Supranational entrepreneurs: the High Representative and the EU global strategy

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The progress that has been made in the EU's security and defence policy since 2016 is portrayed as the most far-reaching and 'unprecedented' since the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).[1] In essence, the advance comprises the launch of four initiatives: the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), a mechanism for the synchronization of national defence planning; the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), providing command of EU missions; Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), an instrument for enhanced cooperation; and the European Defence Fund (EDF) launched by the European Commission. Experts attributed the key role in facilitating the recent progress to Federica Mogherini, who acted as the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) between 2014 and 2019.[2] The HR's office is inter-institutional—its holder also serves as the European Commission's vice-president, as well as chairing the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) and heading the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Defence Agency (EDA).[3] During her term, Mogherini managed to come up with the EU's global strategy (EUGS),[4] labelled as the EU's 'grand strategy',[5] which served as a framework for

[1] Elena Lazarou, *Peace and security in 2019: overview of EU action and outlook for the future* (Brussels: European Parliamentary Research Service, 2019), p. 64; Karlijn Jans, *Will Mogherini's plans transform European defence?* (Brussels: Friends of Europe, 2016); Jo Coelmont, *European strategic autonomy: which military level of ambition?*, Security Policy Brief (Brussels: EGMONT—The Royal Institute for International Relations, 2019); Fraser Cameron, 'Two cheers for the EU's global strategy', *Parliament*, 24 July 2017.

[2] Cameron, 'Two cheers'; Daniela Vincenti, 'Mogherini's global strategy moves beyond zero-sum game', *EURACTIV*, June 2016; Patryk Pawlak, *A global strategy on foreign and security policy for the EU* (Brussels: European Parliamentary Research Service, 2016); Pol Morillas, *Strategy-making in the EU: from foreign and security policy to external action* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019); Antonio Calcara, 'The hybrid role of the High Representative in the security and defence field: more in 10 months than in the 10 years?', *European Security* 29: 3, 2020, pp. 376–95.

[3] On the history of the HR's office, see Brian Crowe, 'A common European foreign policy after Iraq?', *International Affairs* 79: 3, 2003, pp. 533–46.

[4] EEAS, *A global strategy for the European Union's foreign and security policy* (Brussels, 2016).

[5] Signe Marie Cold-Ravnkilde and Christine Nissen, 'Schizophrenic agendas in the EU's external actions in Mali', *International Affairs* 96: 4, 2020, p. 941.

the abovementioned initiatives,[6] and to persuade the member states to adopt the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence (IPSD) that followed.[7]

That assumption about the HR's role in shaping the recent progress constitutes the point of departure for this article. It uses Kingdon's multiple streams approach (MSA) to explore the role Mogherini played in triggering the change.[8] According to the MSA, policy change happens when policy entrepreneurs successfully exploit a window of opportunity that opens in the *problems* or *policies* stream. This article argues that Mogherini, as HR, was the policy entrepreneur who drew on the *problems*, *policies* and *politics* streams that presented themselves between 2014 and 2015, made use of the window of opportunity and pushed for policy change. By finding observable evidence for the HR's deployment of entrepreneurial strategies during the drafting and implementation of the EUGS, this contribution unpacks Mogherini's footprint in the recent policy progress.

More broadly, this research subscribes to institutionalist perspectives that emphasize the agency of individuals within broader structures.[9] In the pages of this journal, Morgan has referred to studies that assign a significant causal role to key officials within the European institutions 'who are seen as using their position to act as policy entrepreneurs'.[10] To date, scholars examining policy entrepreneurship have focused mainly on European Commission officials;[11] the few studies that have referred to the HR as an entrepreneur have not provided a framework that allows their entrepreneurship to be examined.[12] For example, Moumoutzis argued that by using expertise and negotiation skills, the HR acting as an entrepreneur could table proposals and foster consensus among governments; yet he did not offer empirical evidence to support that argument.[13] Another study that pointed to the HR acting as an 'autonomous policy actor' is the analysis of Catherine Ashton's role during the Kosovo and Ukraine crises presented by Amadio Viceré.[14] Especially in the case of the former, owing to the alignment of member states' preferences, the HR played the roles of both policy instigator and policy enforcer, influencing the outcomes; yet Amadio Viceré did not explicitly define

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[6] Karen E. Smith, 'A European Union global strategy for a changing world?', *International Politics* 54: 4, 2017, p. 514.

[7] Council of the European Union, *Implementation Plan on Security and Defence* (Brussels, 2016).

[8] John W. Kingdon, *Agendas, alternatives and public policies* (New York: Longman, 2014).

[9] Michael Mintrom, *Policy entrepreneurs and dynamic change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), p. 26.

[10] Roger Morgan, 'A European "society of states"—but only states of mind?', *International Affairs* 76: 3, 2000, p. 569.

[11] See e.g. Brigid Laffan, 'From policy entrepreneur to policy manager: the challenge facing the European Commission', *Journal of European Public Policy* 4: 3, 1997, pp. 422–38; Dermot Hodson, 'Entrepreneurship and the Barroso Commission', *Journal of European Integration* 35: 3, 2013, pp. 301–14; Sidonie Paris, 'The European Commission and the blue card directive: supranational policy entrepreneurship in troubled waters', *Journal of Contemporary European Research* 13: 2, 2017, pp. 1025–42.

[12] Morillas, *Strategy-making in the EU*, p. 140; Sophie Vanhoonacker and Karolina Pomorska, 'The European External Action Service and agenda-setting in European foreign policy', *Journal of European Public Policy* 20: 9, 2013, pp. 1316–31.

[13] Kyriakos Moumoutzis, 'Why Mogherini's appointment as the EU's High Representative for foreign affairs matters little', *Europe on the Strand*, 3 Sept. 2014, https://europeonthestrand.ideasoneurope.eu/2014/09/03/why-mogherinis-appointment-as-the-eus-high-representative-for-foreign-affairs-matters-little/. (Unless otherwise noted at point of citation, all URLs cited in this article were accessible on 2 March 2021.)

[14] Maria Giulia Amadio Viceré, *The High Representative and EU foreign policy integration* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), p. 257.

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either of these roles. The present article, taking stock of the existing research, applies a new analytical lens that offers a more substantiated insight into the HR's role in the policy-making process. It draws on the idea of the HR acting as policy entrepreneur and, applying the MSA, explores the HR's entrepreneurial activities. In doing so, it offers a dual added value.

First, by focusing on the HR's impact on the decision-making process, the article contributes to the scholarship, for 'existing literature on the post-Lisbon EU foreign policy pays scant attention to the agency of the HR/VPs [vice-presidents]'.[15] The HR's office enjoys a unique inter-institutional position that combines functions in the Council, the Commission, the EEAS and the EDA. Thus, the office-holder carries multiple responsibilities over a range of issues and has the right to propose their own policy initiatives (articles 18, 26–9, 38 and 42, Treaty on European Union; articles 218 and 221, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). However, the authority for policy decisions belongs to the member states. Thus, scholars have referred to a 'contradiction between supranational leadership tasks for the High Representative on one hand and the unvaryingly intergovernmental control of resources on the other',[16] and have pointed to the ambiguity of this office, whose impact depends largely on its interpretation by the incumbent.[17] The dominant view in the literature is that of the HR as a constrained agent of the member states,[18] with limited possibilities for leaving their own footprint on the decision-making process since the formal condition for their action lies in the mandate conferred by the member states.[19] The recognition that, despite the legal and political limits on the powers of the HR, he or she can act as an entrepreneur and is, by virtue of the position's inter-institutional locus at the nexus of EU supranational and intergovernmental foreign policies,[20] in a unique position to combine the three policy streams, allows us to look beyond the vague notion of HR being constrained. Looking at the HR through the lens of the MSA and considering the office-holder as a policy entrepreneur permits us to systematically investigate the HR's agency (use of informational and material resources and power of initiative) and impact on policy change within the existing constraints. By doing so, this article opens up a more fruitful research direction regarding the HR's role than the concept of the constrained agent.

Second, by considering Mogherini as a policy entrepreneur in her role as HR and examining her involvement in achieving the recent policy change, this article offers insights on the role of supranational agents that are relevant beyond the

[15] Maria Giulia Amadio Viceré, Giulia Tercovich and Caterina Carta, 'The post-Lisbon High Representatives: an introduction', *European Security* 29: 3, 2020, p. 264.

[16] Claudia Major and Martina Bail, 'Waiting for soft power: why the EU struggles with civilian crisis management', in Eva Gross, Daniel Hamilton, Claudia Major and Henning Riecke, eds, *Preventing conflict, managing crisis: European and American perspectives* (Washington: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2011), pp. 15–36.

[17] Jolyon Howorth, 'The "new faces" of Lisbon: assessing the performance of Catherine Ashton and Herman van Rompuy on the global stage', *European Foreign Affairs Review* 16: 3, 2011, pp. 303–23.

[18] For a comprehensive literature review on the HR, see Amadio Viceré et al., 'The post-Lisbon High Representatives', pp. 264–66.

[19] Niklas Helwig, 'EU foreign policy and the High Representative's capability–expectations gap: a question of political will', *European Foreign Affairs Review* 18: 2, 2013, pp. 235–54.

[20] Amadio Viceré, *The High Representative*, pp. 92–3.

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EU context. Individuals who have occupied the offices of UN secretary-general and NATO secretary-general have also been labelled as entrepreneurs by scholars who have investigated their involvement in policy-making.[21] Yet the literature does not offer a comprehensive analysis of their entrepreneurial activities. Despite the obvious differences between these posts and the office of HR, all three positions share one characteristic: their office-holders act as supranational agents but they depend upon an intergovernmental system for their mandates.[22] Thus, by exploring the entrepreneurship exercised by HR Mogherini using the MSA, and by examining the strategies she deployed to influence the decision-making process, this research provides an analytical lens that can be used to examine the roles of other supranational policy entrepreneurs in intergovernmental settings.

The article proceeds as follows. After a brief recapitulation of the MSA and its use in relation to EU foreign and security policy, the article delves into the case-study: the EUGS. It starts by identifying the three streams—*problems*, *politics and policies*—which came together between 2014 and 2015 to create a window of opportunity for policy change. It then moves on to focus on the HR's entrepreneurship, looking for observable evidence of Mogherini's entrepreneurial strategies and her attributes as an entrepreneur. The last section summarizes both the empirical and the theoretical findings, and reflects on the analytical usefulness of the MSA in studying supranational agents.

Apart from the secondary literature, the research draws on primary documents obtained from the EU institutions and from national foreign and defence ministries. In addition, 16 semi-structured interviews were conducted with individuals who were involved in the development and implementation of the EUGS or have closely observed the process.

Multiple streams and the EU's foreign and security policy

Kingdon's MSA is one of the key reference frameworks with regard to studies of policy change.[23] It presumes the existence of three streams: *problems*, *politics* and *policies*. *Problem*s are conditions that policy-makers want to have addressed. They often 'need a little push to get attention',[24] and this push can be provided by focusing events such as crisis. The *politics* stream constitutes the broader environment within which policy is made. It comprises public mood, election results and parti-

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[21] See e.g. David Kennedy, 'Leader, clerk, or policy entrepreneur? The secretary-general in a complex world', in Simon Chesterman, *Secretary or general? The UN secretary-general in world politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 158–82; Ryan C. Hendrickson, 'The changing role of NATO's secretary general', in Sebastian Mayer, ed., *NATO's post–Cold War politics: the changing provision of security* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), pp. 124–39.

[22] On similarities between the office of HR and 'executive heads of IOs', see also Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi and Benjamin Kienzle, 'The High Representative and directoires in European foreign policy: the case of the nuclear negotiations with Iran', *European Security* 29: 3, 2020, pp. 322–3, p. 331.

[23] For an overview of the application of the MSA, see Michael D. Jones, Holly L. Peterson, Jonathan J. Pierce, Nicole Herweg, Amiel Bernal, Holly Lamberta Raney and Nikolaos Zahariadis, 'A river runs through it: a multiple streams meta-review', *Policy Studies Journal* 44: 1, 2016, pp. 13–36.

[24] Kingdon, *Agendas, alternatives and public policies*, p. 94.

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san or ideological distributions in the legislature.[25] The third stream, the *policy stream*, consists of ideas developed to address existing problems. Furthermore, the MSA implies the existence of *policy windows* as opportunities to push for proposals. They open in the *problem* stream because of a focusing event, or in the *politics* stream out of a specific political constellation. However, 'windows provide the stimulus for choice and structure the search for problems and solutions, but they do not determine the outcome'.[26] For a change to happen, there has to be a *policy entrepreneur*, who draws the streams together during a window of opportunity. Entrepreneurs develop proposals and commit resources—time, energy, reputation—in hope of achieving approval of their ideas.[27] They also act as brokers, negotiating among other actors and putting forward solutions to problems.[28] Most importantly, however, entrepreneurs bring together the three streams—*problems, policies* and *politics*—during open policy windows. In this way, they facilitate policy change. The drawing together is a function of the nature of the policy window and the skills of the entrepreneur.[29] Scholars engaged in detailed studies of entrepreneurial attributes have identified particular skills that contribute to the success of entrepreneurs: among others, *persistence*—the 'willingness to invest large and sometimes remarkable quantities of one's resources';[30] *social acuity*—perceptiveness in understanding others, engaging in policy conversations and making use of policy networks;[31] and a *sense of timing*—exploring the right moment to bring the streams together.[32] The literature also provides rich insights into entrepreneurial strategies.[33] The three most widely recognized strategies are: *framing problems and arousing interests*; *venue-shopping*; *and mobilizing support by creating teams and coalitions*.[34] The first strategy consists of providing a narrative by developing frames that convey meaning to different audiences and point to particular dimensions of the problem in order to present the solution in language that appeals to different policy-makers.[35] Venue-shopping means strategically selecting and/or creating different settings to increase the chance of gaining support for a proposed solution or course of action.

[25] Kingdon, *Agendas, alternatives and public policies*, p. 145.

[26] Nikolaos Zahariadis, 'Ambiguity and choice in European public policy', *Journal of European Public Policy* 15: 4, 2008, pp. 514–30 at p. 519.

[27] Kingdon, *Agendas, alternatives and public policies*, pp. 122–3.

[28] Michael Mintrom, 'Policy entrepreneurs and the diffusion of innovation', *American Journal of Political Science* 41: 3, 1997, pp. 738–9.

[29] Robert Ackrill, Adrian Kay and Nikolaos Zahariadis, 'Ambiguity, multiple streams, and EU policy', *Journal of European Public Policy* 20: 6, 2013, pp. 871–87.

[30] Kingdon, *Agendas, alternatives and public policies*, p. 181.

[31] Michael Mintrom and Phillipa Norman, 'Policy entrepreneurship and policy change', *Policy Studies Journal* 37: 4, 2009, pp. 649–67 at p. 652.

[32] Paul Cairney, 'Three habits of successful policy entrepreneurs', *Policy and Politics* 46: 2, 2018, pp. 199–215; Dimitrios C. Christopoulos, 'Relational attributes of political entrepreneurs: a network perspective', *Journal of European Public Policy* 13: 5, 2006, pp. 757–78.

[33] Jeff Checkel, 'Ideas, institutions and the Gorbachev foreign policy', *World Politics* 45: 2, 1993, pp. 271–300; Mintrom and Norman, 'Policy entrepreneurship and policy change'; Ackrill et al., 'Ambiguity, multiple streams, and EU policy'; Cairney, 'Three habits of successful policy entrepreneurs'; Mintrom and Luetjens, 'Policy entrepreneurs and foreign policy decision making' in Sebastian Harnish, Juliet Kaarbo and Kai Oppermann, eds, *Oxford research encyclopedia of politics* (online: Oxford University Press 2017).

[34] Ackrill et al., 'Ambiguity, multiple streams, and EU policy'; Cairney, 'Three habits of successful policy entrepreneurs'; Zahariadis, 'Ambiguity and choice'.

[35] Mintrom, *Policy entrepreneurs and school choice* (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2000), p. 137.

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Finally, entrepreneurs mobilize support by building teams and forming coalitions that endorse their policy solutions.[36] Activating supporters can be also achieved via venue-shopping—reaching out to groups whose backing can pull in others.

The foundation for the application of the MSA to EU policy-making has been laid by Zahariadis and his co-authors.[37] So far, the approach has been used to study the agenda-setting and decision-making processes in the European Commission and the European Parliament.[38] Yet Kingdon's approach seems also to be suitable for studying the EU's foreign and security policy. One of its central notions is the assumption of ambiguity in the policy process resulting from the complexity and plurality of the actors engaged.[39] This is precisely what this policy area embodies. It is characterized by a 'dense set of European institutions and practices',[40] with multiple stakeholders such as member states, the HR, the EEAS and EDA, the European Commission and the European Parliament. Also, this policy domain includes a wide range of overlapping areas such as civilian and military missions, trade, development and neighbourhood policy. Moreover, there are three decision-making procedures: intergovernmentalism, the community method and hybrid procedures. Also, supranationalism has recently emerged in this field.[41] In short, the EU's foreign and security system is complex and opaque. The MSA, with its ability to capture different agents and explain contextual change, and its perception of policy outcomes as an interplay between streams, actors and processes, seems to be well equipped to study this policy domain.

The application of the major components of the MSA to the EU's foreign and security policy yields the following picture. With regard to the *problems* stream, the recent events that drew the attention of policy-makers to the EU's security included, for example, the consequences of the Arab Spring—military conflicts in the Middle East and the wave of refugees and migrants—and the terrorist attacks of 2015 in Paris. In the *politics* stream, three factors are particularly important: the balance of Council members' national and partisan affiliations; the ideological balance of parties in the European Parliament; and the mood around the idea of European integration. The ideas regarding the EU's foreign and security policy floating in the *policy* stream can come from at least three circles: from actors enjoying formal decision-making power; from other members of the policy process who

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[36] Falk Daviter, 'Policy framing in the European Union', *Journal of European Public Policy* 14: 4, 2007, pp. 654–66.

[37] Zahariadis, 'Ambiguity and choice'; Nikolaos Zahariadis, 'Complexity, coupling, and the future of European integration', *Review of Policy Research* 20: 2, 2003, pp. 285–310; Nikolaos Zahariadis, *Ambiguity and choice in public policy* (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2003); Ackrill et al., 'Ambiguity, multiple streams, and EU policy'.

[38] On the Commission, see e.g. Robert Ackrill and Adrian Kay, 'Multiple streams in EU policy-making: the case of the 2005 sugar reform', *Journal of European Public Policy* 18: 1, 2011, pp. 72–89; Neill Nugent and Sabine Saurugger, 'Organizational structuring: the case of the European Commission and its external policy responsibilities', *Journal of European Public Policy* 9: 3, 2002, pp. 345–64. On the Parliament, see e.g. Stefan Thierse, 'Policy entrepreneurship in the European Parliament: reconsidering the influence of rapporteurs', *Journal of European Public Policy* 26: 2, 2017, pp. 267–85.

[39] Zahariadis, 'Ambiguity and choice'.

[40] Michael E. Smith, 'Beyond the comfort zone: internal crisis and external challenge in the European Union's response to rising powers', *International Affairs* 89: 3, 2013, p. 655.

[41] Pierre Haroche, 'Supranationalism strikes back: a neofunctionalist account of the European Defence Fund', *Journal of European Public Policy* 27: 6, 2020, pp. 853–72.

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do not enjoy a formal mandate; and from the think tank community, broadly understood. Finally, the *policy entrepreneurs* in this area can emerge from any of the three circles mentioned above: (1) decision-makers such as representatives of the member states acting independently or via institutions such as the European Council (*collective entrepreneurs*); (2) officials of the EU institutions without or with limited formal power, such as the HR; and (3) the think-tank community. So far, scholars have analysed member states and the European Commission as entrepreneurs in EU's foreign and security policy.[42] Yet, as argued above, the HR, with an inter-institutional position that gives its office-holder multiple responsibilities and a coordinating role with respect to various areas of EU foreign and security policy, is uniquely placed to act as an entrepreneur and to draw together the three streams running through the complex system of the EU's foreign and security policy. Thus, the HR can leave a footprint on decision-making despite the formal constraints. The following case-study unpacks the entrepreneurship practised by HR Mogherini and explores her actions as a supranational 'agent of change'.[43]

The EU's global strategy: tracing the HR's entrepreneurship

Drawing on the MSA, I understand policy change to arise from an interplay between the problems, politics and policy streams during a window of opportunity. The key figure in the context of the EU's global strategy is the HR, who acts as policy entrepreneur, draws together the three streams in the window of opportunity and thus influences policy change. In the following case-study, I look for manifestations of Mogherini's attributes as an entrepreneur and the strategies she used in order to affect the policy outcome. The focal episode of this case-study is the process of drafting and the beginning of implementation of the EUGS, which took place between November 2014 and December 2016.

The following examination is divided into two parts. First, I explore the three policy streams that presented themselves between 2014 and 2015 and created a window of opportunity. Then, I turn to the policy entrepreneurship and look for evidence of the entrepreneurial strategies identified above—framing problems and arousing interests, venue-shopping and mobilizing support by creating teams and coalitions—as used by Mogherini. I also reflect on the manifestation of entrepreneurial attributes, looking for evidence for her persistence, social acuity and sense of timing.

Three policy streams

The trigger for the HR's policy entrepreneurship is the appearance of the three policy streams at a given point in time. In this case-study, the streams came

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[42] On member states, see Federica Bicchi, *Actors and factors in European foreign policy-making: insights from the Mediterranean case*, working paper (Florence: European University Institute, 2002); on the Commission, see Alexandra Krause, 'The European Union's Africa policy: the Commission as policy entrepreneur in the CFSP', *European Foreign Affairs Review* 8: 2, 2003, pp. 221–37.

[43] Mintrom and Norman, 'Policy entrepreneurship and policy change', p. 655.

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together in 2014–2015, creating a propitious moment for Mogherini to push for policy change. The first stream—*problems*—was constituted by the deteriorating security environment and the growing demand for a stronger EU capacity to act within the security realm. [44] We can identify at least three focusing events driven by international developments that formed the problem stream: the Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea in 2014; the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015; and the wave of migrants and refugees that came to Europe in 2015 from the war-torn Middle East and North Africa region.

The *politics* stream—the broader political environment around the policy-making process—has been characterized by an overall mood favourable to European integration. In 2015, most of the European Council's members shared such an attitude, with the majority coming from circles close to the European People's Party, composed of liberals and social democrats. Only two members championed a more Eurosceptic position. A similar constellation of positions was present in the FAC. Despite existing divisions between the member states over, among other things, the relocation of refugees, there was broad support for the further enhancement of the EU's foreign and security policy.[45] The European Parliament, too, was fairly enthusiastic about integration, those in favour outnumbering the Eurosceptics. At the same time, the newly elected president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, announced European security and defence to be one of his priorities.[46] Another aspect of the prevailing mood was strong public support for the CFSP and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In 2015, the former was supported by 66 per cent and the latter by 72 per cent of respondents to Eurobarometer.[47] In essence, the 'climate of the times' can be summarized as pro-European and supportive of further integration within foreign and security policy.[48]

Finally, the *policy* stream consisted of ideas developed to tackle the abovementioned need to boost the EU's performance as a security provider. These ideas included general concepts of how to strengthen the Union's ability to act externally as well as proposals to revise the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS). Starting with the first category—as discussed above—there were repeated pleas by the intergovernmental bodies for enhanced EU performance in this area. The Commission joined the chorus by calling for the pooling of capabilities and synergies in defence procurement.[49] With respect to ESS revisions, many ideas were in circulation among the think-tank community.[50] Yet there was a cleavage among

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[44] For more on the security environment, see Monika Sus and Marcel Hadeed, *European security 2030*, LSE ideas reports (London: London School of Economics, 2019), pp. 5–7.

[45] Council of the European Union, *Council conclusions on CSDP* (Brussels, 2015); European Council, *European Council Meeting (25 and 26 June 2015)—conclusions* (Brussels, 2015).

[46] Jean-Claude Juncker, *A new start for Europe: my agenda for jobs, growth, fairness and democratic change* (Brussels: European Commission, 2014).

[47] European Commission, *Special Eurobarometer 461 report: designing Europe's future* (Brussels, April 2017).

[48] Zahariadis, 'Ambiguity and choice', p. 518.

[49] Juncker, *A new start for Europe*.

[50] See e.g. Jan Joel Andersson, Erik Brattberg, Malin Häggqvist, Hanna Ojanen and Mark Rhinard, *The European Security Strategy: reinvigorate, revise or reinvent*, occasional paper (Stockholm: The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 2011); Sven Biscop, *EU grand strategy: optimism is mandatory*, Security Policy Brief (Brus-

national leaders regarding the necessity for a new security outlook: while several countries saw the need for it, the 'big three'—France, Germany and the UK—were opposed.

This brief analysis of the three policy streams shows that the policy window opened in both the problems and politics streams. 'A compelling geostrategic context and a clear political awareness of it are the necessary conditions for a productive strategic reflection process';[51] both were present and a window of opportunity emerged. When Mogherini was appointed as HR in November 2014, she started to act as a policy entrepreneur and embarked on the process of bringing the three streams together. In the next section of the article, I explore the HR's entrepreneurship in this case that led to Mogherini's footprint on policy change.

The HR's entrepreneurship

Securing a mandate for strategy development (October 2014 to June 2015)   When Mogherini took over the office from Ashton, ideas for a new strategy were in circulation; however, there was no consensus on the question, so in 2013 the European Council tasked the HR with formulating an assessment of the impact of global changes on the Union and the challenges arising from them.[52] While Ashton did not take up this task,[53] Mogherini welcomed the mandate and signalled from the outset that the 'joint process of strategic reflection could pave the way to a new European Security Strategy'.[54] She believed in the need for a new strategy and tied it to the overall sense of direction that the EU required if it was to meet its multilateral commitments.[55] In this way, she started to frame the issue and arouse interest among the member states, from whom she needed a clear mandate for the strategy.[56] Moreover, despite objections from some high-level EEAS officials who suggested the 2013 mandate should be interpreted as calling for the immediate development of a strategy,[57] Mogherini insisted on a two-step process with the strategic assessment preceding the strategy itself and laying the groundwork for it. Her approach served a threefold purpose. First, during the assessment phase, she tried out a tailor-made process of drafting and established a network of inter- and

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sels: EGMONT—The Royal Institute for International Relations, 2012); International Affairs Institute, The Polish Institute of International Affairs, Elcano Royal Institute and The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, *Towards a European global strategy: securing European influence* (Rome, 2013).

[51] Nathalie Tocci, *Framing the EU's global strategy: a stronger Europe in a fragile world* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), p. 11.

[52] European Council, *European Council conclusions (19–20 December)* (Brussels, 2013), p. 4.

[53] Calcara, 'The hybrid role of the High Representative', p. 382.

[54] Federica Mogherini, 'Answers to the European Parliament. Questionnaire to the Commissioner-Designate Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Vice-President of the Commission', 6 Oct. 2014.

[55] Federica Mogherini, speech at the Munich Security Conference, 8 Feb. 2015.

[56] Nathalie Tocci, 'Towards an EU global strategy', in Antonio Missiroli, ed., *Towards an EU global strategy: background, proceess, references* (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2015), p. 118; Smith, 'A European Union global strategy for a changing world?', p. 508.

[57] Author interviews with special adviser to the HR on the EUGS, Sept. 2017, Rome; with former official from EEAS Strategic Planning Unit, Oct. 2019, Berlin; and with European Commission official (DG Neighbourhood), Nov. 2019, Brussels.

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intra-institutional connections that would be useful in the next step.[58] Second, the assessment process served to raise awareness among the member states that a new strategy was needed. Gradually building up support for the issue at stake is one technique of the framing strategy.[59] Third, Mogherini deliberately made much of her inter-institutional position and promoted a 'whole of EU' approach—a global understanding of security that incorporates all external portfolios and instruments at the EU's disposal as opposed to the traditional, narrower, perception.[60] Her vision was not shared by some member states and she needed time to convince them.[61]

A successful framing of the process would not have been possible without the team Mogherini built—a team that included both 'insiders' and 'outsiders'. Among the former was Stefano Manservisi, an experienced Commission official who became her *chef de cabinet*, and Alfredo Conte, head of the Strategic Planning Unit and a former official in the Council secretariat; these two individuals played crucial roles and promoted the HR's ideas in the Commission and the EEAS respectively.[62] Among the latter, the key role was played by Natalie Tocci, who was given the role of writing of the strategic assessment. That the HR surrounded herself with highly skilled people points to her social acuity and her ability to make use of her network.

During this period, the HR engaged in mobilizing interest for the strategy, delivering six speeches in various venues in which she set out her vision for the document. This active involvement in the process bears witness to Mogherini's persistence and willingness to invest resources to achieve the desired policy outcome. In addition, by talking to diverse groups such as think-tanks, EU officials and multilateral partners,[63] she applied one of the techniques ascribed to the framing strategy: drawing support from a broad range of actors.[64]

Mogherini's entrepreneurial activities proved successful. The two-step process, called the 'Mogherini approach',[65] despite initial criticism from some member states,[66] contributed to their coherence. The presentation of the strategic review was followed by the European Council's mandate for a new strategy.[67]

[58] Karolina Pomorska and Sophie Vanhoonacker, 'Europe as a global actor: searching for a new strategic approach', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 54, Annual Review, 2016, p. 207.

[59] Mintrom and Norman, 'Policy entrepreneurship and policy change'.

[60] Nathalie Tocci, 'The making of the EU global strategy', *Contemporary Security Policy* 37: 3, 2016, p. 464.

[61] Author interviews with expert from Polish think-tank, June 2016, Wroclaw; with official from Polish ministry of foreign affairs, Oct. 2019, Warsaw; with former official from Netherlands ministry of foreign affairs, Dec. 2019, by telephone.

[62] Claire Darmé, *Pros and cons of proactive political leadership: a review of the legacy of the 'last chance' Commission* (Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2019), p. 7; Tocci, *Framing the EU's global strategy*, p. 56; author interview with European Commission official (DG Neighbourhood), Nov. 2019, Brussels.

[63] Federica Mogherini, 'Extracts of the speech of HRVP Mogherini at the EDA annual conference', 16 Nov. 2015, https://euusrbiji.europa.rs/extracts-from-the-high-representativevice-president-of-the-european-commission-and-head-of-the-european-defence-agency-federica-mogherinis-speech-at-the-eda-annual-conference/?lang=en; Mogherini, speech at the Munich Security Conference, 2015.

[64] Mintrom and Norman, 'Policy entrepreneurship and policy change'.

[65] Pawlak, *A global strategy*, p. 2.

[66] Morillas, *Strategy-making in the EU*, p. 138.

[67] EEAS, *The European Union in a changing global environment: a more connected, contested and complex world* (Brussels, 2015); European Council, *European Council Meeting (25 and 26 June 2015)—conclusions*, p. 4.

Designing and carrying out the drafting process (June 2015 to mid–June 2016)   Once the mandate was on the table, the HR launched the second step of the process: the drafting of the actual strategy. Once again Mogherini and her team, with Tocci as the penholder, designed the procedure.

In this stage the working method initiated during the first step—the strategic review—was continued. Mogherini and her team refused to follow a Brussels-style procedure of document-drafting via the Committee of Permanent Representatives or the Political and Security Committee (PSC), claiming that those bodies would not have 'sufficient time for this exercise'.[68] Both committees, and the FAC, were informed about the developments, but were not consulted in their formation. At the same time, since Mogherini was aware that buy-in from the member states was crucial,[69] she and her team decided to develop new venues for consultation with them. The method chosen—in which Tocci developed the skeleton of the document and consulted it at first only with Mogerini and her team while keeping it out of sight of other stakeholders—was unconventional and initially prompted criticism.[70] The consultations with member states, which took place in the next step, were mostly conducted via points of contact (POCs) that had been launched for the specific purpose and usually consisted of one or two officials from the national foreign ministries.[71] The POCs served as a transmission belt between the drafting team and national administrations by, among other things, answering a questionnaire on their respective countries' strategic priorities.[72] Several member states were not satisfied with the scope for input they were given, and provided HR with non-papers specifying their ideas for the strategy.[73] It was not clear how their input was being processed, and complaints of their not being sufficiently engaged continued to be made.[74] This prompted the HR and her team to modify the consultation mechanism. Representatives of the POCs were invited to see the draft and discuss it with Tocci. These so-called 'confessionals' took place in small groups of three or four member states.[75] This restricted format facilitated discussions and allowed Mogherini and Tocci to keep control over the consultations by reducing the risk of several member states joining forces and demanding

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[68] Tocci, 'The making of the EU global strategy', p. 464.

[69] Nathalie Tocci, 'From the European Security Strategy to the EU global strategy: explaining the journey', *International Politics* 54: 4, 2017, p. 493.

[70] Author interviews with expert from Polish think-tank, June 2016, Wroclaw; with special adviser to the HR on the EUGS, Sept. 2017, Rome; with official from Polish ministry of foreign affairs, Oct. 2019, Warsaw; with expert from Belgian think-tank, Nov. 2019, Brussels; with European Commission official (DG Neighbourhood), Nov. 2019, Brussels.

[71] Pawlak, *A global strategy*, p. 6; Tocci, 'From the European Security Strategy to the EU global strategy'.

[72] Author interviews with official from Polish ministry of foreign affairs, June 2016, Wroclaw; with special adviser to the HR on the EUGS, Sept. 2017, Rome; with official from Polish ministry of foreign affairs, Oct. 2019, Warsaw; with official from Estonian ministry of foreign affairs, Dec. 2019, by telephone; with former official from Netherlands ministry of foreign affairs, Dec. 2019, by telephone; with official from Spanish ministry of foreign affairs, European Union and cooperation, Dec. 2019, by telephone.

[73] Pawlak, *A global strategy*; author interviews with official from Polish ministry of foreign affairs, June 2016, Wroclaw; with expert from Polish think-tank, June 2016, Wroclaw; with official from Estonian ministry of foreign affairs, Dec. 2019, by telephone; with former official from Netherlands ministry of foreign affairs, Dec. 2019, by telephone.

[74] Pomorska and Vanhoonacker, 'Europe as a global actor', pp. 207–8.

[75] Ricardo López-Aranda, 'Una nueva estrategia exterior para la Unión Europeaux', *Cuadernos de Estrategia*, vol. 184, 2017, p. 74.

changes in the text. This reflects the entrepreneurial use of creating a new venue as a 'procedural device to manipulate the number of decision-makers in order to elicit a favourable outcome'.[76]

As a result of these enhanced bilateral and minilateral dialogues, 'by the end of the process of informal negotiations, every Member State had agreed with every word of the EUGS'.[77] The representatives of the member states indicated that their buy-in into the strategy increased in part owing to Tocci's expertise and conciliatory attitude.[78] The method of drafting also secured a final document that was in line with Mogherini's vision of the global approach,[79] despite initial objections by some member states.[80]

A second aspect of the venue-shopping was the outreach process which formed part of the strategy of mobilizing support. As noted above, European think-tanks were involved in the policy stream and, despite their differences regarding the content of a new strategy, they applauded the idea. Mogherini intentionally built up a community of proponents, knowing that their support would carry weight during the implementation of the strategy.[81] The outreach process included over 50 seminars held across Europe, in the vast majority of which either Mogherini or a member of her team participated,[82] underlining the HR's persistence and her determination to achieve the desired outcome.

A third aspect of the venue-shopping (or rather, venue-modification) concerns the European Commission. As noted above, the driving philosophy behind the HR's strategy was a global approach. Accordingly, she made use of her vice-presidential position, recognizing that input from the various directorates-general (DGs) was essential. Her action was in line with Juncker's interests, and his determination to strengthen the EU's global role contributed to the opening of the window in the politics stream. Yet despite the Commission's backing for the new strategy,[83] some of its officials objected to the unconventional drafting process.[84] Instead of traditional discussions of the text among Commission's DGs and service departments, a special task force of officials representing the external dimensions of the respective DGs was established and served as a platform for consultation and providing input.[85] However, as with the member states, the personalities and

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[76] Zahariadis, 'Ambiguity and choice', p. 523.

[77] Tocci, *Framing the EU's global strategy*, p. 43.

[78] Author interviews with expert from Belgian think-tank, Nov. 2019, Brussels; with European Commission official (DG Neighbourhood), Nov. 2019, Brussels; with official from Estonian ministry of foreign affairs, Dec. 2019, by telephone; with official from permanent representation of Poland to EU, Dec. 2019, by telephone; with former official from Netherlands ministry of foreign affairs, Dec. 2019, by telephone; with official from Bulgarian ministry of foreign affairs, Dec. 2019, by telephone.

[79] Morillas, *Strategy-making in the EU*.

[80] Author interviews with expert from Polish think-tank, June 2016, Wroclaw; with official from Polish ministry of foreign affairs, Oct. 2019, Warsaw.

[81] Federica Mogherini, speech at EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) annual conference: 'Towards an EU global strategy—the final stage', Paris, 22 April 2016.

[82] EUISS, *Towards an EU global strategy—consulting the experts* (Paris, 2016), pp. 109–11.

[83] European Political Strategy Centre, *In defence of Europe* (Brussels, 2015), p. 9.

[84] Author interviews with special adviser to the HR on the EUGS, Sept. 2017, Rome; with expert from Belgian think-tank, Nov. 2019, Brussels; with European Commission official (DG Neighbourhood), Nov. 2019, Brussels.

[85] Tocci, 'From the European Security Strategy to the EU global strategy', p. 439; author interviews with special

persistence of the drafting team motivated the Commission's officials to engage in the drafting process.[86]

Even so, the Commission perceived the strategy as 'Mogherini's document'.[87] Simultaneously, it continued working on the European Defence Action Plan (EDAP), aimed at providing industrial incentives for defence cooperation. The EDAP was about to be published in spring 2016, but Mogherini was determined to delay it and publish the EUGS first.[88] The timing was crucial in this case, as HR's aim was for the EUGS to serve as an overarching framework for further steps in the EU's external activities. In the end, the EDAP saw the light of day in November 2016 and was perceived as a part of the EUGS's implementation, even though the HR was not in the lead on the EDAP.[89]

During this part of the process, venue-shopping and the creation of new venues were the entrepreneurial strategies on which the HR concentrated. Despite objections to the process as not being inclusive enough and serving as window-dressing,[90] many interlocutors from the EEAS and from the member states stressed that it was the unconventional method employed that made it possible to develop such a comprehensive strategic document in so short a time.[91] At the same time, the HR and her team succeeded in stimulating debate across Europe and contributed to a growing consensus about the need for the EU to step up as a security provider.[92] This observation testifies to the success of both the framing and support-mobilizing strategies employed. In mid-June 2016, the text of the EUGS was ready. Shortly before the scheduled presentation, the Brexit vote in Britain happened.

Adapting to the internal shock (June 2016)   The UK's decision to leave the Union disrupted Mogherini's entrepreneurship, taking attention away from the publication of the document. Some among both national leaders and the EEAS argued

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adviser to the HR on the EUGS, Sept. 2017, Rome; with former official from EEAS Strategic Planning Unit, Oct. 2019, Berlin.

[86] Author interviews with expert from Belgian think-tank, Nov. 2019, Brussels; with European Commission official (DG Neighbourhood), Nov. 2019, Brussels; with official from permanent representation of Poland to EU, Dec. 2019, by telephone; with former official from Netherlands ministry of foreign affairs, Dec. 2019, by telephone.

[87] Vincenti, 'Mogherini's global strategy'; Michel Barnier, 'Stepping-up European security and defence', *European Defence Matters*, no. 10, 2016, p. 36.

[88] Author interview with European Commission official (DG Neighbourhood), Nov. 2019, Brussels; Eleonore Heimsoeth, *The European External Action Service's policy influence in security and defence*, PhD diss., forthcoming 2021, London School of Economics and Political Science.

[89] Revecca Pedi, 'The (small) state of the Union: assessing the EU's ability to implement its global strategy', *New Perspectives* 27: 1, 2019, p. 52.

[90] Author interviews with expert from Polish think-tank, June 2016, Wroclaw; with European Commission official (DG Neighbourhood), Nov. 2019, Brussels; with official from permanent representation of Poland to EU, Dec. 2019, by telephone.

[91] Author interviews with EEAS counsellor, Oct. 2015, London, May 2016, Berlin; with special adviser to the HR on the EUGS, Sept. 2017, Rome; with official from Estonian ministry of foreign affairs, Dec. 2019, by telephone; with former official from Netherlands ministry of foreign affairs, Dec. 2019, by telephone; with official from Bulgarian ministry of foreign affairs, Dec. 2019, by telephone.

[92] Hylke Dijkstra, 'Introduction: one-and-a-half cheers for the EU global strategy', *Contemporary Security Policy* 37: 3, 2016, p. 371.

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for a postponement of the presentation,[93] but Mogherini decided not to do this.[94] She embarked once more on the framing strategy, presenting the Brexit vote as a factor adding to the purpose of the EUGS by providing unity at the moment when the 'existence of our Union is being questioned'.[95] Despite some initial criticism ascribing the lack of formal approval of the EUGS by the European Council to the HR's bad timing,[96] with hindsight there seems to be agreement that she made the right decision.[97] This demonstrates her entrepreneurial attribute in the matter of appropriate timing. Furthermore, as the next section shows, Mogherini managed to use the Brexit vote to direct attention to the implementation of the EUGS.[98] In sum, she succeeded in preventing the internal shock administered by the British vote from diverting her pursuit of policy change.

Shaping the beginning of the implementation process (July–December 2016) Once the EUGS had been published, the HR instantly steered the debate around to its implementation,[99] proposing a detailed roadmap with a tight schedule.[100] In spite of the member states' criticism of the bad timing of the EUGS's publication, within four months Mogherini had succeeded in getting them to commit to 'effective and prompt implementation jointly with the High Representative and the Commission' and to ensuring their 'ownership and involvement throughout the process'.[101] Once again, Mogherini applied the framing strategy, entrusting the drafting of the IPSD to Tocci, supported by the EEAS's director-general Pedro Serrano and chair of the Politico-Military Group Arnoult Molenaar. Another manifestation of Mogherini's framing strategy is offered by the example of Franco-German non-paper that called for advances in security and defence via, among other things, the launch of PESCO.[102] There is no doubt that this intergovernmental initiative made an instrumental contribution to the policy stream. Despite the fact that Mogherini was not in the lead with respect to PESCO,[103]

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[93] Morillas, *Strategy-making in the EU*, pp. 153–5; author interviews with special adviser to the HR on the EUGS, Sept. 2017, Rome; with European Commission official (DG Neighbourhood), Nov. 2019, Brussels.

[94] Lisbeth Aggestam and Elsa Hedling, 'Leaderisation in foreign policy: performing the role of EU High Representative', *European Security* 29: 3, 2020, pp. 312–13.

[95] Pawlak, *A global strategy*, p. 3.

[96] Morillas, *Strategy-making in the EU*, pp. 155–6; Tocci, *Framing the EU's global strategy*, pp. 47–8, pp. 88–9.

[97] Morillas, *Strategy-making in the EU*, p. 154; author interviews with special adviser to the HR on the EUGS, Sept. 2017, Rome; with official from Estonian ministry of foreign affairs, Dec. 2019, by telephone; with former official from Netherlands ministry of foreign affairs, Dec. 2019, by telephone; with official from Bulgarian ministry of foreign affairs, Dec. 2019, by telephone.

[98] Tocci, 'The making of the EU global strategy', pp. 470–71.

[99] Council of the European Union, Foreign Affairs Council, Background brief (Brussels, 15 July 2016).

[100] EEAS, *Roadmap to implement the EU global strategy* (Brussels, 2016).

[101] Council of the European Union, *Council conclusions on the global strategy on the European Union's foreign and security policy* (Brussels, 2016), p. 2.

[102] Jean-Marc Ayrault and Frank Walter Steinmeier, 'A strong Europe in a world of uncertainties', 26 June 2016, https://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/DokumentUE-2.pdf; Ursula von der Leyen and Jean Yves le Drian, 'Revitalizing CSDP: towards a comprehensive, realistic and credible defence in the EU', 11 Sept. 2016, https://club.bruxelles2.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/let-fra-all-defensefeuiileroute@fr160911en.pdf.

[103] Barbara Kunz, *Why Franco-German leadership on European defense is not in sight*, policy brief (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2019), p. 3; Lucie Béraud-Sudreau and Alice Pannier, 'An "improbable Paris–Berlin–Commission triangle": usages of Europe and the revival of EU defense cooperation after 2016', *Journal of European Integration*, publ. online 19 March 2020, DOI: 10.1080/07036337.2020.1740215.

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she succeeded in taking over the proposal and in linking it with the IPSD.[104] Moreover, she managed to frame the implementation of the EUGS as a triple package consisting of the IPSD, the Commission's EDAP, with the EDF presented as an instrument developed to 'pursue the objectives of the Global Strategy',[105] and the EU–NATO declaration on strategic partnership signed on 8 July 2016 and implemented by the FAC on 6 December 2016.[106] Her role was limited with regard to the two latter initiatives,[107] yet her inter-institutional position enabled her to be involved in their development through her roles as Commission vice-president and chair of the FAC.[108] The fact that both proposals have been recognized as part of the EUGS's implementation,[109] despite Mogherini's secondary role, proves her framing strategy successful. She seized the opportunity and coupled ideas floating in the policy stream with two other streams to shape policy change.

Also, there was a focusing event that appeared in the the problem stream and played into her hands.[110] The victory of Donald Trump in the US presidential election of November 2016 provided additional impetus as

the spectre of an uncertain US security guarantee loomed large, changing the calculus of the most reluctant Member States concerning European defence. When on the morning of 8 November 2016, the PSC reconvened, the mood had palpably changed. By Friday that week, the PSC had agreed on an ambitious set of conclusions on security and defence, endorsed by the Council the following week.[111]

The Council accepted the IPSD as proposed by the HR, changing only few nuances.[112]

The EUGS implementation process continues,[113] yet the first six months set the tone, establishing the strategic document as an 'umbrella' for further integration within foreign and security policy.[114] In December 2016, the European Council

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[104] Heimsoeth, *The European External Action Service's policy influence*; author interviews with official from Estonian ministry of foreign affairs, Dec. 2019, by telephone; with official from permanent representation of Poland to EU, Dec. 2019, by telephone; Council of the European Union, *Implementation Plan on Security and Defence*, pp. 29–30.

[105] Darmé, *Pros and cons of proactive political leadership*, pp. 10–11.

[106] Council of the European Union, *Implementation Plan on Security and Defence*, pp. 7–8; Nicoletta Pirozzi and Vassilis Ntousas, *Walking the strategic talk: a progressive EU foreign policy agenda for the future* (Brussels: Foundation for European Progressive Studies, 2019), p. 6.

[107] Author interviews with European Commission official (DG Neighbourhood), Nov. 2019, Brussels; with official from NATO headquarters, Nov. 2019, Brussels.

[108] Calcara, 'The hybrid role of the High Representative', pp. 384, 388.

[109] Andrea Frontini, *Another perfect storm for European defence—but can the Union really make strength?*, commentary (Brussels: European Policy Centre, 2016); author interviews with official from permanent representation of Poland to EU, Dec. 2019, by telephone; with former official from Netherlands ministry of foreign affairs, Dec. 2019, by telephone; with official from Bulgarian ministry of foreign affairs, Dec. 2019, by telephone.

[110] Félix Arteaga, *European defence between the global strategy and its implementation*, working paper (Madrid: Elcano Royal Institute, 2017), p. 8.

[111] Nathalie Tocci, 'Academia and practice in European foreign policy: opportunities for mutual learning', *Journal of European Integration* 40: 7, 2018, p. 842.

[112] Council of the European Union, *Implementation Plan on Security and Defence*; Morillas, *Strategy-making in the EU*, p. 161.

[113] Assessment of the EUGS's implementation falls beyond the scope of this article. There is a lively discussion in the literature about its successes and failures: for more on this, see e.g. Foundation for European Progressive Studies, *In our hands: progressive ideas for a renewed and repurposed trans-Atlantic bond* (Brussels, 22 Jan. 2021), https://www.feps-europe.eu/resources/publications.html.

[114] Author interview with former official from Netherlands ministry of foreign affairs, Dec. 2019, by telephone.

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confirmed its commitment to the implementation of the EUGS.[115] Most of the political decisions that have followed since then regarding the civilian and military aspects of EU external action testify to the central role of the EUGS by referring to it as the overall framework.[116]

The HR's footprint on policy change

As the exploration of Mogherini's entrepreneurship presented above shows, she managed to leave a tangible footprint on the implementation of the EUGS, despite many doubts about it after its publication.[117] Three aspects of her impact on policy change stand out. First of all, she succeeded in keeping the EUGS global and in linking internal and external security. This has been facilitated by the framing of the implementation as a triple package together with the EDAP and the EU–NATO declaration. As experts have claimed, the 'EUGS stands as the most encompassing set of political guidelines for external action the EU has ever produced'.[118] Second, despite the HR's limited formal powers, Mogherini used her inter-institutional position, remained in the middle of the policy-making process and exerted ownership throughout the process from drafting to the implementation. She was able to 'decisively shape the delicate military dimension of EU security and defence',[119] even though the decision-making power in this area belongs to the member states. Finally, the EUGS became the 'vehicle' through which further developments in the field of foreign and security policy circulated.[120] This is something else that Mogherini intended from the outset.[121] The strategy became a reference point for further documents produced by the member states (all Council presidency programmes published after June 2016 refer to it, as do the German *Strategic review and way ahead on security policy and the future of the Bundeswehr*) and the EU institutions.[122] The EUGS is seen as a 'symbol of convergence of EU members on foreign policy, defense and security';[123] by embarking on a rapid implementation and by linking various ideas floating in the policy stream under the umbrella provided by the EUGS, Mogherini managed to

[115] European Council, conclusions of meeting 15 Dec. 2016 (Brussels, 2016).

[116] See e.g. Council of the European Union, *Conclusions of the Council on the establishment of a civilian CSDP compact* (Brussels, 2018); Council of the European Union, *Permanent Structured Cooperation—PESCO* (Brussels, 2017); Council of the European Union, *Council conclusions on security and defence in the context of the EU global strategy* (Brussels, 2019); European Commission, *Joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council: a strategic approach to resilience in the EU's external action* (Brussels, 2017).

[117] Hans W. Maull, 'Sadly, the EUGS reads more like a symptom of the problem than part of a solution for Europe's deep crisis', *International Spectator* 51: 3, 2016, pp. 34–6; Jo Coelmont, *Message to—and from—the European political leadership: agreeing to disagree on strategy is a luxury the EU can no longer afford* (Brussels: EGMONT—Royal Institute for International Relations, 2016); author interview with expert from Polish think-tank, June 2016, Wroclaw.

[118] Darmé, *Pros and cons of proactive political leadership*, p. 7

[119] Calcara, 'The hybrid role of the High Representative', p. 383.

[120] Morillas, *Strategy-making in the EU*, p. 134.

[121] Tocci, 'The making of the EU global strategy', p. 462.

[122] Author interviews with European Commission official (DG Neighbourhood), Nov. 2019, Brussels; with official from Estonian ministry of foreign affairs, Dec. 2019, by telephone; with official from permanent representation of Poland to EU, Dec. 2019, by telephone; with former official from Netherlands ministry of foreign affairs, Dec. 2019, by telephone.

[123] Béraud-Sudreau and Pannier, 'An "improbable Paris–Berlin–Commission triangle', p. 6.

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arouse interest in the strategy even among these member states that were initially sceptical or uninterested.[124] In short, Mogherini and her team have over-delivered and their achievements in bringing together the EU 28 foreign policies have gone much farther than one would have expected.[125]

Conclusions

This article has studied the entrepreneurship employed by HR Mogherini, who was conceptualized as a supranational agent with little formal power, dependent on the intergovernmental system for her mandate, during the drafting and the early stages of implementation of the EUGS. As the analysis has shown, by applying entrepreneurial strategies, Mogherini was able to leave her footprint on the policy change, despite the legal and political constraints that characterize the HR's office. The article offers both empirical and theoretical findings.

With regard to the empirical observations, the case-study confirms the exercise of entrepreneurship by the HR. This was triggered by the convergence of three policy streams within the EU's foreign and security policy in a window of opportunity and resulted in the HR's achievement of her desired policy outcome—the implementation of the EUGS as an umbrella for further policy initiatives. While there is evidence that Mogherini's actions were characterized by the continuous co-presence of all three entrepreneurial attributes, her strategies differed across the respective parts of the process. The first strategy—*framing and arousing interest*—was most prominent in the first part of the process and also played an essential role during the implementation, while *venue-shopping and mobilizing support* were most salient during the drafting of the strategic document. Overall, evidence was found for the presence of all three strategies in various techniques that can be ascribed to them. In exercising entrepreneurship, Mogherini benefited from her inter-institutional position and was able to control the process and to present ideas coming from other stakeholders (such as the Franco-German proposal for PESCO, or the EDF designed by the European Commission) as elements of the EUGS's implementation package. This analysis supports the argument that the HR, by acting as a policy entrepreneur, can affect policy change despite the formal constraints on this office. Some experts argued that, especially during the drafting process, the member states were acting as the HR's 'followers'.[126] The instruments put forward during the implementation process—PESCO, MPCC, EDF, CARD—have been floating in the policy stream since 2013, but none of the stakeholders coupled all of them with the problems and politics streams to push for policy change.[127] It took Mogherini, acting as a policy entrepreneur, to draw together the multiple

[124] Author interviews with official from Polish ministry of foreign affairs, June 2016, Wroclaw; with expert from Belgian think-tank, Nov. 2019, Brussels; Monika Sus, 'Member states as strategy-maker or strategy-taker? Analysing Polish involvement in the development of the EU global strategy', *Polish Yearbook of Political Science*, vol. 45, 2016, pp. 337–50.
[125] Annalisa Piras, Report of an event organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies and by the Women in International Security UK, London, 14 March 2018.
[126] Morillas, *Strategy-making in the EU*, p. 183.
[127] Author interview with European Commission official (DG Neighbourhood), Nov. 2019, Brussels.

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ideas with the politics and problems streams to push for progress. At the same time, President Juncker with the EDF, or France and Germany with their PESCO proposal, could be also identified as entrepreneurs. However, the unique inter-institutional position of the HR gave Mogherini the advantage in combining the various ideas floating in the policy stream and framing them all as linked to the EUGS's implementation, and thereby achieving wide-ranging policy change.

Despite the limited generalization potential of this single case-study, the research does offer two theoretical findings. First, it demonstrates the usefulness of the MSA in the analysis of the EU's foreign and security policy. This approach allows us to embrace the complexity of the governance system within this policy area by offering an analytical framework that includes both internal and external conditions (the problem stream); the multiple actors and their characteristics (the politics stream); and the variety of policy solutions and proposals in circulation (the policy stream). Furthermore, the notion of the policy entrepreneur offers a suitable tool to account for agency, since it can be deployed with respect to various actors operating in this policy domain. Applied to the HR, this concept allows us systematically to unpack the performance of this role in the policy-making process, as the case-study has shown. A comparative research design that examines the entrepreneurship of different HRs across divergent areas of EU's foreign and security policy would provide valuable insights into the HR's impact on policy change. At the same time, as indicated above, there is a plurality of stakeholders bringing ideas into the policy stream: the member states, the European Commission and others. This gives rise to the possibility of *competitive entrepreneurs* who may try simultaneously to influence a particular policy-making process. Such a perspective allows us to examine the dynamics between various actors involved in the EU's foreign and security policy-making, and merits further conceptualization and empirical research.

Second, by presenting a catalogue of entrepreneurial strategies and by providing observable manifestations of the execution of these strategies via various techniques, this article offers a tool that can be used to examine the activities of other supranational agents outside the EU context. All three strategies—framing and arousing interest (by defining problems in a way that is beneficial for the entrepreneur, gradually building up interest in the issue at stake, drawing support from various actors, etc.), venue shopping (selecting the right venue for the preferred outcome, modifying a venue if it is not suitable, etc.) and mobilizing support (by building a trusted team, developing coalitions, etc.)—can be looked for in the activities of other supranational agents. In the same vein, the article also reflects on the key attributes of entrepreneurs—persistence, social acuity and sense of timing—and provides insights with regard to the observable manifestations of these attributes. The catalogue of strategies and entrepreneurial attributes can be adapted and deployed to explore the impact of supranational agents on policy-making processes in a variety of other institutional settings.