Political violence, national identity, and foreign policy in Europe

The cases of Austria and Greece

Marion Foster, University of Texas-Austin

What we need now is clarity. We have been neutral, we are neutral, and we will remain [neutral]. Neutrality has proved beneficial for Austria and for its population. It has never harmed us, but has always helped us. Because of this positioning, that we can still be a constructive partner in negotiations with third countries outside the EU but at the same time can partake in international solidarity within the EU or the UN, there is no reason to question our neutral status.

—Karl Nehammer, Federal Chancellor of Austria,

Interview with *Der Standard,* March 13, 2022

Greece must give its own answer. Our brothers have been living in Ukraine for 2,000 years. At the same time, our explicit warning is that we will allow no imitator of revisionism to operate in our area. End of story. […] The current crisis can be an opportunity for the EU to take a step forward and align its economic development with its strategic priorities. […] We have always been on the right side of history and that is what we are doing now.

—Kyriakos Mitsotakis, Prime Minister of Greece,

Speech to the Greek Parliament, March 1, 2022

INTRODUCTION

The above-cited quotations were made by the heads of government of Austria and

Greece, respectively, in the context of the European Union's policy response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. They highlight the tendency of political leaders to make use of the past in order to explain present policy, but also the difficulties the EU continues to have in speaking with one voice about on foreign and security policy. Successive rounds of EU enlargement have made the questions over what, if any, goals small states pursue within a common European foreign policy more salient. However, much of International Relation scholarship has focused on the preponderance of large powers, especially of France, Germany, and, before Brexit, the UK, in shaping the Union's policy. Small states, by contrast, are often viewed as not pursuing specific goals within the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP), or at least as not being effective in advocating for them.

In part, this neglect of small states[1] is common to the study of International Relations more generally, which has traditionally held that only great powers are capable of influencing international politics in significant ways. This view has been increasingly criticized,[2] however, and it is especially controversial in the case of the EU. While Papayoanu predicted in 1997 that the post-Cold War European regional order would blend characteristics of a regional concert—i.e., oligopolistic collusion between the continent's larger powers—with those of a collective security system,[3] Tavares has more recently highlighted the EU's character as a regional community with a level of "actor-ness" in foreign affairs.[4] At the core of the EU's identity as a foreign policy actor lies an internal multilateralism that is based on the commitment to act on

[1] It is important to note here that the label "small state" often serves as a residual category, i.e. small states are generally defined by what they are not—neither regional powers nor, on the other hand, micro states, which have been more clearly defined in the literature. The concept of small states is thus somewhat arbitrary. For the purpose of this paper, small states are defined as all EU member states with the exception of the "Big Five": Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and Poland.

[2] Cf., Amitav Acharya, "The Emerging Regional Architecture of World Politics," *World Politics* 59, no. 4 (2007): 629–52; Amitav Acharya, "Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds," *International Studies Quarterly*, no. 58 (2014): 647–59.

[3] Paul A. Papayoanu, "Great Powers and Regional Orders: Possibilities and Prospects after the Cold War," in *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World*, ed. David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 127.

[4] Rodrigo Tavares, "Understanding Regional Peace and Security: A Framework for Analysis," *Contemporary Politics* 14, no. 2 (2008): 118.

the basis of treaties and to adhere to unanimity in decision-making. Bendiek (2019) emphasizes that this commitment to internal multilateralism legitimizes the EU's external actions both vis-à-vis its own member states and third countries.[5] Though this multilateralism resembles in practice a "concert embedded in multilateralism," requiring both consensus between the larger powers—primarily Germany and France—as well as the willingness to find compromises with all member states within multilateral consultations.

This form of "embedded concert" nevertheless opens avenues for smaller EU member states to pursue their own foreign policy goals and attempt to influence EU decision-making on CFSP and defense policy. As a consequence, it is important to shine a spotlight on how these states develop a sense of national interest and the policy ideas and institutions that flow from these interests. I argue that small EU member states, just as large ones, derive their policy objectives from national security imaginaries that have developed over the long term and are rooted in the interpretations societies make about their collective past, their security environment, and the role of their country in the world. Intersubjectively shared narratives about episodes of political violence—in the form of interstate or civil war, authoritarian repression, forced population displacements, and large-scale terrorist violence—are especially important in this regard in democratic societies since they touch on the heart of the social contract between the state and the citizen. Collective narratives that draw on episodes of political violence tend to be remarkably stable and influence stated policy objectives long after the external security environment has changed significantly.

Drawing on concepts from historical sociology, foreign policy analysis, and constructivist IR theory, this paper develops the outlines of a causal mechanism linking experiences of political violence with national security doctrines, institutions, and specific

[5] Annegret Bendiek, "Democratization First: The Community Method in CFSP as a Precondition for a European Defense Policy," *Éditoriaux de l'Ifri* (Paris, September 2019), 2.

policies. As part of a dissertation project that examines the evolution of security doctrines in Austria and Greece, the paper also conduct an analysis of early 20th century political violence in Austria and Greece. It seeks to identify patterns of trauma and collective memory that have gone on to influence national identity and the institutionalization of specific foreign policy values. Illuminating these values is important for an understanding of the ideational origins of EU member states' foreign policies, their subsequent trajectories toward European integration, and how their political leaders pursue their security policy goals within the framework of EU CSFP.

VIOLENCE, IDENTITY, AND INSTITUTIONS

How do states develop and maintain external policies that provide for the security of their citizens? Which traces can we find in these policies of collective interpretations made about past experiences of violence? And how do these narratives endure or change over time? To answer these questions, I draw on three different bodies of literature. First, I engage with the growing constructivist literature in the field of International Relations (IR), especially within the subfields of historical international relations (HIR) and foreign policy analysis (FPA), to examines the role of ideas and identity in shaping security interests. Second, scholarly works in memory studies and historical sociology help me illuminate the relationship between narratives of identity, violence, and state formation. Third and finally, I borrow from the new institutionalism in policy science to explore the interplay between ideas and institutions in guiding policy choice, and to address the problem of continuity and change in security doctrines.

First, however, a caveat is in order. Security is not an unproblematic and unambiguous

term. As Kessler (2021) reminds us, it is a concept, not an empirical fact, [6] and as such has both an internal and an external dimension. It encompasses, on the one hand, the social contract. Thomas Hobbes was among the first political thinkers to point out that, by granting state the monopoly of violence in exchange for the provision of security to citizens, state security becomes as a domestic political issue.[7] This issue touches directly upon the relation between the citizen and the state, and by extension, on the internal division of powers, and the wielding of force by the state.

On the other hand, security also entails the notion of *raison d'état*, or reason of state, nowadays more often referred to as the national interest. Reason of state, as conceptualized most famously by Niccolò Machiavelli, regards the preservation of the state—*mantenere lo stato* —as the most important objective of government. Even though Machiavelli himself did not relate the preservation of the state solely or even predominantly to defense against external threats, he did make observations on how to deal with military preparation, diplomacy, and the management of alliances in his advice to his Prince.[8] In contemporary scholarship, protecting the state against external threats is considered a central element of the national interest.

This dual conceptualization of security still does not tell us *how* the internal and external dimensions of security are to be achieved. What counts as a threat, and how should governments protect against threats? Is the national interest enduring and determined by structural conditions, or does human agency have a role to play in defining it? These are the questions that are at the heart of IR as an academic discipline, and I will now turn to

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[6] Oliver Kessler, "Conceptual History in International Relations: From Ideology to Social Theory?," in *Routledge Handbook of Historical International Relations*, ed. Benjamin de Carvalho, Julia Costa Lopez, and Halvard Leira (London: Routledge, 2021), 551.
[7] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, vol. Vol. 1 (Seattle: Pacific Publishing, 2011).
[8] Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince* (New York: Dover, 1992). Cf. Richard Devetak, "Reason of State: An Intellectual History," in *Routledge Handbook of Historical International Relations*, ed. Benjamin de Carvalho, Julia Costa Lopez, and Halvard Leira (London: Routledge, 2021), 277–88. Compare also the affiliation of Machiavelli's thought to that of other Renaissance political philosophers as described in A. C. Grayling, *The History of Philosophy*, eBook (New York: Penguin, 2019), pt. II Renaissance Political Thought.

positioning my paper within this debate.

The question of ideas and identity in IR

Notwithstanding earlier scholarly works on the nature and characteristics of inter-state relations,[9] International Relations grew into a recognized academic field[10] in the aftermath of World War II and in the context of the emerging cold war. While early works, most prominently Hans Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations*,[11] extensively drew on history to construct their arguments, thereby demonstrating IR's origins in historical scholarship, the field was subsequently affected by the behavioral turn in the social sciences. In the behavioralist view, the aim of social science was to approximate as closely as possible the scientific method developed in the natural sciences to generate parsimonious theories with strong explanatory and/or predictive power across a variety of contexts. By the 1970s, IR had become dominated by approaches that prioritized the structural conditions of the international environment and the instrumental rationality of political actors.[12]

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[9] Such as, most prominently, Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964). Consider also the origins of IR writing in an effort to provide concepts and advice for colonial administrators, as noted, *inter alia*, by Lucian M. Ashworth, "Disciplinary Traditions and Debates," in *Routledge Handbook of Historical International Relations*, ed. Benjamin de Carvalho, Julia Costa Lopez, and Halvard Leira (London: Routledge, 2021), 113–26; Ann E. Towns, "Gender in Historical International Relations," in *Routledge Handbook of Historical International Relations*, ed. Benjamin de Carvalho, Julia Costa Lopez, and Halvard Leira (London: Routledge, 2021), 153–61; Melody Fonseca Santos, "Disciplinary Histories of Non-Anglophone International Relations: Latin America and the Caribbean," in *Routledge Handbook of Historical International Relations*, ed. Benjamin de Carvalho, Julia Costa Lopez, and Halvard Leira (London: Routledge, 2021), 171–80.

[10] Some scholars draw attention to the continuing difficulties IR has in establishing itself as an independent academic discipline and in clearly demarcating itself from Political Science; see for instance, Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, "Ahead to the Past," in *Routledge Handbook of Historical International Relations*, ed. Benjamin de Carvalho, Julia Costa Lopez, and Halvard Leira (London: Routledge, 2021), 573–74. Cf. also Nicholas Onuf's critical attitude toward IR as a field, who refers to IR as "politics at the margins" in Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*, Reissued (London: Routledge, 2013).

[11] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1948).

[12] Cf. Peter J. Katzenstein, "Alternative Perspectives on National Security," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 1–32; John Gerard Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge," in *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization*, ed. John Gerard Ruggie (London: Routledge, 1998), 1–39.

This shift had several consequences. For one, questions of ideology and value conflicts were sidelined in the analysis of foreign and security policy. Instead, the two dominant paradigms[13] of structural (or neo-)realism and liberal institutionalism[14] took their theoretical assumptions—whether they concerned the "anarchy" of the international system or the impulse toward cooperation among utility-maximizing actors imbued by "enlightened self-interest"—for facts of the material world that generations of researchers made the objects of their study.[15] The continuing animosity between IR realists and IR liberals stem at least in part from the apparent necessity for social science to be objective and value-free, which leads scholars on both sides of the debate to deny the theory-laden nature of their basic concepts. To bolster their claims, scholars often refer to the timeless and universal characteristics of the international system's features, in a fashion that "ransack[s] the past to explain the present."[16]

Finally, IR theorizing frequently focused on the Kenneth Waltz's "third image"[17], the systemic level, for explanations of behavior in international politics. In fact, in his *Theory of International Politics*, Waltz (1979) postulated that a theory of international relations should be parsimonious and general, explaining the similarities in outcomes (e.g., of war in the

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[13] There is some controversy over whether the term "paradigms" in the Kuhnian sense should be applied to the broad research programs in IR. Some authors prefer to describe them as "images" instead; see for instance, Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, *International Relations Theory*, 5th ed. (Boston: Longman, 2012).

[14] Referred to by John Gerard Ruggie as "neo-utilitarian" approaches, cf. Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge."

[15] Frank Fischer perceptively observes, regarding the concept of the "political system" routinely employed in policy science, that "no one has ever seen a political system … despite the fact that we talk about them as if we had. A political system … is a linguistic concept discursively invented and employed to describe a set of relationships that we can only partly experience. … Our understandings of these broader systems are interpretive constructions based on these partial views." Frank Fischer, *Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 43, 57 [fn.3]

[16] Julian Go, George Lawson, and Benjamin de Carvalho, "Historical Sociology in International Relations: The Challenge of the Global," in *Routledge Handbook of Historical International Relations*, ed. Benjamin de Carvalho, Julia Costa Lopez, and Halvard Leira (London: Routledge, 2021), 47. See also the problems associated with an uncritical utilization of concepts such as anarchy or empire across vastly different spatial and temporal contexts in Thorbørn L. Knutsen, "Ancient Greece: War, Peace, and Diplomacy in Antiquity," in *Routledge Handbook of Historical International Relations*, ed. Benjamin de Carvalho, Julia Costa Lopez, and Halvard Leira (London: Routledge, 2021), 389–97; Thorbørn L. Knutsen and Martin Hall, "Rome: Republic, Monarchy and Empire," in *Routledge Handbook of Historical International Relations*, ed. Benjamin de Carvalho, Julia Costa Lopez, and Halvard Leira (London: Routledge, 2021), 398–407.

[17] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, The State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, eBook (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).

international system), but not specific cases of outcomes. By abstracting the attributes of individual states and their interaction, Waltz achieved parsimony but left many to wonder what, in the end, his theory explained beyond the *status quo* of the cold war bipolar system.[18]

IR's "interpretive turn"

It is perhaps not unexpected, then, that IR theory frequently failed in predicting, or even explaining, real-world developments. The end of the cold war was one major phenomenon that took most of the field by surprise, and so was the subsequent observation that the change from systemic bipolarity to unipolarity did not coincide with significant adaptions in the national security strategies of many states, including the United States. Spurred by the gap between scholarship and reality, but also by a more general move toward "post-empiricism" in the social sciences,[19] the field increasingly turned toward ideas and identity as causal factors, and toward interpretation as a methodological approach, from the 1980s onward.

Wendt's (1992) observation that "anarchy is what states make of it"[20] highlights the importance of identity in the definition of (national) interest. According to Wendt, what matters is not anarchy in the international system[21] as such—i.e., the fact that there is no supreme authority governing conduct in international politics—but the choices states make in interpreting the meaning of this system. The precepts of IR realism that under anarchy, states must resort to self-help to guarantee their survival, thereby driving quests for power and triggering security dilemmas, will be true only if states opt to see the system as a Hobbesian

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[18] Compare Ruggie's (1998) claim that Waltz's model has only a reproductive, not a transformative logic and can thereby not account for changes in the international system. John Gerard Ruggie, "Political Process and Dynamic Density," in *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization*, ed. John Gerard Ruggie (London: Routledge, 1998), 137–54.

[19] Fischer, *Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices*, 12.

[20] Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992): 391–425.

[21] The postulate of an anarchical international system is itself hotly contested, including by scholars working in the tradition of the English School (ES) of IR, among whose foundational thinkers was Hedley Bull. ES scholars see states as members of an international society, i.e., of a hierarchical and not anarchical system.

state of nature. As Wendt shows, other interpretations are possible, including one of a system of mutual indifference or even of cooperation for collective security.

Other constructivist scholars also criticized IR's neglect of the norms and identities influencing the foreign policy behavior of states. As Katzenstein (1996) points out, realism and liberalism treat identities and norms either as merely derivative of material capabilities or as tools used instrumentally by rational actors,[22] for instance in the establishment and maintenance of international regimes. In each case, interests are considered as exogenously given; shaped either by the power distribution of the international system or by regimes that constrain actor behavior.

Instead of this view of identity and norms as epiphenomenal, IR constructivists propose frameworks of analysis that view states and their environment as mutually constitutive. Importantly thus, for constructivists, norms are not only regulative of behavior, a point that liberal institutionalists also make, but also constitutive of identity and therefore logically prior to the articulation of interest.[23] In other words, norms shape identity, which influences national interest. In addition, norms also impact instrumentality, that is the awareness about the means available and appropriate to respond to security policy challenges.[24] The relationship is made more complex by the observation that iterative behavior, in turn, also shapes identity over time.[25]

This approach problematizes the core assumptions made by the liberal and realist

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[22] Katzenstein, "Alternative Perspectives on National Security."
[23] Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity & Culture in National Security," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 33–75; Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge"; Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*.
[24] Paul Kowert and Jeffrey W. Legro, "Norms, Identities, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 454–62.
[25] Cf., for instance, Richard Ned Lebow, *National Identities and International Relations* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 107.

paradigms, especially that states are homogenous ("like units") differentiated only by material capabilities and factors such as geography, or that states are unitary, rational actors primarily seeking to maximize utility.[26] It also broadens the array of potential factors that affect outcome in international politics,[27] allowing for the causal influence of ideas on both the objectives that states pursue and the means they use to achieve these objectives.

Security imaginaries as heuristics

Particularly interesting in this context is the work constructivist scholars have done on the construction of images of the self, as well as of other actors in international politics. Campbell's (1998) *Writing Security,* for instance, critically examines the way U.S. foreign policy routinely constitutes American identity through the interpretation of dangers allegedly posed by others.[28]

Similarly, Weldes (1999) explores how the Kennedy administration drew on mental images of the Soviet Union and Fidel Castro's Cuba to develop a specific construct of the Cuban Missile Crisis. This construct emphasized certain aspects, such as the assessment of Soviet action *in general* as perfidious and illegitimate, or the deviance of the government in La Havana by referring to Cuban political leaders as *barbudos* (bearded, i.e., unkempt, wild, uncivilized).[29] At the same time, the construct de-emphasized other aspects, most notably the presence of U.S. Jupiter missiles in Turkey and the Soviet threat perceptions connected to

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[26] Ruggie, "Political Process and Dynamic Density"; Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge." For a critique of rational choice theory in foreign policy analysis, see Jean-Frédéric Morin and Jonathan Paquin, *Foreign Policy Analysis: A Toolbox* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), chap. 7.

[27] Peter J. Katzenstein, "National Security in a Changing World," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 498–537; Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge."

[28] John L. Campbell, "Institutional Analysis and the Role of Ideas in Political Economy," *Theory and Society*, no. 27 (1998): 377–409.

[29] In this context, note also Lebow's definition of deviance as "agency that lacks legitimacy" and the use of deviance as a rhetorical weapon by those who want to uphold the *status quo.* Lebow, *National Identities and International Relations*, 166.

American nuclear weapons placed in Europe.[30]

Weldes refers to the heuristics that political actors use to guide decision-making in crisis situations as representations arising from "security imaginaries," which posit specific identities for their own and other countries, e.g., as "friends" or "enemies." Security imaginaries draw on extant cultural and linguistic materials to create associations and subject positions. Their seeming naturalness hides the contested and historically contingent nature of their underlying images. This explains, according to Weldes, why John F. Kennedy's ExCom never questioned the assumption of aggressive Soviet intent during the missile crisis, or why it continuously downplayed Cuban agency in the event.[31]

Norms and identity have been used by scholars as a lens to examine foreign policy and national security doctrines in countries outside the United States as well. The volumed edited by Guzzini (2011), for instance, asks whether post-cold war foreign policy identity crises in countries from Germany to Turkey and Estonia led to a revival of geopolitical thought in Europe.[32] Berger (1996), on the other hand, traces the emergence and consolidation of a "pacific" foreign policy identity in Germany and Japan after World War II.[33] In a wide-ranging investigation, Katzenstein (2005) explores the influence of the United States—not only American power, but also "American purpose," i.e., American ideas and values—on regional integration in Europe and Asia during the second half of the 20th century. Contrary to scholars working more explicitly in the liberal tradition of IR,[34] Katzenstein's account goes beyond considerations of instrumental acquiescence or resistance to an American-led world order and

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[30] Jutta Weldes, *Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
[31] Weldes.
[32] Stefano Guzzini, ed. *The Return of Geopolitics in Europe? Social Mechanism and Foreign Policy Identity Crises* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
[33] Thomas U. Berger, "Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 317–56.
[34] Cf., for instance, G. John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011).

provides a rich and nuanced account of the cultural interactions between the "American imperium" and foreign societies.

Constructivists have thus made important contributions to broadening our perception of the factors that shape international politics. The "interpretive turn" in IR led scholars situating themselves in other IR traditions to draw on concepts of identity and culture for their work as well.[35] However, the influence of ideas on foreign and security policy remains quite often elusive. Among the challenges in studying norms and identity, Kowert and Legro (1996) mention the ubiquity of norms—and therefore, of knowing what is and what is not important—the relationship between material capabilities and norms, the role of agency and norm manipulation, as well as explaining patterns of stability and change.[36]

Legro (2005) himself tackles the question of why the cardinal ideas motivating national security doctrines sometimes change after significant shocks (for instance, Germany's post-World War II renunciation of militarism) and sometimes do not (e.g., the United States' return to pre-war isolationism after World War I).[37] Specifically, he suggests that change is a function of two related but separate processes, collapse of old ideas and consolidation of new ones. This constitutes an important contribution in refining the ways in which we think about the influence of ideas. Regrettably, Legro limits the factors he analyzes for the success of idea consolidation to the number of available alternatives and their early results in terms of efficiency. By leaving the "politics of ideas" explicitly outside his framework of analysis,[38] he opens himself up to the charge of neglecting the role power plays in increasing the relevance of some ideas over others. The next section of this paper examines the contributions made by scholars of historical

[35] This is especially true for neoclassical realist scholars, cf. for instance Colin Dueck, *Reluctant Crusader: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).
[36] Kowert and Legro, "Norms, Identities, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise."
[37] Jeffrey W. Legro, *Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).
[38] Legro, 38.

sociology and memory studies in illuminating this role.

Power, violence, and collective memory

As Fischer (2003) notes, the policy process is a struggle over meaning: "over the symbols we invoke and the categories in which we place different problems and solutions."[39] It takes place not in an atomistic environment of individuals in isolation, weighing different options and making calculations to maximize their utility. This is not to say that rationality plays no part at all in political choice, only that the individualism of rational choice theory does not offer a complete picture. States, and other socio-political entities, must be considered as political communities, where human beings interact and debate their ideas about what makes up the good life.

The return and power of the state

These ideas about the common good, about policy problems and their possible solutions, always entail both ideological and instrumental interests.[40] They point in the direction of either reproducing or transforming dominant ways of viewing the world and the social distributions of power embedded within—and abetted by—these world views. We know that individuals at times support political and social regimes that are not, strictly speaking, in their interest.[41] It is this more complex view of political community and patterns of power distribution that scholars like Theda Skocpol had in mind when they demanded in the 1980s to "bring the state back in" to our ways of thinking and writing about policy and politics.[42]

Their insistence was a reaction to behaviorism in political science, which had

[39] Fischer, *Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices*, 59.
[40] Fischer, 57.
[41] Fischer, 103.
[42] Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

disaggregated political community into the interplay of interest groups, thus leaving the effects of the state on society an empty category. As Skocpol and her colleagues noted, the ways different states are organized affect political culture, empower some types of group formations and collective action (but not others) and make it possible to raise certain issues (but not others).[43] The state as a form of political organization therefore entails power, not the least of which is to legitimize and delegitimize specific meaning of political and social events.[44] Those in control of state institutions can wield this power vis-à-vis the state's own citizens and, depending on the state's resources, potentially also vis-à-vis the citizens of other states.

In contemporary democracies the power of the state over its citizens is circumscribed: important amendments to the social contract include the acceptance of inalienable human rights and fundamental freedoms that they state cannot, in principle, limit or revoke as well as the democratic rights of citizens to vote out a government. But as everyone who has ever been fined for speeding, had to pay her taxes, or get a permit of whatever sort from a local government knows, the power of the state is often quite tangible, even if the state itself is in many ways an abstract concept—a "reification"[45] in Lebow's (2016) words. It is not the individual person of the police officer or IRS official that can compel us to do things we would not voluntarily agree to, but the power of the state that is vested in her as the state's agent. The state is different also from the specific government of a given time period; in our contemporary system of political organization, it represents the most common form of continuity of a political community.[46]

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[43] Theda Skocpol, "Brining the State Back in: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in *Bringing the State Back In*, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 20–27.
[44] Skocpol, 20–27.
[45] Lebow, *National Identities and International Relations*, 47.
[46] This is made clear by the fact that the state typically does not cease to exist when a government falls, even though there have been historical cases when the end of a regime type also entailed the end of the state in its specific form, e.g., the collapse of the Ottoman and Habsburg empires during World War I, or the end of the communist regime in the Soviet Union.

The state and violence

What is more, the capacity for violence and the monopoly over its internal use remains fundamental to the state's power. Consider how modern states were formed. In Europe especially, violence played a central role in the formation of states and their ties with each other.[47] Tilly (1975) argues that the relationship between violence and European state formation over a thousand-year period from AD 990 to 1990 was close enough to warrant the maxim that "war made the state, and the state made war."[48] There is no corner of the European continent that has escaped the violent logic of state formation—even states we nowadays consider models of peacefulness, such as Sweden, have established their statehood as a result of violent conflict, including aggression against neighboring political entities.

Tilly (1992) finds that in western Europe, the territorial expansion of political entities coincided with the domestic concentration of coercive capacities, a development that began in the late 15th century. The incessant competition between these increasingly large and powerful states gave rise to two developments: one the one hand, small political entities, which had flourished through the Middle Ages, were absorbed by larger ones. On the other hand, the form of the national state became dominant, while other forms—such as the city states of the Italian Renaissance—gradually were absorbed into larger territorial units.[49]

The ubiquity of warfare in Europe at least until the 1815 Congress of Vienna led Tilly to claim that "states themselves operate chiefly as containers and deployers of coercive means, especially armed force." Furthermore, he asserts, this is not a purely historical phenomenon:

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[47] Some scholars have noted that the extraordinary belligerence of states may be a phenomenon that is specific to modern Europe, cf. for instance Miguel Centeno, "Blood and Debt: War and Taxation in Nineteenth-Century Latin America," *The American Journal of Sociology* 102, no. 6 (1997): 1565–1605; Jeffrey Herbst, "War and the State in Africa," *International Security* 14, no. 4 (1990): 117–39.
[48] Charles Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European Statemaking," in *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, ed. Charles Tilly (London: Princeton University Press, 1975), 42.
[49] Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1990*, Revised ed (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1992), 45–47, 54–58.

"Nowadays the development of welfare states, of regulatory states, of states that spend a great deal of their effort intervening in economic affairs, has mitigated and obscured the centrality of coercion."[50] In other words, in the contemporary state, which is largely pacified internally and fights its wars mainly with a professional class of soldiers, the discourses of democratic rights and regulatory policy mask the essence of violence on which its origins and its continuous power rest.[51]

Balibar (1999) draws attention to a specific way in which the English language disaggregates the concepts of power and violence. In German, on the other hand, the term *Gewalt* can be either translated as "violence" or, especially in the form of *öffentliche Gewalt*, as "public authority." Whereas the first concept conjures up an association with a force that is illegitimate and reprehensible, the second one denotes the ordering and regulating power vested in public authority.[52] We find such an intrinsic relation between violence and power also in Walter Benjamin's (1921) observations about legitimate and illegitimate violence. Especially pertinent are the philosopher's remarks concerning the attempt of the state to "divest the individual, at least as a subject, of all violence" because the state fears the "lawmaking character" of violence that is directed against an established order.[53]

Balibar (1999) notes in this context that power does not necessarily have to be physical and directed against specific individuals to constitute violence, a point also made by Johan Galtung's (1998) concepts of structural and cultural violence. Thinkers ranging from Antonio Gramsci to Jürgen Habermas and Michel Foucault have since explored the power of the state,

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[50] Tilly, 51.
[51] The internal aspect of this violence is still tangible for group in society that are routinely discriminated against by the state's agents and by majority populations. It is also visible in extraordinary situations, such as the violent repression of protest.
[52] Étienne Balibar, "Pouvoir," in *Dictionnaire critique du marxisme*, ed. Georges Labica and Gérard Bensussan, 3rd edition (Paris: Presses universitaires de France/ Quadrige, 1999), 902.
[53] Walter Benjamin, "Critique of Violence," in *Selected Writings, Volume 1: 1913-1926*, ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1921), 241.

its agencies, and its ruling elites to legitimize certain ideas over others and repress "deviant" views.[54]

Political discourse over ideas can therefore not be analyzed without reference to the structure and distribution of power in society and the potential of violence vested in the state. If we accept that ideas and identity are prior to the formulation of interests, we also need to critically examine the position and status of their proponents and the sources of their social power. Collective violence—inter-state and civil wars, but also other forms of political violence such as significant terrorist acts or repressive violence—can alter these power relationships, while at the same time calling into question the legitimacy of the state as such. If the state can no longer uphold the social contract by guaranteeing the security of its citizens, its monopoly of violence becomes contestable and its ordering principles open to renegotiation.

Violence and memory

Because of the close link between power and violence, the provision of security, in both its internal and external dimensions, is a core function of the modern state and has an important impact on its legitimacy. The experience of collective violence therefore provides the conditions (indeed, the necessity) for a reformulation of security policy, but it also becomes a central element in the ideas shaping the substance of this reformulation, namely through its entry into collective memory.[55] Collective memory, or "national autobiographies,"[56] are complex and always contested in multiple ways. As Cubitt (2007) points out, this contestation is due, *inter alia*, to the ambiguous relationship between history and memory as such, but also

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[54] For a concise overview of the respective philosophies of Gramsci, Habermas, and Foucault cf. Fischer, *Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices*, 35–40, 78. Cf. also Balibar, "Pouvoir," 201; Johan Galtung, *Frieden mit friedlichen Mitteln: Friede und Konflikt, Entwicklung und Kultur*, trans. Hajo Schmidt (Opladen, Germany: Leske + Budrich, 1998).

[55] Note that the term "collective memory" is contested. Some scholars prefer to differentiate between public and collective memory, cf. Lebow, *National Identities and International Relations*, 47–48. Others prefer the term "social memory," cf. Geoffrey Cubitt, *History and Memory*, eBook (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007) Introduction.

[56] Lebow, *National Identities and International Relations*, 133–36.

to the complicated issues of transmission and representation of memory in large groups.[57]

What is clear, however, is that violence plays a large role in collective memory. To see this, it is sufficient to ponder the practice of commemoration of national holidays. These often portray heroic perspectives on collective violence (such as the "independence day" as the culmination of violent struggle for freedom) or, conversely, regenerative aspects of overcoming tragedy and trauma (e.g., the *Tag der deutschen Einheit,* German Unity Day, as a marker of national reunification following half a century of division that had its origins in World War II). National holiday commemorations frequently also feature performances of a military character, such as parades or exhibitions, giving armed force the seemingly natural center stage in the celebration of national sovereignty and unity.

Nevertheless, unity often does not extend far below the surface. Different "storylines"[58] typically compete for legitimacy and the prerogative over interpretation of the collective past. In this context, it is important to note that political actors are not only leaders, but also participants in the battle over the interpretation of the past —in other words, they do not necessarily try to manipulate others but may themselves be convinced of their own narratives.[59] Further, as Petersen (2002) remarks, political actors may often simply go along with the flow of events, especially if their specific formulations find resonance in an emerging political situation.[60]

These struggles can be especially strong and visible in states that must (re)construct

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[57] Cubitt, *History and Memory,* chaps. 2, 4.
[58] Fischer, *Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices,* chap. 87 et seqq.
[59] Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics,* 2nd ed. (Urbana, Il.: University of Illinois Press, 1985), 20.
[60] Roger D. Petersen, *Understanding Ethnic Violence. Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 66. This observation is in line with Edelman's argument that leadership lies more in the dynamics of a situation than in a person *per se*. Edelman consequently characterized charisma as a group function, not a personality trait. Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics,* 73, 80. Compare also the description of the "charismatic situation" in M. Rainer Lepsius, "Max Weber's Concept of Charismatic Authority and Its Applicability to Adolf Hitler's 'Führerstaat,'" in *Max Weber and Institutional Theory,* ed. Claus Wendt (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2017), 93–97.

their institutions after periods of protracted violence. Ironically, the competition over the meaning of the past—which usually also entails an implicit plan for the future—has the potential for violence, either through domestic confrontation or through conflicts with other states. It thus threatens to return societies to the cycles of violence they are attempting to escape. Democratic governance has been advanced as a solution to peacefully mediate such internal and external conflicts but, as Mansfield and Snyder (2007) show, transitions to democracy frequently coincide with an increased risk of democratizing states becoming involved in wars.[61]

The relationship between violence, memory, and democratization therefore appears to be complex and ambivalent. Surveying recent history, we find evidence to support this argument not only in western and central European countries after the ravages exerted by decades of war, unrest, and repression culminating in World War II. It is also present in the context of decolonization in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, or in the case of countries that (re)gained their sovereignty after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Democratization after the experience of collective violence—whether in the form of war, colonial or ideological-authoritarian repression —is always difficult, and in some cases, it spurs further violence.

Transnational power and national security

Finally, but importantly, external influence makes itself felt in these struggles over past, present, and future—especially when it comes to security policy. Here, questions arise over the role a state is going to play on the international stage[62] and, in many cases, also over its strategic alignment with one or another camp in ideological and power competitions. The direct

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[61] Edward D.S. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War*, BCSIA Studies in International Security (Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press, 2007).

[62] For a concise overview of role theory in international politics cf. Morin and Paquin, *Foreign Policy Analysis: A Toolbox*, chap. 8; Lebow, *National Identities and International Relations*, chap. 4.For a more in-depth treatment, cf. Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank, and Hanns W. Maull, *Role Theory in International Relations: Approaches and Analyses*, ed. Routledge (London, 2011).

intervention of large, powerful states in the domestic political competition of smaller states through the provision of assistance or, conversely, through threats and/or the imposition of sanctions is obviously important. In addition, however, the assessment of a state's role in and by the international community has increased in significance as well. Lebow (2016) calls international society the "thinnest of societies"[63] but still emphasizes its role in legitimizing or penalizing individual states as well as in providing a forum in which even small states can gain influence and a voice in international politics.[64]

In summary, then, to understand how societies become amenable to specific ideas about their security and how to achieve it, we must go beyond simply stipulating the importance of ideas and identity. We must carefully examine the distribution and sources of power among domestic and external actors in the political contest over ideas as well as the narratives they employ to create and legitimize specific meanings for past events, without losing sight of the intrinsic connection between power and violence.

From ideas to rules: Institutions and the problem of continuity and change

To get from ideas to the norms and values that underly concrete national security policy we need yet another step. Béland (2019), who argues that political ideas are "historically constructed beliefs and perceptions of both individual and collective actors,"[65] offers the following definition of institutions: they are "embedded rules that shape … actors' behavior alongside, and in conjunction with, ideas." As such, they constitute "social and political settlements and the products of power struggles which are themselves embedded in ideational and institutional processes."[66]

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[63] Lebow, *National Identities and International Relations*, chap. 77.
[64] Lebow, chaps. 94–103.
[65] Daniel Béland, *How Ideas and Institutions Shape the Politics of Public Policy* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 4.
[66] Béland, 5.

Institutionalization as a dynamic process

From this definition it becomes clear that ideas, institutions, and socio-political power structures are closely intertwined. An unambiguous definition of the point at which an idea turns into a rule enforced through institutions will not always be possible.[67] At the same time, the interaction between political competition and institutions runs in two directions simultaneously. Political competition is structured by existing institutions, yet it also continuously creates new institutions.

For this reason, Lepsius (2017) suggests that researchers should focus not on a static concept of institutions, but instead on dynamic institutionalization processes.[68] The relevant question to ask, then, is not what an institution is, but what the social consequences of institutions are. Moreover, this perspective also invites us to separate the concept of institutions that structure social action[69] from the material form of organizations, such as parliaments or ministries of foreign affairs. The description of an organization, cautions Lepsius (2017), is not the equivalent of institutional analysis.[70]

New institutionalism in policy science

Renewed interest in the study of institutions ("neo-institutionalism") in political and policy science emerged as another reaction to the earlier dominance of behaviorism in these fields. New institutionalism draws attention to how institutions such as constitutional and electoral systems or economic regimes shape the objectives ("interests") of actors and structure the power relations that underlie the mediation of these interests.[71] It represents a critique of the

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[67] Béland, 5.
[68] Claus Wendt, "Introduction to Lepsius' Concept of Institutional Theory," in *Max Weber and Institutional Theory*, ed. Claus Wendt (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2017), 2.
[69] M. Rainer Lepsius, "The Institutionalization and Deinstitutionalization of Rationality Criteria," in *Max Weber and Institutional Theory*, ed. Claus Wendt (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2017), 35–36.
[70] M. Rainer Lepsius, "Institutional Analysis and Institutional Policy," in *Max Weber and Institutional Theory*, ed. Claus Wendt (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2017), 51.
[71] Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," in *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Perspective*, ed. Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank

rational actor paradigm underlying behaviorist approaches in so far as it points to the importance of structures that limit the agency of individual and collective actors. At the same time, structures (institutions) do not constitute outcomes in themselves;[72] they leave an, albeit constrained, space for human agency. Institutionalism thus can also be interpreted as a critique of purely structuralist paradigms. In International Relations, we may think here of neo-realism, which attributes outcome predominantly to specific structural configurations of the international system.

Different types of institutionalism differ in the weights they ascribe to agency vs. structure in outcomes. Rational-choice institutionalism, for instance, treats institutions as intervening variables that can shape but not determine behavior.[73] My argument, conversely, draws on two other forms of new institutionalism, namely historical and sociological institutionalism. Historical institutionalism posits, in a nutshell, that history matters. Institutions evolve historically through complex processes.[74] More than simply creating constraints and opportunities that act as intervening variables on actor behavior, they produce alternative logics of action. As Allison and Zelikow (1999) show in their study of the Cuban missile crisis, decision-makers more often follow a logic of appropriateness that considers previous practices and existing routines, not a purely rational logic of consequences geared toward maximally efficient outcomes.[75]

This insight explains why behavior in material organizations embedded in specific frameworks of values and norms, for instance, is frequently inefficient but still hard to change.

Longstreth (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 1–32.
[72] Thelen and Steinmo.
[73] Thomas A. Koelble, "The New Institutionalism in Political Science and Sociology," *Comparative Politics* 27, no. 2 (1995): 239–41.
[74] Ellen Immergut, "The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism," *Politics and Society* 26, no. 1 (1998).
[75] Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd ed. (Harlow, UK: Longman, 1999), 146. For an explication of the logic of appropriateness and its application by neo-institutionalists, cf. James March and Johan P. Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," *American Political Science Review* 78 (1984): 734–49.

An important concept in this context is that of path dependence, or what Béland (2019) calls "lock-in effects."[76] Past decisions continue to shape future outcomes, even if the current environment would suggest different solutions to be more effective or efficient. Scholars have paid particular attention to positive feedback effects from previously instituted policies and practices that reinforce logics of appropriateness and make adaptation more difficult.[77]

Sociological institutionalism, for its part, builds on these insights but emphasizes the importance of institutions in creating meaning for individuals. Inefficiency, for instance, may be due also to the symbolic functions of specific practices and even entire institutions. I have mentioned above the ritual practice of national holiday celebrations, which are often organized around narratives that highlight certain aspects of a society's history (while sublimating and suppressing others). In Austria, for example, the storyline of "perpetual neutrality" *(immerwährende Neutralität)* is gratuitously utilized in speeches and practices surrounding national holiday celebrations to reproduce a specific foreign policy identity related to abstract ideas of non-alignment, bridge-building, and peacefulness.

This image is evidently geared toward evoking emotions of collective identity as well as toward drawing a sharp dividing line to a history of imperialism, fascism, and participation in aggressive nationalism in the period up to and during World War II.[78] Because of its status as a marker of post-World War II Austrian identity, neutrality as an institution of foreign policy is difficult to remove, even though most scholars and political actors privately agree that it has lost its practical meaning since the end of the cold war. Sociological institutionalism, then,

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[76] Béland, *How Ideas and Institutions Shape the Politics of Public Policy*, 11. For a closer examination of path dependence, cf. Daniel Béland, "Ideas and Social Policy: An Institutionalist Perspective," *Social Policy & Administration* 39, no. 1 (2005): 1–18.

[77] However, Béland cautions that besides self-reinforcing effects we may also find self-undermining phenomena that gradually erode existing responses to policy problems. Béland, *How Ideas and Institutions Shape the Politics of Public Policy*, 12.

[78] Note also that that the fact that neutrality practically got imposed on Austria as a condition for regaining its full statehood after 1945 plays no part in these contemporary celebrations.

draws attention to how institutions produce alternative rationalities, in which questions of effectiveness and efficiency take a backseat to the creation and continuous reproduction of meaning. The emphasis here is less on how institutions impact actors' rational calculations, but on how they shape actors' identities and basic preferences.[79]

Ideas as the "switchmen" of politics

How can we conceptualize the role ideas play in the process of institutionalization from a neo-institutionalist perspective? Max Weber likened the function of ideas to those of "switchmen" or "switchboard operators," which determine the tracks on which political action runs.[80] From this metaphor, Lepsius (2017) derives the concept of "guiding ideas" *(Leitideen),* which lie at the beginning of institutionalization processes and are always in competition with alternative guiding ideas. Consider the situation of a state being reconstituted after a major war, such as Germany after World War II. As Legro (2005) shows, the lessons that the conservative Konrad Adenauer drew from the previous half-century were quite different from those drawn by the socialist Kurt Schumacher, and so were their prescriptions for post-WWII Germany's security policy. Whereas Adenauer favored integration into a Western alliance opposed to Soviet communism, Schumacher preferred West German neutrality.[81] These two broad and differing world views would therefore set West German security policy on quite different tracks.

However, guiding ideas do not directly influence actors: they become relevant for social action only if they are institutionalized.[82] Institutionalization processes convert ideas into rules,

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[79] Lepsius, "Max Weber's Concept of Charismatic Authority and Its Applicability to Adolf Hitler's 'Führerstaat,'" 6.
[80] For an analysis of this "switching concept," cf. M. Rainer Lepsius, "Interests and Ideas: Max Weber's Allocation Problem," in *Max Weber and Institutional Theory*, ed. Claus Wendt (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2017), 23–34; Fischer, *Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices*, 24–27.
[81] Legro, *Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order*, 112–15.
[82] Lepsius, "Max Weber's Concept of Charismatic Authority and Its Applicability to Adolf Hitler's 'Führerstaat,'" 6–7.

as we have seen in Béland's definition above, and it is in this form that they shape and constrain human behavior. In this understanding, rules do not simply affect rational calculus, they also constitute actor identities by providing signposts to the type of action and objectives that are appropriate and plausible in a specific context. To continue the example of Germany, Adenauer won the post-1945 competition for ideas—due in part also to the backing his political vision received from the Western allies—and was therefore able to set in motion the institutionalization of foreign policy ideas which aligned West Germany with the United States and integrated the country into the North Atlantic alliance.[83] There cannot be any question that close alignment with the U.S. and NATO membership subsequently shaped German concrete policy actions and, over time, the country's foreign policy identity.

Continuity and change

The question of power lurks in this example, both in terms of its domestic distribution through electoral outcomes, the alignment of socioeconomic interest groups, etc. but also in terms of the influence external actors can exert. Yet the unceasing ebb and flow of domestic political competition and its interaction with external influences mean that political ideas are always being critiqued, deconstructed, and reassembled. We have noted above the path dependence of institutions and their reproduction of social meaning. Yet at the same time, there are constant demands to reform or repair institutions. These demands are often made in the name of efficiency or justice of specific outcomes but are typically underpinned by attempts to transform broader structures of power and domination.[84] In the words of Lepsius (2017), processes of institutionalization and de-institutionalization are constantly going on in parallel.[85]

Complete and abrupt de-institutionalization is rare even, as Legro's (2005) examples

[83] Legro, *Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order*, 112–15.
[84] Fischer, *Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices*, 77.
[85] Lepsius, "The Institutionalization and Deinstitutionalization of Rationality Criteria," 40.

from the field of international politics show, in the aftermath of major shocks. However, the absence of wholesale revision cannot be equated to the absence of any change at all. Under a perhaps deceptive veneer of continuity, processes of layering new elements onto an existing institutional framework, and of policy drift that adapts existing solutions to changing environments abound.[86] The practice of recombining familiar elements of existing political ideas in new forms, for its part, has been subsumed under the term "bricolage."[87]

The dynamics of incremental change become especially powerful when viewed through the lens of framing, which refers to the normative concepts that political actors discursively use to legitimize policies or responses to a novel challenge.[88] Frames play a crucial part in determining what comes to constitute a policy problem. Via the narrative frames used to constitute problems, they also imply a specific range of solutions. In this sense, in the context of security policy, frames are an element of the security imaginaries we encountered above, and they make use of the same method of reassembling familiar elements in order to craft solutions to novel problems.

As Béland (2019) observes, through process such as layering, policy drift, and bricolage, incremental change can gradually become transformative.[89] In other words, by continuously eroding, adapting, and reassembling institutions at the margins, these institutions can be transformed in terms of their actual social consequences. This also means that political actors may be able to affect change without altering narratives that constitute core elements of cultural and social discourses, thus avoiding potentially futile and costly attempts to attack institutions head-on. In the novel "The Leopard" *(Il Gattopardo)*, set during the period of Italian unification in the 19th century, Tancredi Falconeri tells his uncle that "[i]f we want

[86] Béland, *How Ideas and Institutions Shape the Politics of Public Policy*, 38–39.
[87] Campbell, "Institutional Analysis and the Role of Ideas in Political Economy."
[88] Campbell.
[89] Béland, *How Ideas and Institutions Shape the Politics of Public Policy*, 38–39.

things to stay as they are, things will have to change."[90] The hallmark of successful institutions, then, may be that their meaning remains constant for us even if their contents and consequences change.

The preceding pages have laid out a research agenda that investigates how ideas can influence behavior in international politics through institutional processes. It has also drawn attention to how power distributions structure the playing field for competing ideas. We must take these into account if we want to understand why some ideas are more convincing—literally, more "powerful"—in a specific situation than others. Furthermore, this section has also highlighted the intrinsic relationship between power and violence that is at the core of the modern state and which the study of international politics and security has yet to integrate more comprehensively in its concepts and analyses. The following section takes a look at how this connection of power and violence played out in Austria and Greece in the first half of the 20th century.

HISTORICAL ORIGINS: GREECE AND AUSTRIA FROM THE BALKAN WARS TO THE REORDERING OF EUROPE AFTER WWII

> *"The history of the peace movement in Greece, from the time of its birth in 1995," Z continued, "is a cruel story. At the first meeting of the friends of peace in Piraeus, the police looked the other way while hirelings burst into the theater and threw spittoons at the speakers, shouted, hissed, and threatened without any interference from the Chief of Police, who was present in the first row of the orchestra. A participant in a disarmament meeting in Lesbos was killed for reasons that have remained mysterious to this day. In Athens a young soldier who took part in another peace meeting was court-*

[90] *"Se vogliamo che tutto rimango come è, bisogna che tutto cambi."* Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa, *Il Gattopardo* (Milan: Feltrinelli "Le Comete," 2002), 25.

martialed and sent to Triethnes, a remote post near the Albania-Yugoslav borders where he died shortly afterwards, succumbing, to quote the official statement of the High Command, 'to the effects of an accident at the rifle range.'

Why is peace so intolerable to them? Why don't they attack other organizations and movements …? Why do they vent their wrath on our movement alone, which aims at peace and international détente, which draws support from all over the world and includes leaders of all parties? The reason is simple: the other movements are Greek, local, oriented toward internal affairs. Consequently, they don't interest our Allies — those great protectors of ours, who to our faces always play the friend and behind our backs doublecross us right down the line. Think of Asia Minor in 1922, and now today in Cyprus…"[91]

This quote, from the political novel *Z*, captures the complicated mixture of polarizing narratives, domestic politics, and external security pressures that suffused the political atmosphere of post-World War II Greece. Vassilis Vassilikos wrote *Z* in 1966 as a thinly fictionalized account of the assassination of socialist Member of Parliament (MP) Grigoris Lambrakis in Thessaloniki three years earlier. The novel, which Costa-Gavras turned into a motion picture awarded at the Academy Awards and the Cannes Film Festival, struck a nerve in a country dealing uneasily with the legacy of a civil war that had ended only in 1949.[92] It also ominously foreshadowed the military junta that would seize power in Athens in 1967.

Breaking out almost immediately after the expulsion of Axis troops, the Greek civil war had origins in domestic political developments dating backing to the beginning of the 20th century. Yet it was also marked by the upheaval of the two world wars and by the emerging

[91] Vassilis Vassilikos, *Z*, trans. Marilyn Calmann, 25th anniv (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1991), 101–2.
[92] It was banned in Greece in 1966.

cold war, pitting progressives, communists, and left-wing partisans on one side against a motley collection of conservative democrats, monarchists, remnants of Greece's pre-war fascist dictatorship, nationalist paramilitaries, and Nazi collaborators. The Greek government army prevailed, due in large part to interventions by the United Kingdom and the United States, against opponents supported by Yugoslavia and, covertly, the USSR. By contrast, the political rifts dividing Greek society would not be overcome for a long time.

These rifts pervade the pages of Vassilikos' novel and make tangible the difficulties faced by a society emerging from a protracted cycle of violence that are impossible to neatly categorize as the experience of "war," defined as a state of declared armed conflict with a clear beginning and end. Instead, a close examination of the political, economic, and sociocultural situation of post-World War II Greece reveals how external and internal aspects of violent conflict had become entangled over the previous decades, how they had both inflamed and in turn been stoked by domestic and international political trends, and how they had marked the sense of identity and belonging of different population groups. Neither could the political and social divisions of Greek society easily be subsumed into a simplifying opposition of "right" vs. "left," capitalist-democratic vs. socialist/ communist. The cleavages were complex and crisscrossed back and forth between modernizers and conservatives, democrats and fascists, royalists, "Venizelists,"[93] social democrats, and communists.

Greece and Austria in the "European civil war"

Greece in the 1940s and 1950s, even though its specific situation was idiosyncratic, shared its recent history of domestic and external violence with many other European societies of the time. Territorial reordering of Europe as a result of the collapse of three empires—the

[93] A term used to refer to the supporters of the political thought of Eleftherios Venizelos, the preeminent Greek liberal politician of the early 20th century, prime minister from 1910 to 1915, 1917 to 1920, in 1924, and from 1928 to 1933. Venizelos towered over the politics of his country in a way that earned him the sobriquet "the maker of modern Greece" in a 1921 New York Times article, see J.W. Duffield, "Venizelos, Maker of Modern Greece," *The New York Times*, 1921.

Ottoman, Roman, and Habsburg ones—and of the peace treaties of Brest-Litovsk, Versailles, St-Germain, Trianon, Sèvres, and Lausanne at the end of World War I had caused large population movements, often accompanied by harassment, repression, and physical violence.[94] Political instability had been rife in Europe in the interwar years of 1918 to 1939, with *coups d'état* overthrowing governments in countries ranging from Hungary (1920) to Portugal (1926).[95]

The October Revolution had triggered the civil war of "Reds" vs. "Whites" in Russia and led to foreign intervention as well as to the Polish-Soviet War of 1919-1921.[96] Radical authoritarian nationalism, most infamous in its manifestations as German national socialism and Italian fascism, had by 1938 become the government ideology in Greece, Austria, Hungary, and Poland.[97] The Spanish Civil War, fought between Republicans and Nationalists as well as their respective foreign supporters from 1936 to 1939, led to large-scale human suffering as a result of atrocities against civilians, direct deaths from hostilities, and indirect loss of life due to malnutrition and disease.[98] As World War II erupted and the Axis powers invaded and occupied large parts of Europe, divisions emerged between collaborators and resistance movements everywhere from France to Yugoslavia, Ukraine and the Baltic states. These rifts became visible not least in Italy itself, where the *partigiani* (partisans) fought both Italian fascists and, after 1943, the Nazi occupiers.[99]

The two world wars of 1914-1918 and 1939-1945 dominate our contemporary

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[94] Cf. Julia Eichenberg and John Paul Newman, "Introduction: Aftershocks: Violence in Dissolving Empires after the First World War," *Contemporary European History* 19, no. 3 (2010): 183–94.
[95] Cf. the case studies collected in António Costa Pinta and Aristotle Kallis, eds., *Rethinking Fascism and Dictatorship in Europe* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
[96] Cf. Norman Davis, "The Missing Revolutionary War," *Soviet Studies* 27, no. 2 (1975): 178–95.
[97] Cf. Jørgen Møller, Svend-Erik Skaaning, and Jakob Tolstrup, "International Influences and Democratic Regression in Interwar Europe: Disentangling the Impact of Power Politics and Demonstration Effects," *Government and Opposition* 52, no. 4 (2017): 559–86. See also case studies in Costa Pinta and Kallis, *Rethinking Fascism and Dictatorship in Europe*.
[98] Enzo Traverso, *Fire and Blood: The European Civil War, 1914-1945*, trans. David Fernbach, eBook (London: Verso, 2016), chap. 8 Enlightenment and counter-enlightenment.
[99] Traverso, *Fire and Blood: The European Civil War, 1914-1945* Introduction.

imagination of violence in first half of the 20th century because of their global scale, their nature as total wars, and the industrial destruction of human lives perpetrated by the Nazis during the Holocaust. And yet, World War II was in many ways a culmination of political violence that had begun before 1914 and had never been fully absent in Europe after 1918. This waxing and waning of violence over three decades have prompted scholars to describe them as a period of "European civil war."[100]

Enzo Traverso (2016) notes the entanglement of "'classic' wars between states; civil wars; wars of national liberation; genocides; violent confrontations arising from cleavages of class, nation, religion, politics, and ideology"[101] between 1914 and 1945, drawing attention to the multitude of "local civil wars" that were stoked and inflamed by World War II. One may add here that these local civil wars were ongoing in some cases already before the outbreak of World War I and as such influenced a country's alignment in the Great War. For instance, irredentist conflict between Greek and Bulgarian nationalists had led to a campaign of political terror in northern Greece in the first decade of the 20th century and prompted Greece's entry into the quadruple alliance of the League of the Balkan. The League, in turn, played a role in the first and second Balkan Wars and contributed to a chain of events linked to the outbreak of World War I.[102]

The Austro-Hungarian monarchy, in turn, which triggered World War I in response to the assassination of archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914 by a Serb nationalist, was an empire beset by conflict on the eve of that war. As Beller (2006) shows, domestic and foreign policy were intertwined in the context of nationality conflict in the Danube monarchy. The Habsburgs viewed Serbia as an alternative power center in the Balkans, potentially attractive to

[100] See the discussion of the concept of European civil war in Traverso, chap. 1.
[101] Traverso, chap. 1 Interpretations.
[102] Ioannis Zelepos, *Kleine Geschichte Griechenlands. Von der Staatsgründung bis heute*, 2nd ed. (Munich: C.H.Beck, 2017), 89–92, 99–102.

ethnic minorities within the empire, as well as a satellite of Russia. The combination of internal and external dynamics only served to inflate Austrian threat perceptions tied to Serb nationalism.[103]

Franz Ferdinand himself had been part of a circle of "new men" advocating for a more muscular Habsburg foreign policy with the aim of reinvigorating the monarchy's standing abroad and of strengthening the identity and loyalty of its subjects. By the time the archduke was assassinated in Sarajevo, the empire had however failed in efforts to reign in Serbia through either trade sanctions—the 1906-10 "Pig War"—or a regional détente with Russia. Its ruling circles were therefore convinced that only force could stem the tide of Serb expansion on the Habsburg southern flank.[104]

Vienna's gamble on war with Serbia in the end revealed itself as singularly ill-judged. As the defeat of the German-Austrian alliance became evident, domestic unrest erupted. Hungary withdrew from the dual monarchy, and on November 11, eight days after the Austrian government had concluded an armistice, emperor Karl renounced the throne. The peace treaty of St-Germain left Austria a rump state, cut off from many of its former industrial centers in now independent Czechoslovakia as well as from Germany, with whom most Austrians felt ethnic kinship. The first Austrian republic was beset by war debts and economic problems. Domestic policy soon deteriorated from attempts to build an all-party coalition government.[105] After civil war-like confrontations between conservative and socialist paramilitary groups had destroyed the last vestiges of consensus between the major political groupings in the early 1930s, so-called "Austrofascist" forces under chancellor Engelbert Dollfuß erected an

[103] Steven Beller, *A Concise History of Austria* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), chap. 5 An empire falls apart.
[104] An empire falls apart Beller, chap. 5.
[105] Beller, chap. 5 The orphan republic, 1918-1927.

authoritarian, corporatist state.[106]

Greece, meanwhile, had ended World War I on the side of the victors. While the country made territorial gains, its domestic politics had become increasingly acrimonious because of the confrontation between prime minister Eleftherios Venizelos—who had advocated for support to the Entente powers—and king Constantine I, who had favored the Triple Alliance. Moreover, the territories allotted to Greece by the Treaty of Sèvres in Asia Minor turned out to be a poisoned chalice. Because of the Greek government's political and strategic mishandling of the territories, but also because of Mustafa Kemal's refusal to accept the post-war fragmentation of present-day Turkey, Athens and Ankara were soon engaged in a military conflict. Hostilities ended with Greek defeat and the expulsion of most ethnic Greeks from Asia Minor in 1922. One year later, the Treaty of Lausanne cemented the ethnic cleansing of Greeks—categorized by the treaty as individuals of Greek Orthodox faith—from the Turkish Republic and, conversely, of most Muslims from Greece.[107]

Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, the political situation in Greece was marked by political instability, exacerbated by the inflow of refugees, contention over minority rights, and the deteriorating global economic situation. King George II was forced to abdicate in 1922, and the newly proclaimed Second Hellenic Republic then suffered a military coup and a military countercoup in rapid succession. Except for the period 1928-1932, during which Venizelos again headed the government, Greece remained in political turmoil fanned by the mutual antipathy between royalists, republicans, and the emerging communist movement. In 1935, another *coup d'état* led to the abolishment of the republic and the reinstatement of the monarchy. A year later, Ioannis Metaxas, a royalist army general, suspended parliament with

[106] Dollfuß was assassinated in 1934 during a failed coup attempt by Nazi agents after he had tried to ban the National-Socialist Party in Austria.
[107] Zelepos, *Kleine Geschichte Griechenlands. Von der Staatsgründung bis heute*, 111–16, 118–21.

the king's approval, and established a dictatorial regime modeled after Benito Mussolini's Fascist Italy.[108]

World War II and its aftermath

As during the Great War, Austria and Greece were on different sides during World War II as well. Austrians had acquiesced for the most part without any resistance to German annexation *(Anschluss)* in 1938 and were thus complicit in Hitler's war of aggression and Nazi crimes perpetrated before and during the war, especially the Holocaust.[109] The Greek government, on the other hand, actively opposed Italian and, later, German occupation, and many Greeks engaged in armed resistance against the axis powers.[110] Accordingly, at the end of the war, Austria was occupied by the Allies whereas Greece regained its sovereignty immediately after the German withdrawal in August 1944.

However, it soon became apparent that the two countries faced challenges that were in many respects similar. Both had been in dire political and economic straits even before the outbreak of WWII, with societies divided between opposing ideologies and struggling with inflationary pressures, unemployment, and economic stagnation. The war had entrenched political rifts, and it had further devastated the economy. The political elites that acceded to power in Athens and Vienna in 1944/1945 had for the most part spent the war years in exile and therefore struggled to connect with and gain legitimacy from a population traumatized by atrocities both suffered and perpetrated.

In addition, the deteriorating relations between the western Allies and the Soviet Union

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[108] Zelepos, 138–41, 144–48.

[109] The historic responsibility flowing from this acquiescence was not explicitly and publicly recognized in Austria until the 1980s. The post-war political consensus had been that Austria, in line with the wording of the Allies' Moscow Declaration, had been "the first free country to fall a victim to Hitlerite aggression." See Declaration on Austria in "The Moscow Conference, October 1943: Joint Four-Nation Declaration," 1943, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/moscow.asp.

[110] At the same time, Greek collaboration with the Nazis also occurred, in part as an outgrowth of rivalry between right and left-wing paramilitary groups; a development that foreshadowed the civil war which broke out in 1946.

sharply constrained domestic leeway for social reconciliation in the post-war years. Both Austria and Greece were located at the geographical fault lines between the two ideological camps and were therefore perceived as potential buffers between capitalist-democratic and communist zones of influence.

In Austria's case, it took a decade until the country regained its independence. It would do so only as the result of a compromise between Austrian political leaders and Nikita Khrushchev, wherein the Austrians accepted to commit to "perpetual neutrality" in exchange for the withdrawal of Allied occupation troops. Greece, as indicated above, slid into civil war almost immediately after the end of World War II. While the communist forces were never able to take power in Athens, they established strongholds in various parts of the country and fought pitched battles against the Greek government army, thanks in part to support from Marshall Tito's Yugoslavia and covert Soviet assistance.

As the overt violence of the civil war in Greece ended and a path to state independence opened up for Austria, the question of national identity came to the fore for both countries. External pressures certainly played a major role in this context. The war had fundamentally altered the distribution of power in the international system, most notably by confirming the rise of the United States to super-power status and through the emergence of systemic bipolarity. It had also convinced the governments of the western Allies that a type of global governance was required beyond the model of the League of Nations, which had failed miserably in preventing World War II.

This meant not only an organizational replacement for the League but also the establishment of a web of international institutions and agreements to guide and regulate international governance and prevent future wars of aggression.[111] These included, for instance,

[111] For a description of the U.S. turn toward liberal internationalism post-WWII, cf. Legro, *Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order*, chap. 3.

the Bretton Woods institutions but also the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which stipulated in principle that governments had to respect the fundamental rights and basic freedoms of all human beings. Regarding Europe, specifically, a pessimistic view had become dominant, namely that conflict between the regional powers was inevitably fated to lead to incessant wars. The way out of this vicious cycle was seen in integration between the continent's historic rivals, France and Germany, within the framework of a regional organization that originally focused on trade relations and over time morphed into the contemporary European Union.

This combination of international liberal institutionalism promoted chiefly by the United States and the beginning ideological confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union constrained the choices of foreign policy alignment and internal governance for Europe's smaller powers. Those countries that had been fully or partially liberated by the western Allies—and who escaped the German fate of partition—opted for alignment with what became referred to during the cold war as the "free world," including the associated form of internal government as democracies and market economies. Democratic governance initially often remained more pretense than practiced reality, and free market ideology was filtered in all cases through rather gratuitous state intervention. However, outside financial support, which came mainly from the United States and was a requisite of economic survival, mandated at least a token commitment to democracy and liberal governance.

Democracy also meant that political choices could not simply be decreed from above. They had to be negotiated between different political forces supported by varying strata of the population. As the Greek case and the considerable support for the communist movement in the civil war shows, the choices were contested, to say the least. Moreover, they put into stark relief the social cleavages opened by half a century of ideological confrontation, rapid demographic and social change, and armed violence. To ensure the stability of any government,

these cleavages had to be confronted in some fashion. In part, this meant leading political actors had to advance ideas that fostered the perception of a national community and thus legitimized policy choices, especially about the security of the population and the country's role in the world.

From the vantage point of today the choices made by political leaders in Austria and Greece in the post-war years seem obvious. But this view neglects their contested nature at the time as well as the necessity political elites felt to actively suppress, sublimate, or coopt competing narratives. I posit that the cleavages, ideological confrontations, and generalized sense of insecurity faced by the Greek and Austrian societies in the years after 1945, while idiosyncratic in their concrete manifestations, are a challenge they have historically shared and continue to share with all societies emerging from protracted violence. Examining the patterns through which societies and political leaders in these cases made sense of their recent experiences of collective violence, and how the ensuing narratives influenced their politics of security, may prove useful for the analysis of a wide array of cases in future research.

Linking Violence to National Security Policy

Based on the historical background described in the previous section, I now aim to proposal a causal mechanism to formative national security experiences, and especially the experience of collective violence, to security doctrines in Austria and Greece. As outlined above, a combination of pressures from the international system and domestic political cleavages confronted both countries at this point: legacies of protracted violence meshed with rivalling political ideologies, which in turn were influenced by a novel distribution of power in the international system, the U.S. turn to liberal institutionalism, and the system confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. How did Greek and Austrian societies and political elites make sense of the recent experiences of collective violence under these

circumstances, and how did their interpretation influence the conceptualization of security doctrines and the (re)construction of national security organizations?

I use the term security doctrine or security policy to encompass what scholars and commentators in the U.S. generally refer to as "national security policy," which is understood by their European counterparts as both "foreign policy" and "defense policy," or, in the specific case of the European Union, as "foreign and security policy." The two latter variants make clear that this policy field encompasses not only questions of military security but also of diplomacy. Security policy choices in this work thus refer to what Legro (2005) generally describes as "ideas about how to approach international society."[112] Within this admittedly broad category, my research is motivated by the question of how security doctrines positioned Austria and Greece vis-à-vis the dominant great powers and ideological influences in the international sphere.

Hypotheses

Three working hypotheses arise from the review of the existing literature and the gaps identified in it.

H1. Because security and the monopoly of violence are intrinsic elements of the modern state, addressing recent experiences of collective violence is a central legitimizing task for political elites.

The long first half of the twentieth century, understood as the period in which the (west) European state system fully transitioned from imperialism and aggressive totalitarianism to the model of democratic national states, constitutes a clear example of the close connection between violence and state formation. Between 1914 and 1945, empires had collapsed, two

[112] Legro, 8.

total wars had led to massive loss of life, displacement, and destruction, and totalitarian repression had entailed the imprisonment, torture, and killing of millions, culminating in the Holocaust. Authoritarianism, internal political strife, and terrorism had deeply affected many European countries in the interwar period; for some states, especially in southern Europe, these continued after World War II into the 1960s and 1970s.

Once the political process became pacified and advanced precariously toward democratization, the European states had to (re)build security institutions under conditions of domestic political competition. These were also influenced by the material and ideological environment that the end of World War II and the emerging cold war imposed on them. I argue here that the way in which political elites responded to these conditions, and the type of discursive frames and imaginaries they mobilized to propagate their policy preferences, were shaped significantly by the ideas they employed to make sense of the trauma of violence, guilt, and victimhood in the previous half-century.

The geographic focus of my research does not imply that the experience of violence as a central element of foreign policy identity applies exclusively to non-communist European states after World War II. My intention here is rather to build a framework based on a small number of cases that can plausibly be analyzed in parallel over an extended time period. Further research into the interlinkages between the experience of political violence and the ideas and institutions of security policy should therefore apply this heuristic to other spatial and temporal contexts.

H2. National security doctrines must be gradually institutionalized—i.e., transformed from political ideas into norms, values, and rules—to influence and channel concrete policy choices.

I argue that broad security doctrines have a an ideational and an institutional component. The ideational component is provided by policy paradigms that include specific

world views and the programmatic and policy prescriptions that flow from these views. Once such policy paradigms become the accepted "rules of the game", they are institutionalized as norms and values. In turn, these norms and values are reflected in the setup of material organizations of security policy, such as the military, the diplomatic service, and the national security bureaucracy, where they shape logics of action and create path dependence.

Doctrines thus plays two major roles. First, they legitimize more specific and concrete policy choices, even if these policy choices are to a significant degree influenced by structural constraints and/or dominant ideologies propagated by powerful states and other transnational actors. By framing policy choice in a way that is consistent with perceptions of collective historic experience, the prevailing *zeitgeist* and public sentiment, policymakers can win support and legitimacy for their choice of security policy.

Second, once doctrines become institutionalized, they constrain policy innovation and change. The individuals charged with implementing, evaluating, and adjusting policy are socialized into a system that tends to reproduce itself. In the absence of significant shocks, radical doctrine reversion becomes rare.

H3. The inherent ambiguity and symbolic character of national security doctrines allows policymakers to engage in incremental changes that modify policies over time without having to challenge established perceptions of a country's identity and role in the world.

This does not mean, however, that policies are rigid and do not evolve at all. The most long-lasting doctrines typically provide room for ambiguity and ambivalence that make them more useful as symbols than as clear policy prescription. Therefore, processes such as policy drift or "bricolage" allow policymakers to reassemble elements of the accepted doctrine in a way that incrementally alters its original meaning and intent.

For instance, strategies that were perceived as successful in one case are applied to an entirely different case, and prescriptions that are imposed on a national government by more powerful state or transnational actors rendered ("translated") in a way that is seemingly in line with national policy. Through these processes, the substantive content and implementation of security policy can be transformed over time without necessarily altering the discursive frames that have won legitimacy and wide acceptance.

Causal mechanisms

I posit that two causal mechanisms link formative national security experiences, and especially the experience of collective violence, to security doctrines. The first mechanism is ideational and emphasizes the importance of political ideas of national security for societies that emerge from episodes of violence. Such ideas must include narratives that help societies create meaning,[113] overcome the divisions wrought by violence,[114] establish a sense of the country's (new) identity,[115] and successfully respond to external, systemic pressures. Ideas, however, do not only put forward a specific worldview, but also entail programmatic aspects of concrete policies[116] that can be leveraged in the political competition of democratizing societies: they thus have a dual character of concrete policy and symbolic meaning.[117] In short, the ideational mechanism illuminates how specific ideas on national security are employed in political debate and why they resonate in societies emerging from collective violence.

The second mechanism is institutional. As states (re)constitute their foreign service,

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[113] Cubitt, *History and Memory*.
[114] Lebow, *National Identities and International Relations*. See also Duncan Bell, "Violence and Memory," *Millenium: Journal of International Studies* 38, no. 2 (2009): 345–60.
[115] Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity & Culture in National Security."
[116] Campbell, "Institutional Analysis and the Role of Ideas in Political Economy"; Béland, "Ideas and Social Policy: An Institutionalist Perspective."
[117] Murray Edelman, "Symbols and Political Quiescence," in *Public Policy: The Essential Readings*, ed. Stella Z. Theodoulou and Matthew A. Cahn (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995), 26–34; Murray Edelman, "Constructing the Political Spectacle," in *Public Policy: The Essential Readings*, ed. Stella Z. Theodoulou and Matthew A. Cahn (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995), 381–89.

military forces, and national security bureaucracies, ideas successful in the political competition are institutionalized and embedded in national security organizations. These institutions provide the values, norms, and rules that shape and constrain security policy.[118] Over time, they encourage path dependence and the development of "security imaginaries",[119] heuristic devices that help policymakers evaluate and respond to security challenges by assigning stable roles both to one's own country and to external "friends" and "enemies."[120] These security imaginaries work not only on the highest level of political decision-making but also pervade the security organizations and find resonance in society.[121] Radical revisions in a country's security doctrine become rare absent significant shocks, while incremental change is accommodated by the ambiguous and symbolic nature of the doctrines.[122] The steps in the composite – ideational and institutional – causal mechanism described above are visualized in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1 Causal mechanism



[118] Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*; John Gerard Ruggie, "Interests, Identity, and American Foreign Policy," in *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization*, ed. John Gerard Ruggie (London: Routledge, 1998), 203–28.
[119] Weldes, *Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis*.
[120] Lebow, *National Identities and International Relations*.
[121] March and Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life." Cf. also Béland, *How Ideas and Institutions Shape the Politics of Public Policy*.
[122] Edelman, "Symbols and Political Quiescence"; Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through," in *Public Policy Theories, Models, and Concepts: An Anthology*, ed. Daniel McCool (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995), 142–57.

It is important to note here that I view the experience of collective violence as only one among several factors that influence decisions on security doctrines; it is, however, an important one. In this sense, I am making a synthetic argument that allows for multicausality of complex phenomena. Among other influential factors are pressures emanating from the international environment—such as great power interests or the transnational diffusion of ideas—as well as domestic constraints, including the availability of material resources and the distribution of power among domestic political and social actors.

Examining the interaction of these factors with the experience of collective violence provides a more complete picture of why specific security doctrines emerge and endure over time. The point is not to isolate a single explanation and "black-box" other factors but to study the social phenomenon of collective violence and its consequences for national security in a contextual fashion. This argument is schematically depicted as a tangled net of interrelated factors influencing policy outcomes through ideas and institutions in Figure 2 below. The figure also shows feedback loops between policy outcomes and ideas and institutions.

Figure 2 Tangled net of interrelated factors influencing outcomes through ideas and

institutions, feedback loops



CONCLUSION

Conflict is an element of human community, and in democratic societies, conflicting interests and values are a part of the interplay of ideas that facilitates social progress. While conflict is thus unavoidable, its violent denouement is not inevitable. I posit that understanding how security is imagined, debated, and legitimized in societies that emerge from protracted cycles of violence is important if we want to understand their foreign policy trajectories and their behavior in international and supranational institutions, especially within the context of the EU's CFSP. Historical cases, such as Austria and Greece, can provide useful insights that may also be used to compare and contrast their experiences with those of other countries in very different circumstances.

To achieve an understanding of how security institutions are (re)constructed after extensive violence, it is necessary to keep in view both the influence exerted by international actors and the pressures of the domestic environment. Political elites always work under these

twin pressures. Ideological demands by powerful foreign actors must be reconciled with regional security concerns and domestic priorities. Unfortunately, the requisite detailed analysis of historical, socioeconomic, and political context frequently does not attract scholarly attention, except for countries considered to be "great powers" or if a concrete security crisis erupts. There is a widespread but unfortunate perception among the IR scholarly community that small states are irrelevant to explain outcomes in international politics, and even that they are too small to have "grand strategies" at all.[123]

More nuanced scholarship has pointed out the relational nature of power and influence in international politics and has drawn particular attention to the power of resistance of small states.[124] My paper argues that we can derive important insights from countries that are often considered "too small" to be of relevance. As such, it is part of a trend toward scholarship that favors widening the universe of cases studied in international security beyond the great powers[125] and the dominant "threat *du jour*." Note Neumann and Gstöhl (2006): "Few social analysts working in fields other than IR would rest content with an analysis of social organizations or indeed institutions that looked only at one particular class of entities. When considered from this point of view, IR literature comes up fairly short not only because it often focuses on variation along just one variable, namely differences in capabilities, but also because even this job has not been done satisfactorily since case studies are heavily tilted

[123] Cf. the remarks criticizing this perspective made by Simon Reich at the Albritton Center for Grand Strategy, Texas A&M University, on the occasion of the presentation of his new book co-authored with Peter Dombrowski, *Across Type, Time and Space: American Grand Strategy in Comparative Perspective*, on September 21, 2021. "Across Type, Time and Space: American Grand Strategy in Comparative Perspective," Albritton Center for Grand Strategy, accessed November 17, 2021, https://calendar.tamu.edu/bushschool/event/250919-across-type-time-and-space-american-grand-strategy. Note in this context also the critique of Neumann and Gstöhl (2006) of the view that "important events must have important causes, and that great events must have great causes." Iver B. Neumann and Sieglinde Gstöhl, "'Lilliputians in Gulliver's World?,'" in *Small States in International Relations*, ed. Jessica Beyer, Iver B. Neumann, and Sieglinde Gstöhl (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006), 22.
[124] K.J. Holsti, "The Concept of Power in the Study of International Relations," *Background* 7, no. 4 (1964): 179–94; Acharya, "The Emerging Regional Architecture of World Politics."
[125] Iver B. Neumann and Sieglinde Gstöhl, "Lilliputians in Gulliver's World?," in *Small States in International Relations*, ed. Jessica Beyer, Iver B. Neumann, and Sieglinde Gstöhl (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006), 3–36.

towards the ‘giants’.”[126]

In addition, traditional scholarship often neglects the way in which small states can leverage their membership in the European Union to pursue specific foreign policy goals. This is partially due to the EU’s unique characteristics, combining the features of a regional security order with the emerging character of a foreign policy actor in the international system. The EU’s management of its common foreign and security policy combines aspects of both great power coordination and cooperation between France, Germany, and before Brexit, the United Kingdoms and of multilateralism, the negotiation of compromise solutions with all member states. In a growing and more heterogenous EU, small member states are learning how to amplify their voice through a variety of approaches, including resistance, bargaining, and the joining of coalitions. Therefore, understanding how national security imaginaries are formed, and how they are linked to narratives of historical violence, is crucial for our interpretation of the evolution of EU foreign policy.

[126] Neumann and Gstöhl, “‘Lilliputians in Gulliver’s World?,’” 2006, 21.

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