Shaping Preferences for International Cooperation: Partisan Cueing on Fiscal Integration

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Abstract

In the past, governments' international integration efforts were buoyed by citizens' tacit support. This support has eroded as political challengers politicized international cooperation, forcing governments to heed constituents' preferences during international negotiations. Party cueing research suggests that parties have considerable leverage over public preferences, but it is unclear to what extent public opinion is responsive to cueing on specific integration steps that directly affect national autonomy. We use a pre-registered information treatment experiment in five countries to study the effects of in- and out-party cues about fiscal integration in the European Union (EU). We find that political parties have ample latitude to shape preferences about international cooperation, as both in-parties and out-party cues affect support for joint European debt. This pattern is robust across countries and across citizens with different EU priors. We further find that in-party cues affect citizens' preference certainty, suggesting the importance of cueing beyond direct persuasion.

Keywords:
international cooperation; partisan cueing; fiscal integration; joint European debt; political parties; information treatment experiment;

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Introduction

International cooperation is increasingly contested at the domestic level. In the past, governments' efforts to further international cooperation could rely on the tacit support of citizens. Yet, as international politics has become increasingly politicized in the national arena, national governments face democratic constraints when negotiating at the international level (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Hutter et al. 2016; Beramendi and Stegmueller 2020; De Vries et al. 2021; Walter 2021). While preferences for international cooperation and globalization in Western democracies seem to be relatively stable over time (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Walter 2021), political parties in the last two decades have successfully mobilized opposition to international cooperation for political gains (De Vries et al. 2020; De Vries et al. 2021). Acting as political entrepreneurs, challenger parties have capitalized on anti-globalization sentiments by politicizing issues related to cross-border cooperation and interaction, such as international organizations (IOs), European integration, and migration. As a result, mainstream parties that support institutionalized international cooperation have lost electoral ground to anti-globalization challengers (De Vries et al. 2020; Trubowitz and Burgoon 2020).

The entry of international cooperation into mass politics can have pervasive effects. Governments pay close attention to public opinion and respond to domestic public opinion when negotiating at the international level (Hagemann et al. 2017; Schneider 2020). Moreover, influenced by anti-globalization challengers, mainstream parties veer toward policy positions that are at odds with the liberal international order (Abou-Chadi 2016; Meijers 2017). The UK's withdrawal from the European Union (EU) and the United States' temporary withdrawal from the World Health Organization (WHO) during the Trump presidency signify the systemic impact that anti-globalization challengers can have on the international order. This suggests that governments and mainstream parties are at the behest of political entrepreneurs and a critical public when acting on the international level.

However, we argue that despite the politicization of international cooperation, political parties can steer public preferences for international cooperation and the pooling of sovereignty. Literature on cueing effects shows that political actors have considerable leeway to shape public preferences (Bullock 2011; Kam 2005; Bisgaard and Slothuus 2018; Slothuus and Bisgaard 2021). Cues provide citizens with informational and directional shortcuts that facilitate citizens' decision-making and opinion formation (Druckman and Lupia 2016; Leeper and Slothuus 2014). Given the complexity of international affairs and its perceived distance from everyday life, citizens are also susceptible to partisan cueing effects on international cooperation (Dellmuth 2016; Guisinger and Saunders 2017; Steenbergen et al. 2007). These studies have shown that elite communication can significantly affect citizens' *diffuse* support for international cooperation, as elites affect perceptions of regime legitimacy (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2021), overall regime support (Maier et al. 2012), or general support for integration (Pannico 2020).

Yet, it is unclear how political parties can affect citizens' support for *specific* integration steps that are electorally salient, that can be costly and that directly affect national sovereignty (cf. Stoeckel and Kuhn 2018). Further international cooperation ultimately hinges on such steps, which are likely to be electorally contested. To adequately establish the sway of political parties over public preferences on international cooperation, we thus need to study the effects of partisan cueing for specific and highly contentious integration proposals. Moreover, existing research usually focuses on individual countries and is thus unable to assess the cross-country validity of the same cues. Finally, it generally only examines the effect of cues that come from parties that people sympathize with (Stoeckel and Kuhn 2018; Maier et al. 2017). It is thus unclear whether cueing effects hold across countries with different party systems, and whether respondents are only open to cues from parties that they support ("in-parties") or also from parties that they oppose ("out-parties") (e.g., Bolsen et al. 2014; Bakker et al. 2020a; Slothuus and De Vreese 2010; Leeper and Slothuus 2014).

To examine how political parties can affect citizens' preferences for international coop-

eration, we conduct a pre-registered information treatment experiment on the effect of partisan information on preferences for fiscal integration in the European Union (EU) in five countries: France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain. International fiscal integration affects both states' budgetary autonomy and redistribution between states and, hence, touches upon a cornerstone of national sovereignty (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2018). Despite the functional gains associated with fiscal integration (Copelovitch et al. 2016; Jones et al. 2016), European citizens were reluctant to support far-reaching forms of cross-border fiscal integration during the Eurozone crisis (Bechtel et al. 2014; Beramendi and Stegmueller 2020; Walter et al. 2020). Specifically, we examine the question of joint debt, or *Eurobonds*, in the NextGeneration EU pandemic recovery fund of 2020. Joint debt represents a highly contested form of fiscal integration, as it involves high levels of international risk sharing (De Grauwe 2018).[1]

We study how informational cues about parties' voting behavior on joint European debt affect respondents' preferences for joint debt as well as the certainty of their preferences (Druckman and Lupia 2016, p.19). To obtain our information treatments, we leverage parties' voting behavior in a European Parliament (EP) vote on the issue in the context of the EU's pandemic recovery fund. Employing parties' actual positions in the EP vote anchors partisan cues to a specific, real-life situation and, more importantly, ensures that the partisan cues are comparable across countries and parties. To analyze whether respondents respond to information about the positioning of different parties, our design provides respondents either with information about the voting position of their "in-party", "out-party", or neither (control condition). This mitigates the risk of endogeneity that inflicts studies that use observational data to study public opinion and allows us to analyze the causal effect of party cues on fiscal integration preferences in Europe.

We find that there is a symmetric effect of receiving partisan informational cues on EU fiscal integration: In-party cues favoring joint European debt have a significant positive effect, while in-party cues against joint debt have a negative effect on respondents' pref-

[1]We use the terms "joint (European) debt", "common (European) debt", and "Eurobonds" interchangeably throughout the article.

erences. For out-party cues, we find the opposite: Out-party cues in support of joint debt significantly increase opposition to joint debt, while out-party cues in opposition to Eurobonds increase support. Remarkably, in-party cues work independently of priors and across all countries. The effect of out-party cues is smaller and is more dependent on both country context and political priors. In-party cues, moreover, affect respondents' certainty of their joint debt preferences. Overall, we find strong evidence that parties can generate support for and opposition to fiscal integration. Information about the voting behavior of parties can even alter democratic majorities on the issue if citizens were given the chance to vote on the issue.

The central contribution of this paper is, therefore, to demonstrate that political parties have ample latitude to shape citizen preferences about far-reaching international cooperation even on salient and highly contested questions. We extend cueing theory to show that by adopting, and communicating, a specific policy position, parties can influence the preferences of both their supporters and opponents. This applies both to mainstream and challenger parties, which suggests that political parties are not necessarily constrained by the mass politics of international cooperation. Instead, mainstream parties have the opportunity to use the politicization of international politics to their advantage by creating popular support for their preferred policy among their constituents. When it comes to public support for international cooperation, political parties, therefore, reap what they sow. Importantly, this also helps to understand the EU's remarkable and unprecedented decision to establish a pandemic recovery fund, including joint European debt, in July 2020.

This paper also makes several important methodological contributions. First, existing evidence on elite cueing often relies on single-country studies in idiosyncratic political contexts. This is understandable, given that different political constellations are problematic for cross-country experimental designs. Focusing on party voting behavior in the EP allows us to leverage the unique character of European multi-level governance, measuring the effect of the same cues on the same topic across several countries. Second,

our experimental design allows us to examine in- and out-party cues in the context of multi-party democracies. While the study of in- and out-party cueing effects is relatively straightforward in party systems with two major parties, this is not the case in most European parliamentary democracies. We, therefore, apply a new measure of in- and out-party assignment (Bakker et al. 2020b) to the study of party cues on international cooperation. Third, to capture the full effect of party cues on public opinion, we also examine the repercussions of receiving partisan information for citizens who are *not* directly persuaded by a party cue. Using insights from social psychology (Lavine et al. 1998; Tormala and Rucker 2007), we establish whether both failed and successful persuasion attempts (i.e., cues) can affect how certain respondents are about their preference (cf. Druckman et al. 2013; Alvarez and Brehm 1995).

Theory

The Mass Politics of International Fiscal Integration

Mass politics has not featured prominently in most "traditional" international relations scholarship (De Vries et al. 2021). Instead, realist and liberal intergovernmentalist theories for a long time have ignored the role of domestic politics in national preference formation (Keohane and Keohane 2005; Moravcsik 1997; Waltz 2010). Yet, the advent of anti-globalization challengers and the profound effects of mass politics on international cooperation has signaled the importance of studying the political dynamics of domestic preference formation on international cooperation (Hooghe and Marks 2009; De Vries et al. 2021; Trubowitz and Burgoon 2020; Walter 2021).

The politicization of far-reaching international cooperation, such as integration in institutions like the EU, has made the domestic public a relevant force for national governments to reckon with when negotiating forms of international cooperation. Therefore, scholars have theorized that democratically elected governments are increasingly constrained

by critical citizens and opposition parties (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Beramendi and Stegmueller 2020; De Vries et al. 2021; Walter 2021).

This particularly applies to questions related to fiscal integration.[2] Fiscal integration implies some form of fiscal risk-sharing across borders, which touches upon core state powers related to budgetary autonomy (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2018). Nevertheless, fiscal integration is often considered to be a prerequisite for the survival and thriving of an international organization like the EU (e.g. Mundell 1961; De Grauwe 2018). The Eurozone crisis, in particular, exposed significant deficiencies of a monetary union without centralized fiscal policies. To alleviate the fragility of the Eurozone, scholars have proposed that EU member states issue joint bonds (De Grauwe 2018, p. 240). Joint debt liability increases the creditworthiness of Europe's governments by shielding the common currency area from the destabilizing influence of financial markets.

However, fiscal integration, and especially joint debt, is a highly contested issue in the EU. On the one hand, policymakers in Northern Europe commonly highlight concers of "moral hazard" (Rathbun et al. 2019). They fear that joint liability incentivizes countries to issue more debt than they can repay – to the detriment of "responsible" member states. In addition, common debt may be subject to lower credit ratings compared to triple-A-rated northern member states (De Grauwe 2018, p. 240). Voters in northern countries also expressed strong opposition to fiscal risk-sharing during the Eurozone crisis (Bechtel et al. 2014; Beramendi and Stegmueller 2020; Walter et al. 2020). They were skeptical about European bailouts and vehemently opposed Eurobonds, as they feared significant financial transfers. Since European governments are responsive to public opinion (Schneider and Slantchev 2018; Degner and Leuffen 2020), EU leaders faced a "democratic constraint" (Beramendi and Stegmueller 2020).

Southern European member states, on the other hand, were reluctant to accept strict common budgetary and fiscal rules that Northern European governments demanded in

[2] We define "fiscal integration" as the pooling of budgetary decisions under common institutions shared by participating governments.

exchange for limited fiscal support. EU bailouts during the Eurozone crisis were conditional upon stringent austerity measures, which reduced support for fiscal integration in southern member states (Fernández-Albertos and Kuo 2016; Jurado et al. 2020). Experimental evidence from Italy shows that citizens are even reluctant to stay in the Eurozone if membership was conditional on further fiscal consolidation (Baccaro et al. 2021). This contestation over fiscal integration occurs in a critical moment of European integration. The EU no longer enjoys the tacit public support which marked earlier phases of integration (Hooghe and Marks 2009). Public debate on the EU has become increasingly controversial and polarized (Hutter et al. 2016), and governments are increasingly responsive to public opinion at the EU level (Hagemann et al. 2017; Schneider 2020; Degner and Leuffen 2020). Substantial steps forward in integration are, therefore, contingent on public support.

Party Cues and Joint Debt Preferences

The politicization of EU politics has led domestic governments and mainstream parties to respond to (anti-European) public opinion (Hagemann et al. 2017; Schneider 2020) and to anti-European challenger parties (Meijers 2017). Yet, citizens' preferences for fiscal integration are not independent of political supply. Public opinion also responds to elite communication, and hence, political parties can actively shape and steer citizens' political preference formation (Zaller 1992; Bolsen et al. 2014; Kam 2005; Bisgaard and Slothuus 2018; Slothuus and Bisgaard 2021). Citizens can rely on party cues as a heuristic to form accurate judgments (Bullock 2011; Leeper and Slothuus 2014). Equally, due to motivated reasoning, citizens can process party cues to express preferences that are congruent with their preferred party (Leeper and Slothuus 2014).

Given the complexity of international politics, and the distance from citizens' daily lives, elites arguably have particularly strong leverage over citizens' preferences for international cooperation (Dellmuth 2016; Guisinger and Saunders 2017; Steenbergen et al. 2007). Recent scholarship has shown that party cueing affects citizens' *diffuse* support

for international cooperation and integration. Dellmuth and Tallberg (2021), for instance, show that elite communication can affect the legitimacy perceptions of international organizations. With respect to European integration, studies have found that political elites can drive overall support for European cooperation (Gabel and Scheve 2007; Steenbergen et al. 2007; Maier et al. 2012; Maier et al. 2017; Pannico 2020).

The deepening of international cooperation, however, depends on *specific* integration steps that directly affect national autonomy (cf. Easton 1975). Therefore, we argue that we need to study partisan cueing for specific and highly contentious integration proposals if we are to adequately understand the ability of political parties to shape public preferences (see also Stoeckel and Kuhn 2018). Building on these insights, we investigate whether in- and out-party cues affect support for the introduction of joint European debt, a specific integration step that is electorally salient and highly contested.

Previous research primarily emphasizes that the public is open to cues from knowledgeable elites that they trust (Zaller 1992). However, both in- and out-parties provide citizens with meaningful information that could inform their political preferences (Bolsen et al. 2014; Slothuus and De Vreese 2010; Bisgaard and Slothuus 2018). Hence, the influence of partisan information on the EU is not necessarily limited to sources they trust (Pannico 2020), but also extends to sources that individuals may outright oppose.

We argue that these mechanisms are also at play when citizens receive information about political parties' voting behavior in the European multi-level context. Despite being considered a second-order parliament, political parties have used their parliamentary prerogatives in the EP to set the agenda and communicate policy positions (Slapin and Proksch 2010). The communicative potential of parliamentary activity in the EP is particularly present in roll-call votes on motions for resolution, which Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) use to publicly take positions (Carrubba et al. 2006). We thus expect that informational cues about parties' EP voting behavior on joint European debt influences individuals' endorsement thereof.

Table 1: Expected effects on support for Eurobonds vs. the control group.

Treatment group	**Party position on European debt**	
	Support	*Opposition*
In-party	+	-
Out-party	-	+

Table 1 shows an overview of our expectations. We expect that in-party cues from parties that support Eurobonds have a positive effect on respondents' Eurobonds support vis-à-vis the control group, which does not receive a party cue. In-party cues from parties that oppose Eurobonds have a negative effect on respondents' support compared to the control group. We expect out-parties cues to have the opposite effect, as they also provide respondents with information about the policy at stake. We thus formulate the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1a: Respondents receiving an in-party cue in favor of common European debt support Eurobonds more than respondents in the control group.

Hypothesis 1b: Respondents receiving an in-party cue in opposition to common European debt support Eurobonds less than respondents in the control group.

Hypothesis 2a: Respondents receiving an out-party cue in favor of common European debt support Eurobonds less than respondents in the control group.

Hypothesis 2b: Respondents receiving an out-party cue in opposition to common European debt support Eurobonds more than respondents in the control group.

Preference Congruence and Attitude Certainty

Elite cueing research overwhelmingly focuses on whether cues can change public opinion. Yet, the lack of a partisan cueing effect is not synonymous with the absence of any effect of partisan information. Statistically significant effects notwithstanding, it is equally possible that some individuals are not persuaded by partisan information. To capture the full effect of party cues on public opinion, we examine the repercussions of receiving partisan information for individuals who do not follow the cue. Revisiting the literature on attitude certainty and ambivalence (Alvarez and Brehm 1995; Lavine et al. 1998; Druckman et al. 2013; Zaller 1992), we posit that "unsuccessful" cues can affect individuals' attitude certainty.

In social psychology, attitude certainty denotes the subjective sense of conviction that individuals have in their preference as well as the perceived precision of their preference (Gross et al. 1995; Tormala and Rucker 2007; Lavine et al. 1998). High attitude uncertainty is assumed to be the result of a lack of information (Alvarez and Brehm 1995; Lavine et al. 1998), which can be resolved by providing people with new information. We argue that the effect of new information on attitude certainty depends on both the source of the cue and the congruence with one's priors. When partisan messaging is congruent with one's views, we expect respondents to be more certain about their preferences. By contrast, incongruent partisan messages can lead citizens to become less certain and more reflective of their policy preferences. As such, the effects of elite communication on attitude certainty can be regarded as a starting point of elite persuasion.

Previous observational research has shown that citizens may be more or less certain about their EU preferences (De Vries and Steenbergen 2013). We hypothesize, therefore, that when individuals' preferences are (in)congruent with the in-party cue, this positively (negatively) affects their attitude certainty regarding European debt. Conversely, when respondents' preferences are (in)congruent with the out-party cues, this decreases (increases) certainty. Table 2 shows an overview of our expectations of the relation-

Table 2: Expected effects on preference certainty vs. the control group.

Congruent preference?	**Party cue**	
	In-party	*Out-party*
Congruent	+	-
Incongruent	-	+

ship between preference congruence and attitude certainty. We formulate the following hypotheses:

> **Hypothesis 3a:** Respondents receiving an in-party cue that is (in)congruent with their view are more (less) certain about their preferences than respondents in the control group.

> **Hypothesis 3b:** Respondents receiving an out-party cue that is (in)congruent with their view are less (more) certain about their preferences than respondents in the control group.

Data and Methods

Extant studies on party leverage on EU support have relied on indirect observational evidence (Gabel and Scheve 2007; Steenbergen et al. 2007) or on experimental evidence covering a limited number of countries and parties (Maier et al. 2012; Maier et al. 2017; Stoeckel and Kuhn 2018; Pannico 2017; Pannico 2020). Instead, we examine the persuasion effect of in- and out-party cues for a specific integration issue in multiple countries.

To test our theoretical expectations, we conducted a survey experiment in July 2020 (10 July to 28 July) in five EU member states: France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain. This selection of countries includes the most important EU member states involved in the debate about the mutualization of new debt in 2020. It ensures sufficient variation on country-level variables such as the likely net recipient/contributor position

from the issuance of European debt and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Italy and the Netherlands represent the two opposing poles in the European discussion, where Italy represents the "southern bloc" that demanded pan-European solidarity, while the Netherlands represents the "northern bloc" (or more specifically, the so-called "frugal four") that was reluctant to support cross-border transfers. Germany and Spain also belong to the northern and southern camps, respectively, but took more moderate negotiation positions during the COVID-19 crisis, showing a willingness to compromise. Finally, although France had a clear negotiation position during the Eurozone crisis (Lehner and Wasserfallen 2019; Degner and Leuffen 2019), it is often a mediator between the northern and southern blocs.

We recruited 1,500 respondents per country, which gives us a sample of 7,500 respondents in total. The sample was drawn from a large online panel provided by the survey company IPSOS. Sampling quotas ensure that the sample in each country is nationally representative on the following categories: age, gender, education level, and region of residence (NUTS1-level). Moreover, we used a soft quota for household income. The survey was conducted in the countries' main languages.[3] On average, respondents took 15 minutes and 22 seconds to complete the survey.[4]

Fieldwork was conducted in the period when European governments agreed on the creation of the *NextGenerationEU* pandemic recovery fund, including jointly issued debt, at the July 2020 European Council summit. Joint debt was hotly debated in the period preceding our fieldwork. To illustrate this, Figure 1 presents Google Trends data for the keyword "Eurobonds" in the five countries studied. Google Trends data estimate the salience of search terms on Google's search engine relative to the specified time period per country. The results show that the term Eurobonds grabbed people's attention in almost all countries at the height of the Eurozone crisis in 2011 and 2012, and again in 2020 when the pandemic hit. We thus fielded our survey at a time of high salience, relative to other periods.

[3] In Catalonia respondents could choose between taking the survey in Spanish or Catalan.
[4] Appendix A provides further information on our survey.



Figure 1: Salience of Eurobonds by country from 2008 to 2020 according to Google Trends.
Note: The figure shows Google Trends data for the term "Eurobonds" by country from 2008 to 2020. It shows the relative volume of the search volume for the word on Google. The lines for each country are smoothed using a loess fit with an alpha of 0.5..

Experimental Treatment

We included an information treatment experiment in the survey to examine the effect of party cues on support for joint European debt in Europe. Before the experimental manipulation, we measured respondents' in-party (i.e, the party one supports) and out-party (i.e., the party one opposes). While in- and out-party measurement in two-party systems is straightforward, this is not the case in our five multi-party democracies. Some studies have circumvented this problem by reducing the number of parties respondents could choose from, selecting only "major parties" (e.g., Bisgaard and Slothuus 2018). Not all countries in our sample have two major parties, however. Therefore, we rely on the approach proposed by Bakker et al. (2020b) to assign respondents' in- and out-party. To measure a respondent's in-party we asked which party they would most likely vote for if national elections were held. A respondent's out-party is measured by asking them which party they would least likely vote for if elections were held.

We then exposed respondents to a vignette, informing them about a real European Parliament (EP) vote on an amendment to a motion for resolution on the proposed European pandemic recovery fund. The amendment was proposed on April 16, 2020, by Philippe Lamberts of the Belgian party *Ecolo* and the European party group Greens/European Free Alliance (EFA). It advocated for the issuance of joint European debt in the recovery fund. Specifically, the amendment read as follows:

> . . . considers it essential that, in order to preserve the cohesion of the European Union and the integrity of its monetary union, a substantial share of the debt that will be issued to combat the consequences of the COVID-19 crisis is mutualized at EU level; . . . "

Respondents were randomly assigned to one of three treatment groups. One-third of respondents were assigned to the control condition and received a vignette about the EP vote without a party cue. The second third of respondents were allocated to the condition in which the vignette was accompanied by a statement how their in-party voted on the amendment. The final third of respondents were allocated to a condition in which the vignette was accompanied with a cue on how their out-party voted on the amendment. The three vignettes are shown in Table 3.

Table 3: Vignettes for control and treatment groups.

Basic vignette (shown to everyone)		
The European Parliament recently voted on the question of whether the countries in the European Union (EU) should commit to so-called common European debt. In this case, EU countries would borrow money together on the financial markets as a group in order to help those EU countries who experience economic problems because of the COVID-19 pandemic. For a substantial share of this new common debt, the EU countries would then be responsible together for paying this back.		
Control group (1/3)	**Treatment group ('in-party') (1/3)**	**Treatment group ('out-party') (1/3)**
No further information	In this vote, [IN-PARTY] [voted in favor / voted against / did not participate].	In this vote, [OUT-PARTY] [voted in favor / voted against / did not participate].



Figure 2: Voting behavior of parties on the amendment by EU position.
Note: The figure shows the voting behavior of all parties represented in the EP in each country by their general position on European integration. The parties' positions are based on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) (Jolly et al. 2022). For a list of all party abbreviations, see Appendix A.3.

We determined in- and out-parties' positions on joint European debt based on the voting behavior of their MEPs on the amendment. All parties voted in a unitary fashion. In total, 40 political parties were included.[5] A total of 16 parties voted in favor of the amendment, 20 parties voted against the amendment, two abstained from voting, and

[5]Table A.3 in the appendix gives an overview of all parties included in the experiment, how they voted, and how the cue was coded.

two were not represented in the European Parliament.[6]

Figure 2 shows that there is no straightforward relationship between parties' voting behavior on the motion and their overall position on European integration. Eurosceptic parties like Unbowed France (*La France Insoumise*), Brothers of Italy (*Fratelli d'Italia*), and Vox (Spain) voted in favor of the amendment, whereas pro-EU parties like D66 (The Netherlands) and the People's Party (*Partido Popular*, Spain) voted against joint borrowing. This discrepancy between parties' general position on the EU and their voting decision renders reputation-based pretreatment unlikely (Slothuus 2016; Druckman and Leeper 2012).

Despite the relative salience of the issue of Eurobonds we also expect exposure-based pretreatment to be unlikely, given that the proposed amendment was mostly a symbolic motion. It is unlikely that respondents had been exposed to information about their in- or out-party voting behavior before our survey. Nevertheless, if respondents had been pretreated, on joint debt or the recovery fund more generally, our results could be regarded as a conservative estimate, as the experiment would identify the *additional* treatment effect of the experiment, alongside the real-world treatment (Gaines and Kuklinski 2011, p. 450).

Analytical Strategy

After the experimental manipulation, we measured three distinct dependent variables. First, we included two different measures of support for Eurobonds: We asked respondents to indicate their preference for joint European debt on a 7-point scale and we asked them how they would have voted on the amendment ("in favor", "against", or "would not vote"). Second, we asked them to indicate how certain they are about their preference for a common European debt on a 7-point scale. To aid the interpretation of results,

[6]Four parties in our sample were accompanied by the "cue" that the party did not vote on the issue. *Le République en Marche* and *Italia Viva* abstained in the EP vote and *Debout la France* and the *Socialistische Partij* (SP) did not have a seat in the EP.

we recode the range of the two dependent variables that were measured on a scale so that they range from 0 (complete opposition/complete uncertainty) to 1 (complete support/complete certainty). Given that we are interested in *support* for integration, we also recode respondents' vote choice: The variable takes a value of 1 if respondents would have voted in favor of the amendment and a value of 0 if they would have voted against it or abstained from the vote.[7]

We employ OLS and linear probability regression models to estimate the average treatment effects (ATEs). Based on the combinations of our vignettes (in- vs. out-party) and the voting behavior of the different parties (in favor vs. against), we have four different treatment groups for all analyses involving support and vote choice: in-party in favor, in-party against, out-party in favor, and out-party against.[8] We compare the effect of these treatments against the control group, which includes all respondents that did not receive any information on party behavior in the vote. To test how stable the treatment effects are across countries and individuals, we compute heterogeneous treatment effects by country and support for EU competences in socio-economic policies in exploratory analyses.

To analyze the influence of cues for preference certainty, we then create a variable that measures the "congruence" of the respondent's hypothetical vote for or against joint European debt with the party cue that they received. People who received a party cue in favor of (against) Eurobonds and who stated that they would vote in favor (against) of Eurobonds are classified as congruent, whereas people who received the same cue but who stated that they would vote against (in favor of) Eurobonds are classified as incongruent. We thus combine the type of party cue (in-party vs. out-party) with information about congruence (congruent vs. incongruent) to create four different groups: in-party congruent, in-party incongruent, out-party congruent, and out-party incongruent. We

[7] Appendix A provides more information on all key variables, including their operationalization and summary statistics.

[8] We drop respondents who received the cue that their in- or out-party did not participate in the vote, as this cue is not of substantive interest but was only included to reflect the real-life situation and include all parties. Very few respondents selected the four relevant parties as their in- or out-party except in France, given that *La République en Marche* abstained from the vote.

again use people who did not receive any information as the control group.

In Appendix C, we include several additional tests to probe the robustness of our findings. First, we abstract from regression analysis and simply compute the average support for Eurobonds and vote choice by treatment group. Second, we include the few respondents which received the cue that their in- or out-party did not vote. We then also operationalize the "vote" dependent variable differently and compute logistic regression models. Third, we test for other heterogeneous treatment effects (respondents' left-right placement, exclusive national identity, education, and economic risk exposure). In addition, we assess whether the findings hold across different party types: mainstream vs. challenger parties and government vs. opposition parties. Finally, we exclude people who failed the attention check from the analyses. Overall, the results are robust and the treatment effects shown below persist for different subgroups of the population.

Results

Average Treatment Effects of Cueing on Support for Eurobonds

Our survey shows high baseline support for joint European debt in July 2020. The left-hand side of Figure 3 shows that support for Eurobonds was skewed towards the left: On a scale from 1 to 7, average support for Eurobonds was 4.18. The right-hand side of Figure 3 shows that 50 percent of respondents would have voted in favor of the amendment in the EP, whereas only 28.3 percent would have voted against it. 21.7 percent would have abstained from the vote.

The high overall support for joint European debt masks variation across countries, as Figure A.1 in the Appendix shows. There was a clear majority in favor of common European debt in Italy and Spain, where 61.5 and 62.6 percent were in favor, respectively. In France and Germany, a relative majority was in favor, as 48.7 and 44.9 percent supported



Figure 3: Support for Eurobonds in five European countries, pooled.
Note: The left panel of the figure shows the distribution of respondents for a continuous measure of support for joint debt. The right panel of the figure shows the distribution of responses to a hypothetical vote question. Question wording in Table A.2. Missing observations are excluded. Only data from the control group shown..

the proposal, respectively. Dutch citizens were much more skeptical: Nearly 50 percent of respondents would have rejected the proposal; only 32.3 percent would have voted in favor.

Despite the relatively high average support for Eurobonds, party cues still have a substantial and statistically significant influence on support for Eurobonds. Figure 4 shows ATEs of the four different cues on individuals' support for Eurobonds and their hypothetical vote choice, estimated by OLS and linear probability regression models, respectively. Generally, it shows that informational cues about parties' voting behavior have the hypothesized effects for both in-party (H1) and out-party (H2) cues. This effect is robust if we control for country fixed effects and individual-level covariates.[9]

Specifically, in-party cues have a large effect in both directions on support for Eurobonds, as shown in the left panel of Figure 4. Informing people that their in-party voted against joint European debt reduces support by 9.8 percentage points, according to the model that includes country fixed effects and individual-level covariates. Informing respondents that their in-party voted in favor of common European debt increases support by 7 percentage

[9]Further regression analyses show that the ATEs persist if additional control variables are included in the models (see Table A.6).



Figure 4: Average treatment effects of party cues on support for Eurobonds by country.
Note: The figure shows the average treatment effect of different party cues on support for Eurobonds. The treatment effects are estimated based on three OLS regressions. Model 1 includes country fixed effects and several individual-level covariates (age, age squared, gender, education, income), model 2 includes only country fixed effects, while model 3 includes no covariates.

points. This is clear evidence in support of Hypothesis 1a and 1b that respondents follow partisan cues and align their positions on European debt with their in-party.

Out-party cues also have the expected effects. The effects are slightly smaller but are still significant and substantial, providing evidence for Hypothesis 2a and 2b. In particular, if respondents are informed that their out-party voted against the introduction of Eurobonds, their support increases by 4.2 percentage points according to the first model.[10] Informing respondent that their out-party voted in favor of the amendment is a stronger signal. It decreases support for Eurobonds by 8.8 percentage points.[11]

The treatment effects are even larger for respondents' hypothetical vote choice in the EP vote. In some instances, they are twice as large as the effect on the continuous variable. For example, informing respondents that their in-party voted against the proposal reduces their likelihood to vote in favor of it by 24.6 percent. This is the largest treatment effect

[10]This effect is not statistically significant in Model 1, which does not account for country differences. See below for a further discussion on heterogeneity across countries.

[11]All effect sizes discussed in the text refer to models that include covariates and country fixed effects.

that we observe. Informing respondents that their in-party voted in favor still increases the likelihood that respondents support the amendment by 17.7 percent. Out-party cues against and in favor of Eurobonds again have a smaller but still substantial effect (7.6 and 21 percent, respectively).

Stark differences in average support for the amendment across treatment group suggest that the party cues are consequential (see Figure A.7 in the Appendix). Among people who receive the in-party cue in favor of the amendment, 74 percent would vote for it. In contrast, among people who receive the in-party cue against the amendment, only 25 percent would make this choice. People who receive the out-party cue also adjust their hypothetical vote choice, which changes the overall majority: Among people who receive the out-party cue against the proposal, 54 percent would vote for the proposal; in the group that receives the out-party cue in favor of it, only 38 percent would make this choice.

Overall, the results in Figure 4 show a striking symmetry of cueing effects. Both in- and out-party cues influence respondents in the expected direction. This suggests that in multi-level polities like the EU, information about parties' voting behavior can influence people's preferences, even in low-salient arenas such as the EP. Hence, party behavior in these political arenas seems to be far from irrelevant: if respondents receive information about party behavior, this can substantially influence their own preferences.

Heterogeneous Treatment Effects of Partisan Cueing

The average results shown in Figure 4 may hide important variation in the treatment effects, since preferences for Eurobonds vary by country and correlate with ideological priors on European integration. Country contexts and motivated reasoning may thus undermine the treatment effects in some instances. Are some groups more receptive to party cues than others?

By Country

Figure 5 shows the average treatment effect of party cues on support and vote choice by country. Party cues have the expected effects across almost all countries. In-party cues, both against and in favor of Eurobonds, clearly influence respondents' support for Eurobonds and their hypothetical vote choice in all countries. These effects are statistically significant except in one case: In Spain, in-party cues in favor of the amendment do not significantly increase support for joint European debt. Given the high baseline support in Spain, there seems to be a ceiling effect.[12] However, even in Spain, the cue still significantly increases the likelihood to vote in favor of Eurobonds.



Figure 5: Partisan cueing effects on support for Eurobonds by country
Note: The figure shows the heterogeneous treatment effects on Eurobonds support and vote choice by country, estimated with OLS regressions with country fixed effects.

For out-party cues, heterogeneity in treatment effects across countries is somewhat larger.

[12] In Spain, support for Eurobonds was widespread as shown in Figure A.7, although both the *Partido Popular (PP)* and *Ciudadanos* (Cs) voted against the amendment. The high support for Eurobonds in Spain is also shown in predicted probability plots included in Appendix B.

Out-party cues in either direction have a statistically significant effect in Germany and Italy. In France, only out-party cues against Eurobonds have the expected effect, while out-party cues in favor of Eurobonds do not have a statistically significant effect. In the Netherlands and Spain, the opposite is true: Out-party cues in favor of Eurobonds reduce support and the likelihood that respondents would vote in favor, while out-party cues against Eurobonds do not have an effect. In contrast to Spain, opposition to joint European debt is common in the Netherlands, according to our survey. Moreover, in the actual EP vote, only the green party *GroenLinks* and the center-left party PvdA voted in favor. Given that the government's opposition to Eurobonds was salient and widely reported in national news, out-party cues against Eurobonds may not have provided much additional information to respondents in this case.

Overall, the pattern found in Figure 4 is consistent across countries. In particular, in line with Hypotheses 1a and 1b, there is strong evidence that in-party cues have the expected effects in all five countries. The effect of out-party cues varies across countries, but in most countries, the cues have the expected effects, as stipulated in Hypotheses 2a and 2b. In all countries, the effect of party cues on vote choice is stronger than the effect on support for Eurobonds.

By Participants' EU Integration Priors

Cue-taking may also depend on priors about European integration. We, therefore, test for heterogeneous treatment effect by respondents' support for the EU. We leverage a question which asked respondents prior to treatment the following: "Regarding economic and social policies, should decisions be made mainly by the [COUNTRY] government, mainly by the European Union, or jointly?" Figure 6 shows the treatment effects of party cues by responses to this question. We distinguish between individuals who believe that decisions should mainly be made by the national governments and all others.

People who generally support joint European decisions regarding economic and social



Figure 6: Partisan cueing effects on support for Eurobonds by EU integration priors.
Note: The figure shows the heterogeneous treatment effect on support for common European debt by treatment group and EU integration priors, estimated with OLS regressions using country fixed effects..

policy are also supportive of Eurobonds, as shown in the multivariate regression analyses and the predicted probability plots in Appendix B. Nevertheless, there seems to be no ceiling effect. Instead, all cues still have the expected effects. In-party cues in favor of Eurobonds as well as out-party cues against Eurobonds further increase support among this group of respondents. In turn, respondents are not resistant to cues if they go against their priors, either. In fact, cues that are expected to reduce support for Eurobonds (In-party: Against and Out-party: In favor) have remarkably strong effects.

People who believe that economic and social decisions should mainly be taken by national governments also react to all cues as expected. Despite their ideological priors, these respondents do not resist treatments in favor of Eurobonds. The effect of in-party cues on support for Eurobonds is large, and the effect of out-party cues is also positive and statistically significant. At the same time, we also see the expected negative effects in the "In-party: Against" and the "Out-party: In favor" treatments.

In sum, the results show that the treatment effects exist even among people who have

different priors about European integration. Parties thus seem to have the ability to influence peoples' views on the EU fiscal integration, irrespective of their priors. What is more, this ability to influence public opinion equally applies to both mainstream parties and challenger parties, as Figure A.12 in the Appendix shows.

The Effects of Cueing on Preference Certainty

Although our experiment suggests that people follow both in-party cues and out-party cues, there are some respondents who do not. Around fifty percent of all participants who receive an in-party cue still adopt a position that is incongruent with their in-party. Similarly, there is a sizeable number of participants who voice a preference consistent with the out-party cue (see Figure A.2 in the Appendix).

However, party cueing may not only influence peoples' position but also the certainty with which individuals hold these positions (Lavine et al. 1998; Tormala and Rucker 2007), also among participants who are not persuaded by the cue. According to our survey, many Europeans are relatively certain of their position on Eurobonds, but a sizeable number of people reports that they are not certain. This is true across all countries, as shown in Appendix A. Overall, 20 percent of respondents respond with 3 or less on the scale from 1 to 7.

What is the effect of receiving a party cue that is (in-)congruent with one's own preference for common European debt? Figure 7 shows the treatment effects of these different types of cues on respondents' certainty of their position. The results show that out-party cues do not have a statistically significant impact on certainty, irrespective of whether respondents adopt a congruent or incongruent position.

In-party cues, however, have statistically significant effects on certainty. People who receive an in-party cue and adopt a congruent position with their in-party are also more certain of their position vis-à-vis the control group. This effect is statistically significant in models without covariates and with country fixed effects. It disappears when including



Figure 7: Party cueing effects on certainty.
Note: The figure shows average treatment effects of party cues on respondents' preference certainty estimated with three OLS regressions: Model 1 includes country fixed effects and several individual-level covariates (age, age squared, gender, education, income), Model 2 includes only country fixed effects, Model 3 includes no covariates.

individual-level control variables. As shown below, this is largely because certainty is correlated with education, i.e., people with a higher level of education are more likely to be certain of their preferences.

The strongest effect on preference certainty exists for people who receive an in-party cue but choose not to follow this cue, i.e., those who adopt an incongruent position with their in-party. Those respondents become more uncertain about their stated preference, and this effect is statistically significant across all three models. Therefore, party cues cannot only influence the positions of respondents, but also the certainty with which respondents hold these positions: People who chose not to follow their in-party's position become less certain of their preference. To capture the full effect of party cueing on public opinion, one should thus not only study positions but also respondents' preference certainty, especially on contentious and salient issues such as fiscal integration.

Conclusion

International cooperation increasingly has to reckon with domestic political dynamics (Hooghe and Marks 2009; De Vries et al. 2021). This has led scholars to conclude that political parties, and in particular mainstream or governing parties, are constrained by the public when negotiating further international integration. This is particularly the case for European integration, and the contentious issues of fiscal integration and joint risk-sharing, in particular. While many economists underline the importance of a fiscally integrated EU, studies found limited popular support for fiscal integration (Bechtel et al. 2014; Beramendi and Stegmueller 2020; Walter et al. 2020). A contentious question has been whether EU member states should issue joint debt to stabilize the Eurozone (De Grauwe 2018). In this paper, we examined to what extent political parties can drive support or opposition for joint European debt.

Thanks to a multi-country experimental survey linked to a vote in the EP, we were able to test the effect of party cues on support for specific integration steps in multiple countries. Leveraging information from a vote in the EP on the issue, we find a symmetric effect of receiving partisan informational cues that is striking: In-party cues in support of Eurobonds have a positive effect, while in-party cues in opposition to Eurobonds have a negative effect on support for Eurobonds. For out-party cues, we find the opposite: Out-party cues in favor of Eurobonds increase opposition, while out-party cues against Eurobonds decrease support for Eurobonds. In general, the effects are robust across countries, and they exist even among people with different ideological priors. Therefore, a substantial amount of people are persuaded by both in- and out-party cues.

Going further, our results also show that some people who do no change their opinion in response to party cues are still affected by them. When respondents receive an in-party cue but continue to adopt a preference that is incongruent with it, this negatively affects participants' subjective attitude certainty. We can speculate that if people are repeatedly exposed to incongruent partisan communication, this uncertainty might lead to attitude

change in the long run.

Our study thus contributes to cueing theory by showing that it is necessary to examine both the effects of in- and out-party cues on preferences and preference certainty to obtain a complete picture of party persuasion. By extending cueing theory in this way, our study shows that political parties, including mainstream parties, have considerable leverage to induce support for or opposition to international cooperation among citizens. Hence, the main contribution of our study is to show that political parties seem to reap what they sow with regards to international cooperation.

In fact, our results suggest that even a largely symbolic vote in a second-order parliament like the EP has the ability to influence public opinion. Crucially, however, the external validity of this finding depends on the extent to which citizens are informed about such voting behavior. Our findings, therefore, suggest that both proponents and opponents of Eurobonds – be they political parties, EU institutions, media outlets, or civil society organizations – can manufacture support or opposition for Eurobonds by publicizing the outcome of such votes.

This also helps to explain why the EU was able to agree on the *NextGenerationEU* pandemic recovery fund in July 2020, which included provisions to issue joint European debt for the first time. Although limited in time and scope, this was a historic moment because it represented an unprecedented step towards fiscal integration in Europe. Our study suggests that EU governments' emphasis on European solidarity (Ferrera et al. 2021) could have played a role in garnering public support for cross-country fiscal solidarity during the pandemic.

Since fiscal integration in the EU is a particularly far-reaching and contentious instance of international cooperation, we believe our results have bearing on other, non-European forms of international cooperation. Future research should verify to what extent cueing effects influence support for specific international cooperation steps beyond the EU. Still, in view of recent evidence that mainstream parties lose electoral support when adopting

anti-globalization positions in response to challenger parties (Abou-Chadi and Wagner 2019; Abou-Chadi et al. 2021; Meijers and Williams 2020), our evidence already suggests that mainstream parties may be better advised to communicate in favor of international cooperation. As citizens respond to party communication, opposition to international cooperation can significantly boost resentment towards integration, which may affect mainstream parties' electoral fortunes in the long run.

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Online Appendix

Shaping Preferences for International Cooperation: Partisan Cueing on Fiscal Integration

Online Appendix
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A Further Information on Data and Methods

A.1 General information about the survey, summary statistics, and variable coding

The paper draws on an online survey about preferences towards the European pandemic recovery fund Next Generation EU that was fielded from 10 July to 28 July 2020 in five European countries: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands. The online survey was fielded in coordination with IPSOS. They recruited 1,500 respondents in each country from their large online panel. We employed a quota sampling approach based on age, gender, education, region of residence (at NUTS1-level), and a soft quota for income in each country to ensure that our samples are as representative of the population as possible. The quotas for the demographic categories were derived from Eurostat statistics. NUTS-1 refers to major socio-economic regions in the European Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics, such as the German states or French regions.

Prior to fieldwork, we received IRB approval and we obtained respondents' consent at the beginning of the survey. Respondents were informed that the survey was anonymous, their participation voluntary, and that the data would be used for scientific purposes and kept in a data repository to allow subsequent use. Respondents had to indicate that they had read and agreed to the information given in the consent message.

The survey then included questions on the following aspects: demographic information, political preferences, attitudes towards the EU, experimental manipulation and post-treatment questions, socio-economic information, and (economic) questions relating to the Covid-19 pandemic. The implementation of the online survey included timers, which allowed the survey companies to clean the data by removing responses that were equal to or less than 33 percent of the median duration per country. To further filter out inattentive respondents, we included an attention check and run analysis which exclude these responses (see below).

Table A.1: Summary statistics.

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Support for Eurobonds	6,481	0.60	0.25	0.14	1.00
Vote choice	7,501	0.50	0.50	0	1
Preference certainty	6,403	0.66	0.22	0.14	1.00
Treatment	7,170	2.61	1.46	1.00	5.00
Congruence	7,501	2.69	1.57	1	5
EU decisions	7,201	0.54	0.50	0	1
Left-right position	6,560	2.00	0.75	1.00	3.00
COVID economic concern	7,297	0.42	0.49	0	1
Identity	7,501	0.34	0.47	0	1
Gender	7,501	0.51	0.50	0	1
Age	7,501	50.20	16.93	17	98
Education	7,501	1.97	0.76	1	3
Income	7,501	2.11	0.98	1	4

Table A.2: Operationalization of dependent and independent variables.

Variable	Survey question	Operationalization
Support for Eurobonds	Please tell us whether you agree with COUNTRY committing to such common European debt.	Categorical variable: 1-7, recoded to 0-1
Vote choice	If you could vote on this question, how would you vote?	Binary variable: 1=support; 0= against, would not vote
Preference certainty	Please indicate how certain you are of your preference on such common European debt.	Categorical variable: 1-7, recoded to 0-1
In-party	If you had to choose, which of the following parties are you most likely to vote for in the next parliamentary election?	Categorical variable consisting of all main parties in each country
Out-party	If you had to choose, which party will certainly NOT receive your vote during the next parliamentary elections?	Categorical variable consisting of all main parties in each country
EU decisions	Regarding economic and social policies, should decisions be made mainly by the [COUNTRY] government, mainly by the European Union, or jointly?	Categorical variable: 1 = By the national government, 0 = By the EU or jointly
Left-right position	On a scale from 0 to 10, where would you place yourself, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?	Categorical variable: 1 = Left; 2 = Center; 3 = Right
COVID economic risk	How concerned are you about the effects that the coronavirus might have for the financial situation of your household?	Binary variable: 1 = Concerned; 0 = Not concerned
Identity	Do you see yourself as ...? [German, etc.] only, [German, etc.] and European, European and [German, etc.], European only	Binary variable: 1 = Exclusive national identity; 0 = No exclusive national identity
Gender	Are you? Male, Female, Other, I prefer not to say	Binary variable: 1 = Female; 0 = Other
Age	Please tell us the year of your birth/ month/ day?	Continuous variable: 17 - 98
Education	What is your highest completed level of education? If you are unsure about your degree or if you completed your education abroad, please choose the degree you think is closest.	Categorical variable: 1 = Low; 2 = Middle; 3 = High
Income	Can you tell us which value describes your household's yearly total income, after tax and compulsory deductions, from all sources? If you don't know the exact figure, please give an estimate.	Categorical variable: 1 = Low; 2 = Middle; 3 = High

A.2 List of party cues

Table A.3: List of parties included in the experiment and assigned cue.

Country	Party	Vote	Cue
France	La République en Marche (LREM)	Abstain	did not vote on this.
France	Rassemblement National (RN)	Against	has voted against this.
France	Parti socialiste (PS)	In favor	has voted in favor of this.
France	Les Républicains (LR)	Against	has voted against this.
France	Europe Écologie-Les Verts (EELV)	In favor	has voted in favor of this.
France	Modem (MDM)	Against	has voted against this.
France	Debout la France (DLF)	Could not vote	did not vote on this.
France	La France insoumise (FI)	In favor	has voted in favor of this.
Germany	CDU/CSU (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands)	Against	has voted against this.
Germany	SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands)	In favor	has voted in favor of this.
Germany	AfD (Alternative für Deutschland)	Against	has voted against this.
Germany	FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei)	Against	has voted against this.
Germany	Die Linke	In favor	has voted in favor of this.
Germany	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	In favor	has voted in favor of this.
Netherlands	VVD	Against	has voted against this.
Netherlands	Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV)	Against	has voted against this.
Netherlands	CDA	Against	has voted against this.
Netherlands	D66	Against	has voted against this.
Netherlands	GroenLinks	In favor	has voted in favor of this.
Netherlands	Socialistische Partij (SP)	Could not vote	did not vote on this.
Netherlands	Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA)	In favor	has voted in favor of this.
Netherlands	ChristenUnie (CU)	Against	has voted against this.
Netherlands	Partij voor de Dieren (PvdD)	Against	has voted against this.
Netherlands	50Plus	Against	has voted against this.
Netherlands	Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (SGP)	Against	has voted against this.
Netherlands	Forum voor Democratie (FvD)	Against	has voted against this.
Spain	PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Españo)	In favor	has voted in favor of this.
Spain	PP (Partido Popular)	Against	has voted against this.
Spain	Unidas Podemos	In favor	has voted in favor of this.
Spain	VOX	In favor	has voted in favor of this.
Spain	Ciudadanos (Cs)	Against	has voted against this.

Spain	Partido Nacionalista Vasco - Euzko Alderdi Jeltzale (EAJ-PNV)	In favor	has voted in favor of this.
Spain	ERC (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya)	In favor	has voted in favor of this.
Spain	Junts per Catalunya (JxCat)	Against	has voted against this.
Italy	Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S)	In favor	has voted in favor of this.
Italy	Partito Democratico (PD)	In favor	has voted in favor of this.
Italy	Lega	Against	has voted against this.
Italy	Forza Italia (FI)	Against	has voted against this.
Italy	Fratelli d'Italia (FdI)	In favor	has voted in favor of this.
Italy	Italia Viva (IV)	Abstain	did not vote on this.

Note: Parties that received more than 5 percent of the vote in the most recent national parliamentary election but have no representation in the EP are included in the experiment with the cue "did not vote on this".

B Additional Results

B.1 Distribution of support and hypothetical vote choice for Eurobonds by country



Figure A.1: Support for Eurobonds by country.
Note: The figure shows the distribution of support (top) and hypothetical vote choice (bottom) for Eurobonds by country. The figures show data from the control group only.

B.2 Distribution of preference certainty



Figure A.2: Congruence and certainty of positions on Eurobonds, pooled.
Note: The left panel of the figure shows the distribution of respondents by party cue and congruence. It shows whether respondents align their vote choice with the vote choice of the in-party or out-party cue that they receive. The right panel of the figure shows the distribution of respondents' preference certainty.



Figure A.3: Certainty of positions on Eurobonds by country
Note: The figure shows the distribution of respondents' preference certainty by country .

B.3 Regression tables corresponding to figures 4 and 7

Table A.4: OLS regressions for average treatment effects of party cues on support for Eurobonds and vote choice.

	Dependent variable:					
	Support			Vote choice		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
In-party: Against	−0.126***	−0.099***	−0.098***	−0.279***	−0.245***	−0.246***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
In-party: In favor	0.098***	0.070***	0.070***	0.218***	0.178***	0.178***
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Out-party: Against	−0.0004	0.043***	0.042***	0.019	0.078***	0.076***
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Out-party: In favor	−0.039***	−0.087***	−0.088***	−0.137***	−0.208***	−0.209***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Constant	0.605***	0.611***	0.700***	0.524***	0.508***	0.534***
	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.026)	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.049)
Country-fixed effects?	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls?	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Observations	6,204	6,204	6,204	7,170	7,170	7,170
R^2	0.069	0.171	0.187	0.089	0.136	0.163
Adjusted R^2	0.068	0.170	0.185	0.088	0.135	0.161
Note:					*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

Table A.5: OLS regressions for average treatment effect of party cues on preference certainty.

	Dependent variable:		
	Certainty		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
In-party: Congruent	0.016*	0.016*	0.013
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Out-party: Congruent	0.005	0.006	0.005
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Constant	0.662***	0.666***	0.583***
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.025)
Country-fixed effects?	No	Yes	Yes
Controls?	No	No	Yes
Observations	6,403	6,403	6,403
R^2	0.004	0.009	0.036
Adjusted R^2	0.003	0.008	0.034
Note:	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001		

B.4 Regression tables estimating correlates

Table A.6: Individual-level correlates of the support for Eurobonds, vote choice, and preference certainty.

	Dependent variable:		
	Support	Vote choice	Certainty
	(1)	(2)	(3)
In-party: Against	−0.078***	−0.208***	
	(0.009)	(0.018)	
In-party: In favor	0.053***	0.150***	
	(0.008)	(0.017)	
Out-party: Against	0.028***	0.058***	
	(0.008)	(0.016)	
Out-party: In favor	−0.074***	−0.185***	
	(0.009)	(0.019)	
In-party: Congruent			0.009
			(0.008)
In-party: Incongruent			−0.027**
			(0.010)
Out-party: Congruent			0.004
			(0.010)
Out-party: Incongruent			−0.011
			(0.008)
Female	−0.032***	−0.072***	−0.041***
	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.006)
Age	−0.003**	−0.002	0.003**
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Age squared	0.00003**	0.00003	−0.00003**
	(0.00001)	(0.00002)	(0.00001)
Education (ref.: low): Middle	−0.011	0.015	0.007
	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.007)
Education: High	−0.002	0.043**	0.033***
	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.008)
Income (ref.: low): Middle	0.009	−0.001	0.007
	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.007)
Income: High	0.025**	0.025	0.034***
	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.008)
Income: Refused	−0.028*	−0.086***	−0.007
	(0.012)	(0.022)	(0.011)
No EU decisions	0.088***	0.099***	0.013*
	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.006)
LR position (ref.: Left): Center	−0.044***	−0.113***	−0.024***
	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.007)
LR position: Right	−0.043***	−0.137***	0.012
	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.008)
Exclusive national identity	−0.082***	−0.124***	−0.042***
	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.007)
No COVID economic risk	−0.023***	−0.027*	−0.008
	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.006)
Country (ref.: France): Germany	−0.079***	−0.085***	0.018*
	(0.009)	(0.019)	(0.009)
Country: Italy	0.067***	0.126***	−0.0002
	(0.010)	(0.019)	(0.009)
Country: Netherlands	−0.107***	−0.171***	−0.024**
	(0.009)	(0.019)	(0.009)
Country: Spain	0.062***	0.095***	−0.0001
	(0.010)	(0.020)	(0.009)
Constant	0.720***	0.700***	0.591***
	(0.028)	(0.055)	(0.027)
Observations	5,627	6,119	5,821
R^2	0.271	0.216	0.051
Adjusted R^2	0.268	0.213	0.047
Residual Std. Error	0.212 (df = 5605)	0.442 (df = 6097)	0.211 (df = 5799)
F Statistic	99.254*** (df = 21; 5605)	80.027*** (df = 21; 6097)	14.690*** (df = 21; 5799)

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

B.5 Predicted support for Eurobonds by country and EU position



Figure A.4: Predicted support for Eurobonds by country.
Note: The figure shows the predicted support for Eurobonds by country based on the same regression models used to calculate the ATEs shown in Figure 5.



Figure A.5: Predicted support for Eurobonds by EU integration priors.
Note: The figure shows the predicted probabilities of support for Eurobonds by EU integration priors based on the same regression models used to calculate the ATEs shown in Figure 6.

C Robustness Tests

C.1 Include "no vote" cue as independent variable



Figure A.6: Average treatment effects of party cues on support for Eurobonds including "no vote" cue.

C.2 Average support for Eurobonds and preference certainty by treatment group



Figure A.7: Support for Eurobonds by treatment group
Note: The figure shows the average support for Eurobonds and the average share of people who would have voted in favor of Eurobonds by treatment group. The top panel shows results from the pooled sample; the bottom panel shows results by country. 95 percent confidence intervals included. Values above the horizontal dashed line indicate more than 50 percent support.

C.3 Robustness check: Other operationalization of the vote variable

Table A.7: OLS regressions for average treatment effect of party cues on voting in favor (vs. against) and not voting (vs. against).

	Dependent variable:			
	In favor		No vote	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
In-party: Against	−0.314***	−0.313***	−0.195***	−0.182***
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.021)
In-party: In favor	0.151***	0.151***	0.107***	0.098***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.030)	(0.029)
Out-party: Against	0.077***	0.076***	0.034	0.029
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Out-party: In favor	−0.227***	−0.226***	−0.136***	−0.123***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.024)
Constant	0.685***	0.756***	0.533***	0.565***
	(0.016)	(0.052)	(0.021)	(0.071)
Country-fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls?	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	5,641	5,641	3,558	3,558
R^2	0.216	0.222	0.108	0.140
Adjusted R^2	0.215	0.219	0.106	0.136
Note:				*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A.8: OLS regressions (model 1 and 2) and logistic regressions (model 3 and 4) for average treatment effect of party cues on vote choice.

	Dependent variable:			
	Vote choice			
	OLS		*Logistic*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
In-party: Against	-0.245^{***}	-0.246^{***}	-1.148^{***}	-1.188^{***}
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.083)	(0.085)
In-party: In favor	0.178^{***}	0.178^{***}	0.825^{***}	0.846^{***}
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.079)	(0.080)
Out-party: Against	0.078^{***}	0.076^{***}	0.354^{***}	0.351^{***}
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.071)	(0.072)
Out-party: In favor	-0.208^{***}	-0.209^{***}	-0.910^{***}	-0.947^{***}
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.082)	(0.084)
Constant	0.508^{***}	0.534^{***}	0.026	0.155
	(0.015)	(0.049)	(0.066)	(0.235)
Country-fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls?	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	7,170	7,170	7,170	7,170
R^2	0.136	0.163		
Adjusted R^2	0.135	0.161		
Log Likelihood			−4,448.368	−4,336.763
Akaike Inf. Crit.			8,914.735	8,707.526
Note:			*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

Table A.9: Multinomial regression for average treatment effect of party cues on vote choice.

	Dependent variable:			
	In favor	Would not vote	In favor	Would not vote
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
In-party: Against	-1.496^{***}	-0.843^{***}	-1.503^{***}	-0.821^{***}
	(0.093)	(0.100)	(0.002)	(0.001)
In-party: In favor	1.082^{***}	0.436^{***}	1.090^{***}	0.416^{***}
	(0.112)	(0.132)	(0.030)	(0.023)
Out-party: Against	0.405^{***}	0.126	0.403^{***}	0.136^{***}
	(0.086)	(0.102)	(0.025)	(0.017)
Out-party: In favor	-1.191^{***}	-0.544^{***}	-1.205^{***}	-0.509^{***}
	(0.099)	(0.108)	(0.021)	(0.017)
Constant	0.797^{***}	0.142	1.140^{***}	0.487^{***}
	(0.082)	(0.092)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Country-fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls?	No	No	Yes	Yes
Akaike Inf. Crit.	13,412.150	13,412.150	13,076.830	13,076.830
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

C.4 Robustness check: Other heterogeneous treatment effects (support)



Figure A.8: Heterogeneous treatment effects of party cues on support for Eurobonds by left-right position.
Note: The figure shows the heterogeneous treatment effects on support for Eurobonds by left-right position. They are estimated based on OLS regressions with country fixed effects.



Figure A.9: Heterogeneous treatment effects of party cues on support for Eurobonds by national identity.
Note: The figure shows the heterogeneous treatment effects on support for Eurobonds by national identity. They are estimated based on OLS regressions with country fixed effects.



Figure A.10: Heterogeneous treatment effects of party cues on support for Eurobonds by COVID-19 economic risk exposure.
Note: The figure shows the heterogeneous treatment effects on support for Eurobonds by COVID-19 economic risk exposure. They are estimated based on OLS regressions with country fixed effects.



Figure A.11: Heterogeneous treatment effects of party cues on support for Eurobonds by education.
Note: The figure shows the heterogeneous treatment effects on support for Eurobonds by education. They are estimated based on OLS regressions with country fixed effects.



Figure A.12: Heterogeneous treatment effects of party cues on support for Eurobonds by support for challenger vs. mainstream party.
Note: The figure shows the heterogeneous treatment effects on support for Eurobonds by support for challenger vs. mainstream party. They are estimated based on OLS regressions with country fixed effects.



Figure A.13: Heterogeneous treatment effects of party cues on support for Eurobonds by support for opposition vs. government party.
Note: The figure shows the heterogeneous treatment effects on support for Eurobonds by support for opposition vs. government party. They are estimated based on OLS regressions with country fixed effects.

C.5 Robustness check: Heterogeneous treatment effects (certainty)



Figure A.14: Heterogeneous treatment effects of party cues on preference certainty.
Note: The figure shows the heterogeneous treatment effects on preference certainty by country. They are estimated based on OLS regressions with country fixed effects.



Figure A.15: Heterogeneous treatment effects of party cues on preference certainty by EU position
Note: The figure shows the heterogeneous treatment effect on preference certainty by EU position. They are estimated based on OLS regressions with country fixed effects.

C.6 Robustness check: Exclude respondents who failed attention check



Figure A.16: Average treatment effects of party cues on support for Eurobonds by country
Note: The figure replicates Figure 4 excluding all respondents who failed the attention check..



Figure A.17: Average treatment effects of party cues on support for Eurobonds by country
Note: The figure replicates Figure 7 excluding all respondents who failed the attention check..