

Different aspects of the transnational cleavage. Assessing the evolutions of the structural anchorage

Eftichia Teperoglou – efteperoglou@polsci.auth.gr

Leonardo Puleo – leonardo.puleo@ulb.be

Giuseppe Carteny – giuseppe.carteny@mzes.uni-mannheim.de

Abstract

Over the last decades political science literature hypothesized the formation of a new cleavages triggered by the globalization, denationalization, European Union (EU) integration and the migration crises and opposing those who supports a higher degree of transnational integration in political, cultural and economic terms (i.e. integrationists) and who resists to this trend in favour of a restoration of national sovereignty and identity (i.e. demarcationist). The existence of this division has been so far tested by looking at the supply side of the political competition. Here we argue that a political conflict in order to be qualified as a cleavage needs the presence of structural anchorage at the individual level. Furthermore, we claim that in the study of the formation of a new political cleavage, the *critical junctures* that are supposed to trigger the transformation should be also integrated analytically and methodologically into the modelling. Our results show the absence of a structural anchorage of the transnational cleavage. In this respect, we advocate to refer to the conflict among demarcationists and integrationists as a transnational divide, rather than a transnational cleavage.

1. Introduction¹

In the last decade, the research on political cleavages witnessed a renaissance. Various authors suggested that the globalization, denationalization, European Union (EU) integration and the migration crises triggered the development of a new transnational cleavage confronting who favours and who contrasts the processes of political, economic and cultural supranational international integration (Bornschieer 2010; Hooghe and Marks 2018; Hutter and Kriesi 2019; Kriesi 2010). Despite a growing interest in the process of political mobilization of the transnational cleavages, the pieces of evidence signalling its structural embedding are still rather scarce (but see Bornschieer et al. 2021; Dolezal and Hutter 2012; Hooghe and Marks 2021; Lachat and Dolezal 2008). Furthermore, the existing studies focus on a limited period, and they are usually restricted to a small set of European countries.

¹ We would like to thank all the participants to the ProConEU project, and in particular Hermann Schmitt and Daniela Braun for their thoughtful suggestions and wholehearted support to this research effort. Last but not least, we would also like to thank Julian Leiser for his excellent research assistance in the party classification workflow.

Against this backdrop, the paper builds on the classic literature on cleavage theory (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Lipset and Rokkan 1967a), investigating whether the alleged transnational cleavage is anchored on structural factors, assessing if their strength evolved over time (Bartolini 2005a). Here, we share a classic perspective on cleavage research, suggesting that in order to be defined as a “cleavage” a political conflict should show structural (i.e., socio-demographic & contextual), normative (i.e., attitudinal), and institutional (i.e. political mobilization) dimensions (Bartolini and Mair 1990). In this respect, no research has yet explored the structural dimension of the transnational cleavage, casting doubt about the nature of this conflict: is the transnational cleavage a cleavage, after all?

Through a longitudinal and comparative research design, combining different waves of the European Election Study (EES) (1989-2014) and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) (1996-2021), we assess the alleged existence of the transnational cleavage across different European countries. Our paper studies across thirty years the impact of the structural factors in the voting for the parties mobilizing the transnational cleavage. Furthermore, we classify political parties on the demarcationist vs. integrationist conflict on the basis of a novel coding scheme, implemented using Comparative Manifesto Project (MARPOR) and Euromanifesto data. We run our analysis both looking at national and European Parliament (EP) elections. We decide to focus on two different arenas because is not that easy to decide which represents the best observation point to assess the birth of the transnational cleavage. Indeed, on the hand, we might argue that the European elections, being formally unrelated to the process of national government formation, should provide voters with a higher degree of freedom in their vote choice (Reif and Schmitt 1980). On the other hand, political parties might over-emphasise EU issues in their manifesto for the EP election and thus they may look more integrationist than they actually are.

The paper contributes to the literature on cleavage theory both on a theoretical and an empirical level. On the one hand, we consider the agency of political parties in encouraging patterns of structural voting (Deegan-Krause and Enyedi 2010) and in this respect, we provide a novel operationalization of integrationist and demarcationist parties. On the other hand, we provide the first longitudinal scrutiny on the existence of the transnational cleavage across European countries, investigating its (alleged) full-fledged nature by inspecting the presence of structural features. Our findings reveal that, at the individual level, there are no signs of an increase in relevance of the structural anchorage in the formation of cleavage in supporting demarcationist vs. integrationist parties. Despite other studies that convincingly found the existence of a division of the political space at the party level (Hooghe and Marks 2018; Kriesi et al. 2006), at the individual level we do not register the formation of a stable structural anchorage. In this respect,

we conclude our study by suggesting that the political conflict between integrationists and demarcationists should be indicated as a transnational “divide” rather than a transnational cleavage.

In the next section, we clarify our understanding of the concept of cleavage. The third section reviews the contributions of the transnational cleavage, while the fourth section underlines what we still don’t know about the structural anchorage of this cleavage introducing a set of hypotheses. The fifth and the sixth sections present our data and the operationalization of the integrationist and demarcations parties and then discuss our modelling. Finally, section seventh presents the main results of the research and the conclusion traces the broader implication for the field of cleavage research.

2. On the concept of cleavage

The seminal study by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) theorized a nexus among the structural social differences, the mobilization process and the political divisions. In brief, the authors suggested that the modification of the social structure provoked by the national building process (XV century) and the industrial revolution (XVIII century) (i.e., *critical junctures*) created the pre-conditions for the following politicization – and stabilization – of the political conflicts in Europe.

From this seminal contribution, research on cleavages mainly focused on the role of social-structural factors in shaping voting behaviour (Rose and Urwin 1969). This state of the art developed upon an untold ambiguity on the meaning of the concept of cleavage. Indeed, several pieces of research, following a certain sociological determinism, linked social stratification with the patterns of voting behaviour and partisan alignment. In this debate, Giovanni Sartori heavily criticized such a reductionism signalling how (structural) cleavages are not by default destined to escalate into political cleavage (Sartori 1969: 4). The crucial point, already present in Lipset and Rokkan's analysis (1967:27), is that the politicization of a conflict must be mediated by a process of identity formation and following political mobilization. These ambiguities are linked to the fact that Lipset and Rokkan did not provide a clear definition of the concept of cleavage. The most convincing and accepted definition has been provided by Bartolini and Mair² (1990) suggesting that a cleavage essentially incorporates three dimensions: “an empirical element, which identifies, the empirical referent of the concept, and which we can define in

² The literature provided also definition of cleavage that de-emphasized the importance of the structural dimension in the process of cleavage formation (Enyedi 2005). Still, Bartolini & Mair (1990) constitutes the main point of reference on all the elaborations on the transnational cleavage’s concept.

social-structural terms; a normative element, that is the set of values and beliefs which provides a sense of identity and role to the empirical element and which reflect the self-consciousness of the social group(s) involved; and an organizational/behavioural element, that is the set of individual interactions, institutions, and organizations, such as political parties, which develop as part of the cleavage” (1990: 199).

This reconceptualization of cleavage is paramount for at least two reasons: i) it stresses the causal arrow moving from societal structural transformation to the formation of political conflict and ii) it defuses the sociological determinism, problematizing the relationship between the socio-structural variables and voting behaviour. From this definition derives that societal divisions do not deterministically *evolve* into full-fledged political cleavages. Indeed, a social division is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the process of cleavage formation. Society is divided by a myriad of social divisions that can be based on gender, education, income, working sector etc. However, in order to become a cleavage, a structural division must be socialized, internalised, and ultimately politicized by an entrepreneur that is mobilizing it. In other words, there is not a deterministic fate in the process of cleavage formation. The agency here is eminently political and, in this respect, the political organizational phase of mobilization should be preceded by a phase of (group) identity formation (Bartolini 2004).

These remarks on cleavage definition are important because they allow us to discern between cleavages and other forms of political division. As brilliantly summarized by Kevin Deegan-Krause (2006), scholars should employ the term *cleavage* only for pointing at the simultaneous presence of structural, organizational, and normative divisions, otherwise, they will provide a very weak *intension* to the cleavage concept. In this respect, a division of the political space that lacks a structural anchorage but that reveals the combination of an attitudinal (i.e., normative) component that is politicized by political parties should be defined as a political divide, rather than as a full-fledged cleavage.

3. The transnational cleavage

Before discussing the contributions of the literature on transnational cleavage, it is important to stress a terminological remark. Several authors have used different terms to indicate a similar phenomenon: the consolidation of the second dimension of political competition stimulated by the processes of EU integration, globalization, and de-nationalization. A plethora of labels have been attached to the *poles* of this division: libertarianism vs. authoritarianism (Kitschelt 1994), integration vs. independence (Hix 1999; Hix and Lord 1997), GAL vs. TAN (Hooghe et al. 2002), demarcation vs. integration (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008, 2012), libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian (Bornschieer 2010; Bornschieer et al.

2021); universalism vs. particularism (Beramendi et al. 2015) and cosmopolitan vs communitarian (Teney, Lacewell, and De Wilde 2014). Finally, Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks label this (potential) new cleavage as transnational cleavage (2018: 138), arguing that: “[It] has as its focal point the defence of national political, social, and economic ways of life against external actors who penetrate the state by migrating, exchanging goods or exerting rule”. In this paper we adhere to their conceptualization, which presents two main advantages: 1) it implies that the trigger of the cleavage is rooted into three interconnected – and perhaps overlapping – phenomena: globalization, EU integration and increase migration in-flows; 2) it suggests that the new cleavage is not confined into a single country (or a group of countries) but that it could be potentially mobilized in all contexts affected by the three over mentioned phenomena. Still, we disagree with the label these authors (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002; Marks et al. 2006) assign to the poles of the transnational cleavage. Indeed, the acronyms of GAL (*Green Alternative Liberal*) and TAN (*Traditional Authoritarian Nationalist*) parties provides a set of adjectives that cannot always be applied simultaneously to all the parties politicizing said cleavage. Indeed, if the latter sticks together economic, cultural and institutional preferences (Hooghe and Marks 2018; Kriesi et al. 2008, 2012), the politicization of the cleavage should not – by default – be considered as an exclusive affair of greens and radical right parties. As the literature on strategic party competition has shown mainstream parties might also emphasize the issues of the transnational cleavage stimulated by the competition with challenger parties (Abou-Chadi 2016; Green-Pedersen 2019). In this respect, if the critical juncture of the transnational cleavage is represented by the process of globalization – a process of economic integration, with cultural and institutional consequences – then we believe that Hanspeter Kriesi’s (2006, 2008, 2012) distinction between integrationist vs. demarcationist parties better captures the poles of the cleavage, by indicating those parties demanding for more cultural, economic and political integration, and those advocating a restoration of boundaries at the economic, political and cultural level. In the next lines, we will use the terminology employed by distinct authors when we will refer to their works, while we will always refer to the transnational cleavage and to demarcationist vs. integrationist parties in defending our conceptualization.

a. Framing the transnational cleavage

Among the four cleavages envisaged by Lipset and Rokkan, the class cleavage had extraordinary power in crystallizing the social conflict into the left/right continuum, constraining voters, and parties’ belief system (Converse 1964). However, from the 1970s several authors started to argue that the social transformation of the affluent European societies boosted the rise of the second dimension of political contestation (Inglehart 1977). A seminal contribution on the increasingly bi-dimensional nature of the

European political space has been advanced by Herbert Kitschelt (1994). He hypothesized the formation of a new cultural dimension, influenced by those attitudes that Roland Inglehart defined as ‘post-materialist values (1977) and formed by citizens and parties’ preferences on LGBTQI+ rights, environment, abortion, etc. He labelled the two poles of this dimension as libertarianism and authoritarianism (1994).

An important stimulus on cleavage theory and the development of the second dimension of political competition came from EU scholars (Bartolini 2005b; Hix 1999; Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002). Using a *Rokkanian* paradigm, Simon Hix (Hix 1999) argued that the widening of the European integration created a political-territorial tension between integration and independence. Rokkan argued that when a polity is formed, a process of political integration occurs generating conflicts between the centre – leading the polity-building process – and the periphery (Rokkan 1973). In a similar vein, Hix argued that “[a] ‘national/territorial cleavage’ is manifest at the EU level if any of these features of national identity are threatened and/or if some nations are perceived to benefit (through gaining resources, for example) at the expense of others” (Hix 1999). In this interpretation, left/right and integration/independence dimensions coexist, and they are orthogonal to each other. In contrast, Hooghe and Marks argued that certain features of the independence/integration cleavage (in their early lexicon nationalism/supranationalism) might be integrated within the left/right division (1999). They suggested that left parties and voters are indeed more supranationalist, than rightist ones. However, the left/right dimension cannot fully explain the entire set of preferences and alignment when the issues of integration/independence cleavage are at stake. Specifically, they suggested that the second cultural dimension of political competition explains better than the classic left/right dimension parties and voters’ position on EU integration. From here, Hooghe, Marks and the other scholar affiliated to Chapel Hill school, started to employ the acronym GAL vs. TAN to indicate the poles of the cultural dimension of political competition (Hooghe, Marks Wilson 2002). These contributions coming from EU scholars share the merit to conceptualize the EU integration process as a source of territorial differentiation and de-nationalization process (the transfer of competencies from the nation-state centre to the supranational centre), that might act as the trigger of the formation of a new cleavage. However, this EU-centred wave of cleavage research does not precisely clarify the contents that are supposed to animate this new cleavage including territorial, cultural, and economic conflicts (Bartolini 2005b).

A more recent set of contributions by Hanspeter Kriesi and colleagues (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008, 2012) provided a cleavage-based explanation to the contemporary transformation of the European political space. The trigger for the rise of the transnational cleavage is the process of globalization, transforming the world economy and the modes of reproduction of wealth and creating a new division

between those individuals that can exploit this changed framework (the so-called ‘winners’ of globalization), and those that have not the proper skills to improve, or simply to preserve, their life condition in this new environment (the so-called ‘losers’ of globalization). In economic terms, the new cleavage is informed by an increasing tension between protectionist and neoliberal policies (Kriesi et al. 2008). In cultural terms, the conjunction between globalization and the EU integration process threatened national identity (Kriesi et al. 2008). If in the past, the attitudes on EU integration were linked to the preferences on the economy, it has been ascertained that after the Maastricht treaty deepening of the integration process, the parties’ preferences on EU correlate more with the cultural rather than the economic dimension of competition (Schäfer et al. 2021). Furthermore, the increasing relevance of the migration issue contributed to conflating the protection of national identity with a more restrictive view on migration and migrant integration (Otjes and Katsanidou 2017). Finally, in terms of institutional preference on the European integration process, the transnational cleavage opposes those who aim to preserve the national centre of decisions vis-à-vis the strengthening of a (new) European centre.

In their brilliant piece on the transnational cleavage, Hooghe and Marks (2018) did not diverge from the conceptualization provided by Kriesi and his colleagues, albeit providing important conceptual clarifications. In their perspective, the rising transnational cleavage did not emerge everywhere with the same intensity and it did not annihilate existing cleavages. In this changing environment, political parties cannot immediately respond to the transformed political space, due to their ideological stickiness (Schumacher, De Vries, and Vis 2013). Thus, new parties politicizing the new transnational cleavage increasingly expanded their success altering the format and the mechanic of the European party systems.

4. What we still do not know about the transnational cleavage

The most fundamental thing that we still do not know about transnational cleavage is whether it consists in a full-fledged cleavage or something else. A few lines above we argued that a political conflict, to be ranked as a cleavage, should include structural, normative, and organizational elements. The existing literature on the transnational cleavage provides abundant shreds of evidence on the existence of organizational and normative differences in the European political space, still, our knowledge on the structural component of the transnational cleavage is limited (but see Bornschier et al. 2021; Hooghe and Marks 2021).

Let’s clarify what is already widely accepted on the transnational cleavage: its organizational component. The remarkable works of Kriesi’s crew clarified the contours of the supply-side of the transnational cleavage (Hutter and Kriesi 2019; Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008, 2012). These works assume that

the structure of the Western Political space is bi-dimensional (Kitschelt 1994) and they argue that the transnational cleavage does not add a third dimension of conflict, rather re-interpret the already existing economic and cultural dimension. In this framework, established parties slowly adapt to the changing environment while new radical right, green, and social liberal parties politicize the opposite poles of the transnational cleavage. Their works conclude that European countries witnessed, starting from early 2000, a *tripolarization* of the political space (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008, 2012), further boosted by the post-2008 great recession (Hutter and Kriesi 2019). As noticed by Otjes and Katsanidou (2017), these works explore mainly contexts with a limited variance of the expected triggers of the transnational cleavage (e.g. economic globalization, deepening of the EU integration and migration). In this respect, the main theoretical tenets on the formation of the transnational cleavage cannot be adequately tested. Still, when this variance is added into the models (Otjes and Katsanidou 2017; Hutter and Kriesi 2019), the results seem to support the theoretical rationale of the transnational cleavage. Indeed: 1) the association between EU integration, migration and economic attitudes appear mediated by societal and economic conditions; 2) Countries showing lower degree of GDP per capita and lower migrant arrivals appear to be characterized by a more stable structure of competition, even with a high replacement of parties (e.g. Central and Eastern countries) (Hutter and Kriesi 2019).

A recent paper by Vincenzo Emanuele and others (Emanuele, Marino, and Angelucci 2020), following Bartolini and Mair's (1990) conceptual framework, explores the consolidation of the transnational cleavage focusing on, , the electoral strength and the electoral volatility of the demarcationist bloc. The analysis covers all the European elections from 1979 to 2019 and reveals that the electoral strength of the demarcationist parties increased, especially from 2004. Still, the authors notice that the electoral relevance of the transnational cleavage is not undifferentiated across the European countries and some places did not experience at all its politicization. However, as for other works reviewed here, the authors do not explain why the transnational cleavage has been politicized more in some countries and not in others.

The attempts to study the individual structural determinants of transnational cleavage have been scarce and subjected to several limitations. They consist of an article combining structural factors, identity formation and political preferences by Bornschier and others (2021) and a working paper recently presented by Hooghe and Marks (2021). The contribution by Bornschier and colleagues (2021) has the merit to draw on an original survey aiming to measure the degree of subjective group identities, that according to the classic *Rokkanian* perspective constitutes a prerequisite of the cleavage closure process. First, the author ascertains that educational level, social classes and living in rural vs. urban areas influence individual closeness to nationalistic identities and then they show the relevance of structure and identities

in predicting the support for far-left and far-right parties (Bornschier et al 2021). The results on the structural roots of the transnational cleavage are in this respect encouraging, still, the study covers only one single – and very peculiar– case, namely the Swiss one. Moreover, the study investigates just one point in time, and it provides clues neither about the timing of the closure of the transnational cleavage nor about its link with the expected critical juncture (i.e., globalization).

Recently, Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks explored the problem of the structural roots of the transnational cleavage (2021). In this work, the critical juncture marking the rise of the cleavage is set at the beginning of the 1960s associated with the “informational revolution” (2021: 5). The authors believe that the impact of the informational revolution can be divided into two phases. In the first phase, the informational revolution expanded the number of people holding jobs dealing with the reproduction and re-elaboration of information (e.g., scientists, designers, teachers). These individuals developed creative problem-solving skills departing from the classic producerism of the industrial society. According to Hooghe and Marks, women can exploit more opportunities in this changing job market and highly educated individuals (especially those with humanities or social science backgrounds) are more likely to contest established socio-political arrangements. From these priors, the authors argued that the first consequence of the informational revolution is represented by the rise of green parties, considered “the most feminized of all European party families” (Keith and Verge 2018, quoted in Hooghe and Marks 2021:7). The second phase, then, is represented by “the generation of a transnational cleavage and the rise of TAN parties” (Hooghe and Marks 2021: 8). This process intensified in 1990s because of the deepening and widening of the international globalization (NAFTA in 1992, Maastricht 1993, WTO in 1994, etc.), stimulated a global (re)division of labours which eroded the industrial sectors in Europe and bolstered the tertiary sector, harming the former industrial workers. This process, according to the authors increased the likelihood of the following group to support TAN parties: i) poorly educated males; ii) workers in those sectors vulnerable to automation or technological innovations; iii) security workers (e.g., policemen, etc.), iv) extraction workers (e.g., those dealing coal, oil, or other minerals extraction). The empirical analysis consists of an overview of the Green and TAN electorate, suggesting that sociocultural professionals, women and highly educated individuals constitute the core of green voters. Conversely, TAN parties are the least voted among individuals with postsecondary education, the least voted among sociocultural professionals, the most voted among production and service workers and the least voted among women. The authors argue that sociocultural sectors are those with the highest percentage of women and thus for this reason, also the males working in these sectors are more likely to support green parties. Hooghe and Marks’s contribution has the merit to investigate the structural base of green and TAN parties support. Yet, we believe that, first, the authors are not convincing in defining

the informational revolution. Although arguing that information revolution should be considered as the main trigger of the transnational cleavage, their models do not include any indicator of such revolution, and – furthermore- they do not justify why, as argued earlier by the same authors (Hooghe and Marks 2018), globalization should not be considered anymore as the critical juncture of the transnational cleavage. Second, the analyses do not consider cross-country differences, an arguable analytical strategy given the quite diverse political mobilization of green parties across countries. Finally the structural variables explored by the authors are not clearly linked to the process of identity formation. For example, it is unclear to what extent sex can be the basis for the reproduction of cleavage. The literature on the gender gap in support of RPPs clearly showed that women are not more likely to hold libertarian positions than men (Campbell and Erzeel 2018; Hartevelde and Ivarsflaten 2018; Spierings, Lubbers, and Zaslove 2017).

This review shows that on the structural determinants of transnational cleavage, the empirical evidence is still blurred. In a recent article, Ford and Jennings (2020) reviewed the transformations of the European electorate that could provide a structural base for the emergence of transnational cleavage. An important emphasis is placed on: i) the marginalization of low-skilled and low educated workers, ii) the expansion of higher education, iii) the phenomenon of mass immigration, and iv) the raising division between cosmopolitan cities vs. conservative peripheries.

One of the potential structural sources for the mobilization of the transnational cleavage is represented by education. It has been observed how individuals with a low level of education tend to show more authoritarian attitudes, whereas highly educated individuals are more likely to share libertarian attitudes (Brooks 2006; Van der Waal et al. 2007). Furthermore, a high level of education predicts fairly well the support for the green, pro-EU and, more generally, integrationist parties (Dolezal 2010; Evans and Ivaldi 2018; Grant and Tilley 2019; Vries 2018). Conversely, individuals with a low level of formal education constitute the core voters of radical right parties (Betz 1994; Mudde 2007; Wagner and Meyer 2017). An analysis of the Danish case showed that the level of education is also a source for shared (and conflicting) identities, building psychological (i.e. normative) cohesion for the development of the transnational cleavage (Stubager 2009). Precisely this means that: “the objective conflict between the educational groups also has a subjective side, as reflected in the development of a psychological structure associated with the conflict [on the libertarian/authoritarian dimension] (Stubager 2009: 205). Furthermore, political parties tend to react to voters polarization on the authoritarian-libertarian divide (Stubager 2010) and the differences in education level influence also the support for libertarian and authoritarian parties (Stubager 2013).

H1: Voters with low degree of education are more likely to vote for demarcationist parties

As we already underlined, the process of globalization deepens the sense of social and political marginalization among low skilled labour workers. This implies that according to the seminal contributions on the transnational cleavage (Kriesi et al 2008, Kriesi et al 2012; Hooghe and Marks 2018), individuals self-identifying into low social class will tend to support demarcationist parties (Rydgren 2013). Traditionally, low skilled and manual workers were the *classe gardée* of socialist, communist, and social democratic parties. However, the process of de-industrialization and globalization brought a numerical contraction of the working-class voters, pushing leftist and centre-left parties towards middle-class voters embracing liberal and cosmopolitan values. This transformation created a marginalization for those individuals holding leftist attitudes on economy and authoritarian ones on the cultural dimension (Lefkofridi, Wagner, and Willmann 2014). In this respect, the rise of radical right parties altered the traditional class cleavage; and in line with the expectation of the seminal theories on the transnational cleavage (Hooghe and Marks 2018; Kriesi et al. 2008, 2012), research showed that manual/low-skilled employments are predictors of the radical right parties' support (Rydgren 2013).

H2a: Voters self-identifying at the bottom of the social stairs are more likely to vote for demarcationist parties

H2b: Blue collars are more likely to vote for demarcationist parties

H3: Voters who are unemployed are more likely to vote for demarcationist parties

The globalization trends easing the international flows of capitals, industrial delocalization contributed also to a sharp geographical division between (mega)cities and peripheral and rural areas (Rickard 2020). Urban areas became the centre of gravity for creative or high skilled jobs, while the periphery witnessed a process of internal migration trends, draining away social and human capital (Moretti 2012). In political terms, it has been noted how the divide between cities and rural areas stimulate self-selections, sorting and contextual effect dynamics. Precisely, European big cities are often stronghold of progressive and libertarian parties, because they attract highly educated people and people with more libertarian worldview prefer to move in a cosmopolitan metropolis, rather than in a rural area (Maxwell 2019). A recent fine-grained analysis of the anti-EU vote at the national election (Dijkstra, Poelman, and Rodríguez-Pose 2020), revealed that the support for anti-EU parties is the result of the interaction of socioeconomic and geographical factors. Precisely, long-term industrial and economic decline constitutes an important predictor for the support of anti-EU votes (Carreras, Irepoglu Carreras, and Bowler 2019). Similar conclusions have also been reached in analysing the support of radical right parties (Patana 2020)

H4: Voters living in rural areas are more likely to vote for integrationist parties.

According to our knowledge, one of the main weaknesses of research dedicated to the structural basis of the transnational cleavage is the lack of works linking the critical juncture(s) of the transnational cleavage to its relevance across countries. Indeed, very often the analysis include cases with a limited variance on country-level variables (Otjes and Katsanidou 2017). If we agree in considering globalization as the main trigger of driving the compositional changes of the European electorate, then it should follow that the degree of supranational political integration, economic openness, and thus the extent to which local workers and entrepreneurs are exposed to international competition, can magnify the impact of the transnational cleavage. Furthermore, mass migration inflows have also been indicated as a source of cultural anxieties capitalized by demarcationist parties. Consequently, we also analyse the extent to which mass migration affected the likelihood to support one or the other pole of the transnational cleavage across space and time. Finally, considering the temporal evolution of the transnational cleavage, what we should see is also relevant growth over time of the transnational cleavage (and its determinants) magnitude. Although considering the direct effect of our contextual variables on the likelihood to vote for demarcationist parties *per se*, our investigation also considers the extent to which the selected contextual level factors *moderate* the effect of individual-level structural characteristics on the likelihood to vote for a demarcationist party. What we should expect, then, is that as globalisation and migration grow in magnitude, or at least over time, the impact of the structural basis of the transnational cleavage on the vote choice should increase. .

H5a: In Countries with a higher degree of economic globalization, voters are more likely to support demarcationist parties.

H5b: In Countries with a higher degree of migration in-flows voters are more likely to support demarcationist parties.

H5c: The likelihood to vote for a demarcationist party increases over time.

H6: The impact of the structural basis of the transnational cleavage on voters' choices grows over time and it is conditional on globalisation and mass migration levels.

5. Data, Measurement, and Methods

a. Data

For testing our hypotheses, we rely on a longitudinal and comparative research design, analysing vote choice in both national (parliamentary and presidential) and European Parliament (EP) elections. We decide to focus on two different arenas because both present opportunities and challenges to investigate the transnational cleavage. Indeed, on the hand, we might argue that the European elections, being formally unrelated to the process of national government formation, should provide voters with a higher degree of freedom in their vote choice (Reif and Schmitt 1980). For the same reason, parties might be incentivized to show more radical positions. On the other hand, however, political parties in EP elections might over-emphasise EU issues, and in some cases look more integrationist than what they actually are.

Therefore, our individual-level data basis consists in two harmonised longitudinal datasets, one combining all the European Election Study (EES) voter studies conducted between 1989 and 2014, and a second one merging all the studies of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) conducted in EU member states for national elections (both parliamentary and presidential) held between 1996 and 2021 (CSES modules 2, 3, 4, and 5). Given our multi-level approach, these datasets are then integrated with information derived from party-level and country-level data. The party-level data from which we derive the integrationist vs. demarcationist party classification (and, in turn, our dependent variables) are the Euromanifesto (EMCS) project for the same time period covered by our EES longitudinal dataset, and the Comparative Manifesto (MARPOR) for the elections included in our CSES integrated dataset. Finally, the country-level data merged with our individual-data basis are derived from the Eurostat and the Swiss Economic Institute (KOF) datasets.

b. Measurement

As mentioned earlier, our main dependent variables, integrationist vs. demarcationist vote choice in national and EP elections, are computed relying on a novel operationalization of integrationist and demarcationist parties. Following our earlier discussion concerning the dimensions composing the transnational cleavage, we measured party positions on the transnational cleavage, by estimating said positions on the (1) economic, (2) cultural, and (3) EU institutional dimensions, then creating an additive index and transforming it in a dichotomous variable identifying integrationist and demarcationist parties. For computing party positions, we took inspiration from Lowe and colleagues (2011) logit scaling technique, relying on the following formula:

$$\theta_{ij} = \log \frac{IntCult_{ij} + IntEco_{ij} + IntEU_{ij} + 0.5}{DemCult_{ij} + DemEco_{ij} + DemEU_{ij} + 0.5}$$

where $IntCult_{ij}$, $IntEco_{ij}$, and $IntEU_{ij}$ are the total numbers of integrationist quasi-sentences in the manifesto components on the three dimensions of the transnational cleavage for the i^{th} party in the j^{th} year, and $DemCult_{ij}$, $DemEco_{ij}$, and $DemEU_{ij}$ are the total numbers of demarcationist quasi-sentences in the manifesto components for the same party in the same year on the three dimensions of interest. Therefore, θ_{ij} represents party i position on the transnational cleavage dimension in year j , an interval measure theoretically ranging from $-\infty$ to $+\infty$, with lower values indicating more demarcationist positions and higher values indicating more integrationist positions. After computing θ_{ij} then we transformed it in a new interval measure, δ_{ij} , ranging from 0 to 1 relying on a logistic transformation:

$$\delta_{ij} = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-\theta_{ij}}}$$

Finally, we dichotomized δ_{ij} , creating a dummy variable with values equal to 0 for $\delta_{ij} \geq 0.75$ and values equal to 1 for $\delta_{ij} \leq 0.25$, and assigning all the remaining cases³ to a residual category⁴.

Although relying on different set of items and/or categories⁵, we applied this routine to both our party-level datasets (EMCS and MARPOR), then recoding EES and CSES respondents' vote choices according to our party classification. By this token, we thus computed our two dependent variables, which distinguish between demarcationist (1) and integrationist (0) vote choices for EP and national elections.

In terms of individual-level independent variables, we rely on two very similar sets of variables. For both EES-based and CSES-based analyses our main independent variables consist in one variable identifying

³ We also run our analysis considering the entire universe of political parties ($\delta_{ij} > 0.50$ and $\delta_{ij} \leq 0.50$), and the results do not differ from what we'll show in the following pages.

⁴ We performed a validity check our party position estimates, and for dubious cases we applied the following qualitative criteria: i) *Path-dependency*. If a party appears in one bloc (say, integrationist) for one election and not the remaining ones, we recoded the case as belonging to the other block; ii) *Collateral data*. If a party position has been classified (a) with dimension scores computed with a low number (or without any) quasi-sentences and/or (b) based on 0 values on some dimensions of interest, we checked collateral data (e.g., CHES) in order to determine the validity of our scores and classification. Finally, most controversial cases have been flagged for being scrutinized by country-experts.

⁵ The EMCS and MARPOR items used for computing party scores on the dimensions of interest are listed in Appendix A.


unemployed voters (1 = Unemployed, 0 = Unemployed), a second one identifying low educated individuals (1 = Low education, 0 = Medium or High education), and a third one identifying voters living in rural areas (1 = Rural, 0 = Small, medium, or big town). EES- and CSES-based analyses, then, differ only for one individual-level variable. In the EES-based analyses we rely on respondents' self-identification with a specific social class, creating a dichotomous variable discriminating between voters identifying with lower social classes (1) and those identifying with the remaining ones (0). In the CSES-based analyses we rely on respondents' occupation, discriminating between blue-collar (1) and the remaining categories. Finally in both sets of analyses, we include a small set of control variables, namely voters' gender (1 = Female, 0 = Male), and their age.

In terms of contextual-level independent variables, we employ three indicators. First, to investigate the temporal evolution of integrationist vs. demarcationist vote choices and the hypothesized changing impact of our individual-level structural variables, we rely on a time indicator, namely the election years of both EP and national general elections. Second, to investigate the impact of the critical junctures on our dependent variables and on the effects of our individual-level predictors, we employ the KOF globalisation index (Dreher 2006), measuring the economic, social, and political dimensions of globalisation at given point in time (year) for each political context considered. Finally, as a migration indicator, we employ the crude rate of net migration plus statistical adjustment, namely the ratio between (i) the difference between the number of immigrants and the number of emigrants of a country throughout a specific year (controlling for natural change) and (ii) the average population of that country in the same time period.

c. Methods

Given the hierarchical structure of our data, and the dichotomous nature of our dependent variables, we employ a set of generalized linear mixed models (GLMMs) with logistic link function to empirically test our hypotheses. The nesting procedure differs between EES- and CSES-based analyses, because of the different timing of the elections considered. EP elections are usually held in the same period of time across all the EU member states. As a consequence, in models based on our EES longitudinal dataset voters (level 1) are nested in countries (level 2), which in turn are nested in election years (level 3). Only in one set of models, those including the time indicator, the third level (election year) is dropped for statistical modelling reasons. Differently, given discrepancies across EU countries in terms of national election timing, voters (level 1) are first nested in a specific election (level 2), which in turn are nested in countries (level 3). To test the extent to which our contextual-level variables moderate the effect of our

Figure 1: The structural basis of the transnational cleavage, Regression coefficients (Population effects)



lower-level predictors on our dependent variables, we employ a set of cross-level interactions between our contextual variables and our lower-level predictors, and in all these cases our individual-level variable slopes are set at random (Hesig and Schaeffer 2019). Specific features of our models related to our hypotheses are then discussed in the following section, dedicated to the results of our empirical analyses.

6. Results

Our first set of hypotheses (from H1 to H4) are tested with two sets of models including only individual-level predictors (see Tables 2 and 3). As summarised by Figure 1, the results partially support our expectations. Considering models' referring to national elections' vote choice (Table 2, Models from 2a to 5a), the coefficients of blue-collar, unemployed, and low education are positive and highly significant ($p < 0.001$), whereas the coefficient of the variable identifying voters living rural areas is negative and not statistically significant. When turning to models' referring to EP elections vote choice, the only coefficient positively associated with a demarcationist vote choice and highly significant ($p < 0.001$) is the one

referring to low social class (Model 2b), while unemployment and low education coefficients (Models 3b and 4b) are positive but only marginally significant ($p < 0.05$). The most puzzling results of the latter models is the one referring to the rural-urban variable (Model 5b). In this case the coefficient is highly significant ($p < 0.001$) but *negative*, a result suggesting that low educated individuals are significantly less prone to vote for demarcationist parties as compared to medium or high educated ones. Overall, as mentioned a few lines above, the results of these two first set of models seems to partially support our hypothesis (in particular, H1, H2a, H2b, and H3). Nonetheless, when moving from the magnitude of the coefficients to the magnitude of the effects (predicted probability to vote for a demarcationist party) these results appear less enthusiastic. Indeed, even just considering the strongest coefficient among those considered so far (blue-collar in Model 3a) the marginal effect of this variable consists in approximately a 5% increase of the predicted probability to vote for a demarcationist party (from 6% to 11%), just considering the average point estimates and ignoring the (overlapping) confidence intervals of the predictions.

Table 1: Direct and Contingent effects of contextual-level variables

		Direct		Contingent		
Variable			x Education	x Blue-collar	x Unemployed	x Rural
CSES Models	Time	*** +	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
	Globalisation	n.s.	** +	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
	Migration	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	* +
Variable			x Education	x Low Soc.Class	x Unemployed	x Rural
EES Models	Time	*** +	n.s.	* -	* -	n.s.
	Globalisation	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
	Migration	*** +	* +	** +	n.s.	* +

Notes: + positive coeff.; - negative coeff.; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$; n.s. not significant

Models including contextual-level predictors return an even more blurred picture. Table 1 summarise the direct and contingent effects (cross-level interactions) of said variables (Tables from 4 to 9). Starting from the direct effects, the only consistent variable affecting the likelihood to vote for a demarcationist party is the time variable. The direct effect of this variable is always positive and highly significant (at least $p < 0.01$), and it is somewhat stronger when considering national elections' vote choices as compared to EP ones, a result perhaps related also to the different time periods considered in our CSES- and EES-based models. Nonetheless, this result is in line with our expectations and clearly related to the growing electoral strength of demarcationist parties, starting from the second half of the 2000s. When turning to

our second contextual factors, globalisation, a totally different picture appears. The direct effect coefficients of said variable is (almost) always not significant, and in a few cases (see Table 6, Models 14a and 16a) the effect is positive and marginally significant ($p < 0.05$), although characterized by quite strong coefficient and prediction magnitudes. Finally, when considering our migration indicator, again, our models return rather mixed results. The coefficients of the direct effect of this factor on the likelihood to vote for a demarcationist party in national elections (Table 8) are always statistically not significant. When turning to EP elections vote choice, the coefficients are always positive and highly significant ($p < 0.001$). Yet, the magnitude of said coefficients is invariably small, and this is reflected also in the low predictive power of said factors. Thus, our results only partially support our hypotheses about the direct effects of our contextual-level variables (H5a, H5b, and H5c).

Finally, to further test the impact of our contextual variables on the likelihood to vote for a demarcationist party, we rely on a wide set of a cross-level interactions (Tables from 4 to 9). Overall, our contextual variables seldom moderate the impact of the individual-level structural antecedents of demarcationist vote choices, with a few exceptions. Our globalisation positively and significantly ($p < 0.01$) moderates the impact of education on demarcationist vote choice in national elections (Table 6, Model 15a). Yet, the magnitude of the coefficient of this specific interaction term appears at best marginal, and indeed once turning to the marginal effect of education conditional on globalisation, the predicted probabilities to vote for a demarcationist party are barely affected. The second, positive, and highly significant ($p < 0.01$) coefficient is then the one referring to the cross-level interaction term between migration and social class (Table 9, Model 25b). Although this coefficient might appear rather interesting, also in this case we shall not indulge too much on its magnitude. Indeed, the coefficient of low social class, always positive and highly significant in all the other models in which it is included, becomes negative and not significant, rendering the contingent effect of this contextual variable, at best, marginal. Thus, pulling together the results of models analysing the contingent effects of our contextual-level variables, we find scant support for our last hypothesis (H6).

7. Conclusions

In this paper, we have taken very seriously both the classic literature on cleavages and the new wave on the rise of the transnational cleavage, and precisely, we underlined how cleavage theory requires the presence of a structural anchorage in order to label a political division as a cleavage. In this respect, we performed the most comprehensive test on the rise of the transnational cleavage developed until now by exploring to what extent in the last 30 years structural variables – both at the individual and contextual levels – influenced the patterns of voting behaviour in Europe. Moreover, our models were quite benevolent to the transnational cleavage thesis, indeed we avoid including ideological and issues' preference controls in order to investigate exclusively the traces of structural voting. Our result provides a quite clear picture: socio-demographic variables have a marginal role in shaping voting behaviour, while contextual factors (migration crises, globalization developments) have almost none. Furthermore, the already modest effects of the socio-demographic predictors do not show any increase over time. This result proves wrong the widespread understanding of the process of *closing* the boundaries of the transnational cleavage. Additionally, our contextual variables did show influence when interacting with our socio-demographic predictors. In this respect, we filled a gap in the contemporary research on cleavage by including the alleged “critical juncture(s)” within our model. Globalization and migration crises, which have been indicated as the exogenous shocks boosting the cleavage development, exercise neither direct nor interaction effects in shaping voting behaviour. These findings suggest the need for a re-assessment of the transnational cleavage thesis.

Before advancing our theoretical arguments, an additional contribution deserves to be mentioned: our novel operationalization of the demarcationist/integrationist parties. For the first time indeed, we provided a dynamic classification based on parties' supply taking into account the multi-dimensionality of the transnational divide. Indeed, following the literature, this divide cannot be reduced either to cultural or economic issues, but it is expected to combine them also with institutional preferences on supranational polities. This new operationalization should be now tested and compared to alternative understandings of the transnational cleavage (GAL/TAN) or other operationalization (e.g. those based on newspaper analyses, see Hutter and Kriesi 2019; Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008, 2012). Still, on a theoretical and methodological level, the classification based on party manifestos should be able to catch quite correctly political parties' positions at least in the immediate proximity of an election. In this respect, we invite researchers to employ our fine-grained classification to assess the evolution of the supply side of the demarcationist/integrationist divide over time.

In linking theoretical apparatus with the empirical reality, we underlined how the original conceptualization and cleavages, and its authoritative reassessments (Bartolini 2005a; Bartolini and Mair 1990; Lipset and Rokkan 1967b), expect the simultaneous presence of structural, normative and institutional differences in cementing the transnational cleavage. In this paper, we did not test whether normative and institutional differences are dividing – and partially clustering – European parties and voters into a conflict between demarcationists vs. integrationists. This has been done elsewhere (Emanuele, Marino, and Angelucci 2020; Hooghe and Marks 2018; Langsæther and Stubager 2019), overall with positive results. Furthermore, our data confirmed also indirectly how the electoral relevance of the support for demarcationist parties is increasing over time, indeed our pooled models showed how voters in more recent survey waves are more likely to support demarcationist parties. Still, our result poses to the existing scholarship a pressing question: is it correct to employ the concept of cleavage in order to depict the conflict between integrationists and demarcationists? We provide a negative answer to this question and in this respect, we welcome the suggestion by Kevin Deegan-Krause (2006) to assign the term “division” in order to describe those political conflicts involving exclusively normative and institutional dimensions.

A cult Italian movie made famous the expression: “Words are important! Who doesn't speak well doesn't think well and doesn't live well!”⁶. We think that this statement might be inspiring in supporting the use of the concept of “divide” instead of “cleavage” to describe the conflict between integrationists and demarcationists. The concept of cleavage, indeed, involves a clear pattern of stability due to the closure of the system of political loyalties resulting in a predictable pattern of voting behaviour. In this respect, it is quite hard to find in contemporary party system developments those pockets of stability that should be the natural outcome of a cleavage-based understanding of the voting behaviour. If we indulge in a historical comparison between the class cleavage and the integrationist vs. demarcationist divide, then two interconnected reflections can be advanced. First, class cleavage – as well as all the other cleavages – was not produced by the deterministic link between socio-demographic differences and voting behaviour. What truly cemented the political division was the process of political socialization, which was immersed in a dense web of civil society, political and cultural organizations, stimulating a common vision of the world to the members of a given group (e.g., newspapers, cultural associations,

⁶ The movie is “Palombella Rossa” (1989), in which the director and actor Nanni Moretti interprets an MP of the Italian Communist Party that after a car accident is struggling in reconstructing his sense of self as communist and human being.

radio and TV broadcasters, trade unions). Second, this fertile organizational soil was close to political parties and, more precisely, it was a by-product of a historical type of political organization: the mass party. Now, we know from the empirical literature on party organization that several characteristics of the mass party are nowadays gone (van Biezen, Mair, and Poguntke 2012). We don't want to deny here that some of the parties politicizing the transnational divide (e.g. some radical right parties) are actually pushing to create more stable connections with society (Albertazzi and van Kessel 2021). Still, we contend the fact that contemporary demarcationist political parties are activating a network of meso-level organizations boosting political socialization among those with a similar socio-demographic background, triggering the development of the transnational cleavage. In this respect, we suggest that future studies on cleavage development should carefully take into account the agency of political parties in the process of cleavage formation (Enyedi 2005).

In this respect, we conclude by highlighting a limitation of our study that could hopefully become the starting point for further research. It could be argued that the transnational divide is a cleavage *in statu nascendi* and then its effect on voting behaviour would be more visible in the future. Given the difficulties in analysing data coming from the future, we suggest focussing on an alternative path of research: a longitudinal exploration between socio-structural determinants and political identities. As we underlined several times, cleavage theory is not about a determinist relationship but is entirely about the effect of political socialization on voting behaviour. This research path has been already initiated by Simon Bornschier and his colleagues (2021), still, their analysis is based only in one peculiar country (Switzerland) and at one point in time. We don't know to what extent Bornschier's results can be extended to other countries and most important we don't know to what extent they are divergent from previous trends, supporting the thesis of the emersion of a "new" cleavage.

8. References

- Abou-Chadi, Tarik. 2016. "Niche Party Success and Mainstream Party Policy Shifts – How Green and Radical Right Parties Differ in Their Impact." *British Journal of Political Science* 46(2): 417–36.
- Albertazzi, Daniele, and Stijn van Kessel. 2021. "Right-wing Populist Party Organisation across Europe: The Survival of the Mass-party? Introduction to the Thematic Issue." *Politics and Governance* 9(4): 224–27.
- Bartolini, Stefano. 2005a. "La Formations Des Clivages." *Revue internationale de politique comparée* 12(1): 9–34.
- . 2005b. *Restructuring Europe: Centre Formation, System Building and Political Structuring Between the Nation-State and the European Union*.
- Bartolini, Stefano, and Peter Mair. 1990. *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: The Stabilisation of European Electorates 1885-1985*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Beramendi, Pablo, Hausermann Silja, Herbert Kitschelt, and Hanspeter Kriesi. 2015. *The Politics of Advanced Capitalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Betz, Hans-Georg. 1994. *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- van Biezen, Ingrid, Peter Mair, and Thomas Poguntke. 2012. "Going , Going ,..... Gone ? Party Membership in the 21 St Century." *European Journal of Political Research* (April).
- Bornschieer, Simon. 2010. "The New Cultural Divide and the Two-Dimensional Political Space in Western Europe." *West European Politics* 33(3): 419–44.
- Bornschieer, Simon, Silja Häusermann, Delia Zollinger, and Céline Colombo. 2021. *Comparative Political Studies How "Us" and "Them" Relates to Voting Behavior—Social Structure, Social Identities, and Electoral Choice*.
- Campbell, Rosie, and Silvia Erzeel. 2018. "Exploring Gender Differences in Support for Rightist Parties : The Role of Party and Gender Ideology." 14: 80–105.
- Carreras, Miguel, Yasemin Irepoglu Carreras, and Shaun Bowler. 2019. "Long-Term Economic Distress, Cultural Backlash, and Support for Brexit." *Comparative Political Studies* 52(9): 1396–1424.
- Deegan-Krause, Kevin, and Zsolt Enyedi. 2010. "Agency and the Structure of Party Competition: Alignment, Stability and the Role of Political Elites." *West European Politics* 33(3): 686–710.
- Dijkstra, Lewis, Hugo Poelman, and Andrés Rodríguez-Pose. 2020. "The Geography of EU Discontent." *Regional Studies* 54(6): 737–53.
- Dolezal, Martin. 2010. "Exploring the Stabilization of a Political Force: The Social and Attitudinal Basis of Green Parties in the Age of Globalization." *West European Politics* 33(3): 534–52.
- Dolezal, Martin, and Swen Hutter. 2012. "Participation and Party Choice: Comparing the Demand Side of the New Cleavage across Arenas." In *Political Conflict in Western Europe*, eds. Hanspeter Kriesi et al. Cambridge University Press.
- Dreher, Axel. 2006. "Does Globalization Affect Growth? Evidence from a New Index of Globalization." *Applied Economics* 38(10): 1091–1110.
- Emanuele, Vincenzo, Bruno Marino, and Davide Angelucci. 2020. "The Congealing of a New Cleavage? The

- Evolution of the Demarcation Bloc in Europe (1979-2019).” *Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica* 50(3): 314–33.
- Enyedi, Zsolt. 2005. “The Role of Agency in Cleavage Formation.” *European Journal of Political Research* 44(5): 697–720.
- Evans, Jocelyn, and Gilles Ivaldi. 2018. *The 2017 French Presidential Elections. A Political Reformation ?* Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ford, Robert, and Will Jennings. 2020. “The Changing Cleavage Politics of Western Europe.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 23: 295–314.
- Grant, Zack P, and James Tilley. 2019. “Fertile Soil : Explaining Variation in the Success of Green Parties Fertile Soil : Explaining Variation in the Success of Green Parties.” *West European Politics* 42(3): 495–516.
- Green-Pedersen, Christoffer. 2019. *The Reshaping of West European Party Politics: Agenda Setting and Party Competition in Comparative Perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University.
- Harteveld, Eelco, and Elisabeth Ivarsflaten. 2018. “Why Women Avoid the Radical Right: Internalized Norms and Party Reputations.” *British Journal of Political Science* 48(2): 369–84.
- Hesig, Jan Paul, and Merlin Schaeffer. 2019. “Why You Should Always Include a Random Slope for the Lower-Level Variable Involved in a Cross-Level Interaction.” *European Sociological Review* 35(2): 258–79.
- Hix, Simon. 1999. “Dimensions and Alignments in European Union Politics: Cognitive Constraints and Partisan Responses.” *European Journal of Political Research* 35(1): 69–106.
- Hix, Simon, and Christopher Lord. 1997. *Political Parties in the European Union*.
- Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks. 2018. “Cleavage Theory Meets Europe’s Crises: Lipset, Rokkan, and the Transnational Cleavage.” *Journal of European Public Policy* 25(1): 109–35.
- . 2021. “The Social Roots of the Transnational Cleavage: Sex, Education, and Occupation.” *Jean Blondel Tuesday Seminar - CIRCAP, University of Siena*.
- Hooghe, Liesbet, Gary Marks, and Carole J. Wilson. 2002. “Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?” *Comparative Political Studies* 35(8): 965–89.
- Hutter, Swen, and Hanspeter Kriesi. 2019. *European Party Politics in Times of Crisis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Inglehart, Ronald F. 1977. *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kriesi, Hanspeter et al. 2006. “Globalization and the Transformation of the National Political Space: Six European Countries Compared.” *European Journal of Political Research* 45(6): 921–56.
- . 2008. *West European Politics in the Age of Globalization*. Cambridge University Press.
- . 2010. “Restructuration of Partisan Politics and the Emergence of a New Cleavage Based on Values.” *West European Politics* 33(3): 673–85.
- . 2012. *Political Conflict in Western Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lachat, Romain, and Martin Dolezal. 2008. “Demand Side: Dealignment and Realignment of the Structural

- Political Potentials.” In *West European Politics in the Age of Globalization*, eds. Hanspeter Kriesi et al. Cambridge University Press.
- Langsæther, Peter Egge, and Rune Stubager. 2019. “Old Wine in New Bottles? Reassessing the Effects of Globalisation on Political.” *European Journal of Political Research* 58: 1213–33.
- Lefkofridi, Zoe, Markus Wagner, and Johanna E. Willmann. 2014. “Left-Authoritarians and Policy Representation in Western Europe: Electoral Choice across Ideological Dimensions.” *West European Politics* 37(1): 65–90.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Stein Rokkan. 1967a. *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*. New York: Free Press.
- . 1967b. “Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives.”
- Marks, Gary, Liesbet Hooghe, Moira Nelson, and Erica Edwards. 2006. “Party Competition and European Integration in the East and West.” *Comparative Political Studies* 39(2): 155–75.
- Maxwell, Rahsaan. 2019. “Cosmopolitan Immigration Attitudes in Large European Cities: Contextual or Compositional Effects?” *American Political Science Review* 113(2): 456–74.
- Moretti, Enrico. 2012. *The New Geography of Jobs*. Boston - New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
- Mudde, Cas. 2007. *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Otjes, Simon, and Alexia Katsanidou. 2017. “Beyond Kriesiland: EU Integration as a Super Issue after the Eurocrisis.” *European Journal of Political Research* 56(2): 301–19.
- Patana, Pauliina. 2020. “Changes in Local Context and Electoral Support for the Populist Radical Right: Evidence from Finland.” *Party Politics* 26(6): 718–29.
- Reif, Karlheinz, and Hermann Schmitt. 1980. “Nine Second-Order National Elections – a Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results.” *European Journal of Political Research* 8(1): 3–44.
- Rickard, Stephanie J. 2020. “Economic Geography, Politics, and Policy.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 23: 187–202.
- Rydgren, Jens. 2013. *Class Politics and the Radical Right*. Routledge.
- Sartori, Giovanni. 1969. “From the Sociology of Politics to Political Sociology*.” *Government and Opposition* 4(2).
- Schäfer, Constantin, Sebastian A. Popa, Daniela Braun, and Hermann Schmitt. 2021. “The Reshaping of Political Conflict over Europe: From Pre-Maastricht to Post-‘Euro Crisis.’” *West European Politics* 44(3): 531–57.
- Schumacher, Gijs, Catherine E. De Vries, and Barbara Vis. 2013. “Why Do Parties Change Position? Party Organization and Environmental Incentives.” *Journal of Politics* 75(2): 464–77.
- Spierings, Niels, Marcel Lubbers, and Andrej Zaslove. 2017. “‘Sexually Modern Nativist Voters’: Do They Exist and Do They Vote for the Populist Radical Right?” *Gender and Education* 29(2): 216–37.
- Stubager, Rune. 2009. “Education-Based Group Identity and Consciousness in the Authoritarian-Libertarian Value Conflict.” *European Journal of Political Research* 48(2): 204–33.
- . 2010. “The Development of the Education Cleavage: Denmark as a Critical Case.” *West European Politics* 33(3): 505–33.

- . 2013. “The Changing Basis of Party Competition: Education, Authoritarian–Libertarian Values and Voting.” *Government and Opposition* 48(3): 372–97.
- Teney, Céline, Onawa Promise Lacewell, and Pieter De Wilde. 2014. “Winners and Losers of Globalization in Europe: Attitudes and Ideologies.” *European Political Science Review* 6(4): 575–95.
- Vries, Catherine E De. 2018. “The Cosmopolitan-Parochial Divide : Changing Patterns of Party and Electoral Competition in the Netherlands and beyond The Cosmopolitan-Parochial Divide : Changing.” 1763.
- Wagner, Markus, and Thomas M. Meyer. 2017. “The Radical Right as Niche Parties? The Ideological Landscape of Party Systems in Western Europe, 1980–2014.” *Political Studies* 65(1S): 84–107.

9. Regression tables

Table 2: 2001-2021 NP/Pres Vote Choice: Integrationist vs Demarcationist, and Strong Int. vs Strong Demarc.

	Integrationist vs Demarcationist Vote Choice				
	Model 1a	Model 2a	Model 3a	Model 4a	Model 5a
Low education (Ref = Me/Hi)	0.296*** (0.042)	0.402*** (0.094)	0.294*** (0.042)	0.296*** (0.042)	0.301*** (0.042)
Blue collar (Ref = Others)	0.612*** (0.052)	0.613*** (0.052)	0.683*** (0.077)	0.616*** (0.052)	0.607*** (0.053)
Unemployed (Ref = Employed/Else)	0.567*** (0.076)	0.549*** (0.076)	0.571*** (0.076)	0.594*** (0.119)	0.560*** (0.077)
Rural (ref = Sm/Mi/Large Towns)	0.105* (0.043)	0.094* (0.043)	0.104* (0.043)	0.102* (0.043)	-0.034 (0.107)
Gender	-0.244*** (0.039)	-0.248*** (0.039)	-0.248*** (0.039)	-0.243*** (0.039)	-0.249*** (0.039)
Age	0.157*** (0.044)	0.151*** (0.044)	0.152*** (0.044)	0.156*** (0.044)	0.158*** (0.044)
AIC	17373.225	17336.146	17369.208	17369.171	17276.845
BIC	17446.005	17425.099	17458.161	17458.124	17365.798
Log Likelihood	-8677.612	-8657.073	-8673.604	-8673.585	-8627.423
Num. obs.	24020	24020	24020	24020	24020
Num. groups: election_short	51	51	51	51	51
Num. groups: countryshort	23	23	23	23	23
Var: election_short (Intercept)	6.011	6.268	6.250	6.046	5.913
Var: countryshort (Intercept)	3.495	3.920	3.568	3.774	3.640
Var: election_short education_dum1		0.222			
Cov: election_short (Intercept) education_dum1		-0.510			
Var: election_short bluecoll_oe1			0.084		
Cov: election_short (Intercept) bluecoll_oe1			-0.382		
Var: election_short unemployed1				0.177	
Cov: election_short (Intercept) unemployed1				-0.403	
Var: election_short rural_urban_dum1					0.295
Cov: election_short (Intercept) rural_urban_dum1					0.084

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

Table 3: 1989-2014 EP Vote Choice: Integrationist vs Demarcationist, and Strong Int. vs Strong Demarc.

	Integrationist vs Demarcationist Vote Choice				
	Model 1b	Model 2b	Model 3b	Model 4b	Model 5b
Low education (Ref = Me/Hi)	0.093 (0.053)	0.229* (0.110)	0.090 (0.054)	0.094 (0.053)	0.098 (0.054)
Lower soc.cl. (Ref = Others)	0.536*** (0.046)	0.536*** (0.046)	0.558*** (0.158)	0.536*** (0.046)	0.545*** (0.046)
Unemployed (Ref = Employed/Else)	0.395*** (0.088)	0.395*** (0.088)	0.392*** (0.088)	0.315* (0.136)	0.397*** (0.088)
Rural (ref = Sm/Mi/Large Towns)	0.085 (0.044)	0.085 (0.044)	0.063 (0.044)	0.082 (0.044)	-0.276** (0.105)
Gender	-0.119** (0.040)	-0.122** (0.040)	-0.120** (0.040)	-0.118** (0.040)	-0.121** (0.040)
Age	-0.224*** (0.043)	-0.216*** (0.043)	-0.221*** (0.043)	-0.224*** (0.043)	-0.228*** (0.043)
AIC	16783.124	16777.751	16656.472	16782.983	16770.718
BIC	16859.239	16870.780	16749.501	16876.012	16863.747
Log Likelihood	-8382.562	-8377.875	-8317.236	-8380.491	-8374.359
Num. obs.	34794	34794	34794	34794	34794
Num. groups: countryshort	27	27	27	27	27
Num. groups: year	6	6	6	6	6
Var: countryshort (Intercept)	9.492	9.800	9.885	9.437	8.774
Var: year (Intercept)	0.452	0.449	0.438	0.452	0.436
Var: countryshort education_dum1		0.150			
Cov: countryshort (Intercept) education_dum1		-0.704			
Var: countryshort socialclass_dum1			0.373		
Cov: countryshort (Intercept) socialclass_dum1			-0.302		
Var: countryshort unemployed21				0.139	
Cov: countryshort (Intercept) unemployed21				0.339	
Var: countryshort rural_urban_dum1					0.196
Cov: countryshort (Intercept) rural_urban_dum1					1.185

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

Table 4: 2001-2021 NP/Pres Vote Choice: Integrationist vs Demarcationist, cross-level interactions with time

	Model 6a	Model 7a	Model 8a	Model 9a	Model 10a	Model 11a	Model 12a	Model 13a
Low education (Ref = Me/Hi)	0.376** (0.093)	0.518 (0.287)	0.289** (0.042)	0.289** (0.042)	0.295** (0.042)	0.296** (0.042)	0.300** (0.042)	0.300** (0.042)
Blue collar (Ref = Others)	0.614** (0.052)	0.614** (0.052)	0.737** (0.073)	0.792** (0.193)	0.616** (0.052)	0.618** (0.052)	0.607** (0.053)	0.607** (0.053)
Unemployed (Ref = Employed/Else)	0.548** (0.076)	0.548** (0.076)	0.570** (0.076)	0.570** (0.076)	0.545** (0.120)	1.079** (0.376)	0.560** (0.077)	0.560** (0.077)
Rural (ref = Sm/Mi/Large Towns)	0.094* (0.043)	0.094* (0.043)	0.104* (0.043)	0.104* (0.043)	0.102* (0.043)	0.102* (0.043)	0.002 (0.107)	0.045 (0.331)
Gender	-0.248** (0.039)	-0.248** (0.039)	-0.249** (0.039)	-0.249** (0.039)	-0.243** (0.039)	-0.243** (0.039)	-0.249** (0.039)	-0.249** (0.039)
Age	0.151** (0.044)	0.151** (0.044)	0.153** (0.044)	0.153** (0.044)	0.155** (0.044)	0.156** (0.044)	0.158** (0.044)	0.158** (0.044)
Time	4.375** (1.444)	4.574** (1.521)	4.713** (1.152)	4.987** (1.564)	4.410** (1.477)	4.681** (1.493)	4.517** (1.496)	4.550** (1.511)
Time x Low edu.		-0.201 (0.405)						
Time x Blue collar				-0.078 (0.284)				
Time x Unemployed						-0.707 (0.494)		
Time x Rural								-0.060 (0.468)
AIC	17328.976	17330.731	17358.827	17360.700	17362.365	17362.880	17269.750	17271.747
BIC	17426.016	17435.858	17455.867	17465.826	17459.405	17468.006	17366.790	17376.873
Log Likelihood	-8652.488	-8652.366	-8667.414	-8667.350	-8669.183	-8668.440	-8622.875	-8622.873
Num. obs.	24020	24020	24020	24020	24020	24020	24020	24020
Num. groups: election_short	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51
Num. groups: countryshort	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23
Var: election_short (Intercept)	4.633	4.688	5.045	5.085	4.462	4.494	4.623	4.640
Var: election_short education_dum1	0.213	0.217						
Cov: election_short (Intercept) education_dum1	-0.360	-0.421						
Var: countryshort (Intercept)	3.763	3.775	3.873	3.834	3.665	3.849	3.443	3.437
Var: election_short bluecoll_oe1			0.087	0.090				
Cov: election_short (Intercept) bluecoll_oe1			-0.637	-0.667				
Var: election_short unemployed1					0.175	0.134		
Cov: election_short (Intercept) unemployed1					-0.166	-0.311		
Var: election_short rural_urban_dum1							0.297	0.298
Cov: election_short (Intercept) rural_urban_dum1							-0.155	-0.174

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

Table 5: 1989-2014 EP Vote Choice: Integrationist vs Demarcationist, cross-level interactions with time

	Model 6b	Model 7b	Model 8b	Model 9b	Model 10b	Model 11b	Model 12b	Model 13b
Low education (Ref = Me/Hi)	0.279* (0.125)	0.403* (0.166)	0.157** (0.053)	0.153** (0.053)	0.164** (0.053)	0.163** (0.053)	0.168** (0.053)	0.168** (0.053)
Low soc.cl. (Ref = Others)	0.470*** (0.045)	0.470*** (0.045)	0.513** (0.163)	0.746*** (0.196)	0.466*** (0.045)	0.467*** (0.045)	0.475*** (0.045)	0.476*** (0.045)
Unemployed (Ref = Employed/Else)	0.421*** (0.087)	0.420*** (0.087)	0.416*** (0.087)	0.418*** (0.087)	0.342* (0.136)	0.801*** (0.242)	0.425*** (0.087)	0.425*** (0.087)
Rural (ref = Sm/Mi/Large Towns)	0.075 (0.043)	0.075 (0.043)	0.050 (0.044)	0.050 (0.044)	0.071 (0.043)	0.071 (0.043)	-0.325** (0.112)	-0.410** (0.158)
Gender	-0.123** (0.040)	-0.123** (0.040)	-0.120** (0.040)	-0.119** (0.040)	-0.118** (0.040)	-0.117** (0.040)	-0.121** (0.040)	-0.121** (0.040)
Age	-0.201*** (0.043)	-0.203*** (0.043)	-0.213*** (0.043)	-0.214*** (0.043)	-0.212*** (0.042)	-0.214*** (0.042)	-0.217*** (0.042)	-0.217*** (0.042)
Time	1.673*** (0.078)	1.725*** (0.092)	1.613*** (0.078)	1.730*** (0.097)	1.661*** (0.078)	1.702*** (0.080)	1.655*** (0.078)	1.616*** (0.093)
Time x Low edu.		-0.178 (0.167)						
Time x Low soc.cl.				-0.335* (0.162)				
Time x Unemployed						-0.618* (0.295)		
Time x Rural								0.120 (0.160)
AIC	17052.570	17053.462	16936.142	16933.905	17066.612	17064.406	17053.309	17054.749
BIC	17145.599	17154.948	17029.171	17035.391	17159.642	17165.893	17146.338	17156.236
Log Likelihood	-8515.285	-8514.731	-8457.071	-8454.952	-8522.306	-8520.203	-8515.655	-8515.375
Num. obs.	34794	34794	34794	34794	34794	34794	34794	34794
Num. groups: countryshort	27	27	27	27	27	27	27	27
Var: countryshort (Intercept)	9.318	9.332	9.463	9.463	8.936	8.949	8.266	8.258
Var: countryshort education_dum1	0.206	0.205						
Cov: countryshort (Intercept) education_dum1	-0.686	-0.712						
Var: countryshort socialclass_dum1			0.400	0.402				
Cov: countryshort (Intercept) socialclass_dum1			-0.377	-0.412				
Var: countryshort unemployed21					0.141	0.138		
Cov: countryshort (Intercept) unemployed21					0.340	0.216		
Var: countryshort rural_urban_dum1							0.233	0.238
Cov: countryshort (Intercept) rural_urban_dum1							1.274	1.283

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

Table 6: 2001-2021 NP/Pres Vote Choice: Integrationist vs Demarcationist, cross-level interactions with globalisation

	Model 14a	Model 15a	Model 16a	Model 17a	Model 18a	Model 19a	Model 20a	Model 21a
Low education (Ref = Me/Hi)	0.421*** (0.093)	-0.890* (0.443)	0.293*** (0.042)	0.293*** (0.042)	0.296*** (0.042)	0.296*** (0.042)	0.301*** (0.042)	0.300*** (0.042)
Blue collar (Ref = Others)	0.614*** (0.052)	0.617*** (0.052)	0.706*** (0.078)	0.270 (0.400)	0.616*** (0.052)	0.616*** (0.052)	0.607*** (0.053)	0.608*** (0.053)
Unemployed (Ref = Employed/Else)	0.549*** (0.076)	0.547*** (0.076)	0.570*** (0.076)	0.570*** (0.076)	0.563*** (0.120)	1.162 (0.680)	0.561*** (0.077)	0.562*** (0.077)
Rural (ref = Sm/Mi/Large Towns)	0.094* (0.043)	0.093* (0.043)	0.104* (0.043)	0.104* (0.043)	0.103* (0.043)	0.102* (0.043)	-0.004 (0.107)	-0.873 (0.562)
Gender	-0.248*** (0.039)	-0.249*** (0.039)	-0.248*** (0.039)	-0.249*** (0.039)	-0.243*** (0.039)	-0.242*** (0.039)	-0.249*** (0.039)	-0.249*** (0.039)
Age	0.151*** (0.044)	0.152*** (0.044)	0.152*** (0.044)	0.154*** (0.044)	0.156*** (0.044)	0.156*** (0.044)	0.158*** (0.044)	0.158*** (0.044)
Globalisation	8.436* (3.592)	5.746 (3.852)	7.896* (3.699)	6.915 (3.876)	6.474 (3.840)	6.772 (3.877)	6.647 (3.820)	6.746 (3.850)
Globalisation x Low edu.		1.544** (0.531)						
Globalisation x Blue collar				0.528 (0.488)				
Globalisation x Unemployed						-0.699 (0.802)		
Globalisation x Rural								1.020 (0.677)
AIC	17332.580	17327.676	17366.691	17367.624	17368.234	17369.559	17275.677	17275.522
BIC	17429.620	17432.803	17463.730	17472.750	17465.274	17474.686	17372.716	17380.648
Log Likelihood	-8654.290	-8650.838	-8671.345	-8670.812	-8672.117	-8671.780	-8625.838	-8624.761
Num. obs.	24020	24020	24020	24020	24020	24020	24020	24020
Num. groups: election_short	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51
Num. groups: countryshort	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23
Var: election_short (Intercept)	5.917	5.286	5.523	5.360	5.068	5.087	5.154	4.871
Var: election_short education_dum1	0.226	0.143						
Cov: election_short (Intercept) education_dum1	-0.733	-0.383						
Var: countryshort (Intercept)	4.109	4.580	4.420	4.687	4.704	4.790	4.449	4.805
Var: election_short bluecoll_oe1			0.094	0.086				
Cov: election_short (Intercept) bluecoll_oe1			-0.515	-0.448				
Var: election_short unemployed1					0.175	0.155		
Cov: election_short (Intercept) unemployed1					-0.235	-0.318		
Var: election_short rural_urban_dum1							0.297	0.270
Cov: election_short (Intercept) rural_urban_dum1							-0.103	0.153

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

Table 7: 1989-2014 EP Vote Choice: Integrationist vs Demarcationist, cross-level interactions with globalisation

	Model 14b	Model 15b	Model 16b	Model 17b	Model 18b	Model 19b	Model 20b	Model 21b
Low education (Ref = Me/Hi)	0.244* (0.112)	-0.098 (0.322)	0.090 (0.054)	0.090 (0.054)	0.095 (0.053)	0.094 (0.053)	0.098 (0.054)	0.099 (0.054)
Low soc.cl. (Ref = Others)	0.535*** (0.046)	0.536*** (0.046)	0.561*** (0.158)	0.682* (0.344)	0.534*** (0.046)	0.535*** (0.046)	0.544*** (0.046)	0.544*** (0.046)
Unemployed (Ref = Employed/Else)	0.391*** (0.088)	0.393*** (0.088)	0.388*** (0.088)	0.388*** (0.088)	0.305* (0.137)	1.221* (0.581)	0.395*** (0.088)	0.395*** (0.088)
Rural (ref = Sm/Mi/Large Towns)	0.085 (0.044)	0.085 (0.044)	0.062 (0.044)	0.062 (0.044)	0.082 (0.044)	0.082 (0.044)	- 0.270** (0.105)	-0.401 (0.295)
Gender	- 0.122** (0.040)	- 0.122** (0.040)	- 0.120** (0.040)	- 0.120** (0.040)	- 0.118** (0.040)	- 0.117** (0.040)	- 0.121** (0.040)	- 0.121** (0.040)
Age	- 0.218*** (0.043)	- 0.215*** (0.043)	- 0.223*** (0.043)	- 0.223*** (0.043)	- 0.225*** (0.043)	- 0.225*** (0.043)	- 0.228*** (0.043)	- 0.229*** (0.043)
Globalisation	0.560 (0.592)	0.213 (0.655)	0.820 (0.599)	0.926 (0.651)	0.504 (0.590)	0.533 (0.591)	0.375 (0.587)	0.316 (0.597)
Globalisation x Low edu.		0.463 (0.382)						
Globalisation x Low soc.cl.				-0.163 (0.390)				
Globalisation x Unemployed						-1.258 (0.700)		
Globalisation x Rural								0.179 (0.341)
AIC	16778.759	16779.375	16656.430	16658.250	16784.162	16783.340	16772.241	16773.963
BIC	16880.245	16889.319	16757.916	16768.193	16885.648	16893.284	16873.727	16883.907
Log Likelihood	-8377.379	-8376.688	-8316.215	-8316.125	-8380.081	-8378.670	-8374.120	-8373.982
Num. obs.	34794	34794	34794	34794	34794	34794	34794	34794
Num. groups: countryshort	27	27	27	27	27	27	27	27
Num. groups: year	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
Var: countryshort (Intercept)	9.397	9.616	9.282	9.226	9.050	9.040	8.501	8.539
Var: countryshort education_dum1	0.157	0.176						
Cov: countryshort (Intercept) education_dum1	-0.744	-0.859						
Var: year (Intercept)	0.403	0.418	0.380	0.377	0.411	0.414	0.405	0.406
Var: countryshort socialclass_dum1			0.375	0.373				
Cov: countryshort (Intercept) socialclass_dum1			-0.308	-0.273				
Var: countryshort unemployed21					0.141	0.225		
Cov: countryshort (Intercept) unemployed21					0.357	0.744		
Var: countryshort rural_urban_dum1							0.191	0.175
Cov: countryshort (Intercept) rural_urban_dum1							1.144	1.094

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

Table 8: 2001-2021 NP/Pres Vote Choice: Integrationist vs Demarcationist, cross-level interactions with migration

	Model 22a	Model 23a	Model 24a	Model 25a	Model 26a	Model 27a	Model 28a	Model 29a
Low education (Ref = Me/Hi)	0.400*** (0.094)	-0.456 (0.572)	0.294*** (0.042)	0.294*** (0.042)	0.296*** (0.042)	0.296*** (0.042)	0.301*** (0.042)	0.300*** (0.042)
Blue collar (Ref = Others)	0.613*** (0.052)	0.614*** (0.052)	0.682*** (0.077)	0.587 (0.434)	0.615*** (0.052)	0.615*** (0.052)	0.607*** (0.053)	0.608*** (0.053)
Unemployed (Ref = Employed/Else)	0.548*** (0.076)	0.549*** (0.076)	0.571*** (0.076)	0.572*** (0.076)	0.592*** (0.119)	0.513 (0.988)	0.560*** (0.077)	0.561*** (0.077)
Rural (ref = Sm/Mi/Large Towns)	0.094* (0.043)	0.094* (0.043)	0.104* (0.043)	0.104* (0.043)	0.102* (0.043)	0.102* (0.043)	-0.055 (0.107)	-1.492* (0.612)
Gender	-0.248*** (0.039)	-0.249*** (0.039)	-0.248*** (0.039)	-0.248*** (0.039)	-0.243*** (0.039)	-0.243*** (0.039)	-0.249*** (0.039)	-0.249*** (0.039)
Age	0.151*** (0.044)	0.152*** (0.044)	0.152*** (0.044)	0.152*** (0.044)	0.156*** (0.044)	0.155*** (0.044)	0.158*** (0.044)	0.158*** (0.044)
Migration index	-0.990 (4.368)	-2.710 (4.498)	-1.567 (4.282)	-1.805 (4.403)	-1.554 (4.379)	-1.600 (4.422)	-2.582 (4.344)	-2.695 (4.377)
Migration x Low edu.		1.275 (0.839)						
Migration x Blue collar				0.148 (0.643)				
Migration x Unemployed						0.117 (1.423)		
Migration x Rural								2.210* (0.898)
AIC	17338.069	17337.746	17371.034	17372.975	17371.016	17373.008	17278.493	17275.190
BIC	17435.108	17442.873	17468.074	17478.101	17468.056	17478.134	17375.533	17380.316
Log Likelihood	-8657.034	-8655.873	-8673.517	-8673.487	-8673.508	-8673.504	-8627.247	-8624.595
Num. obs.	24020	24020	24020	24020	24020	24020	24020	24020
Num. groups: election_short	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51
Num. groups: countryshort	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23
Var: election_short (Intercept)	6.310	6.338	6.369	6.394	6.191	6.195	6.113	6.299
Var: election_short education_dum1	0.222	0.201						
Cov: election_short (Intercept) education_dum1	-0.494	-0.519						
Var: countryshort (Intercept)	3.749	3.678	3.257	3.236	3.387	3.388	3.099	3.086
Var: election_short bluecoll_oe1			0.084	0.084				
Cov: election_short (Intercept) bluecoll_oe1			-0.376	-0.392				
Var: election_short unemployed1					0.175	0.177		
Cov: election_short (Intercept) unemployed1					-0.386	-0.393		
Var: election_short rural_urban_dum1							0.297	0.231
Cov: election_short (Intercept) rural_urban_dum1							0.210	-0.083

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

Table 9: 1989-2014 EP Vote Choice: Integrationist vs Demarcationist, cross-level interactions with migration

	Model 22b	Model 23b	Model 24b	Model 25b	Model 26b	Model 27b	Model 28b	Model 29b
Low education (Ref = Me/Hi)	0.283* (0.114)	-0.333 (0.274)	0.089 (0.055)	0.089 (0.055)	0.091 (0.054)	0.091 (0.054)	0.096 (0.054)	0.094 (0.054)
Low soc.cl. (Ref = Others)	0.518*** (0.047)	0.518*** (0.047)	0.614*** (0.161)	-0.331 (0.336)	0.517*** (0.047)	0.517*** (0.047)	0.527*** (0.047)	0.526*** (0.047)
Unemployed (Ref = Employed/Else)	0.412*** (0.089)	0.410*** (0.089)	0.411*** (0.089)	0.414*** (0.089)	0.363* (0.141)	0.331 (0.437)	0.415*** (0.089)	0.411*** (0.089)
Rural (ref = Sm/Mi/Large Towns)	0.089* (0.044)	0.087* (0.044)	0.068 (0.045)	0.067 (0.045)	0.086 (0.044)	0.086 (0.044)	-0.203* (0.095)	-0.783** (0.241)
Gender	-0.124** (0.041)	-0.124** (0.041)	-0.122** (0.041)	-0.123** (0.041)	-0.119** (0.040)	-0.119** (0.041)	-0.122** (0.041)	-0.123** (0.041)
Age	-0.227*** (0.044)	-0.226*** (0.044)	-0.227*** (0.044)	-0.227*** (0.044)	-0.232*** (0.044)	-0.232*** (0.044)	-0.236*** (0.044)	-0.237*** (0.044)
Migration index	2.171*** (0.270)	1.894*** (0.290)	2.313*** (0.285)	1.834*** (0.306)	2.188*** (0.271)	2.184*** (0.276)	2.164*** (0.270)	1.854*** (0.296)
Migration x Low edu.		1.047* (0.451)						
Migration x Low soc.cl.				1.693** (0.546)				
Migration x Unemployed						0.060 (0.763)		
Migration x Rural								0.963* (0.391)
AIC	16396.866	16393.597	16277.957	16270.348	16401.331	16403.320	16391.451	16387.345
BIC	16498.210	16503.387	16379.301	16380.137	16502.675	16513.109	16492.794	16497.135
Log Likelihood	-8186.433	-8183.799	-8126.978	-8122.174	-8188.665	-8188.660	-8183.725	-8180.673
Num. obs.	34383	34383	34383	34383	34383	34383	34383	34383
Num. groups: countryshort	27	27	27	27	27	27	27	27
Num. groups: year	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
Var: countryshort (Intercept)	8.959	8.970	9.171	8.920	8.484	8.482	7.776	7.746
Var: countryshort education_dum1	0.178	0.126						
Cov: countryshort (Intercept) education_dum1	-0.923	-0.768						
Var: year (Intercept)	0.437	0.442	0.432	0.432	0.444	0.444	0.432	0.429
Var: countryshort socialclass_dum1			0.395	0.300				
Cov: countryshort (Intercept) socialclass_dum1			-0.664	-0.557				
Var: countryshort unemployed21					0.154	0.152		
Cov: countryshort (Intercept) unemployed21					0.228	0.225		
Var: countryshort rural_urban_dum1							0.137	0.166
Cov: countryshort (Intercept) rural_urban_dum1							0.856	1.003

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

10. Appendix A

Table A1: Euromanifesto and MARPOR categories employed to measure demarcationist vs. integrationist conflict

Dimensions	Euromanifesto 1989 - 2004	Euromanifesto 2009	Euromanifesto 2014	MARPOR				
Cultural	p1_602	National Way of Life: Negative	per_v1/2/3/4_602	National Way of Life: Negative	per_v1/2_601b	National Way of Life: General: negative	per602	National Way of Life: Negative
	p2_601	European Way of Life: Positive						
	p1/2/3_607	Multiculturalism: Positive	per_v1/2/3/4_607	Multiculturalism: Positive	per_v1/2/3_607a	Multiculturalism: positive	per607	Multiculturalism: positive
	p1_601	National Way of Life: Positive	per_v1/2/3/4_601	National Way of Life: Positive	per_v1/2_601a	National Way of Life: General: positive	per601	National Way of Life: positive
	p2_602	European Way of Life: Negative						
	p1/2/3_608	Multiculturalism: Negative	per_v1/2/3/4_608	Multiculturalism: Negative	per_v1/2/3_607b	Multiculturalism: negative	per 608	Multiculturalism: negative
			per_v1/2/3/4_6011a	Immigration: Positive	per_v1/2/3_60111a	Immigration (EU Citizens): positive		
			per_v1/2/3/4_6011b	Immigration: Negative	per_v1/2/3_60111b	Immigration (EU Citizens): negative		
					per_v1/2/3_60112a	Immigration (beyond EU): positive		
					per_v1/2/3_60112b	Immigration (beyond EU): negative		
				per_v1/2/3_60113a	Immigration (unspecified): positive			
				per_v1/2/3_60113b	Immigration (unspecified): negative			
Economic	p1/2/3_407	Protectionism: Negative	per_v1/2/3/4_407	Protectionism: Negative	per_v1/2/3_406b	Protectionism: negative	per407	Protectionism: negative
	p1/2/3_406	Protectionism: Positive	per_v1/2/3/4_406	Protectionism: Positive	per_v1/2/3_406a	Protectionism: positive	per406	Protectionism: positive
	p2_4084	Single Market: Positive	per_v1/2/3/4_4084	Single Market: Positive	per_v1/2/3_4084a	Single Market: positive		
	p2_4086	European Monetary Union/ European Currency: Positive	per_v1/2/3/4_4086	European Monetary Union/ European Currency: Positive	per_v1/2/3_4086a	EMU/EC: positive		
	p2_4085	Single Market: Negative	per_v1/2/3/4_4085	Single Market: Negative	per_v1/2/3_4084b	Single Market: negative		
p2_4087	European Monetary Union/ European Currency: Negative	per_v1/2/3/4_4087	European Monetary Union/ European Currency: Negative	per_v1/2/3_4086b	EMU/EC: negative			
European Union	p1/2/3_108	Europe, European Community/Union: Positive	per_v1/2/3/4_108	Europe, European Community/ Union: General Positive	per_v1/2/3_108a	Europe, European Community/Union: General : positive	per108	European Community/Union: Positive
	p2_203	Constitutionalism Positive	per_v2_203	Constitutionalism positive	per_v2_203a	Constitutionalism: Positive		
	p2_3021	Transfer of Power to the EC/EU: Positive	per_v1/2/3/4_3021	Transfer of Power to the EC/EU: Positive	per_v1/2/3_3011a	transfer of Power to the EC/EU: positive		
	p2_306	Competences of the European Parliament: Positive	per_v1/2/3/4_306	Competences of the European Parliament: Positive	per_v1/2/3_306a	Competences of the European Parliament: positive		
	p2_308	Competences of the European Commission: Positive	per_v1/2/3/4_308	Competences of the Commission: Positive	per_v1/2/3_308a	Competences of the European Commission: positive		
	p2_310	Competences Council: Positive	per_v1/2/3/4_310	Competences of the Council: Positive	per_v1/2/3_310a	Competences Council: positive		
	p2_312	Competences ECJ: Positive	per_v1/2/3/4_312	Competences of the ECJ: Positive	per_v1/2/3_312a	Competences ECJ: positive		
	p2_314	Competences other institutions: Positive	per_v1/2/3/4_314	Competences of the other Institutions: Positive	per_v1/2/3_314a	Competences other institutions: positive		
p2_3141	Positive Mentions ECB	per_v1/2/3/4_3141	mention to ECB: positive	per_v1/2/3_3141a	Competences ECB: positive			

Table A1: Euromanifesto and MARPOR categories employed to measure demarcationist vs. integrationist conflict (continued)

Dimensions	Euromanifesto 1989 - 2004		Euromanifesto 2009		Euromanifesto 2014		MARPOR
	p2_316	EU Enlargement Positive	per_v1/2/3/4_316	EU enlargement: Positive	per_v1/2/3_316a	EU enlargement: positive	
	p2_4041	EU structural Fund: Positive	per_v1/2/3/4_4041	EU Structural Funds: Positive	per_v1/2/3_4011a	Structural Funds: Positive	
	p2_4011	EU structural Fund: Negative	per_v1/2/3/4_4011	EU Structural Funds: Negative	per_v1/2/3_4011b	Structural Funds: Negative	
	p1/1/3_110	Europe, European Community/Union: Negative	per_v1/2/3/4_110	Europe, European Community/ Union: General Negative	per_v1/2/3_108b	Europe, European Community/Union: General : negative	per110 European Community/Union: Negative
			per_v1/2/3/4_1101a	Financing the EC/EU: Positive	per_v1/2/3_1081a	Financing the EC/EU: positive	
	p1_1101	Financing the EC/EU: Negative	per_v1/2/3/4_1101b	Financing the EC/EU: Negative	per_v1/2/3_1081b	Financing the EC/EU: negative	
	p2_204	Constitutionalism Negative	per_v2_204	Constitutionalism negative	per_v2_203b	Constitutionalism: Negative	
	p2_3011	Transfer of Power to the EC/EU: Negative	per_v1/2/3/4_3011	Transfer of Power to the EC/EU: Negative	per_v1/2/3_3011b	transfer of Power to the EC/EU:negative	
	p2_307	Competences of the European Parliament: Negative	per_v1/2/3/4_307	Competences of the European Parliament: Negative	per_v1/2/3_306b	Competences of the European Parliament: negative	
	p2_309	Competences of the European Commission: Negative	per_v1/2/3/4_309	Competences of the Commission: Negative	per_v1/2/3_308b	Competences of the European Commission: negative	
European Union	p2_311	Competences Council: Negative	per_v1/2/3/4_311	Competences of the Council: Negative	per_v1/2/3_310b	Competences Council: negative	
	p2_313	Competences ECJ: Negative	per_v1/2/3/4_313	Competences of the ECJ: Negative	per_v1/2/3_312b	Competences ECJ: negative	
	p2_315	Competences other institutions: Negative	per_v1/2/3/4_315	Competences of the other Institutions: Negative	per_v1/2/3_314b	Competences other institutions: negative	
	p2_3151	Negative Mentions ECB	per_v1/2/3/4_3151	mention to ECB: Negative	per_v1/2/3_3141b	Competences ECB: negative	
	p2_317	EU Enlargement Negative	per_v1/2/3/4_317	EU enlargement: Negative	per_v1/2/3_316b	EU enlargement: negative	
	p2_318	Complexity EU system	per_v1/2/3/4_318a	Complexity of EU political system: positive	per_v1/2/3_318a	Complexity EU political system: positive	
			per_v1/2/3/4_318b	Complexity of EU political system: negative	per_v1/2/3_318b	Complexity EU political system: negative	
			per_v1/2/3/4_6021a	EU Integration: Positive	per_v1/2/3_6021a	EU Integration: positive	
			per_v1/2/3/4_6021b	EU Integration: Negative	per_v1/2/3_6021b	EU Integration: negative	
					per_v1/2/3_1082a	EU Exit: positive	
				per_v1/2/3_1082b	EU Exit: negative		
				per_v1/2/3_4087a	EMU/EC-transnational solidarity: positive		
				per_v1/2/3_4087b	EMU/EC-transnational solidarity: negative		