

EU Grand Strategy & Crises

(this paper is based on a book proposal)

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Synopsis

EU Grand Strategy & The Liberal International Order (working title) provides an authoritative and comprehensive account of European Union grand strategy, with a focus on the impact the EU's aspirations and actions have had on the world stage. Accessible to scholars, students, and practitioners alike, the book will lay out the enduring debates, long-term trends, tools, and achievements that constitute EU grand strategy. Using an interpretivist lens, rather than a standard rationalist approach, the book emphasizes that grand strategy is derived from both the need to address global transformations as well as processes internal to actors, such as historical memory, national pathologies, and domestic politics.¹ Ultimately, however, grand strategy is still outward facing. That is, its purpose is to allow an actor to have an impact on the international system in tangible ways, whether it is through shaping diplomatic outcomes, encouraging multilateralism, or competing with other great powers. Even though the EU is still a relative newcomer to the international stage – its Common Foreign and Security Policy became operational in 2003 – the goal of this book is to shed light on the various ways that EU grand strategy has played out in practice, and to argue that it has had far more of an impact on the liberal international order than observers typically recognize.

¹ Thierry Balzacq, Peter Dombrowski, and Simon Reich, "Introduction: Comparing Grand Strategies in the Modern World," in *Comparative Grand Strategy A Framework and Cases*, Oxford University Press, 2019; Daniel Fiott and Luis Simón, "The European Union", in Thierry Balzacq, Peter Dombrowski and Simon Reich (eds.), *Comparative Grand Strategy: A Framework and Cases*, Oxford University Press, 2019, pp. 262-283; Markus Kornprobst, "Building agreements upon agreements: The European Union and grand strategy", *European Journal of International Relations*, June 2014, 21 (2), pp. 267–292.

Although it is often assumed that the EU, made up of a diverse group of 27 member states, is not coherent enough to have a consistent and comprehensive approach to its foreign policy,² this book reveals how the EU has actually implemented its grand strategy across a range of issue areas, with the aim of influencing the world in very targeted ways. Indeed, the overarching argument of the book is that the EU is a classic liberal internationalist actor, pursuing a *milieu strategy* (i.e. striving to impact the international environment itself), much more so than a traditional *positional strategy* (i.e. focusing mainly on benefiting its own power in relation to other great powers).³ The book argues that more than any other actor in the international system, the EU is remarkably explicit and consistent about its goal of upholding a liberal, internationalist world order, with its emphasis on multilateralism, democracy, international institutions, use of force as a last resort, and openness.⁴ Indeed, it persists with its liberal principles even when aspects of it cut against the grain of other actors' grand strategies, including its closest ally, the United States. The times in which this consistency is most visible is when the EU is most tested, during periods of international crises.⁵

² Julian Lindley-French, "In the Shade of Locarno: Why European Defence Is Failing," *International Affairs* 78, no. 4 (2002): 789–811; Asle Toje, *The European Union as a Small Power: After the Post–Cold War*. London: Palgrave, 2010; Cameron Vaske, "Refining Strategic Autonomy: A Call for European Grand Strategy," *Carnegie Ethics Online Monthly Column*, December 5, 2018.

³ G. John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*, Princeton University Press, 2012.

⁴ For example, see: European Union, "A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, December 2003; European Union, "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy," June 2016.

⁵ Mai'a K. Davis Cross, *The Politics of Crisis in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, 2017.

Over the last 10-15 years, there has been a significant increase in research that investigates the EU as a global actor,⁶ the nature of EU power,⁷ EU external relations,⁸ and the inner workings of EU foreign policy governance.⁹ How is a book on EU grand strategy different from this? While this book certainly overlaps to some degree with all of these literatures, it is distinct in that it emphasizes explicit goals the EU seeks to achieve in influencing the international system, and the extent to which and why the EU lives up to these goals. As such, the stakes are higher than any of these other approaches alone, which tend to focus on specific examples and processes rather than providing a more global perspective and analysis of outcomes. While much of the academic debate has centered on whether the EU is an actor in its own right, the type of actor it is, and why it has been able to devise common approaches to foreign policy despite obstacles, this book assumes the EU is already a more or less “normal” actor in the international system.¹⁰ The EU has the resources, tools, and wherewithal to contend

⁶ For example, GLOBUS Horizon 2020 project, ARENA Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo, 2016-2020.

⁷ Ian Manners, 2002, “Normative Power Europe: a Contradiction in Terms?” *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40(2): 235–258; Richard Whitman, 2002, “The Fall, and Rise of Civilian Power in Europe?” National Europe Centre Paper No. 16, Canberra: Australian National University; Helene Sjursen, 2006, “What Kind of Power: European Foreign Policy in Perspective,” Special issue of *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13(2):169–181; Zaki Laïdi, *Norms over Force: The Enigma of European Power*, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008; Joseph Nye, *Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York: Public Affairs, 2004; Mai’a K. Davis Cross, 2011, “Europe, A Smart Power?” *International Politics*, 48(6): 691–706.

⁸ Joseph Batora, 2013, “‘The Mitrailleur Effect’”: The EEAS as an Interstitial Organization and the Dynamics of Innovation in Diplomacy,” *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 51(4): 598–613; Ana Juncos and Karolina Pomorska, 2013, “‘In the Face of Adversity’: Explaining the Attitudes of EEAS Officials vis-à-vis the New Service,” *Journal of European Public Policy*, 20(9): 1332–1349.

⁹ Mai’a K. Davis Cross, *Security Integration in Europe: How Knowledge-based Networks are Transforming the European Union*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011; Simon Duke, 2005, “The Linchpin COPS: Assessing the Workings and Institutional Relations of the Political and Security Committee,” Maastricht: European Institute of Public Administration; Jolyon Howorth, 2007, “The Political and Security Committee and the Emergence of a European Security Identity,” *IntUne Integrated and United: A Quest for Citizenship in an ‘ever closer Europe,’* Siena, Italy; Ana Juncos and Karolina Pomorska, 2006, “Playing the Brussels Game: Strategic Socialisation in the CFSP Council Working Groups,” *European Integration online Papers (EIoP)*, Volume 10; Ana Juncos and Christopher Reynolds, 2007, “The Political and Security Committee: Governing in the Shadow,” *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 12: 127–147; Jeffrey Lewis, 2005, “The Janus Face of Brussels: Socialization and Everyday Decision Making in the European Union,” *International Organization* 59(4): 937–971.

¹⁰ Mai’a K. Davis Cross and Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski, 2016, “What type of power has the EU exercised in the Ukraine-Russia crisis? A framework of analysis.” Special Issue: Europe’s Hybrid Foreign Policy, *Journal of Common Market Studies* 55(1): 3-19.

with the likes of the US, China, Russia, India, and others. The question is what the EU's grand strategy looks like when implemented, what kind of impact it has, and how we can make sense of it *as a whole* in understanding the past and anticipating the future.

There is also a large and wide-ranging literature on grand strategy itself, although it rarely includes the EU.¹¹ On the more scholarly end of the spectrum, research on grand strategy tends to be more in the realist vein and thus neglects to consider the EU, with its unique quasi-federal character, as a serious actor at all.¹² On the more policy-based end of the spectrum, there is some limited interest in the EU, but it tends to be almost entirely prescriptive, laying out what the EU should do to implement its grand strategy more successfully as it looks towards the future.¹³ In contrast, this book is neither rationalist nor prescriptive, instead aiming to provide policymakers and the international affairs community with the knowledge necessary to get beyond EU documents and proclamations to distill what EU grand strategy actually achieves from a big-picture, global perspective, and the extent to which the EU has the power to maintain the liberal internationalist order. Thus, this book will primarily address the following issues:

- The making and re-making of the EU's grand strategy
- The unique tools of grand strategy that the EU has as a hybrid, quasi-federal actor
- The EU's goals in devising grand strategy and how it seeks to influence the world
- The domestic and subjective factors that go into defining the EU's grand strategy

¹¹ Some exceptions include: Michael E. Smith, (2011) "A liberal grand strategy in a Realist World? Power, Purpose and the EU's changing Global Role," *Journal of European Public Policy*, 18:2, 144-163; Richard Higgott and Simon Reich, "Hedging by Default," LSE Ideas, <https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/publications/reports/hedging-by-default>; Daniel Fiott and Luis Simón, "The European Union", in Thierry Balzacq, Peter Dombrowski and Simon Reich (eds.), *Comparative Grand Strategy: A Framework and Cases*, Oxford University Press, 2019, pp. 262-283; Markus Kornprobst, "Building agreements upon agreements: The European Union and grand strategy", *European Journal of International Relations*, June 2014, 21 (2), pp. 267-292.

¹² For example, Stephen Krasner, "An Orienting Principle for Foreign Policy: The Deficiencies of 'Grand Strategy'," *Policy Review*, no. 163 (October/November 2010), <http://www.hoover.org/research/orienting-principle-foreign-policy> as cited in Thierry Balzacq, Peter Dombrowski, and Simon Reich, "Introduction: Comparing Grand Strategies in the Modern World," in *Comparative Grand Strategy A Framework and Cases*, Oxford University Press, 2019.

¹³ Sven Biscop, *Grand Strategy in 10-words*, Bristol University Press, 2021; Neil Winn, 2014, "European Union grand strategy and defense: strategy, sovereignty, and political union," *International Affairs Forum*, 4(2): 174-9; Bart Szewczyk, *Europe's Grand Strategy: Navigating a New World Order*, Palgrave, 2021.

- The historical/collective memories and crises that impact grand strategy priorities over time
- How the international environment is different with the EU as a major actor than without it.

Building on the notion of the liberal world order, and the debate surrounding this, each chapter is devoted to a particular theme at the intersection of liberal internationalism and EU grand strategy.

The first theme is **rules**. The EU is fundamentally a rules-based actor that seeks to maintain and lead the loosely rules-based international order that has existed in one form or another since the nineteenth century.¹⁴ This theme is at the core of liberalism. Rules or norms about how to act on the world stage, when war is appropriate or not, how to structure collective security, when to maximize transparency and fairness, whether fundamental human rights have been violated, and so on, comprise a rules-based order. Internally, the EU and its member states prioritize the rule of law without question, even in the relatively rare instances when certain member states (for example, Hungary and Poland) pursue illiberal rules. I will argue in this sense that low-politics rules, i.e. those pertaining to trade, the environment, and society, give the EU a strong presence on the world stage, while high-politics rules present more of a challenge when it comes to implementing grand strategy. International rules of behavior ultimately exist because actors conform to them. In a liberal international order, rules matter because they maintain peace, transparency, and stability. The key question is the extent to which the EU plays a role in enforcing them, especially when the US breaks them or shirks its own responsibility in upholding them.

¹⁴ Ikenberry argues that liberal internationalism emerged in the nineteenth century as western countries embraced “free trade, international law, collective security and the functional organization of the western capitalist system.” G. John Ikenberry, “The end of liberal international order?” *International Affairs*, 94: 7-23. p. 9.

The second theme is **legitimacy**. The EU's grand strategy, in its various incarnations and actions, consistently emphasizes what is legitimate and what is not, based on understood and shared values and norms. In a general sense, the EU has influence through its legitimacy as an integrated and multilateral democratic actor, but also more specifically in how it gets involved in specific situations and crises. Under this theme, I will examine a range of cases to illustrate how the EU has behaved both persuasively and coercively according to the liberal conception of what is legitimate – that is, in the name of human rights, peacekeeping, multilateralism, and democracy. At the same time, within this theme the inherently contested nature of legitimacy must be acknowledged. Through the case studies examined under this theme, I will argue that the EU is actually quick to settle on what is legitimate in a particular situation or crisis, and often acts most convincingly in the name of these values. Indeed, legitimacy unties the EU's hands when it comes to using the range of tools at its disposal, even if there is sometimes internal tension over what is legitimate. Legitimacy engages not only EU behavior, but also judgments about other actors with which the EU is dealing.

The third theme is **power**. Grand strategies are, of course, ultimately all about power. And power is in part derived from both rules and legitimacy. But it is not enough to simply count power resources as many realists do.¹⁵ Resources that are not matched up with real-world situations tell us little about what an actor can do in a given context vis-à-vis specific actors. This book takes the approach that the EU has power through its resources *in relation to* the international environment and the actors with which it contends.¹⁶ While the EU is known for its civilian, diplomatic, and normative power, the EU also has substantial sources of traditional,

¹⁵ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Waveland Press, 2010.

¹⁶ David Baldwin, "Power and International Relations," in Carlsnaes, W. (ed.) *Handbook of International Relations*, London: Sage, 2002. pp. 177–189.

coercive power, such as military capability, technological resources, and human capital, and this is still very much under-recognized in policy circles.¹⁷ Indeed, across the board, in terms of the EU's ability to create and uphold rules, invoke and act upon shared notions of legitimacy, and exercise both hard and soft power, the EU is continually under-estimated. This is to the detriment of those who support the liberal world order, and it is a misperception that this book seeks to correct. Pundits and policy experts often dismiss the EU for being inconsistent or lacking internal consensus when it comes to external action. In addition to this, Russian and Chinese strategy towards the EU explicitly seeks to sow division amongst member states.¹⁸ However, this book shows how agreed-upon rules, shared notions of legitimacy, and power provide a fulcrum around which diverse member states are still able to act as one. More than anything, EU power as executed through its grand strategy allows the EU to play a strong role in guiding the liberal world order through change, transformation, and progress.¹⁹

Naturally, these actions that together comprise EU grand strategy are not without controversy and there is often disagreement amongst member states on what action to take on the world stage. Sometimes divergence happens as a result of different priorities across member states and other times it is in reaction to actors like Russia and China that purposefully seek to divide and conquer the EU. However, it is important to remember that this dynamic is no different than any other actor in international relations. Differences within governments and public opinion domestically often result in sharp divides within democratic societies. This may mean that ultimately potential actions are not taken, or diluted actions are adopted because they

¹⁷ Hugo Meijer, Stephen G. Brooks, "Illusions of Autonomy: Why Europe Cannot Provide for Its Security If the United States Pulls Back," *International Security* 2021 45 (4): 7–43; <https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/45/4/7/100571/Illusions-of-Autonomy-Why-Europe-Cannot-Provide>

¹⁸ For example, China uses so-called United Front tactics, rewarding EU member states that do its bidding and punishing those that do not.

¹⁹ Ikenberry, "The end of liberal international order?" p. 11.

satisfy the lowest common denominator. The EU is neither an outlier nor worse than any other democratic actor in this sense. The United States with its deep political polarization, even sometimes resulting in government shutdowns, is a case in point. Setting regular domestic/internal debates and policy processes aside, the EU can still be analyzed as any other actor on the world stage pursuing its own distinctive grand strategy. Sometimes its actions directly determine international outcomes, and other times its actions push or pull outcomes in the direction of liberal internationalism.

Overall, the book aims to seamlessly weave together the underpinnings of the EU's grand strategy with numerous examples of real-world actions to build a picture of the overall impact the EU has had on maintaining the liberal international order. Case studies include the EU's ongoing actions towards Russia, China, the US, and its neighborhood, as well as specific achievements, such as the Iran nuclear deal, Paris climate change agreement, energy policy, and digital regulations, among others. The book seeks to peel back the heavy layers of narrative, perception, and criticism of the EU to examine precisely what the EU is doing or not doing when it comes to being a strategic actor in the international system. Regardless of how we tend to see the EU and its possible shortcomings, there are clear, tangible outcomes that are often not discussed. Given that much of the existing research surrounding the EU's global role is focused on governance *processes*, this book seeks to fill a gap through its emphasis on *outcomes*. Ultimately, the purpose of grand strategy is to influence the nature of the international system according to one's goals, and that is the central benchmark of this analysis.

At the same time, this book fully grapples with the fact that the liberal world order is in crisis. Threats to its existence abound. There has been resurgent nationalism, isolationism, and great power politics, and even open questioning of democracy as the gold standard in

governance. Some speculate that the US is declining, and with it, removing the chief guarantor of liberal peace. However, as John Ikenberry argues, “despite its troubles...the more general organizing ideas and impulses of liberal internationalism run deep in world politics.”²⁰ Sharing this guarded optimism, this book pays special attention to the *interaction* of rules, legitimacy, and power. As liberal internationalism evolves, rules must adapt, while leaving more fundamental beliefs about legitimacy intact. And as the EU grapples with the challenges of our time, it uses new forms of power to progressively maintain the liberal order in its 21st century form. This is neither the first time nor the worst time that liberal internationalism has come under threat. However, each time it has faced crises, it has survived, even while taking on new forms (i.e. more or less global, hierarchical, reliant on a particular hegemon, wedded to a particular “social purpose”, etc.).²¹ In recent times, the EU has been at the forefront of this effort, and is actually in many ways one of the most adaptable and responsive actors when it comes to re-envisioning liberal internationalism.

Readers will come away from this book with a comprehensive understanding of the strategic engine behind the EU’s role in the world and a solid accounting of its recent track record. Readers should be persuaded that despite the common perception that the EU is almost a non-entity when it comes to international politics, continually plagued by crises at home, it is actually far more pervasive and influential than is typically perceived.²² Its impact reaches across the globe, even if it sometimes acts in relatively quiet ways. Through this comprehensive overview of a range of case studies and examples within each major theme – rules, legitimacy, and power – readers will come to understand the largely unexamined story of the challenges,

²⁰ Ikenberry, “The end of liberal international order?” p. 8.

²¹ Ikenberry, “The end of liberal international order?” pp. 8-9, 12.

²² Andrew Moravcsik, “Why Europe Wins,” *Foreign Policy*, September 24, 2020; Mai’a K. Davis Cross, *The Politics of Crisis in Europe*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017.

successes, influences, missed opportunities, and ground-breaking achievements of EU grand strategy.

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Proposed Chapter Outline

Chapter 1: Introduction

This chapter sets the stage for the book through a brief analysis of how to understand grand strategy in the context of the EU as a unique, quasi-federal actor. In line with Oxford University Press's Grand Strategy book series, I explain why analyzing grand strategy from an interpretivist perspective, which takes seriously the importance of domestic politics, historical memory, and various member-state pathologies, is indispensable. Drawing upon archival research, I argue that the early underpinnings of EU grand strategy were debated even before the

founding of the 1951 European Coal and Steel Community, the precursor to the EU. These early debates about the EU's international role stemmed directly from the societal-level European federalist movement and continue to be important today. Thus, the chapter lays out the making of EU grand strategy historically. I also emphasize the distinction between documented grand strategies, such as the 2003 European Security Strategy and the 2016 Global Strategy, and the EU's actions in the world.²³ While documents make ideas, aspirations, and principles concrete, foreign policy actions cast a clear light on the nature of EU priorities and political will when the stakes are high. Crucially, this chapter establishes the fact that at the core of all manifestations of EU grand strategy is the need to be consistent and coherent, to speak with one voice.

Chapter 2: Rules

This chapter lays out the first main building block of the liberal world order – a rules-based order – and situates the EU in this. There are, of course, different forms of liberalism, from neo-liberal economic laissez-faire to a more social democratic form that recognizes the importance of strong rules to promote equity and fairness alongside openness. The EU clearly leans towards the latter, despite some accusations that the EU is simply a trading bloc, or a product of unfettered globalization. Taking an interpretivist approach, I point to the norms and values that belie this misperception and pave the way for a far more nuanced understanding of EU grand strategy. After establishing the role and importance of rules for the EU, both in terms of its own governance and how it approaches the international system, this chapter brings to bear multiple examples from the EU's multi-tiered commitment to human rights (Honduras, Mali, Sri

²³ Jolyon Howorth, "EU Global Strategy in a changing world: Brussels' approach to the emerging powers", *Contemporary Security Policy*, 37 (3), 2016.

Lanka, LGBTQI, among others) to tackling terrorism²⁴ and cyber-attacks. It also analyzes two major case studies in more depth: diplomacy with and sanctions against Russia and China. These cases demonstrate how rules provide the basis for the EU to act and to influence the behavior of others.

Rules that pertain to the liberal international order, for example, eclipsed the EU's economic interests in the case of China's human rights violations. Shortly after the EU and China were prepared to move forward with the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), an unprecedented and ambitious opening of China's market, the EU reversed course as the scale of China's genocide against the Uyghurs came to light. For the first time since the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre, the EU issued sanctions against China, foregoing the CAI's economic benefits.²⁵ And in the case of Russia, the EU rapidly imposed unprecedentedly harsh sanctions in light of Putin's unprovoked war on Ukraine. The extent to which these sanctions came to encompass key parts of the economy, even aspects of energy, was one of the hardest economic tests the EU had to endure in the name of upholding a rules-based international order. Member states may have different foreign policy priorities, but the establishment and protection of rules bring the EU's diverse actors on to the same page. Moreover, establishing and upholding rules externally, even if it means resorting to coercion, allows the EU to confidently project power.

²⁴ European Council, "The EU's work to tackle terrorism," Accessible here:

<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/eu-response-to-terrorism/>

Agreement on Operational and Strategic Cooperation between the Republic of Colombia and the European Police Office, Accessible here:

https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/agreement_on_operational_and_strategic_co-operation_between_the_Republic_of_Colombia_and_the_European_Police_Office.pdf

²⁵ BBC News, "Uighurs: Western countries sanction China over rights abuses," Accessible here:

<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56487162>; Eyck Freymann and Elettra Ardissino, "China and Europe are Breaking Over Human Rights," *Foreign Policy*, March 29, 2021, Accessible here:

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/29/europe-cai-china-human-rights-uyghurs-sanctions/>

Chapter 3: Legitimacy

Adding a second building-block to liberal internationalism, this chapter begins with an explanation of what is considered legitimate in the liberal world order. In this order, states and non-state actors are expected to pursue international cooperation, democracy, and multilateral institutions, as well as sanction those who violate agreed-upon rules and defend transparency, rights, and fairness. As the EU holds steadfast to the principles of the liberal world order, it also grapples with the range of illiberal threats that exist today, stemming not only from Russia and China, but also more recently from the US. After setting the stage, the chapter moves quickly into the main dimensions of legitimacy reflected in the EU's grand strategy, and brings in a range of examples – fighting fake news,²⁶ returning cultural artifacts,²⁷ vaccine sharing,²⁸ and protecting digital privacy²⁹ – to concretely demonstrate how the EU consistently pushes for a liberal conception of what is legitimate, despite some internal contestation over what that is.

²⁶ European Commission, “Tackling Online Disinformation,” Accessible here: <https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/online-disinformation>; Lewis Powell, “Is the EU Doing Enough to Fight Fake News,” *The New Federalist*, March 19, 2020, Accessible here: <https://www.thenewfederalist.eu/is-the-eu-doing-enough-to-fight-fake-news?lang=fr>

²⁷ Silvia Ellena, “Experts ask the EU to step in to return art looted during colonialism,” *Euractiv*, January 17, 2022, Accessible here: <https://www.euractiv.com/section/languages-culture/news/experts-ask-the-eu-to-step-in-to-return-art-looted-during-colonialism/>

²⁸ Carlo Martuscelli and Jillian Deutsch, “Von der Leyen: EU will donate 200M more coronavirus vaccines,” *Politico*, September 15, 2021, Accessible here: <https://www.politico.eu/article/von-der-leyen-eu-will-donate-200m-more-coronavirus-vaccines/>; European Commission, “Statement by President von der Leyen on vaccine sharing,” Accessible here: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_21_6651; Elian Peltier and Monika Pronczuk, “Basking in Vaccine Success, EU Promises to Donate More Covid Shots,” *The New York Times*, September 15, 2021, Accessible here: <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/15/world/europe/ursula-von-der-leyen-eu-speech.html>

²⁹ Emma Roth, “European European Parliament approves initial proposal to ban some targeted ads,” *The Verge*, January 23, 2023, Accessible here: <https://www.theverge.com/2022/1/23/22897574/european-parliament-eu-digital-services-act-big-tech>; Sandor Zsiros, “What is the EU Digital Services Act and how will it impact Big Tech?” *Euronews*, September 2, 2022, Accessible here: <https://www.euronews.com/2022/01/20/what-is-the-eu-digital-services-act-and-how-will-it-impact-big-tech>; European Commission, “Commission puts forward declaration on digital rights and principles for everyone in the EU,” January 26, 2022, Accessible here: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_452

More in-depth case studies include the EU's role in the Paris climate change agreement and the Iran nuclear deal. During the negotiations leading the Paris climate change agreement (COP21), the EU's strategy began years in advance, launching a major green diplomacy campaign and enabling developing countries to participate in the so-called Nationally Determined Contributions system at the heart of the Paris agreement.³⁰ The EU's determined diplomacy leading to the Iran nuclear deal and its subsequent efforts to revive it after the Trump administration pulled the US out of it, also demonstrate the EU's diplomatic capacity when it comes to upholding legitimacy.³¹

Chapter 4: Power

The third major empirical chapter emphasizes the nature of power in the EU's grand strategy and its global impact. The chapter lays the final building block of the liberal world order through acknowledging the fundamentally power-based approach of grand strategies. Power is both situational and context specific.³² As such, the EU's grand strategy has adapted to circumstances over time so that its resources and tools for influence match up with the challenges at hand. For nearly all great powers, there is a lag in adaptation, especially when it comes to military power, and the EU faces the same challenges as other actors. For example, an actor may be prepared for traditional, boots-on-the-ground scenarios when most situations call for rapid-reaction, multilateral, and flexible forces. Or, actors may believe that their main challenge is territorial, and instead a global pandemic strikes, easily surpassing their global

³⁰ Mai'a K. Davis Cross, "Partners at Paris? Climate Negotiations and Transatlantic Relations." 2018. *Journal of European Integration* 40(5): 571-586.

³¹ Cornelius Adebahr, *Europe and Iran: The Nuclear Deal and Beyond*, London: Routledge, 2017; Tarja Cronberg, *Nuclear Multilateralism and Iran: Inside EU Negotiations*, London: Routledge, 2017.

³² David Baldwin, "Power and International Relations," in Carlsnaes, W. (ed.) *Handbook of International Relations*, London: Sage, 2002. pp. 177-189.

health resources. This chapter reviews the diversity and range of power sources at the EU's disposal through a number of examples, including travel bans,³³ Common Security and Defence Policy and NATO missions and operations, among others.

This chapter also features two more in-depth case studies. The first is focused on US-EU power relations, delving into the extent to which the EU has been able to strengthen the liberal world order, even when the US seriously deviates from it (i.e. in US domestic politics as well as in its approach to Iraq, NATO, and China, among others). This is an area of significant challenge for EU grand strategy given that the US has been a cornerstone of the liberal international order together with Western countries. A second major case study charts the course of the EU's highly significant security and military response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Facing the end of a long period of peace in Europe and Russia's egregious violation of liberal international norms, the EU exerted collective hard power to support Ukraine in ways that would have been unthinkable before February 2022.

Chapter 5: The Future of EU Grand Strategy

This chapter strikes a more speculative tone as it considers future possible scenarios for the EU and its place in the liberal world order. Bringing in more cutting-edge, but still highly contentious issues – such as artificial intelligence, autonomous weapons, human missions to Mars and potential weaponization of outer space, among others – I give a broad outlook on what

³³ Council of the EU, "COVID-19: Council removes Argentina, Australia and Canada from the list of countries for which travel restrictions should be lifted," EU Press Release, January 17, 2022, Accessible here: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/01/17/covid-19-council-removes-argentina-australia-and-canada-from-the-list-of-countries-for-which-travel-restrictions-should-be-lifted/?utm_source=dsms-auto&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=COVID-19%3a+Council+removes+Argentina%2c+Australia+and+Canada+from+the+list+of+countries+for+whic+h+travel+restrictions+should+be+lifted

the future holds as the EU rapidly solidifies and adapts its grand strategy. In the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the EU is clearly headed towards an even more explicit and well-defined grand strategy. I argue that this is not so much a matter of adaptation or just a reaction to circumstances, but an intensification of the EU's original grand strategy goals. Elements of security integration that were considered difficult in the past – for example, common funding on defense, defense union, permanent structured cooperation – are now taken-for-granted.³⁴ The not-so-distant future could see the abolishment of the national veto on EU foreign policy decisions,³⁵ establishment of readily deployable EU armed forces, accession of the remaining Eastern European countries into the EU, and continued security and nuclear threats from Russia. This chapter will paint a picture of what this could look like in terms of the future of the international order and lay out the implications for this. The liberal world order may be on shakier ground these days, but EU leaders are well aware that to give up on it is to give up on the EU itself. It is simply not an option. This chapter assesses the liberal world order's future potential, and should be of particular interest to policy practitioners and those engaged in strategic foresight.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

The book ends with a short conclusion that summarizes the lessons and themes identified throughout. It comes back to the concept of grand strategy and again emphasizes the importance of taking an interpretivist rather than a rationalist approach, explaining what we gain from using

³⁴ Mai'a K. Davis Cross, *Security Integration in Europe: How Knowledge-based Networks are Transforming the European Union*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011.

³⁵ Chiara Albanese, "Draghi Urges EU Member States to Give Up Foreign Policy Vetoes," *Bloomberg*, May 3, 2022. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-05-03/draghi-calls-for-tighter-eu-integration-to-face-war-energy-gaps>

this lens. The chapter also reflects more broadly on the EU's impact on the quality and fabric of the international system since its founding.