**What do (Parties Think) Women Want?**

**Claims Making on Behalf of Women during the 2021 Bundestag Election Campaign**

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Abstract This paper examines the programs of Germany’s six major political parties in the run up to the 2021 German national election. It explores whether these parties identify gendered inequalities – faced either by women or members of the LGBTI community – and, if so, compares the remedies they propose to rectify these inequities. The paper also compares the domains in which inequalities are identified and the degree to which parties adopt an intersectional approach to undoing inequalities. It then turns to the resulting coalition agreement to determine how programmatic differences were resolved during government formation.

I identify distinct differences among the six parties and, among the coalition partners, greater differences on promoting women’s empowerment than on LGBTI rights. The Traffic Light coalition represents a considerable departure from the Merkel era, taking strong and extensive stances to empower queer Germans and, to a lesser degree, to promote equality for women.

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When Angela Merkel became the first woman Chancellor in 2005, parental leave was for one parent only (almost always the mother), fewer than 20% of CDU/CSU members of the Bundestag were women, and women held a similar percentage of German corporate board seats. Lesbian and gay couples could not marry in the Federal Republic, transgender Germans had to involuntarily divorce and undergo medically-unnecessary surgeries before legally changing their sex, and official identity documents did not legally recognize intersex people. Indeed, for many years, students of comparative politics noted that Germany’s conservative welfare state reinforced women’s traditional domestic roles and observed Germany was relatively late to advance lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) rights.[[1]](#endnote-1)

The election of a Christian Democratic woman Chancellor did not harbinger Germany becoming an international leader in promoting gender and sexual equality; however, under Merkel, the Federal Republic made globally significant advances. The country became one of the first to officially recognize the existence of intersex citizens on official documents and to ban “conversion therapy” attempts to change people’s sexual orientations. Germany not only legalized same-sex marriage, but additionally established the Magnus Hirschfeld Foundation to promote LGBTI rights at home and abroad. It reformed its welfare state to encourage stay-at-home fathers and dual career couples and adopted quotas for women on corporate boards. Over the course of Merkel’s Chancellorship, Germany rose almost seven points on the one-hundred-point European Gender Equality Index, progressing toward gender equality faster than the European Union as a whole.[[2]](#endnote-2)

At the time of Merkel’s election in 2005, Christina Xydias examined major political parties’ platforms to identify their “scripts” on gendered issues.[[3]](#endnote-3) She found significant differences among parties’ views on the existence and causes of gender inequality in Germany, the role of the state in addressing such inequalities, and the spheres in which parties identified inequalities. Research conducted after Merkel’s third term also noted major differences among parties in terms of their positions on LGBTI issues.[[4]](#endnote-4)

Four electoral periods, and numerous policy developments after Xydias’ original research, how have parties’ positions on “what women want” evolved and changed? Do their stances on issues of interest to sexual minorities also follow these gendered scripts? How does the newest addition to the German party system, the populist far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), compare to existing parties in terms of its positions on gender and sexuality? As German society has become more diverse,[[5]](#endnote-5) have parties begun to portray “women” or sexual minorities in intersectional terms?

To answer these questions, this article follows Xydias’ methodology and examines the 2021 national election platforms of Germany’s six major parties: the AfD, the Christian Democratic Union/ Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU), the Free Democratic Party (FDP), the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Left, and Alliance 90/the Greens.[[6]](#endnote-6) In addition to investigating parties’ “scripts” on gender inequality, remedies for addressing gender inequality, and spheres in which such inequality can be found – tpoics tackled in the earlier analysis -- I expand the discussion of “gender” to include LGBTI people. Further, I examine the degree to which party platforms portray women and sexual minorities in intersectional terms, recognizing within-category differences among individuals. I conclude by examining how the “Traffic Light” coalition agreement amalgamates these positions, suggesting legislation the next four years may bring.

All six parties identified problematic inequities in terms of gender and, in four cases, sexuality. They offered an array of solutions for alleviating various inequalities in multiple policy areas. Solutions ranged from providing equality of opportunity to promoting equality of outcome. Despite the increasing diversity of German society, however, women and LGBTI people were rarely considered intersectionally.

These conclusions were developed as follows. First, I searched each party’s platform and the coalition agreement for twenty keywords related to gender and sexuality and then extracted corresponding paragraphs of the document. (See Appendix 1 for the list of keywords.) I then qualitatively assessed how the platform/ coalition agreement fit in the three dimensions identified by Xydias.[[7]](#endnote-7) To determine the degree of intersectionality present in a platform I checked to see: a) if the sections of the document devoted specifically to gender or sexuality mentioned differences among women or LGBTI people or b) if sections of the document devoted specifically to other topics (for example the chapter on disabled people) included recognition that women or LGBTI people within this group might possess distinct needs.

**Party Scripts on Gendered Inequalities**

I first compare the 2021 platforms’ views of gender (in)equality as a societal issue. Does a party see the world as inequitable in gendered ways and, if so, who is being inequitably treated? Is this inequity an issue the party seeks to remedy? If a party does not perceive any inequalities to be fixed, the subsequent dimensions become irrelevant. In fact, however, all six parties identify what they view as problematic inequities in terms of gender and, in four cases, sexuality.

The Alternative for Germany’s platform maintains that equality under the law is one of European civilization’s greatest accomplishments and notes Basic Law Article 3’s commitment to the equal rights of men and women. The party then warns that this “human right” is currently under threat. This threat comes in the form of “arbitrarily determined” gender quotas that constitute an unconstitutional form of discrimination of “those who are not favored by the quota.”[[8]](#endnote-8) As German quotas are employed to rectify *women’s* underrepresentation, the populist far right’s implication is that such affirmative action measures constitute inequitable treatment of *men*. In addition, the platform hints that fathers are disadvantaged in divorce proceedings, risk losing access to their children, and excluded from abortion counseling. The AfD also argues that quotas are a form of discrimination against women because they make women feel they can only achieve fulfillment and recognition through careers, rather than behaving in ways consistent with their biology and raising children.[[9]](#endnote-9)

The Alternative for Germany’s platform does not discuss any inequalities faced by lesbian, gay, or bisexual Germans. Not only does the document not contain any terms that refer to these citizens, it explicitly excludes same-sex parents from the term “family.”[[10]](#endnote-10) Intersex citizens are given a passing mention in a section entitled “Sex is a Biological Fact” which claims, “the human species consists of two sexes, male and female.” The party recognizes intersex people, but does not note any problems they face, arguing this “two-sex nature isn’t disqualified by the fact that a few individual people” do not fit into the binary. The AfD continues, “the human can’t just be arbitrarily changed but rather moves within boundaries set by nature,” clearly denying the existence of transgender Germans, a prerequisite for identifying inequities faced by this group.[[11]](#endnote-11)

The CDU/CSU’s platform contains no synonyms for LGBTI people, again ruling out the identification of inequalities or remedies for corresponding problems. In terms of gender inequality, the platform includes a brief statement in a section entitled “Germany as a Country for Opportunities and Families” promising “in the coming decade of modernization we have to address the ongoing disadvantages women face and make it possible for them to have the same chances as men.”[[12]](#endnote-12) Gender inequality is thus situated as an issue faced by women in conjunction with their roles as family members. The platform also includes references to women as “victims” and “the weakest in society” in a section about violence against women.[[13]](#endnote-13)

The Free Democrats’ manifesto does not include any explicit statements regarding existing inequalities among genders or sexualities. Such discrepancies are indirectly noted, however, as the party commits itself to combatting “homophobia” and standing for “liberal feminism.”[[14]](#endnote-14)

The Social Democrats’ platform argues, “we as a society still have a lot to do [about the] still incomplete equality between men and women.” The SPD attributes inequality in part to the pandemic forcing people to return to traditional gender roles and in part due to a lack of “respect” for everyone in society. The theme respect dominates their platform; the party calls for a “society that equally respects all citizens without prejudice … whether male, female, or diverse” and regardless of “sexual orientation.” The SPD also vows to combat transphobia and discrimination on the basis of gender identity.[[15]](#endnote-15)

The Green platform contains the most expansive definition of gender inequality and clearly highlights its connection to societal structures. Their manifesto begins by maintaining “we can reach full equality of the sexes” and concludes “our state should become … more feminist.”[[16]](#endnote-16) They elaborate, “if half the population (women) do not participate equally, are not represented equally, do not get paid equally, and if people still face discrimination … then democracy has not been achieved. We need more access, more participation, more self-determination, more representation…. An equal society needs policies that change structures.”[[17]](#endnote-17) The party extends this concept to the queer community as well arguing “lesbians, gays, bisexuals, trans\*, inter\* and queer people should be able to live self-determined lives free of discrimination.”[[18]](#endnote-18) The platform explicitly recognizes that gendered inequalities are not solely limited to the family or the workplace and instead argues, “gender justice is a multi-faceted task that we need to consider intersectionally. …. We need a binding gender justice strategy, that includes all areas of life and politics, that works across bureaucratic departments, and translates academic findingsinto achievable goals.”[[19]](#endnote-19)

The concept of “gender justice” appears routinely in the Left’s manifesto as one of the party’s key goals. The platform argues

as the Left we stand for feminism that goes back to its roots. This means first and foremost, dividing (paid) work and time fairly between the sexes. We want a society in which everyone can live a free, self-determined, and safe life. … We want a society in which women can take part in political decision-making just like men do and in which life just doesn’t revolve around paid work.[[20]](#endnote-20)

Later in the platform the Left expands this notion of gender justice to the LGBTI community arguing “money, time, recognition and power are not divided equally among genders. No longer will we allow people to be devalued because of their gender or their sexual orientations…. Every human is equally valuable and ‘all genders are beautiful.’[[21]](#endnote-21) The party underscores “because of Germany’s unprecedented World War II crimes against … [among others] homosexuals, Germany has a special responsibility to work against every form of human rights violations … and sexism.”[[22]](#endnote-22)

Thus, while all German parties recognize some gendered inequalities, they disagree as to which genders are disadvantaged. While the AfD primarily sees men as threatened, the other five parties highlight gender inequalities that disadvantage women. The FDP, SPD, Greens and Left recognize inequities involving LGBTI people as well. As a result, all parties go on to consider how to promote equality in the areas where they identify lacunae.

**Party Scripts Addressing Various Gendered Inequalities**

Here, I focus specifically on whether the parties believe that it is the responsibility of the state to rectify inequalities and, if so, whether their platforms propose state measures to achieve equality of *opportunity* or equality of *outcome* (Xydias’ second dimension).[[23]](#endnote-23) While equality of opportunity may be achieved by allowing women and sexual minorities equal *de jure* access to power and influence as heterosexual, cisgender men, equality of outcome requires *de facto* equality. I also note in which spheres the parties propose measures (Xydias’ third dimension).[[24]](#endnote-24) Are policies applied to women solely in their family roles, are they also proposed for women or sexual minorities as economic or political actors, or in additional realms?

The AfD

The AfD’s platform argues that, in its view, state-led attempts to achieve gender equality are actually the *cause* of inequality, not the solution. In fact, the populist far-right warns that “the cultural future of our people, the strength of our economy, and with it our prosperity” are jeopardized by prioritizing “so-called gender justice.”[[25]](#endnote-25) In turn the populist far-right party demands eliminating measures designed to achieve women’s equality. The manifesto “rejects every type of quota” and calls for replacing equality ombudspeople (*Frauenbeauftragten*) within schools, universities, public administration and business with “family ombudspeople;” moreover, the Alternative for Germany advocates cutting funds for “gender ideology” research projects.[[26]](#endnote-26) The party also calls for child welfare offices to keep children with their families (especially fathers) rather than removing them, outlawing youth from medically changing their sex, and refusing to require “gender-just language” – which it views as a “grotesque deformation of the German language.”[[27]](#endnote-27)

The party does not hesitate to call for state action when it comes to preserving traditional gender hierarchies, however. The AfD’s platform demands “activating” family policies that “promote births” in order to prevent a “demographic catastrophe” and “create greater appreciation for family work.”[[28]](#endnote-28) They favor tax and benefit policies that promote marriage (a “marriage start-up credit”), encourage college students to have children, allow families to live from one income while children are young, provide families with cheap land upon which to build a home, and offer higher benefit levels as family size increases. In addition, the party calls for a marketing campaign to promote three-child families.[[29]](#endnote-29) While this section of the program does not explicitly say that women should be the stay-at-home parent in the above scenario, later in the program the AfD argues that “biological sex directly influences the behavior of men and women. Sex roles in the different cultures are all based on this,” implying that the stay-at-home parent is supposed to be the mother.[[30]](#endnote-30)

The AfD’s platform also calls for the German government to warn pregnant women about post-abortion syndrome, officially register abortions, and protect children from being “indoctrinated” by “political ideologies like gender craziness (*Genderwahn)* and climate hysteria.” The manifesto also demands an end to “early sexualization in the sense of ‘diverse’ gender roles” being taught in schools where sex education tries to “make children feel insecure in terms of their sexual identity and tries to disperse with sex roles.” The AfD warns that children’s “development will be massively disturbed” by such education.[[31]](#endnote-31)

In sum, the Alternative for Germany’s approach is for the state to stop measures that would end gendered inequalities for women and LGBTI people and instead employ the state to reinforce traditional gender and sexuality roles, primarily within the family.

The CDU/CSU

The Christian Democrats’ platform proposes equality of economic opportunity for women in Germany, for example calling for greater family-friendliness in public and private sector leadership careers.[[32]](#endnote-32) How this *Chancengleichheit* is to be achieved is not clearly spelled out in the program, other than for the state to “keep an eye on” and “evaluate” progress under existing laws.[[33]](#endnote-33) The Christian Democrats also want to get women “excited” about STEM careers by improving career advising and requiring day care centers remain open evenings and weekends.[[34]](#endnote-34) Further they hope to “encourage” women to start businesses, but do not offer any specific programs designed to do so.[[35]](#endnote-35) In foreign policy, the Christian Democrats pledge to promote women and girls’ right to “self-determination,” suggesting that individual action on the part of disadvantaged genders, rather than structural reforms, is the key to gender equality worldwide.[[36]](#endnote-36)

Where the CDU/CSU do call for specific state actions is to achieve “complete protection against violence for children and women.” The platform promotes recording misogynistic crimes, improving police response to domestic / sexual violence, protecting prostitutes, combatting human trafficking, and adopting a “safe sports” program to prevent sexual violence in athletics.[[37]](#endnote-37) Women and girls are associated with one another and depicted as in need of security provided by a paternalistic state.

As neither the CDU/CSU nor the CSU platform mention LGBTI people at all, there are no proposed state remedies for inequalities faced by sexual minorities – neither to achieve equality of opportunity nor equality of outcome.

The FDP

The Free Democratic Party advocates “liberal feminism,” defined as “legal equality for all sexes and … increase[d] freedom and room for development of all individuals. Liberal feminism strives for the self-determination of all individuals free from prescribed societal roles for their chosen or biological sex.”[[38]](#endnote-38) Thus, the FDP supports legal equality (equality of opportunity) but places the primary onus of achieving equal outcomes on “free” individuals. Their platform contains slightly more detail on how such outcomes might be accomplished than the Christian Democrats’ manifesto, however, and the FDP does promote equality of outcome for sexual minorities.

Like the CDU/CSU, the FDP identifies a lack of access to start-up capital as a hurdle for women entrepreneurs and pledges to encourage networks of women investors and “business angels” to give women the “same access to start-up capital.”[[39]](#endnote-39) In order to encourage women and girls to pursue STEM careers, the FDP called for improved early childhood STEM education and extra-curricular activities targeted at girls and women.[[40]](#endnote-40) They noted women were absent from leading positions in academia and proposed remedying this situation by improving day care at universities, allowing flexible teaching times, and doing a study to determine women’s status within institutions of higher education.[[41]](#endnote-41) If paid parental leave were extended by three months, the party maintained, it would create “incentives for a more balanced division of household labor between parents.”[[42]](#endnote-42)

The Liberals also acknowledge a lack of women in business and public sector leadership positions but did not advocate state measures promoting equality of outcome. Instead, they argue, “rather than rigid quotas we advocate for voluntary measures” in which large firms promise to make leadership at each level reflect the composition of employees at that level. (I.e., in male dominated portions of a company, male dominated leadership would be allowable, although firms should voluntary obligate themselves to “improve” women’s representation.) Large firms should analyze and publish gender pay rates within their organization. The Free Democrats argue that “diversity management” is a “sensible alternative” to quotas because “this way we can achieve equal opportunities for advancement through merit – regardless of gender [or …] sexual orientation.” Like the AfD, the FDP proposed doing away with equality ombudspeople (and ombudspeople for the disabled) and replacing them with Diversity Managers.[[43]](#endnote-43)

Often, the FDP calls for a *removal* of state regulations which they worry create gendered inequalities. For example, in a section entitled “Modern Rights for Strong Families” the party wants to overturn bans on egg and embryo donations as well as non-commercial surrogacy; allow access to reproductive medicine for all who are unable to conceive[[44]](#endnote-44), regardless of marital status or sexual orientation; permit unmarried couples to adopt children; and abolish prohibitions on gay men donating blood. The Free Democrats also call for repealing Paragraph 219 of the German criminal code outlawing the advertising of abortion services and replacing the current Transsexual Law with a “Self Determination Law,” making it easier for individuals to change their sex on identity documents.[[45]](#endnote-45)

At times the FDP *does* call for state action at home and abroad to address gendered inequalities – primarily those impacting sexual minorities. They demand the state assume the cost of trans\* medicine and fertility procedures, ban medical “correction” of intersex children, and completely outlaw conversion “therapy.” The Liberals additionally call for a “National Action Plan Against Homo- and Trans-Phobia” and expanding Article 3 of the Basic Law to include protection from discrimination on the basis of sexual identity. In foreign policy, the FDP argues for a United Nations (UN) convention on LGBTI rights akin to the Convention to Eliminate All forms of Discrimination Against Women, proposes that same-sex marriages be recognized European Union (UN)-wide, violations of LGBTI rights be prohibited in the EU, and underscores that those persecuted on the basis of sexual identity should be granted asylum. The Liberals also demanded the German government ensure safe conditions for LGBTI asylum seekers in shelters and avoid returning queer refuges to unsafe countries. The party further demanded that German integration courses for new immigrants stress “in particular the equality between men and women and the acceptance of different sexual orientations and gender identities.”[[46]](#endnote-46)

The Free Democrats’ platform also advocated for reform of some fundamentally gendered, heteronormative state institutions. The FDP proposed the introduction of legal recognition for non-traditional types of relationships including allowing children to have multiple parents, recognizing two women as mothers upon the birth of their child, and creating a *Verantwortungsgemeinschaft* or a legal entity for people who are not married, partnered, or otherwise directly related but who care for one another. The party justified these goals stating they would “offer as much flexibility as possible to achieve maximum self-determination.”[[47]](#endnote-47)

The FDP did call on the German state to remedy gendered inequalities by fully implementing the UN’s Istanbul Convention on violence against women: providing regular funding for women’s shelters, requiring gynecologists to speak with their patients about domestic violence, and improving police handling of sexual violence. Abroad, Germans should be sure women and girls were included in conflict resolution efforts.[[48]](#endnote-48) In sum, the FDP recognizes gendered inequalities in realms beyond the family and the economy and advocates equality of opportunity policies for women and equality of outcome policies mainly for LGBTI people.

The SPD

The Social Democrats’ platform has greater emphasis on equality of outcome than do the manifestos to its right. The section on gender equality is entitled “Make Equality a Reality” and argues “we need a decade of equality. Equalizing men and women is a job for the entire society. It’s a cross-sectional job that must include all policy areas;” the SPD goes on to promise to “further develop a binding schedule with concrete and effective measures in all policy areas” as well as “fighting for the implementation of the European Union’s gender equality strategy.”[[49]](#endnote-49)

An example of the SPD’s greater attention to equality of outcome rather than opportunity can be seen in its policies promoting women entrepreneurs. In contrast to the CDU/CSU’s vague promise to “encourage” businesswomen, and the FDP’s plan for developing networks of individual women investors to help each other, the SPD calls for the creation of a public “One Stop Agency” for women entrepreneurs with its own start-up funds reserved for women-owned businesses.[[50]](#endnote-50) The Social Democrats’ approach to equal pay advocates a similar approach. The SPD argues the current Pay Transparency Law “isn’t enough”; rather than simply alerting employees to gendered pay inequalities, the law should require firms to correct these imbalances without employee action. The platform also proposes expanding quotas for corporate boards to lower levels of firms and toughening quotas to include sanctions for noncompliance. The party also demanded legislated parity quotas for local, state, and national elections.[[51]](#endnote-51)

A section on “Growing Up Well” argues that the pandemic “made clear that care work is mainly done by women. We are running in this election so that … it will be easier to divide paid work and care work among all sexes.” It goes on to list four policy pillars (all state actions) to accomplish this goal, including paid days off work to care for ill children for each parent.[[52]](#endnote-52) Rather than doing away with women’s ombudspeople, the SPD called for strengthening the Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency and modernizing the General Equal Treatment Act to combat sexism, anti-LGBTIQ\* hostility, and anti-feminism. Also like the Liberals, the SPD calls upon Germany and the EU to fully and “effectively” implement the Istanbul Convention but expand on the FDP’s proposal, also creating a Special State Prosecutor for Femicide. The SPD’s state actions for LGBTI people were virtually identical to the FDP’s measures.[[53]](#endnote-53)

While the SPD also agreed with the Free Democrats’ proposals geared toward achieving equality of outcome for women, their platform lists many additional areas including allocating government contracts in a way that is “gender-just”, abolishing the *Ehegattensplittung* tax policy for married couples, changing the way retirement contributions are calculated to prevent old age poverty among women, providing free contraceptives, decriminalizing abortion, directing foreign policy toward sexual and reproductive rights and health, and fighting “the anti-gender movement at all levels.”[[54]](#endnote-54)

The Social Democrats also recognized societal areas beyond the family and economy which have fallen short of gender equality, noting the lack of gender-specific medical research and physician training, a dearth of contraceptive options for men, discrimination in sports, and low societal regard for social work, leading boys to avoid this promising profession. In addition, they called for diversity and gender justice in cultural leadership positions, funding panels, and juries.[[55]](#endnote-55)

Alliance 90/ die Grünen (the Greens)

The Greens’ approach to gender equality promoted state action to achieve equality of opportunity for women and sexual minorities in many realms; from the start the platform promises “we can achieve full equality of the sexes,” going on to argue “it’s time for a feminist government” and concluding “our state should become more … feminist.”[[56]](#endnote-56) The manifesto calls for a decade of “future-oriented investments” distributed according to gender budgeting principles, arguing “this way the social transformation will succeed.”[[57]](#endnote-57) Alliance 90 agreed with the equality of outcome measures proposed by the FDP and SPD but demanded additional steps.

For example, while the Social Democrats called for quotas for women in elective office, the Greens called for extending this affirmative action measure to “queers” in politics, women in medicine, professorial positions, cultural leadership positions and those who distribute funding for the arts, women’s roles in movies, for bodies that make decisions regarding sports, for Germany’s diplomatic missions abroad and in UN missions.[[58]](#endnote-58)

While the other parties recognized women entrepreneurs’ lack of start-up capital, and the SPD proposed a fund for women only, the Greens’ platform on technology additionally required state allocation of funding to tech companies based in part on the percentage of women in firms’ leadership, arguing this requirement would promote “cultural change” in the tech sector. The Greens considered a range of additional gendered implications in digital life, calling for making artificial intelligence subject to the country’s Equal Treatment law, preventing cyber-grooming and sexual violence on-line, and ending sexual harassment in on-line gaming.[[59]](#endnote-59)

Alliance 90 favored many economic policies to achieve gender equality via state actions, claiming for example that offering continuing education for women (*Weiterbildung*) and raising the minimum wage would help both close the gender wage gap and prevent women’s old age poverty.[[60]](#endnote-60) Moreover, the Greens called for raising pay in female dominated sectors, eliminating part-time, benefit-less “mini jobs” mostly held by women and replacing them with better-compensated positions, improving domestic workers’ employment conditions, and requiring religious employers to follow non-discrimination policies. The Greens also wanted to sharpen Germany’s Equal Pay law to allow unions and other non-governmental organizations -- rather than simply afflicted individuals -- to sue employers who violate the law (the so-called *Verbandsklagerecht*). While other parties wanted to extend the time available for paid parental leave, the Greens also wanted to apply this leave in the case of miscarriage. [[61]](#endnote-61)

Alliance 90 not only went further than the other parties demanding the state act to achieve equality of outcome in politics and the economy as depicted above, they also referenced additional areas for state action. For example, they promised to create a national action plan to combat sex trafficking, compensate intersex and trans\* people who were harmed in the past, reduce financial incentives for caesarian sections, require students to learn about LGBTI people and non-discrimination in schools, and build “gender sensitive” sports stadiums.[[62]](#endnote-62) The Greens included explicit statements about police violence arguing “security must be equally guaranteed everywhere. … [and] cannot be a question of … gender [or] sexual identity.” They thus called for greater police oversight, warning about “antifeminist” right-wing extremism in the state security services.[[63]](#endnote-63) Finally, the Green approached prostitution arguing that people who sell sex need “rights and protection from stigmatization and criminalization”; they demanded better working conditions for legal sex workers.[[64]](#endnote-64)

While the CDU/CSU, FDP, and SPD all pledged to promote the rights of women and girls abroad, and the Greens agreed, the Alliance 90/Grünen platform was far more detailed and broader in scope. In a section on “Conduct International Politics in a Feminist Way,” they promised “we will conduct our foreign, development, trade, and security in a feminist manner. Women, girls and marginalized groups like LGBTI people are especially impacted by war, conflict and poverty. Realizing their right and their roles as actors in international politics promotes peace, development, stability and security.” The platform applied these concepts in special sections on Russia, Turkey, Latin America, the EU and the UN, pledging “our international cooperation will be financially and conceptually geared toward reaching gender justice cross-sectionally as well as reproductive health.”[[65]](#endnote-65) In sum, the Greens’ platform advocated for the broadest and most extensive range of state action to achieve equality of outcome.

The Left

The Left, too, developed a detailed platform demanding state action to promote equality of outcome for women and sexual minorities, agreeing with most everything proposed by the Greens above. In contrast to the Greens, SPD, FDP, and CDU/CSU, however, the Left had little to say about the state remedying women’s lack of access to corporate boardrooms or start-up capital. Rather, unsurprisingly for a party of the far-left, die Linke call upon the state to help achieve equality of outcome for the poorest women. They were also the only party to link gender and climate change and explicitly address non-material aspects of gender inequality in German society.

The Left’s manifesto describes “capitalism as systemic sexism” and it proposed state action to improve minimum pensions for women, raise the minimum hourly wage to 13 Euros, require employers to offer family-friendly shifts, provide free menstrual products and birth control to all, and offer more midwives for pregnant women.[[66]](#endnote-66) The platform frames affordable housing as a feminist issue that enables women to escape domestic violence; it demands teaching feminist economic theory at universities. The Left also calls for a law requiring all medium and large German businesses to ensure the human rights of women and children throughout their entire supply chain. Finally, the platform notes gendered implications of Germany’s debt brake, arguing balanced budgets come at a cost to women because they cause cuts in social infrastructure.[[67]](#endnote-67)

Die Linke’s manifesto also advocates “socio-ecological system change” as a “way to more gender justice” and frequently terms climate change a gendered issue.[[68]](#endnote-68) It observes, “women and children often do not have the legal or financial resources to protect themselves from the consequences of climate change. Women are far more likely to be affected by environmental disasters [such as] droughts or floods.”[[69]](#endnote-69) As a result, the Left called for a “feminist, ecological, and socially just” foreign policy.[[70]](#endnote-70) At home, the Left also referenced women’s economic needs in areas phasing out coal mining.[[71]](#endnote-71)

In addition to calling for state action in economic and environmental respects, the platform pays extensive attention to non-quantifiable gendered inequalities, speaking not only about a gender wage gap but also a Gender Care Gap.[[72]](#endnote-72) The Left recognizes women’s lack of free time as a result of balancing paid work and care responsibilities, noting women caregivers’ “continuing stress, exhaustion, and money worries.”[[73]](#endnote-73) In multiple sections of the platform, the party advocates state-sponsored structural change to promote a more gender equitable division of household and paid labor, granting women more time to enjoy life. For example, the Left proposes better city planning to make it easier for women to commute, run errands, and shuttle children. In addition, the platform expresses concern about the safety of bus stops, train stations, and sparsely populated rural areas. Die Linke suggest special “women’s night taxis” so women can “move around in public 24/7 without fear.”[[74]](#endnote-74)

In contrast to other parties, the Left additionally advocates symbolically addressing *de facto* gendered inequalities by banning sexist advertising, making International Women’s Day a holiday, adopting discrimination free language, requiring gender neutral bathrooms in public buildings, and ensuring equality in the financing of not only athletic opportunities at the grassroots level but also of Germany’s men’s and women’s national soccer teams.[[75]](#endnote-75)

Thus, just as Xydias observed[[76]](#endnote-76) at the start of Merkel’s term, the end of her sixteen years as Chancellor saw all of Germany’s major parties articulate distinctive scripts regarding the existence of gendered inequalities between men and women; parties continued to offer an array of solutions for alleviating inequalities, from providing equality of opportunity to endeavoring to achieve equality of outcome. The addition of a populist far-right party did not change the variety of opinions present in the other parties; however, the AfD’s rise interjected the claim that men experience gendered disadvantages.

The above analysis also portrayed distinctive party scripts (or lack thereof) regarding gendered inequalities faced by sexual minorities. The Christian Democratic parties did not mention LGBTI Germans at all, rendering these citizens invisible. The AfD’s platform went a step further in terms of trans\* Germans, denying their very existence, and arguing against the recognition of same-sex parents and educating young people about sexuality. The other parties’ manifestos all recognized a range of inequalities faced by sexual minorities and proposed solutions to these inequalities often, but not always, similar to the ones they proposed to achieve women’s equality. The FDP, however, was more willing to advocate for state action to achieve equality of outcome for LGBTI individuals than it was for women.

**Intersectional Party Scripts**

While all parties recognized gendered inequalities, and most recognized inequalities faced by sexual minorities, a growing body of research has demonstrated that not all “women,” “men,” and “queer people” enjoy the same social position.[[77]](#endnote-77) For example, disabled women are both socially disadvantaged vis-à-vis other women on the basis of disability *and* disadvantaged vis-à-vis disabled men on the basis of their gender.[[78]](#endnote-78) Below I examine the degree to which Germany’s parties recognized such intersections.

Despite growing scholarly[[79]](#endnote-79) and practitioner[[80]](#endnote-80) attention to intersectionality, in the main, party platforms outside of the Left’s evinced little recognition of those disempowered by an axis in addition to their gender or sexuality. Indeed, the SPD’s platform contained no intersectional references. The most common intersection recognized by the other parties was that of gender and religion/immigration status. Both the Left and the Greens proposed ensuring refugee women could separate their asylum claims from their husbands’ in case of domestic abuse.[[81]](#endnote-81) The CDU/CSU’s manifesto noted distinctive challenges faced by migrant women and called for efforts to integrate them into the German labor market.[[82]](#endnote-82) The FDP expressed concern for LGBTI refugees’ safety in asylum-seeker accommodations as did the Left, who highlighted violence against women refugees too.[[83]](#endnote-83) The Left also demanded the creation of separate, handicapped-accessible accommodations for queer asylum seekers, special agencies to handle LGBTI asylum claims, and mental health services for this population.[[84]](#endnote-84) In an oblique reference to migrant women, the CDU/CSU called for efforts to help women escape from criminal “clans” (extended immigrant families purported to be engaged in criminal activities).[[85]](#endnote-85)

The AfD’s platform paid attention to Muslim women, recognizing that women who follow Islam in Germany face distinct challenges (what they termed “oppression”); however, the party’s solution called for a prohibition on public sector workers, teachers, and school pupils wearing headscarves and for a ban of burkas and niqabs in public. The party paradoxically argued the school headscarf ban would “allow young girls free self-determination.”[[86]](#endnote-86) The Left Party explicitly rejected this position arguing “a ban on headscarves, just like being forced to wear them, would infringe on women’s self-determination.”[[87]](#endnote-87) Similarly, rather than pitting Islam verses equality, the Greens included a section entitled “Protect and Strengthen (women\*) Muslims” which recognized that “Muslim life in all its diversity.” The party pledged to work with “progressive, liberal Muslim associations that stand up for values like equality of the sexes, LGBTI rights and feminism” to address issues faced by women and queer followers of Islam.[[88]](#endnote-88)

The Green’s platform also claimed “gender justice is a cross-sectional undertaking that needs to be thought of intersectionally.” The party did so in a section on homelessness that noted the increasing numbers of homeless women in Germany. Primarily, however, the Greens’ intersectional analysis was confined to the program’s section on violence against women. There the party recognized barriers to women’s shelters faced by residents of rural areas, undocumented women, disabled women and nonbinary or queer people.[[89]](#endnote-89)

While the Greens noted intersectional identities in their manifesto devoted to violence against women, the Left party interjected women’s or sexual minorities’ concerns into many parts of its platform. A section on old age discussed the needs of LGBTI people in nursing homes and concerns faced by retired East German women.[[90]](#endnote-90) The portion of their program devoted to sexual minorities contained the admonition that spending lesbian-oriented projects should be equal to expenditures unique to gay men. It also included a call for greater overall lesbian visibility and efforts to address old age poverty among lesbians.[[91]](#endnote-91) The chapter on disabled Germans noted that long-term unemployment plagues disabled people in Germany, especially disabled women, and called for solutions to this problem. In addition, they stressed the importance of continued financing of women’s equality officers in sheltered workshops (*Behindertenwerkstätten*).[[92]](#endnote-92) Given the Left’s position in the opposition following the election, it is unsurprising that the coalition agreement formed contained limited intersectional references.

**The Coalition Agreement**

The 2021 election resulted in a “traffic light” coalition among the SPD, Greens, and FDP. As the discussion above indicates, there were many points of commonality among these parties in terms of gender and sexuality, along with a few sharp differences. All three parties acknowledged gendered inequalities in Germany affecting women and sexual minorities. The agreement pledged “to combat every form of discrimination” in order to “realize the equality of men and women,” arguing this goal “must” be reached within the decade. It promised to close the “gender data gap” and to implement the Greens’ “equality check” for all laws and policies, including assessing their impact on boys and men. The coalition also agreed to use gender budgeting. [[93]](#endnote-93)

The partners largely concurred that state action was necessary to achieve equality of outcome for LGBTI Germans; as a result, the agreement included almost[[94]](#endnote-94) all policies for the queer community depicted in three parties’ programs above. However, while they concurred that women faced challenges, the FDP’s approach to rectifying these disadvantages was often to press for equality of opportunity, whereas the SPD, and especially the Greens, favored measures to promote equality of outcome and the Greens’ list of measures far outnumbered the proposals put forth by the other parties. As a result, the traffic light agreement did not go as far toward adopting state actions to dismantle gendered inequalities as the SPD or especially the Greens had proposed.

A section on “Queer Life” called for a National Action Plan on Acceptance and Protection of sexual minorities, abolishing the Transsexual Law and replacing it with a self-determination law, funding state-level sex-education programs and the federal Magnus Hirschfeld Foundation, making anti-LGBTI hate crimes laws and documenting such crimes, allowing gay men to donate blood, closing loopholes in Germany’s bans on conversion therapy and child intersex surgeries, public funding for trans\* healthcare, expanding Article 3 of the German Basic Law to include protections on the basis of “sexual identity,” and adopting the Greens’ compensation fund for trans\* Germans who had been forced into unwanted surgeries or divorces.[[95]](#endnote-95) The foreign policy section called for pressing the EU to recognize same sex marriages in all member states as well as to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, working toward a UN Convention on LGBTI rights, protecting LGBTI asylum seekers in shelters, and providing them legal advisors.[[96]](#endnote-96) They also agreed to defend LGBTI rights in foreign policy and in development programs.[[97]](#endnote-97)

The FDP’s stress on individual rights was compatible with the Social Democrats’ and Greens’ calls for removing state regulations promoting gendered inequalities and consensus was also achieved in this area as well. The parties agreed to drop Germany’s Paragraph 219 ban on abortion advertising, permit virtual abortion counseling, and form a commission to consider decriminalizing abortion and allowing non-commercial surrogacy. They pledged to make artificial insemination open to all, permit single egg transfers, recognize previous private sperm donors in the national donor registry, and include two mothers on a birth certificate upon the birth of their child. The platform also included the creation of a *Verantwortungsgemeinschaft* allowing up to four people to be legal parents of a child.[[98]](#endnote-98)

The coalition agreement called for training nurses in medical abortion, including more education about women’s health in medical training, taking domestic violence into consideration in child custody proceedings and liberalizing Germany’s naming law.[[99]](#endnote-99) It also included agreement on increased state involvement in women’s health, for example evaluating how to reduce financial incentives for C-sections and induced labor, providing more midwives, expanding healthy pregnancy education programs for women, criminalizing sidewalk demonstrations in front of abortion clinics, developing birth control for men, and providing free birth control.[[100]](#endnote-100) The coalition also agreed to make an independent Safe Sports center to combat sexual violence in athletics.[[101]](#endnote-101)

The traffic light partners also adopted the Greens’ call for a feminist foreign policy that would lead to women around the world having more “representation and resources.” They expressed concern about women’s rights in Turkey, Afghanistan, and the Middle East and pledged to promote women via Germany’s foreign development programs.[[102]](#endnote-102)

In some economic areas the partners did agree on state action to promote equality of outcome; their agreement provided economic logic for such policies, arguing “gender justice and diversity in all its forms are marks of quality and competitiveness.” The platform identified research on gender equality as an academic “field of the future,” earmarking spending for it.[[103]](#endnote-103) They pledged to ratify the International Labor Organization’s convention on combatting harassment and violence at work, something not mentioned in any party platform.[[104]](#endnote-104) The coalition “aspired” to a higher percentage of women in the workforce via their labor, equality, and family policies, including “promoting” women in the trades, providing part-time training programs for mothers of small children seeking to improve their job skills, and introducing employment protections for those returning to work after parental leave.[[105]](#endnote-105) The agreement also included the Greens’ proposal enabling domestic workers to receive formal employment contracts.[[106]](#endnote-106)

In contrast to the AfD’s heteronormative definition of families, the traffic light coalition asserted “families are diverse and are found everywhere where people take responsibility for one another, and they need time and support. We support parents in more justly dividing care and paid work.” To that end, the agreement included pet projects of all partners, including a right to high-quality all-day childcare and the FDP’s programs to encourage girls in STEM.[[107]](#endnote-107) The agreement introduced two weeks paid time off for a partner after a birth (including the Green’s stillbirth provision) and one additional month paid parental leave, as well as the SPD’s paid days off for parents to care for sick children.[[108]](#endnote-108)

Other portions of the programs clearly represent compromises between the FDP’s equality of opportunity approach and the SPD and Greens’ preference for equality of outcome policies. On example involves mini jobs.[[109]](#endnote-109) While the Greens had proposed abolishing such positions, the coalition agreement allowed them to continue, but did raise the minimum wage improving compensation. The agreement also admonished that these positions “should not become a part-time trap especially for women” and pledged enforcement of labor law in this area. The *Ehegattensplittung* tax policy was not removed as the SPD and Greens had demanded, but tax policy would be “further developed” to encourage two-earner families.[[110]](#endnote-110)

While the traffic light participants agreed closing the gender pay gap and promoting women in leadership positions was important, they disagreed on measures and the FDP’s equality of opportunity approach dominated. The liberals’ interest in “diversity management” made an appearance in a section devoted to promoting women professors while the Greens’ quota for such positions was shunted aside.[[111]](#endnote-111) The partners pledged to “evaluate” the anti-discrimination law” to see if it could be improved. The agreement favored “further developing” and improving implementation of the pay transparency law, allowing interest groups to help individuals fight for their rights under the law; this compromise position fell short of the *Verbandsklagerecht* desired by the SPD and Greens. The coalition would require public and private sector partners to annually report percentages of women in leadership ranks – but not to act on any gender gaps observed. The agreement also called both for making the gender pay gap in cultural positions transparent and for closing it, but proposed no method of doing so.[[112]](#endnote-112)

The Greens’ quota-heavy approach to equality was rejected. The program called for “strengthening” women’s representation on semi-public health boards but did not go as far as a quota; rather than the Greens’ proposed cultural jury quotas, the agreement simply called for “aspiring” to parity and limiting jury members’ terms.[[113]](#endnote-113) Electoral law quotas for women candidates, an idea favored by the Greens and SPD but not the FDP, were not adopted although the coalition promised to form a commission to debate the issue.[[114]](#endnote-114) Finally, in the foreign policy section the traffic light claimed they “want to” send more women into positions of international leadership, but did not employ a quota.[[115]](#endnote-115)

Finally, some of the components of the coalition agreement would benefit women, as explained in individual party platforms, but these policies were not portrayed in gendered terms. For example, the minimum wage was to be raised to 12 Euros, public transit and public housing expanded, digital violence combatted, state pensions raised, wage and tax policies for care workers bettered, more family-friendly working hours for parents in the care sector required, and the childcare profession made more attractive by improving compensation and creating debt-free training programs.[[116]](#endnote-116)

Just as the three parties’ platforms were, the coalition agreement was limited in its intersectional aspects. It did include special promotion of employment and German language-learning opportunities for migrant women.[[117]](#endnote-117) The traffic light also promised to ensure that women’s shelters were accessible to disabled, queer, or migrant people.[[118]](#endnote-118) Finally, the agreement pledged allowing trafficking victims the right to stay in Germany, developing a National Action Plan to combat human trafficking, and ensuring asylum seekers who are victims of domestic violence are not dependent on their abuser to stay in the country.[[119]](#endnote-119)

**Conclusion**

In 2021, as in 2005, the German parties have distinct “scripts” not only in terms of women’s equality but also, in many cases, in terms of sexual minorities. Proposed solutions to these inequalities ranged from equality of opportunity to equality of outcome in a variety of areas including the home, work, sports, culture, foreign policy, free time, and others. Intersectional references, however, remain limited. The Traffic Light coalition agreement contains multiple equality of outcome measures for LGBTI Germans and many proposals to promote equality of opportunity for women in a far greater array of areas than would have likely been found had Merkel’s CDU/CSU been returned to the Chancellorship.

**Appendix 1: List of Keywords searched within Party Manifestos/Coalition Agreement[[120]](#endnote-120)**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **English Translation** | **German Word (and notes)** |
| Daughter(s) | Tochter (Töchter)\*\*\* |
| Discrimination | Diskriminierung\*\*\* |
| Equality | Gleichberechtigung, Gleichstellung |
| Feminism | Feminis\* |
| Gay | Schwul |
| Gender | Gender, Geschlecht\* |
| Girl | Mädchen\*\*\* |
| Homosexual | Homo\* |
| Intersex | Inter\* |
| Islamic dress for women | Burka, Niqab, Kopftuch, Schleier |
| Lesbian | Lesb\* |
| LGBTIQ | LSB\* or LGB\* |
| Mother(s) | Mutter (Mütter) |
| Pregnant | Schwanger\* |
| Queer | Queer |
| Rainbow Family | Regenbogenfamilie |
| Registered Life Partnership | eingetragene Lebenspartnerschaft |
| Sex | Sex\* |
| Transgender | Trans\*\* |
| Women | Frau\*\*\* |

\*I searched using word root truncated as appears; this way all instances regardless of verb conjugation, adjective ending or plural form would be included.

\*\* only instances where related to transgender or intersex issues (i.e., not transportation, transnational, interstate, international)

\*\*\* only in woman specific instances not combined with men (i.e., not “women and men in the military” “lesbians and gay men” “mothers and fathers” “daughters and sons”)

1. Annette Henninger & Angelika Von Wahl, “This Train Has Left the Station: The German Gender Equality Regime on Course Towards a Social Democratic Model (2013–17),” *German Politics* 28:3 (2019) 462-481; Kelly Kollman, “Deploying Europe: the creation of discursive imperatives for same-sex unions,” *LGBT Activism and the Making of Europe: A Rainbow Europe*, P. Ayoub & D. Paternotte, eds. (Palgrave MacMillan: Basingstoke, UK), 97-118. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. Petra Ahrens, Phillip M. Ayoub & Sabine Lang, “Leading from Behind? Gender Equality in Germany During the Merkel Era,” *German Politics* (2022), DOI: 10.1080/09644008.2021.1986009. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. Christina Xydias, “Mapping the Language of Women's Interests: Sex and Party Affiliation in the Bundestag,” *Political Studies* 61: 2 (2013), 319-340. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. Louise K. Davidson-Schmich, “LGBTI Rights and the 2017 German National Election,” *German Politics and Society* 36, No. 2 (2018): 27-54; Louise K. Davidson-Schmich “What does the AfD Say? A Populist Far-Right Party and the Substantive Representation of Gender and Sexuality,” (Paper Prepared for the 27th annual International Conference of Europeanists, June 24, 2021). [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. Barbara Laubenthal, “Refugees Welcome? Reforms of German Asylum Policies Between 2013 and 2017 and Germany’s Transformation into an Immigration Country,” *German Politics*, 28:3 (2019), 412-425. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. Xydias, “Mapping the Language”, 323. The CSU also issued a separate program: “Gut für Bayern. Gut für Deutschland,” <https://www.csu.de/common/download/CSU-Programm_Gut_fuer_Bayern_Gut_fuer_Deutschland_final.pdf> (accessed 13 February 2022). [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. Xydias, “Mapping the Language.” [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. Alternative für Deutschland, “Deutschland. Aber Normal,”https://www.afd.de/wahlprogramm/ (accessed 13 February 2022), 22-24.All translations my own with the exception, noted below, of places in the text where German parties employed English-language phrases. In other portions of their platform the AfD also notes inequitable treatment of women in that women are not subject to the draft (68). [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. AfD, “Deutschland. Aber Normal,” 111, 114-5. [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. Ibid., 104. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. Ibid., 114-5. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. CDU/CSU, “Das Programm für Stabilitat und Erneuerung,” <https://www.csu.de/common/download/Regierungsprogramm.pdf> (accessed 13 February 2022), 75. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. CDU/CSU, “Das Programm für Stabilität und Erneuerung,” 109-110. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. Freie Demokraten, “Nie gab es mehr zu tun,” <https://www.fdp.de/sites/default/files/2021-06/FDP_Programm_Bundestagswahl2021_1.pdf> (accessed 13 February 2022), 40. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. SPD, “Aus Respekt vor deiner Zukunft,” <https://www.spd.de/fileadmin/Dokumente/Beschluesse/Programm/SPD-Zukunftsprogramm.pdf> (accessed 13 February 2022), Sections 1.2 and 3.0. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. Bündnis 90/die Grünen, “Deutschland. Alles ist Drin,” <https://cms.gruene.de/uploads/documents/Wahlprogramm-DIE-GRUENEN-Bundestagswahl-2021_barrierefrei.pdf> (accessed 13 February 2022), 10, 257. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. Ibid., 161. [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. Ibid., 192. [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. Ibid., 188. [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. Die Linke, “Zeit zu handeln!” <https://www.die-linke.de/fileadmin/download/wahlen2021/Wahlprogramm/DIE_LINKE_Wahlprogramm_zur_Bundestagswahl_2021.pdf> (accessed 13 February 2022), 11. [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. Original in English. Die Linke, “Zeit zu handeln!”, 101. [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
22. Ibid., 119. [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
23. Xydias, “Mapping the Language.” [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
24. Ibid. [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
25. AfD, “Deutschland. Aber Normal,”12. [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
26. Ibid., 24, 109, 154. [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
27. Ibid., 109-110, 112-3, 115, 159. [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
28. Ibid., 104. Recall from above that the AfD defines “family” only as a mother, father, and children. [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
29. Ibid., 107-9. The AfD’s manifesto justifies promoting stay at home parenting by citing a 1991 study finding that children under age three run “developmental risks” if cared for by someone other than a parent. [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
30. Ibid., 115. [↑](#endnote-ref-30)
31. Ibid., 111, 113, 114. [↑](#endnote-ref-31)
32. CDU/CSU, “Das Programm für Stabilitat und Erneuerung,” 75. Like the AfD’s platform, the CSU’s separate document rejects the use of gender-neutral terms, arguing “Germany needs a strong identity. This is why it’s important for us to protect … our tradition and our culture. The German language also belongs [to this culture]. Who wants to gender can gender, but no one should be forced to. We stand for identity not ideology.” The CSU also favored preserving the *Ehegattensplittung* tax policy favoring single earner families and improving pensions for mothers (CSU, “Gut für Bayern,” 2-3.) [↑](#endnote-ref-32)
33. CDU/CSU, “Das Programm für Stabilitat und Erneuerung,” 79, 102. One specific policy the CDU/CSU does favor is increasing paid parental leave for two months if “the father takes it in addition to the mother,” 75. [↑](#endnote-ref-33)
34. Ibid., 79. [↑](#endnote-ref-34)
35. Ibid., 90. [↑](#endnote-ref-35)
36. Ibid., 14. [↑](#endnote-ref-36)
37. Ibid., 108, 110, 138. [↑](#endnote-ref-37)
38. Freie Demokraten, “Nie gab es mehr zu tun,” 40. [↑](#endnote-ref-38)
39. Ibid., 12. [↑](#endnote-ref-39)
40. Ibid., 14. [↑](#endnote-ref-40)
41. Ibid., 19. [↑](#endnote-ref-41)
42. Ibid., 33. [↑](#endnote-ref-42)
43. Ibid., 27-8. [↑](#endnote-ref-43)
44. The latter should involve the state covering the costs (33) [↑](#endnote-ref-44)
45. Ibid., 41. [↑](#endnote-ref-45)
46. Ibid., 56-8. [↑](#endnote-ref-46)
47. Ibid., 33-4, 41. [↑](#endnote-ref-47)
48. Ibid., 41, 55. [↑](#endnote-ref-48)
49. SPD, “Aus Respekt vor deiner Zukunft,” section 3.8. [↑](#endnote-ref-49)
50. Ibid., section 2.5. [↑](#endnote-ref-50)
51. Ibid., section 3.8. [↑](#endnote-ref-51)
52. Ibid., section 3.7. [↑](#endnote-ref-52)
53. Ibid., sections 3.8, 3.9, and 4.3. [↑](#endnote-ref-53)
54. Ibid., sections 2.5, 2.7, 3.4, 3.4, and 4.5. The *Ehegattensplittung* tax policy encourages single-earner (usually male breadwinner) families; the SPD proposal would apply only to newly married couples. Existing wedded couples to determine which tax policy would apply to their situation. [↑](#endnote-ref-54)
55. Ibid., sections 2.4, 3.1, 3.8, 3.10, and 3.11. [↑](#endnote-ref-55)
56. Bündnis 90/die Grünen, “Deutschland. Alles ist Drin,” 10, 188, 257. [↑](#endnote-ref-56)
57. Ibid., 60. [↑](#endnote-ref-57)
58. Ibid., 122, 158, 177, 207-9, 225-6, 252. [↑](#endnote-ref-58)
59. Ibid., 77, 100, 210. [↑](#endnote-ref-59)
60. Ibid., 67, 103, 109. [↑](#endnote-ref-60)
61. Ibid., 102, 109-10, 114, 175. [↑](#endnote-ref-61)
62. Ibid., 122, 149-50, 190, 192-3, 211. [↑](#endnote-ref-62)
63. Ibid., 194-6. [↑](#endnote-ref-63)
64. Ibid., 190-1. [↑](#endnote-ref-64)
65. Ibid., Chapter 6 and 236. [↑](#endnote-ref-65)
66. Die Linke, “Zeit zu handeln!”, 10, 24, 35, 37, 102, 106. [↑](#endnote-ref-66)
67. Ibid., 41, 55, 104, 140. [↑](#endnote-ref-67)
68. Ibid., 59, 67, 105, 143. [↑](#endnote-ref-68)
69. Ibid., 143. [↑](#endnote-ref-69)
70. Ibid., 139. [↑](#endnote-ref-70)
71. Ibid., 68. [↑](#endnote-ref-71)
72. Ibid., 102. English in the original. [↑](#endnote-ref-72)
73. Ibid., 34. [↑](#endnote-ref-73)
74. Ibid., 17, 25, 45, 57, 63, 102. [↑](#endnote-ref-74)
75. Ibid., 105-7, 109, 129, 131. [↑](#endnote-ref-75)
76. Xydias, “Mapping the Language.” [↑](#endnote-ref-76)
77. Kimberlé Crenshaw, *On Intersectionality : Essential Writings* (The New Press, 2022); Susan B. Rottmann, Myra Marx Ferree, “Citizenship and Intersectionality: German Feminist Debates about Headscarf and Antidiscrimination Laws,” *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society* 55: Issue 4 (2008), 481–513. [↑](#endnote-ref-77)
78. Lisa Pfahl and Swantje Köbsell, “Disabled Women Fighting for Equality” in Gender, Intersections, and Institutions, L. Davidson-Schmich, ed. (University of Michigan Press, 2017) 61–85. [↑](#endnote-ref-78)
79. Barbara Donovan, “Intersectionality and the Substantive Representation of Migrant Interests in Germany” *German Politics & Society* 30: 105 (2012), 23-44. [↑](#endnote-ref-79)
80. Lise Rolandsen Agustin, *Gender Equality, Intersectionality, and Diversity in Europe* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). [↑](#endnote-ref-80)
81. Die Linke, “Zeit zu handeln!”, 105; Bündnis 90/die Grünen, “Deutschland. Alles ist Drin,” 189. [↑](#endnote-ref-81)
82. CDU/CSU, “Das Programm für Stabilitat und Erneuerung,” 134. [↑](#endnote-ref-82)
83. Freie Demokraten, “Nie gab es mehr zu tun,” 57; Die Linke, “Zeit zu handeln!”, 109, 105. [↑](#endnote-ref-83)
84. Die Linke, “Zeit zu handeln!”, 109. [↑](#endnote-ref-84)
85. CDU/CSU, “Das Programm für Stabilitat und Erneuerung,” 112. [↑](#endnote-ref-85)
86. AfD, “Deutschland. Aber Normal,” 86, 100. [↑](#endnote-ref-86)
87. Die Linke, “Zeit zu handeln!”, 105, 130. [↑](#endnote-ref-87)
88. Ibid., 172. [↑](#endnote-ref-88)
89. Bündnis 90/die Grünen, “Deutschland. Alles ist Drin,” 130, 188-90 [↑](#endnote-ref-89)
90. Die Linke, “Zeit zu handeln!”, 30, 81. [↑](#endnote-ref-90)
91. Ibid., 107-8. [↑](#endnote-ref-91)
92. Ibid., 111. [↑](#endnote-ref-92)
93. SPD, Bündnis 90/Grünen, FDP, “Mehr Fortschritt wagen,” https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/service/gesetzesvorhaben/koalitionsvertrag-2021-1990800 (accessed 13 February 2022), 114, 162. [↑](#endnote-ref-93)
94. Rather than the Greens’ requirement that religious employers to adopt federal labor laws protecting LGBTI employees, the agreement merely proposed working with churches “to check” if employment protections could be expanded. Ibid., 71. [↑](#endnote-ref-94)
95. Ibid., 119 – 121. [↑](#endnote-ref-95)
96. Ibid., 120, 147. [↑](#endnote-ref-96)
97. Ibid., 152. [↑](#endnote-ref-97)
98. Ibid., 101-2, 116. [↑](#endnote-ref-98)
99. Ibid., 82, 86, 102. [↑](#endnote-ref-99)
100. Ibid., 85, 87 [↑](#endnote-ref-100)
101. Ibid., 107, 114. [↑](#endnote-ref-101)
102. Ibid., 144, 152, 155-6. [↑](#endnote-ref-102)
103. Ibid., 19 – 20. [↑](#endnote-ref-103)
104. Ibid., 115. [↑](#endnote-ref-104)
105. Ibid., 28, 33, 76, 101 [↑](#endnote-ref-105)
106. Ibid., 70, [↑](#endnote-ref-106)
107. Ibid., 94, 97. [↑](#endnote-ref-107)
108. Ibid., 101. [↑](#endnote-ref-108)
109. Ibid., 70. [↑](#endnote-ref-109)
110. Ibid., 115. [↑](#endnote-ref-110)
111. Ibid., 24. [↑](#endnote-ref-111)
112. Ibid., 115, 121-2; this intermediate position was also extended to the question of how Germany should promote equal pay at the European Union level, 134. [↑](#endnote-ref-112)
113. Ibid., 86, 122. [↑](#endnote-ref-113)
114. Ibid., 11. [↑](#endnote-ref-114)
115. Ibid., 144. [↑](#endnote-ref-115)
116. Ibid., 18, 49, 70, 73, 81-2, 88, 99. [↑](#endnote-ref-116)
117. Ibid., 77. [↑](#endnote-ref-117)
118. Ibid., 115. [↑](#endnote-ref-118)
119. Ibid., 115, 139. [↑](#endnote-ref-119)
120. For more details on how these keywords were derived see Davidson-Schmich, “What does the AfD Say?” [↑](#endnote-ref-120)