Left-wing	0.24*** (0.03)	-0.71*** (0.03)
Right-wing	-0.28*** (0.03)	0.31*** (0.03)
Education	-0.0004 (0.0004)	-0.003*** (0.0004)
Gender	0.03 (0.02)	-0.28*** (0.02)
Age	0.002*** (0.001)	0.01*** (0.001)
Observations	49,761	49,761
Akaike Inf. Crit.	51,800.70	48,649.06

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 3: Support for common asylum and border control policies. Both DVs are dummies. All coefficients log-odds.

The negative effects of European identity on support for either common asylum or border control policies are shown by table 3, with the predicted probabilities shown in figure 2. The figure shows that those with no European identity express greater support for common border control policies than common asylum regulations. This supports the assumption that core state power integration that primarily impacts the internal autonomy of states will face the greatest contestation. This could be because citizens are more likely to perceive their member states as having a limited capacity to police their external borders, something that for instance the refugee crisis of 2015 made apparent. They could thus be more likely to see such integration as functionally beneficial (Bergmann, 2019). A common European asylum system, on the other hand, is likely to have consequences that are both distributional and cultural, without offering similarly clear benefits to national autonomy. This makes it particularly likely that it would mobilize nationalist identities and public contestation of integration (De Wilde, 2011; Hooghe and Marks, 2009).

However, one should not discount the possibility that higher levels of support may also be driven by the differences in the wording of the questions related to each policy. Whereas the question about common asylum policies asks merely about common asylum policies, the question asking about border control makes explicit reference to a strengthening of the EU's external border and includes mentions of more European border guards. In other words, cueing of border control as implying a reinforcement of the external border may lead people to evaluate this more positively than a common asylum system. It might be more difficult for many respondents to evaluate the still ambiguous proposal for a common EU asylum system.




Figure 2: Support for common asylum and border policies as a function of non-European identity (range: 0-2.5). Both dependent variables are dummies. 95% CIs.

The effect of strongly national identities may also be heterogenous across regional contexts, due either to their regional histories of integration or how identity has sometimes been politicized and used against European integration. This has particularly been the case in Central and Eastern Europe (Börzel and Risse, 2020). To test whether the effect of national identity is stronger in this region than elsewhere in the EU, I interact a dummy for Central and Eastern European citizenship with the index for European identity. This is shown by table 4.

	Support for common asylum and border control policies	
	Asylum (1)	Border control (2)
Constant	0.12 (0.17)	1.00*** (0.14)
European identity	-0.58*** (0.02)	-0.18*** (0.03)
Perception of national situation	0.01 (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)
Trust in national institutions	0.10*** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)
Trust in EU institutions	0.45*** (0.01)	0.10*** (0.01)
Egotropic economic evaluation	0.08*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)
Left-wing	0.24*** (0.03)	-0.70*** (0.03)
Right-wing	-0.28*** (0.03)	0.30*** (0.03)
Education	-0.0004 (0.0004)	-0.003*** (0.0004)
Gender	0.03 (0.02)	-0.28*** (0.02)
Age	0.002*** (0.001)	0.01*** (0.001)
Central and Eastern Europe	-0.52* (0.26)	0.67*** (0.20)
Central and Eastern Europe X European identity index	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.28*** (0.05)
Observations	49,761	49,761
Akaike Inf. Crit.	51,799.19	48,607.90

Note:

*p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

Table 4: Support for common asylum and border control policies. CEE X identity interaction. Both DVs are dummies. All coefficients log-odds.

I plot the predicted values of the interaction to ease interpretation. All other variables are either kept at their reference levels, if categorical, or at their means.




Figure 3: Predicted probability of support for common border and asylum policies. CEE X identity interaction. Both DVs are dummies. 95% CIs.

As figure 3 shows, those who do not identify with Europe in Central and Eastern Europe are equally likely to want common border controls than others not identifying with Europe in other regions. However, they are far less likely to want common asylum policies.

Interestingly, however, the negative effect of the interaction between non-European identity and Central and Eastern European citizenship is much larger for common border controls than asylum policies.

The much more negative evaluation of common asylum policies and the more strongly negative effect of identity on support for common border control in this region have two possible causes: First, previous literature finds general regional variation in support for integration, with the founding member states constituting a core that expresses larger support than more recent member states (Bølstad, 2015). Such differences may be attributable to how citizens have different perceptions of the true meaning of EU memberships, and specifically whether one sees the EU as primarily an economic project. As those not identifying with Europe may be less likely to agree with the idea of the EU as a political project, this can explain the particularly strong reaction to the integration of highly salient core state powers in this group.

Another important reason for the larger negative effect related to integrated border control policies could be the framing of identity as incompatible with a European identity that has been prevalent in right-wing discourses in Central and Eastern Europe (Börzel and Risse, 2020). An alternative explanation is that the region's Euroscepticism has a strongly sovereigntist bent, with leaders in the Visegrad Four countries explicitly arguing for a renationalization of powers relating to migration and border control in the wake of the refugee crisis (Fabbrini, 2019: 72). These cues can explain why those who do not identify with Europe, who are more likely to be sceptical of the EU, in this region are more strongly critical of both forms of core state power integration than those with more inclusive identities compared to what is the case elsewhere. However, should the sovereigntist bent of Euroscepticism be more important than the politicization of identity we would expect to find uniformly greater opposition to both border control and common asylum policies among exclusively national Nordic citizens, due to the sovereigntist Euroscepticism that is prevalent also in this region. Whether this so is discussed in the next section.

Robustness checks

As mentioned in the Methods and data section, omitted variable bias is a likely analytical challenge. I perform sensitivity analyses of my results to test their sensitivity to such bias (see results in A1.10-11). This shows that omitted variables must explain, respectively, 4.7% and 4.8% of the remaining variance of support for both the policies and national identity to nullify the estimate. Since these models are the ones where the coefficient of identity is smallest, the same effect is likely to be less sensitive to omitted variable bias in the models related to border control and asylum policies. One potential omitted variable that might account for variance this large is knowledge of EU politics: Because having knowledge of how a common EU migration policy might look requires a high level of knowledge regarding the EU and its policies, it is likely that knowledge of the EU would be associated with much explained variance. Future studies comparing support for core state power integration must thus incorporate this variable. However, the Eurobarometer surveys included in this dataset do not include questions measuring factual knowledge of the EU.

Political parties in the Nordics have, as discussed in the analysis section, publicly argued for a more differentiated integration of the EU, in turn indicating that Euroscepticism in this region is strongly sovereigntist (Leruth, 2015; Spendzharova and Emre Bayram, 2016). Should the sovereigntist argument be more important than the politicization of identity for explaining the negative effect of identity on support for both policies, we would expect to see a similar pattern of generally large opposition to both asylum and border control integration among Nordic citizens without a European attachment. However, as A1.1 shows, the tendency is for Nordic citizens that do not identify with Europe to express greater support for common border policies and more opposition to common asylum policies than those with more nationally inclusive identities. This suggests a pattern of bifurcated opposition to CSP integration more

in line with the pattern found in the EU populace than exclusive nationals in Central and Eastern Europe. This strengthens the robustness of the conclusion that the politicization of national identity in Central and Eastern Europe is a more important driver of the pattern of larger opposition to both forms of core state power integration than the precise shape of Euroscepticism in this region.

Concluding discussion

This paper makes three empirical contributions to extant literature on the drivers of support for European core state power integration: First, I find that support for CSP integration varies, with assumedly more salient integration producing greater opposition. However, I go one step beyond the analysis comparing support for integration of different policy areas to also include an investigation of differentiated support at the issue level: I find that even where integration consolidates EU control in the same policy area, externally oriented core state power integration is more likely to be supported by those with no European attachment than integration constraining the state as a domestic actor. This suggests that the external or internal dimension of core state powers helps shape support for their integration. I also find that this effect is regionally contingent, with the effect of identity having a more uniformly critical effect on core state powers in Central and Eastern Europe than elsewhere.

My findings have two empirical implications for the emerging literature on public support for core state power integration. First, since my results nuance postfunctional theories positing that the main dimension on which the (non-)politicization of policy integration will be decided is whether it relates to regulatory or core state powers (De Wilde and Zürn, 2012; Hooghe and Marks, 2009), they show that analysts of support for integration must incorporate the orientation of integration in their explanatory schema. This is important both to the

literature on what EU will be seen as legitimate after Brexit (Gänzle et al., 2019) and to the broader debate in political science about what transnational policy cooperation is most likely to face public contestation (Hobolt and de Vries, 2016; Hooghe and Marks, 2018; Zürn, 2019). The second empirical contribution my paper makes is to show that differentiated support is contingent on context. The politicization of identity in certain Central and Eastern European states (Börzel and Risse, 2020), with leaders drawing intimate connections between Euroscepticism and strong affective connection to the nation-state, can explain why the interaction between non-European identity and Central and Eastern European citizenship correlates with stronger opposition to common border controls than either main effect. Such Europeanized border controls could otherwise had great utility in this region, as the influx of migrants to Hungary came close to creating a humanitarian crisis (Kriesi et al., 2021). That this does not translate to greater support for common border control policies suggests that cueing and non-utilitarian evaluations may be more important than utility in explaining why individuals support or oppose integration that is salient and potentially challenging to cultural cohesiveness. This must lead to country-level comparative studies of support for core state power integration that seeks to better understand the causal impact of country-level variables.

Conceptually, my results also suggest that public perceptions of core state power integration do not map neatly onto an axis of pro- or anti-integrationist attitudes. In line with the findings of a fairly recent literature (de Vries and Steenbergen, 2013; Goldberg et al., 2021; Toshkov and Krouwel, 2022), the results suggest that the same groups may desire both more *and* less European integration. This paper shows that this also applies to a group often assumed to have both critical and non-ambivalent attitudes towards the EU (Hooghe and Marks, 2005, 2018). This multidimensionality of public opinion opens two avenues for future study: Future research must investigate how preferences for core state power integration at the policy-level

are shaped by for instance elite discourses. Certain parties may for instance be more likely to argue for some instances of core state power integration and against others. The cueing mechanisms established by previous literature (Harteveld et al., 2013; Hobolt and de Vries, 2016; Steenbergen et al., 2007) may thus become particularly important for shaping popular preferences for integration in less salient policy areas. Future research must also establish whether allowances for differentiation, for instance through opt-outs or temporally differentiated integration, can help increase the legitimacy of such integration among those most critical of it.

References

- Armingeon K and Ceka B (2014) The loss of trust in the European Union during the great recession since 2007: The role of heuristics from the national political system. *European Union Politics* 15(1): 82–107. DOI: 10.1177/1465116513495595.
- Bartolini S (2005) *Restructuring Europe: Centre Formation, System Building, and Political Structuring between the Nation State and the European Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/0199286434.001.0001.
- Basile L and Mazzoleni O (2020) Sovereignist wine in populist bottles? An introduction. *European Politics and Society* 21(2): 151–162. DOI: 10.1080/23745118.2019.1632576.
- Bergmann J (2019) Neofunctionalism and EU external policy integration: the case of capacity building in support of security and development (CBSD). *Journal of European Public Policy* 26(9): 1253–1272. DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2018.1526204.
- Blinder S and Markaki Y (2019) Acceptable in the EU? Why some immigration restrictionists support European Union mobility. *European Union Politics* 20(3): 468–491.
- Bølstad J (2015) Dynamics of European integration: Public opinion in the core and periphery. *European Union Politics* 16(1): 23–44. DOI: 10.1177/1465116514551303.

Martin Moland

Börzel TA and Risse T (2020) Identity Politics, Core State Powers and Regional Integration: Europe and beyond. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 58(1): 21–40. DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12982.

Brack N (2020) Towards a unified anti-Europe narrative on the right and left? The challenge of Euroscepticism in the 2019 European elections. *Research & Politics* 7(2): 205316802095223. DOI: 10.1177/2053168020952236.

Bremer B, Genschel P and Jachtenfuchs M (2020) Juncker’s Curse? Identity, Interest, and Public Support for the Integration of Core State Powers. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 58(1): 56–75. DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12980.

Brosius A, van Elsas EJ and de Vreese CH (2020) Bad News, Declining Trust? Effects of Exposure to Economic News on Trust in the European Union. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 32(2): 223–242. DOI: 10.1093/ijpor/edz025.

Brown TA (2015) *Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Applied Research*. Second edition. Methodology in the social sciences. New York ; London: The Guilford Press.

Cinelli C and Hazlett C (2020) Making sense of sensitivity: extending omitted variable bias. *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series B (Statistical Methodology)* 82(1): 39–67. DOI: 10.1111/rssb.12348.

de Blok L and De Vries CE (2020) A Blessing and a Curse? Examining Public Preferences for Differentiated Integration. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3761218.

de la Baume M and Barigazzi J (2022) EU agrees to give €500M in arms, aid to Ukrainian military in ‘watershed’ move. *POLITICO*, 27 February. Available at: <https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-ukraine-russia-funding-weapons-budget-military-aid/> (accessed 28 February 2022).

de Vreese CH, Boomgaarden HG and Semetko HA (2011) (In)direct Framing Effects: The Effects of News Media Framing on Public Support for Turkish Membership in the European

Martin Moland

Union. *Communication Research* 38(2): 179–205. DOI: 10.1177/0093650210384934.

de Vries C and Steenbergen M (2013) Variable Opinions: The Predictability of Support for Unification in European Mass Publics. *Journal of Political Marketing* 12(1): 121–141. DOI: 10.1080/15377857.2013.752654.

De Wilde P (2011) No Polity for Old Politics? A Framework for Analyzing the Politicization of European Integration. *Journal of European Integration* 33(5): 559–575. DOI: 10.1080/07036337.2010.546849.

De Wilde P and Zürn M (2012) Can the Politicization of European Integration be Reversed? *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 50(s1): 137–153. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5965.2011.02232.x.

Fabbrini S (2019) *Europe's Future: Decoupling and Reforming*. Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Foster C and Frieden J (2021) Economic determinants of public support for European integration, 1995–2018. *European Union Politics*. DOI: 10.1177/1465116521994181.

Freudlsperger C and Jachtenfuchs M (2021) A member state like any other? Germany and the European integration of core state powers. *Journal of European Integration* 43(2): 117–135. DOI: 10.1080/07036337.2021.1877695.

Gabel M (1998) Public Support for European Integration: An Empirical Test of Five Theories. *The Journal of Politics* 60(2): 333–354. DOI: 10.2307/2647912.

Gabel M and Palmer HD (1995) Understanding variation in public support for European integration. *European Journal of Political Research* 27(1): 3–19. DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.1995.tb00627.x.

Gänzle S, Leruth B and Trondal J (eds) (2019) *Differentiated Integration and Disintegration in a Post-Brexit Era*. 1st ed. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York : Routledge, 2020. | Series: Routledge / UACES contemporary European studies: Routledge. DOI:

Martin Moland

10.4324/9780429026959.

Genschel P and Jachtenfuchs M (2016) More integration, less federation: the European integration of core state powers. *Journal of European Public Policy* 23(1): 42–59. DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2015.1055782.

Genschel P and Jachtenfuchs M (2018) From Market Integration to Core State Powers: The Eurozone Crisis, the Refugee Crisis and Integration Theory: Crises in Core State Powers. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 56(1): 178–196. DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12654.

Genschel P and Jachtenfuchs M (2021) Postfunctionalism reversed: solidarity and rebordering during the COVID-19 pandemic. *Journal of European Public Policy* 28(3): 350–369. DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2021.1881588.

Gerring J (2007) *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Goldberg AC, van Elsas EJ and de Vreese CH (2021) One union, different futures? Public preferences for the EU's future and their explanations in 10 EU countries. *European Union Politics*: 146511652110341. DOI: 10.1177/14651165211034150.

Halikiopoulou D, Nanou K and Vasilopoulou S (2012) The paradox of nationalism: The common denominator of radical right and radical left euroscepticism: the paradox of nationalism. *European Journal of Political Research* 51(4): 504–539. DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2011.02050.x.

Harteveld E, Meer T van der and Vries CED (2013) In Europe we trust? Exploring three logics of trust in the European Union. *European Union Politics* 14(4): 542–565. DOI: 10.1177/1465116513491018.

Hobolt SB and de Vries CE (2016) Public Support for European Integration. *Annual Review of Political Science* 19(1): 413–432. DOI: 10.1146/annurev-polisci-042214-044157.

Hooghe L and Marks G (2005) Calculation, Community and Cues: Public Opinion on

Martin Moland

European Integration. *European Union Politics* 6(4): 419–443. DOI:

10.1177/1465116505057816.

Hooghe L and Marks G (2009) A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus. *British Journal of Political Science* 39(1): 1–23. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123408000409.

Hooghe L and Marks G (2018) Cleavage theory meets Europe's crises: Lipset, Rokkan, and the transnational cleavage. *Journal of European Public Policy* 25(1): 109–135. DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2017.1310279.

Inglehart R and Rabier J-R (1978) Economic Uncertainty and European Solidarity: Public Opinion Trends. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 440.1: 66–97.

Karstens F (2020a) How public discourse affects attitudes towards Freedom of Movement and Schengen. *European Union Politics* 21(1): 43–63. DOI: 10.1177/1465116519874880.

Karstens F (2020b) Let Us Europeans Move: How Collective Identities Drive Public Support for Border Regimes inside the EU. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 58(1): 116–137.

Kriesi H (2016) The Politicization of European Integration. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 54: 32–47. DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12406.

Kriesi H, Altiparmakis A, Bojar A, et al. (2021) Debordering and re-bordering in the refugee crisis: a case of 'defensive integration'. *Journal of European Public Policy* 28(3). Routledge: 331–349. DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2021.1882540.

Kuhn T and Nicoli F (2020) Collective Identities and the Integration of Core State Powers: Introduction to the Special Issue. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 58(1): 3–20. DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12985.

Leruth B (2015) Operationalizing national preferences on Europe and differentiated

Martin Moland

integration. *Journal of European Public Policy* 22(6): 816–835. DOI:

10.1080/13501763.2015.1020840.

Leuffen D, Schuessler J and Gómez Díaz J (2020) Public support for differentiated integration: individual liberal values and concerns about member state discrimination. *Journal of European Public Policy*: 1–20. DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2020.1829005.

Magalhães PC (2012) Europe à la Carte? Public Support for Policy Integration in an Enlarged European Union. In: Sanders D, Magalhaes P, and Toka G (eds) *Citizens and the European Polity*. Oxford University Press, pp. 212–243. DOI:

10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199602339.003.0009.

McLaren LM (2002) Public Support for the European Union: Cost/Benefit Analysis or Perceived Cultural Threat? *The Journal of Politics* 64(2). The University of Chicago Press: 551–566. DOI: 10.1111/1468-2508.00139.

Milward A (1999) *The European Rescue of the Nation State*. 0 ed. Routledge. DOI: 10.4324/9780203982150.

Plenta P (2020) Conspiracy theories as a political instrument: utilization of anti-Soros narratives in Central Europe. *Contemporary Politics* 26(5): 512–530. DOI: 10.1080/13569775.2020.1781332.

Rittberger B, Leuffen D and Schimmelfennig F (2013) Differentiated Integration of Core State Powers. In: Genschel P and Jachtenfuchs M (eds) *Beyond the Regulatory Polity?* Oxford University Press, pp. 188–210. DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199662821.003.0010.

Schilde KE, Anderson SB and Garner AD (2019) A more martial Europe? Public opinion, permissive consensus, and EU defence policy. *European Security* 28(2): 153–172. DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2019.1617275.

Schimmelfennig F (2021) Rebordering Europe: external boundaries and integration in the European Union. *Journal of European Public Policy* 28(3). Routledge: 311–330. DOI:

Martin Moland

10.1080/13501763.2021.1881589.

Schoen H (2008) Identity, Instrumental Self-Interest and Institutional Evaluations: Explaining Public Opinion on Common European Policies in Foreign Affairs and Defence. *European Union Politics* 9(1): 5–29. DOI: 10.1177/1465116507085955.

Skinner MS (2012) Norwegian Euroscepticism: Values, Identity or Interest: Norwegian Euroscepticism. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 50(3): 422–440. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5965.2012.02245.x.

Spendzharova AB and Emre Bayram I (2016) Banking union through the back door? How European banking union affects Sweden and the Baltic States. *West European Politics* 39(3): 565–584. DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2016.1143245.


Steenbergen MR, Edwards EE and de Vries CE (2007) Who's Cueing Whom?: Mass-Elite Linkages and the Future of European Integration. *European Union Politics* 8(1): 13–35. DOI: 10.1177/1465116507073284.

Toshkov D and Krouwel A (2022) Beyond the U-curve: Citizen preferences on European integration in multidimensional political space. *European Union Politics*: 146511652210803. DOI: 10.1177/14651165221080316.

van Elsas E and van der Brug W (2015) The changing relationship between left–right ideology and euroscepticism, 1973–2010. *European Union Politics* 16(2): 194–215. DOI: 10.1177/1465116514562918.

Zürn M (2019) Politicization compared: at national, European, and global levels. *Journal of European Public Policy* 26(7): 977–995. DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2019.1619188.

Appendix



A1.1: Support for common asylum and border control policies among non-European Nordic citizens. Both variables are dummies. 95% CIs.

	Support for common asylum and border control policies	
	Asylum (1)	Border control (2)
Constant	-0.01 (0.16)	1.29*** (0.14)
European identity	-0.58*** (0.02)	-0.31*** (0.02)
Perception of national situation	0.01 (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)
Trust in national institutions	0.10*** (0.01)	-0.03 (0.02)
Trust in EU institutions	0.45*** (0.01)	0.10*** (0.01)
Egotropic economic evaluation	0.08*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)
Left-wing	0.24*** (0.03)	-0.71*** (0.03)
Right-wing	-0.28*** (0.03)	0.31*** (0.03)
Education	-0.0004 (0.0004)	-0.003*** (0.0004)
Gender	0.03 (0.02)	-0.27*** (0.02)
Age	0.002*** (0.001)	0.01*** (0.001)
Nordics	-0.45 (0.43)	-0.56 (0.34)
Nordics X Exclusive identity	-0.06 (0.06)	0.35*** (0.06)
Observations	49,761	49,761
Akaike Inf. Crit.	51,802.26	48,616.21

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

A1.2: Support for common asylum and border control policies among Nordic citizens. Both variables are dummies. Random country intercepts.

Variable name	Factor «European identity»	Hypothetical Factor 2	Explained variance	Uniqueness
Feeling of EU citizenship	0.56	0.15	0.34	0.66
Attachment to the EU	0.88	0.05	0.77	0.23
Attachment to Europe	0.78	-0.12	0.62	0.38

Chronbach's alpha: 0.78

A1.3: Factor analysis of index for identity variable.

Variable name	Factor «Perception of national situation»	Factor «Egotropic economic evaluation»	Explained variance	Uniqueness
Perception of national situation	0.82	-0.01	0.67	0.33
Perception of national economy	0.89	-0.06	0.74	0.26
Perception of employment situation	0.67	0.10	0.54	0.46
Perception of national public services	0.58	0.11	0.42	0.58

Chronbach's alpha: 0.85

A1.4: Factor analysis of variable for national situation.

Variable name	Factor «Trust in EU institutions»	Factor «Trust in national institutions»	Explained variance	Uniqueness
Trust in European Parliament	0.85	0.01	0.73	0.27
Trust in European Central Bank	0.71	0.06	0.54	0.46
Trust in European Commission	0.91	-0.03	0.81	0.19

Chronbach's alpha: 0.87

A1.5: Factor analysis of index for trust in European Union institutions.

Variable name	Factor «Trust in national institutions»	Factor «Trust in EU institutions»	Explained variance	Uniqueness
Trust in parties	0.57	0.04	0.35	0.65
Trust in parliament	0.87	-0.01	0.74	0.26
Trust in national government	0.82	0.00	0.68	0.32

Chronbach's alpha: 0.80

A1.6: Factor analysis of index for trust in national institutions.

Variable name	Factor «Support for common external policies»	Hypothetical Factor 2	Explained variance	Uniqueness
Support for common foreign policies	0.75	0.01	0.56	0.44
Support for common trade policies	0.58	0.12	0.36	0.64
Support for common defence policies	0.69	-0.08	0.47	0.53

Chronbach's alpha: 0.71

A1.7: Factor analysis of support for common external policies.

Variable name	Factor «Support for common migration policies»	Hypothetical Factor 2	Explained variance	Uniqueness
Support for common migration policies	0.74	-0.10	0.54	0.46
Support for common asylum policies	0.75	0.10	0.58	0.42
Support for stronger European border control	0.11	0.19	0.05	0.95

Chronbach's alpha: 0.70

A1.8: Factor analysis of support for common migration policies.

Variable name	Factor «Egotropic economic evaluation»	Factor «Perception of national situation»	Explained variance	Uniqueness
Financial situation of household	0.87	0.00	0.76	0.24
Perceived employment opportunities	0.79	0.01	0.63	0.37

Chronbach's alpha: 0.82

A1.9: Factor analysis of index for egotropic economic evaluation.

Treatment	Est.	S.E.	t-value	R ² Y~D X	RV _{q=1}	RV _{q=1,a=0.05}
Non-European identity	-0.093	0.009	-10.65	0.2%	4.7%	3.8%

A1.10: Sensitivity analysis of non-European identity to confounding (support for common external policies)

Treatment	Est.	S.E.	t-value	R ² Y~D X	RV _{q=1}	RV _{q=1,a=0.05}
Non-European identity	-0.076	0.007	-11.037	0.2%	4.8%	4%

A1.11: Sensitivity analysis of non-European identity to confounding (support for common migration policies)