

Citizens' Perceptions of EU responsibility and Electoral Participation:

Is the Glass Half-Full or Half Empty?

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FIRST DRAFT – PLEASE DO NOT CIRCULATE

Abstract

How do citizens' perceptions of EU responsibility affect electoral participation? On the one hand, the multilevel governance model indicates that perceiving the EU as being in charge (attribution of responsibility to EU) should foster participation in EU elections. On the other hand, other scholarships suggest that if the EU is perceived as a constraint (constraints stemming from EU responsibility), it should depreciate beliefs in the value of voting, while it could also provide incentives not to vote in national and EU elections. Yet, no study has examined empirically the effects of citizens' perceptions of EU responsibility on electoral participation and the mechanisms underpinning them at the individual level. Using an original dataset in the first European elections following the EU sovereign debt crisis (CED-EU14), we show that both perceptions of the EU responsibility – attribution or constraint – do not affect turnout and beliefs in the value of voting similarly. First, perceiving the EU as being in charge does not alter beliefs in the value of voting but depresses turnout. Second, perceiving the EU as a constraint alters beliefs in the value of voting, but does not affect national turnout. Interestingly, perceptions of constraint – both stemming from the EU as well as from globalization – decrease turnout in European elections. Our paper contributes to the literature on the EU democratic deficit and more broadly on citizens' detachment to democracy.

Keywords

European integration; EU responsibility; Electoral participation; National elections; European elections; perceptions.

Introduction

According to Peter Mair, and the strand of research that emerged from his book *Ruling the Void* (2013), the process of European integration and, in particular, the EU response to the Euro sovereign debt crisis have resulted in a widening gap between political leaders' 'responsiveness' towards their electorate, on the one hand, and their 'responsibility' stemming from commitments through economic and political interaction and integration amongst nation-states, on the other (Mair, 2013; Laffan, 2014). Mair submitted that, because of growing institutional constraints, and the related constriction of the policy space (Schäfer and Streeck, 2013), member-states governments have increasingly tended to favour responsible decisions over responsive choices (Mair, 2013); thereby transforming the classic debate about how governing parties ought to combine the tasks of political representation with good government (Sartori, 1976) into an ever-acute dilemma, the so-called Responsibility-Responsiveness (RR) dilemma (Lefkofridi and Nezi, 2020; Karremans and Lefkofridi, 2020). In other words, Peter Mair's thesis put front and centre the question of EU responsibility in domestic politics.

The implications of Mair's thesis looming so large, the scholarship has probed empirically the existence of this RR dilemma at the national and European level. Studies of governing parties at the national level (e.g. Karremans and Damhuis, 2020; Karremans, 2021; Damhuis and Karremans, 2021; Lefkofridi and Nezi, 2020; Karremans and Lefkofridi, 2020) and decisions and reforms of the EU socio-economic governance (e.g. Laffan, 2014) have provided empirical support to his analysis. Yet, we believe that the implications of Mair's thesis loom even larger than the current scholarship has considered as it raises the issue of the legitimacy of the EU from the perspective of citizens. Indeed, responsibility pertains to the governing role of political actors following accepted procedural norms and practices, in particular those laid down in the framework of European governance. Making responsible decisions ties elected leaders' hands and, at the same time, allows EU-level actors to influence

their domestic choices (Laffan, 2014: 273). As stated by Mair himself, ‘responsibility involves an acceptance that, in certain areas and in certain procedures, the leaders’ hands will be tied’ (Mair, 2013: 158). Moreover, as the EU divides decision-making between different level of government – mainly national and European – responsibility attribution matters. The question is thus also to know if citizens hold the EU or the national government responsible for policy outcomes (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014). There are thus two dimensions to the responsibility of the EU: attribution of responsibility in policy-making – are national or European political actors in charge? – and responsibility as a constraint – are the decisions taken following accepted procedural norms and practices?

In this paper, we ask: how do citizens’ perceptions of EU responsibility impact their political behaviours and attitudes in general, and related to their electoral participation in particular. A wide literature investigates how EU issues influence electoral participation, most notably in EP elections (Mattila, 2003; Stockemer, 2012; Clark, 2014; Hobolt, 2014; Schmitt et al., 2015; Kentmen-Cin, 2017; Beach et al., 2018). But while some strands of literature hint that perceptions of EU responsibility may have an influence on electoral behaviour, and less so on the inclination to cast a ballot¹, they draw from distinct conceptualizations of EU responsibility. Each conceptualization yields different theoretical expectations regarding electoral participation in national and European elections, as well as in beliefs toward the act of voting.

Specifically, in line with theories of multilevel governance, which conceives European integration as a process of transfer of competences, a rational choice approach implicitly assumes that the benefits associated with voting at the European level should increase as the

¹ This literature has been notably advanced by Hobolt and Tilley (2014) who argued that perceptions of EU responsibility are important conditioning variables to explain performance voting in line with Costa-Lobo and Lewis-Beck (2012) at both the national and EU level. This has led to a burgeoning literature (Page, 2016; Le Gall, 2018; Devine, 2021). Interestingly however, there exists few studies which have elaborated a theoretical framework linking perceptions of EU responsibility and turnout.

EU gains in responsibility, while it should decrease at the national level (e.g. Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif et al., 1997; Franklin, 2004; Michelsen et al., 2014). From this perspective, the attribution of responsibility to the EU is key, that is, the extent to which the EU is considered to be in charge. In contrast, a second line of argument frames EU responsibility as a process constraining governments' autonomous decision-making. This scholarship contends that EU responsibility – in the context of negative integration - is likely to depress participation in national elections by weakening the belief that voting matters and that voting contributes to changing policies and decision-making at the national level (Mair, 2013; Steiner, 2010, 2016). Within the scholarship that frames EU responsibility as a set of institutional constraints that puts pressure on national decision-making, a Rodrikian perspective (2011) also suggests another mechanism between perceptions of constraints and voting: it contends that constraints can ultimately foster participation in both EP and national elections, as voters would cast their ballot in an effort to counterbalance the effects of economic integration. Overall, these two main strands of the literature illuminate conflicting plausible relations between perceptions of EU responsibility and electoral participation, while few studies have investigated this phenomenon empirically (for notable exceptions, see: Hausermann et al., 2018; Dasseoneville et al., 2021; Turnbull-Dugarte, 2020; Devine, 2021), especially so at the individual level (Le Gall, 2018).

The contribution of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, we aim to advance our understanding of the effects of EU responsibility by proposing a systematic theoretical account of the effects of perceptions of EU responsibility on electoral participation in national and EU elections, but also on individual beliefs in the value of voting. Building on different strands of literature, which do not particularly discuss with each other, we explore distinct alternative hypotheses – and test them – to comprehend the link between the attribution of EU responsibility, the perception of EU constraints and electoral participation beyond the wide literature on EU issue voting. This ambition follows a growing strand of research that accounts

for citizens' political attitudes and behaviours from the supply-side of the political system (Hay 2007; Mair, 2013). On the other hand, we supplement existing studies, which mainly focus on the effects of aggregate indicators of economic integration on electoral participation, by analysing the mechanisms on the individual level. We do so because, not unlike Steiner (2016), we believe that the association between constraints on governments' autonomous decision making must necessarily be rooted in the thoughts and actions of voters in order to circumvent methodological problems of observational equivalence and ecological fallacy that can arise with aggregate studies (Hobolt and Wittrock, 2011).

This article relies on an original dataset to explore this question: The Comparative Electoral Dynamics in the European Union in 2014 (CED-EU14). CED-EU14 is an online survey that was launched at the occasion of the 2014 European elections in seven EU member states: France, Germany, Austria, Portugal, Spain, Greece and Italy. It is the only existing dataset which includes measures of both perceptions of EU responsibility as an attribution of responsibility and as external constraints as they are perceived at the individual level in a comparative setting. In addition, the 2014 European elections are the first European contests to take place after the European sovereign debt crisis, thus providing an important case study to see how perceptions of EU responsibility can affect electoral behaviour. This dataset is thereby instrumental to look for the independent effects of different perceptions of EU responsibility and their effects on electoral participation. Furthermore, the dataset includes questions on turnout in national and European elections and questions capturing beliefs toward the act of voting.

Our analysis shows that perceptions of EU responsibility have different effects on electoral participation and beliefs toward the act of voting depending on how the EU is perceived and thus conceptualized. First, perceiving the EU as being in charge – attribution of responsibility – depresses turnout, but does not alter beliefs toward voting. Specifically,

perceiving the EU to be responsible has a negative effect on turnout in national elections but also in European elections, in contrast to what the second order model might suggest (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif et al., 1997)². Second, we show that perceiving the EU as a constraint on government increases permissiveness toward abstention, and depresses participation at the European level, but does not affect turnout at the national level. This suggests that perceptions of EU responsibility matter to understand the inclination to cast a ballot and beliefs in the value of voting.

The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the different conceptualizations of EU responsibility, and we build our hypotheses on how perceptions of EU responsibility impact turnout in both EU and national elections and beliefs in the value of voting. In the next section, we present the data and the empirical strategy. The fifth section is dedicated to our models and the results. The final section discusses the results.

Perceiving the EU as Being in Charge or as A Constraint on National Government: Differential Effects of EU Responsibility on Electoral Participation

In this article, we focus on two conceptualizations of EU responsibility that are prominent in the literature: European integration as a process of transfer of authority and/or European integration as a constraint on governments' autonomous decision-making.

First, the policy making in the multilevel EU has increased so much in the last decades that it has many traits in common with a federal state. Thus, many studies conceive the EU as a process of transfer of authority (Hooghe and Marks, 2003, 2016). This conceptualization is common in EU studies and depicts European integration as a process where national governments delegate competences to supranational authorities. They do so in a voluntary

² That said, it is worth noting that Reif (1990) also predicted the long-term negative behavioural consequences of the second-order elections on voters.

fashion because they believe that this delegation of power will be beneficial to them, whether materially or symbolically. In this framework, a burgeoning strand of literature has recently argued that this conceptualization of EU responsibility can affect electoral behaviour. The question of how voters attribute responsibility to the EU is here key (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014; Wilson and Hobolt, 2015). Most notably, studies have shown that perceptions of EU responsibility are likely to moderate government accountability at the national level (Costa-Lobo and Lewis-Beck, 2012; Hobolt and Tilley, 2014; Le Gall, 2018) or at the European level (Page, 2016; Magni-Berton et al., 2021), but fewer studies have investigated the effects if these perceptions on electoral participation.

Yet, the (relative) scope of responsibilities allocated to a given level of government can arguably moderate individual electoral participation³. Indeed, the rational choice model of voting contends that voters do not mobilize equally in different elections because the benefits associated with voting are not identical between elections. Specifically, benefits associated with voting increase when the stakes of an election are higher, eventually fostering real turnout (Lefevere and Van Aelst, 2014). In turn, many studies make the difference between “first-order” and “second-order” elections. According to this approach, there is a hierarchy between electoral contests and benefits from voting depend on the character of the election (Franklin, 2001, 2004). Classically, national elections attract more voters because there is more at stake in these elections, eventually increasing perceived benefits of voting. In contrast, European and local elections are second-order contests where voters have fewer incentives to cast a ballot because they appear to have less importance on future outcomes. Following this logic, electoral

³ We are well aware that numerous comparative studies have shown the complex institutional structures that blur the lines of responsibility make it difficult for citizens to hold government account (e.g. De Vries, Edwards, & Tillman, 2011). However, following work of Wilson and Hobolt who demonstrate that, highly politicized environments result in more correct allocations of responsibility (2015). Moreover, Hobolt and Tilley have also demonstrated that citizens’ attribution of responsibility corresponds to the institutional context (2014). Finally, when it comes to our hypotheses, correct attribution of responsibility does not really matter for the mechanism that we would like to explore. Rather what matters is the perception that the EU is responsible that will be key for our argument.

participation is expected to decrease at the level where power is lost, while participation should increase where power is gained. At the individual level, perceptions of responsibility understood as attribution of responsibility are thus important drivers of individual electoral participation.

Empirically, there is large evidence that voters participate less in second-order contests such as local, regional and European elections than in first-order contests such as national elections. In fact, many aggregate-level studies indicate that differential turnout in European elections and in national elections is linked to the stakes of the elections since the seminal work of Reif and Schmitt (1980) at different points in time (Reif and Schmitt, 1997; Marsh 1998, Hix and Marsh 2007, 2011) and in different countries (Schmitt and Teperoglou, 2015; Schmitt & Toygür, 2016). Focusing on the Dutch case, Lefevere and Van Aelst (2014) further confirm the ‘less at stake’ argument of the second-order model at the aggregate-level, but provide only limited support to the ‘less at stake’ argument at the individual level. To our knowledge, there is, however, no study, which investigates how the perception of the EU as being in charge – attribution of responsibility – affect individual turnout in both national and EU elections.

A second conceptualization characterizes EU responsibility as a process which constrains the authority of parliaments and national governments. Indeed, European integration entails many elements of a process of negative integration where the building of a single market has prevailed (Jabko 2006). In some cases, even, European integration is described as an intense case of globalization (Scharpf, 2002; Ward et al., 2015). Under this conceptualization, European integration has the potential to limit the room to manoeuvre of decision-makers, possibly resulting in ‘democracy without choice’ (Sanchez-Cuenca, 2017). As stated by Mair himself, ‘responsibility involves an acceptance that, in certain areas and in certain procedures, the leaders’ hands will be tied’ (Mair, 2013: 158).

In this strand of literature which views the EU as a constraint, scholars have made a number of plausible – and yet opposing – arguments about the way in which constraints should shape citizens’ electoral participation. Indeed, there is little agreement and insights at the theoretical level as to how precisely constraints shape electoral participation. A first approach sees citizens as sophisticated actors and predicts that constraints will decrease turnout by lowering the perceived benefits derived from the act of voting. Here, the rationale is straightforward: if elected officials lack political efficacy to make policy decisions due to the constraints they are facing, then voters will have less incentives to participate in elections because their ballots will have a lower likelihood to contribute to change, all else held constant. More importantly, this approach also argues that EU constraints ultimately undermines citizens’ beliefs in the value of voting across the board – and does not only reduce the inclination to vote in a specific election (Dassoneville et al., 2021; but see: Devine, 2021).

Empirically, this negative relationship between international economic integration and electoral participation has been confirmed at the aggregate level (Steiner, 2010; Marshall and Fisher, 2015), but less so at the individual level (Steiner, 2016; Le Gall, 2018). Interestingly, this association between external constraints, governments’ political efficacy and turnout has also been accounted for in the literature dealing with the 2007 sovereign debt crisis. First, an important bulk of studies show that EU intervention negatively impacted voter attitudes towards the EU and satisfaction with democracy (Armingeon and Guthmann, 2014; Ruiz-Rufino and Alonso, 2017; Schraff and Schimmelfennig, 2019). Additionally, Häusermann et al. (2018) indicated that constraints derived from the crisis decreased electoral participation out of frustration and/or calculation, even in the case of the highly educated who anticipated the loss of national governments’ political efficacy. Finally, Turnbull-Dugarte (2020) recently demonstrated that the intervention of the EU in several member states also reduced electoral participation.

In contrast, an alternative approach could be drawn from Rodrik's trilemma, which holds that one State cannot simultaneously pursue democracy, national determination and economic integration because pursuing any two of these political goods precludes maintaining the third (Rodrik, 2011). Considering citizens as sophisticated actors, two complementary hypotheses can be derived from this. First, the loss of national governments' autonomy under EU responsibility could lead citizens to vote more at the European level in order to influence decision-making. Following Rodrik's argument, citizens could consider that the only way to affect policies in this context of constraining integration is to have decision-making at the European level and give up on national self-determination; thereby, fostering participation at European elections. This echoes Habermas argument that:

'the more the national populations realize, and the media help them to realize, how profoundly the decisions of the European Union pervade their daily lives, the more their interest in making use of their democratic rights also as EU citizens will increase ... Thus, the logic of this development would imply that national citizens ... would also want to exercise democratic influence in their role as EU citizens over what their heads of government negotiate or agree upon in a legal grey area' (Habermas 2012: 49-50, emphasis in original).

Conversely, and following the national determination argument, another alternative hypothesis is to consider that constraints on national government by EU responsibility should lead citizens to take back control by participating at the national level. At the individual level, there is a common and straightforward mechanism, however: perceptions of constraints faced by governments drive up individual electoral participation. Thus, regardless of the theoretically expected outcomes, beliefs in the value of voting remain intact in these approaches, as in the

theoretical argument on the EU as a transfer of authority. Overall, these different bodies of scholarship indicate that perceptions of EU responsibility should affect citizens' electoral participation. Yet, the predicted impacts for different elections and the underlying mechanisms differ.

Theoretical expectations and hypotheses

To advance our understanding of how perceptions of EU responsibility shape electoral participation, we do not favour one conceptualization of European integration over another. Indeed, this article does not theoretically take a stance on whether the EU responsibility should be conceptualized primarily as a transfer of authority and thus of attribution of responsibility or as a constraint, but rather explores a different possibility: namely, that both arguments contain a kernel of truth.

Our analysis focuses on individual perceptions of EU responsibility because we believe that subjective measures are arguably as likely to drive individual choices than aggregate indicators. In this regard, we build on previous qualitative studies of citizens' reactions to European integration which indicate that the impacts of EU integration on political behaviour are shaped by how the EU is framed as a political object and by which dimensions are discussed in political discourses (Baglioni and Hurrelmann, 2016; Medrano, 2005; Van Ingelgom, 2014; White 2011). Besides, we focus on perceptions rather than aggregate indicators, because the latter are more likely to lead to methodological problems of observational equivalence and ecological fallacy, hence limiting the generalizability of the results (Hobolt and Wittrock, 2011). To craft our hypotheses, we build on above-mentioned strands of scholarship's theoretical elaboration and we also combine an analysis of electoral participation, i.e. at the

national and European elections, with an analysis of beliefs toward the act of voting (permissiveness towards abstention) to gain additional analytical leverage.

First, citizens are expected to consider their vote to be less important in second-order contests than in first order elections if they perceive the EU as a process which transfers responsibility between levels of government (Reif and Schmitt 1980, 1997; Marsh 1998, Hix and Marsh 2007, 2011; Lefevere and Van Aelst, 2014; Schmitt and Teperoglou, 2015; Schmitt & Toygür, 2016). Here, attribution of responsibility to the European and national levels of government is the key individual-level mechanism as competences gained or lost at one level relative to the other level define the stakes of individual electoral participation at each level. Specifically, if the national level is perceived as more responsible relatively to the EU level, we expect citizens to participate less in European elections than in national elections. On the contrary, if the EU level is perceived as more responsible than the national level, we expect citizens to participate more in European elections than in national elections. We thereby hypothesize that:

H1a ('being in charge' hypothesis): *The less responsible a citizen considers a level of government relative to the other, the less likely it is that she will turn out to vote at that level.*

That said, citizens' perceptions of the EU as being in charge should not alter beliefs toward the act of voting. Indeed, attribution of responsibility only pertains to a change in the locus of power, and theoretically bears no consequence on the meaningfulness of voting. Our second hypothesis thereby is that:

H1b ('attribution of responsibility' hypothesis): *Relative responsibility attribution has no impact on citizens' attitudes towards abstention.*

In contrast, the literature on European integration as a process of negative integration predicts that perceptions of constraints stemming from EU responsibility will weaken the idea that elections matter as in globalization studies (Steiner, 2016). The argument is that EU responsibility, viewed as a limit the autonomy of national governments, can affect how citizens view elections as a mechanism of policy change, eventually lowering the belief that elections matter. Here, the key individual-level mechanism is the perceived constraint faced by governments. Following, we hypothesize that:

H2a ('EU responsibility as a constraint' hypothesis): *The more a citizen believes that her government's decision-making is constrained by EU responsibility, the more prone she will be to develop permissive attitudes towards abstention.*

In turn, perceived constraints stemming from EU responsibility should depress turnout in all electoral contests. Indeed, citizens should not only care less about the value of casting a ballot, but they should also turn out less (Steiner, 2010, 2016; Le Gall, 2018; Turnbull-Dugarte, 2020). Thus, our last hypothesis is the following:

H2b ('EU responsibility as a constraint' hypothesis): *The more a citizen believes that her government's autonomous decision-making is constrained by EU integration, the less prone she will be to participate in elections both at the EU and the national level.*

Finally, an alternative approach based on Rodrik (2011) could be summarized by two complementary hypotheses. First, the loss of national governments' autonomy could incentivize citizens to vote more at the European level in order to influence policy decisions. Second, and following the national determination argument, perceiving that governments have less leeway could lead to a growing participation at the national level as a way to take control back.

H3a ('trilemma' hypothesis): *The more a citizen believes that her government's autonomy is constrained by EU responsibility, the more prone she will be to participate in elections to take back control either at the national or the European level.*

In these cases, however, the beliefs in value of voting remains intact as in the case for the transfer of authority hypothesis leading us to formulate a similar hypothesis to hypothesis H1b:

H3b ('trilemma' hypothesis): *A citizen's perception of economic constraint has no impact on her attitudes towards abstention.*

Table 1 summarizes our expectations based on both conceptualizations of EU responsibility. What is key in our demonstration is beliefs in the value of voting. Citizens who perceive that EU responsibility is a constrain on governments should be less prone to view electoral participation as an important act. In contrast, attitudes toward the act of voting should not be affected if they perceive European integration is a transfer of authority between levels of government or if they perceive the EU as a constraint and elections as a way to take control back – at one level or the other.

Table 1. Overview of theoretical expectations and relationships between perceptions of EU responsibility, turnout and attitudes towards abstention

The EU as ...	Individual mechanism at play	Turnout in national elections	Turnout in European elections	Beliefs in the value of voting
Being in charge	Attribution of EU responsibility	Decreases turnout (H1a)	Increases turnout (H1a)	No impact expected (H1b)
Constraining governments' autonomous decision-making	EU responsibility as a constrain – constraint expectations	Decreases turnout (H2b)	Decreases turnout (H2b)	Increases permissiveness toward abstention (H2a)
	EU responsibility as a constrain – trilemma expectations	Increases turnout (H3a)	Increases turnout (H3a)	No impact expected (H3b)

Data and empirical strategy

To investigate the effects of citizens' perceptions of EU responsibility – as being in charge (attribution of responsibility) or as a constraint – on electoral participation in national and EU elections, we rely on original dataset, the CED-EU14. The CED-EU14 is a post-electoral survey conducted through Internet in the days following the 2014 European elections (Sauger et al., 2015). Interestingly, these elections are conveniently timed after countries had experienced interventions and, in the case of Greece, were due to leave conditionality and constitutes a good case study especially in line of the findings of Ruiz-Rufino and Alonso (2017) who showed that interventions in Southern European countries and Ireland marked a 'learning process', where citizens in those countries updated their beliefs about their government's autonomy. The study includes seven countries with national representative samples of 4000 people in Austria, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, and 1000 people in Greece and Portugal (Sauger et al., 2015). Overall, 22.072 individuals responded to this questionnaire. In each country, the target

population is citizens aged 18 or above (16 in Austria). Specifically, samples have been drawn from existing online panels by TNS-SOFRES randomly chosen with a simple stratification by region. In this framework, quotas on sex, age, and social status have also been imposed to enhance the representativeness of the survey. At this point, it is worth noting that we choose this dataset because this is the only existing dataset which includes questions regarding individual perceptions of EU responsibility, alongside questions on perceptions of constraints and on beliefs in the value of voting, ultimately providing the first possibility to test these multiple theoretical mechanisms.

Dependent variables: turnout and permissiveness toward abstention

We use three items that measure turnout and permissiveness toward abstention. The first two are traditional measures of electoral turnout. Respondents are asked about their reported participation in their country's last general election and in the 2014 European elections. The variables are binary where 1 corresponds to respondents who declare that they voted in the last general election (respectively, European election), while 0 gathers respondents who declare they did not vote in the last general election (respectively, last European elections). Note that the value 0 gathers respondents who declare they did not vote; thought about voting but didn't; and usually vote but didn't this time. The results to both questions have to be taken with caution for multiple reasons. Most notably, vote reports face problems of over-reporting of voter participation. In our sample, the average reported turnout in general elections is 86.75%, while the official turnout equals 70.1%⁴. The difference between real and reported turnouts might stem from individuals giving wrong information, through a mechanism of social desirability, and sample selection effects, but also from the fact that general elections did not take place in the same year, eventually hindering comparison across countries. That being said, we are

⁴ Official turnout rates are extracted via <https://elections-en-europe.net/resultats/>

interested in the links between perceptions of responsibility and constraints and turnout, rather than in the effects of objective constraints or transfers of authority on the vote. Therefore, we believe that this overestimation is not a major problem.

To strengthen our empirical analysis and to disentangle between the two mechanisms possibly at play, we rely on an additional item that asks respondents about their opinions on the act of (non-) voting. Specifically, we use a question that captures the general permissiveness toward the act of (non-) voting. The question is worded as follows “*In a democracy, people should have the right to vote, but also the right to abstain.*” Original values range from 1 (fully disagree) to 11 (fully agree). Using this variable helps distinguishing between the two strands of the literature and their respective theoretical expectations (see *Table 1*).

Independent variables: responsibility attributions and perceived constraints

Our main objective is to analyse the effects of citizens’ perceptions of EU responsibility on electoral participation. Traditionally, the literature uses aggregate level data such as the degree of integration within world markets or the level of clarity of responsibility to measure attribution of responsibility and/or constraints (Hellwig, 2014; Hobolt et al. 2013; Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck 2017). Sometimes, research also relies on external events such as the Eurozone crisis to capture such constraints (Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino, 2017; Häusermann et al., 2018; Turnbull-Dugarte, 2020) or on the evolution of EU integration over time (Dassonneville et al., 2021). Instead, we rely on individual perceptions to study the effects of EU integration on turnout, following a burgeoning strand of literature (Costa-Lobo and Lewis-Beck, 2012; Le Gall, 2018; Devine, 2021; Le Gall and Devine, 2021).

Specifically, we use two questions, which are formulated as statements, to measure *relative responsibility attributions* and *constraints stemming from the EU*. First, we take advantage of an original question measuring perceptions of relative responsibility attributions

on different issues, including unemployment, taxation, debts and deficits, climate change and immigration. Specifically, the question confronts the perceived responsibility of national governments with the responsibility of the EU on a same scale where 1 means full responsibility of the national government and where 11 means full responsibility of the EU⁵. Note that this item differs from traditional questions of attributions of responsibility, which measure perceptions of governments' responsibility independently (Hellwig et al., 2008, Hobolt and Tilley, 2014a). Although they have their merits, a number of authors (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014b, Page, 2016, Devine, 2021) recently favoured the use of *relative responsibility attributions* to override problems of extrapolation from attitudes toward their national system to the European level, which are common (Harteveld et al. 2013). Thanks to the CED dataset, we can assess, for the first time, the relative responsibility attribution between the domestic government and European Union directly in a single question.

Second, we also use an original question that asks respondents about their perceptions of the effects of the European Union on domestic policymaking, which is worded as follows: “*Most of the important decisions in [country] are imposed by the European Union.*” Values range from 1 (fully disagree) to 11 (fully agree). As of now, studies analysing the effects of the loss of autonomy of national governments on political behaviour mainly use (relative) responsibility attributions (e.g. Costa-Lobo and Lewis-Beck, 2012; Devine, 2021). In fact, there exists no study, which has ever used perceived EU constraints directly. The constraints' dimension is however fundamental in our analysis, given that we aim at assessing the different perceptions of European integration. Not unlike responsibility attributions to the EU, this question can however be subject to what Hobolt and Tilley (2014b) label group-serving bias. Indeed, one theoretical concern that can be raised is that the core independent variable (EU

⁵ Q2. As of today, do you think that the same following issues are mainly dealt with by national or European authorities? Using this scale, what number best describes your opinion. 0 The [country] government has full responsibility 10 The EU authorities have full responsibility. a. Unemployment / b. The tax burden / c. Public debts and deficits / d. Immigration / e. Climate change.

constraints) might be capturing a latent Euroscepticism. Table 2 shows that these variables can however be distinguished.

Table 2. Spearman correlations between perceptions of constraints and attitudes towards the EU

	EC	EUI	ERT
EU Constraint (EC)	1.0000		
EU Integration (EUI)	-0.1122	1.0000	
EU Resp. Tax (ERT)	-0.1407	0.2996	1.0000

Control variables

Following studies on turnout (for instance, see: Blais, 2006; Blais and Daoust, 2020), we include several individual-level determinants to control for alternative explanations of turnout. Specifically, we add variables grasping attitudes and judgments that affect individual motivation (Söderlund et al., 2011; Smets and Van Ham, 2013; Blais and Daoust, 2020), along with sociodemographic controls that lead someone to vote or abstain based on the resource model (Brady et al., 1995).

First, we use two variables, which capture voters' motivations to participate in elections: political interest and civic duty. According to Blais and Daoust (2020), political interest acts as a strong and enduring predisposition that enhances the likelihood to participate based on the simple idea that those who like politics will be more prone to participate than those who dislike politics. In addition, the sense of civic duty also constitutes a strong predisposition for voters to participate in politics. Specifically, it is argued that the collective norm that voting is a moral obligation in a democratic society arguably motivates citizens to participate in politics⁶.

Based on the resource model (Brady et al., 1995), we also include sociodemographic controls such as education, age and income because they provide resources likely to enhance the probability to participate in politics. First, education arguably develops the civic and knowledge skills that foster political participation in general, and the inclination to vote in

⁶ Please note that we exclude civic duty from the analysis of the attitudes towards the right to abstain because they are highly correlated (Spearman's rho = -0.3113).

particular (Tenn, 2007). In addition, high-income citizens are more prone to vote because they have lower costs associated with voting and are generally better informed about the benefit of voting (Matsubayashia and Sakaiya, 2020).

Furthermore, age also significantly affects the inclination to vote. Specifically, the curvilinear impact of age on turnout predicts a low level of turnout during early adult life; a growing mobilization among middle-aged voters and a decline with old age. Moreover, we also add gender as a control. We do so because women long voted less than men, even though the gap is shrinking, because of social norms, structural and situational factors, or women's late enfranchisement.

Finally, we also include variables grasping support for EU integration, because those attitudes act as group-serving biases and shape attributions of responsibility in the EU (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014), while they also enhance the probability to vote in EU elections (de Vries et al., 2011).

Empirical strategy

As our theoretical contribution starts from the consideration that citizens' perceptions about EU responsibility are key mechanisms at the individual level, we need first to verify that citizens discriminate empirically between the two perceptions of responsibility. Thus, we first check for collinearity between variables measuring perceived responsibility attributions and perceived constraints. Most importantly, we run multiple regressions to assess the effects of our main independent variables on electoral participation and opinions toward the right to abstain. To ease interpretation, we display the results of the estimations of OLS regressions, but logistic and order-logistic regressions are also included in the appendix (see table 4). Also, note that the structure of the data is non-random because voters are nested in countries. To control for this non-random effect, we include country fixed effects in the models at the exception of multilevel

regressions. Additionally, we also include multilevel regressions in the appendix (table 5) based on the assumption that multilevel models can be ran, even in small-n settings (Stegmueller, 2013).

Results

First, we need to test whether perceptions of as being in charge or as a constraint on national governments capture (or not) the same latent dimension. In order to do so, we look at correlation between responsibility attribution and perceived EU constraints (see Table 3).

Table 3. Spearman correlations between EU responsibility attribution and perceived EU constraints

	EUC	EURD	EURU	EURT	EURI	EURC
EU Constraint (EUC)	1.0000					
EU Resp. Debt (EURD)	0.1026	1.0000				
EU Resp. Unemployment (EURU)	0.0852	0.6487	1.0000			
EU Resp. Tax (EURT)	0.1037	0.7388	0.7364	1.0000		
EU Resp. Immigration (EURI)	0.0623	0.4282	0.4510	0.4202	1.0000	
EU Resp. Climate (EURC)	0.0080	0.0690	0.0967	0.0061	0.2659	1.0000

These first analyses indicate that the degree to which perceived EU responsibility and perceived constraints are linearly related is not substantive, although the relationship is positive. Indeed, table 3 indicates that the spearman correlations do not exceed $\rho = 0.1037$ (in the case of taxation) with the minimal correlation reaching $\rho = 0.0080$ (in the case of climate). This is an important result, not only because distinct perceptions are key to our study, but also because these two perceptions often go hand in hand in the literature. For example, transferring authority to create the single market arguably decreases the economic autonomy of national governments. In contrast, it is worth noting that responsibility attributions are, however, highly correlated. Not surprisingly, items measuring attribution of responsibility are closely related to each other: for instance, the Spearman correlation coefficient between perceived EU responsibility over debts and taxation is positive and reaches 0.7388. Generally, when perceived responsibility of

the EU increases in one policy area, it increases significantly in another area at the noticeable exception of perceived EU responsibility over climate, which is not closely related to debts, taxation and unemployment.

Now that we have established that perceptions of constraints are not highly correlated with the attribution of responsibility, Table 4 presents the models, which estimate the effects of individual responsibility attributions and perceived constraints from the European Union on electoral participation and on attitudes towards voting.

Table 4. Effects of perceived EU constraints and perceived EU responsibility on electoral participation and permissiveness toward abstention (OLS regressions)

	Participation in Nat. elections	Participation in EU elections	Abstention as a right
EU constraints	0.00118 (0.000996)	-0.00355*** (0.00129)	0.0980*** (0.00889)
EU responsibility Debts	-0.00300*** (0.000790)	-0.00361*** (0.00102)	0.00272 (0.00710)
EU responsibility Immigration	-0.00157* (0.000900)	-0.00131 (0.00117)	-0.00893 (0.00807)
EU responsibility Climate	0.00360*** (0.000939)	-0.000811 (0.00122)	0.0443*** (0.00836)
EU integration	-0.000552 (0.000886)	0.00376*** (0.00115)	0.00609 (0.00794)
Duty	0.103*** (0.00505)	0.227*** (0.00655)	
Political interest	0.0157*** (0.000969)	0.0319*** (0.00125)	-0.0908*** (0.00845)
Government record	-0.000318 (0.000969)	-0.000615 (0.00126)	-0.0408*** (0.00864)
Education	0.00495*** (0.00162)	0.0135*** (0.00210)	0.0102 (0.0145)
Income	0.00940*** (0.00102)	0.00952*** (0.00132)	-0.00846 (0.00909)
Male	-0.00879* (0.00494)	-0.00666 (0.00640)	0.0926** (0.0441)
Age	0.0306*** (0.00254)	0.0428*** (0.00323)	0.123*** (0.0221)
Germany	-0.0273*** (0.00843)	0.0916*** (0.0110)	0.812*** (0.0741)
Italy	-0.0457*** (0.00819)	0.119*** (0.0107)	0.800*** (0.0729)
Spain	-0.0332***	0.0555***	1.396***

	(0.00819)	(0.0107)	(0.0728)
Austria	0.000791	0.0623***	0.526***
	(0.00865)	(0.0113)	(0.0763)
Greece	-0.0976***	0.239***	0.503***
	(0.0154)	(0.0183)	(0.125)
Portugal	-0.0461***	-0.00986	0.570***
	(0.0135)	(0.0178)	(0.122)
Constant	0.608***	0.158***	5.550***
	(0.0155)	(0.0200)	(0.135)
Observations	16,609	17,352	18,306
R-squared	0.087	0.163	0.039

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Models first suggest that sense of civic duty and political interest strongly affect the inclination to cast a ballot in national and European elections in line with the literature on the motivations to vote (Blais and Daoust, 2020), which shows that politically interested and those with a sense of civic duty tend to show up more in both elections. Second, we also find a strong evidence supporting the resource model (Brady et al., 1995). Indeed, we also find that the wealthiest, the oldest and the most educated tend to (declare that they) participate more in elections. Consistent with these results, political interest is also negatively associated with the belief that abstention is also a right. In contrast with estimations on electoral participation, we find, however, that no effects of education and income on beliefs that there is a right to abstain. Interestingly, only age increases permissiveness toward abstention with the effect being statistically significant. Overall, resources seem to play a role only on voting, while underlying motivations appear to affect both participation and attitudes toward voting. Finally, estimations also concur with the idea that EU attitudes affect turnout, but only in the case of EU elections (de Vries et al., 2011).

Turning to our hypotheses, our estimations first indicate that attribution of responsibility over debts and deficits (and to a lesser extent, over immigration) increase the likelihood to (declare to) abstain in both national and EU elections, eventually leaning toward H1a. Indeed, when perceived EU responsibility over debts and deficits increases by 1 unit, the likelihood to participate in national elections decreases, in average, by 0.003 units with the effect being

statistically significant. Interestingly, we find a reverse direction when looking at climate change. In this case, a higher perception of EU responsibility leads to more electoral participation in general elections. In addition, citizens who perceive the EU to be responsible over all policies (at the exception of climate, once again) are less prone to report to have shown up at the European ballot box. Thus, H1a is only supported partially. In fact, this goes against the traditional idea, which predicts that competences gained at one level will systematically foster turnout at this same level.

In contrast, we find a depressive impact of responsibility attributions to the EU in EU elections. In addition, we find no significant effect of responsibility attributions to the EU on permissiveness towards abstention, at the exception of climate change, leading credence toward H1b. Indeed, the sign associated with EU responsibility is generally positive but does not reach the threshold of significance at $p < 0.01$. In fact, those who perceive the EU to be responsible over climate change are the only ones to be more permissive toward abstention. Overall, the first models suggest that individual perceptions of responsibility across levels of governments affect electoral participation, but not attitudes toward voting.

Note that additional estimations further corroborate these results. First, Figure 1 presents models, which include individual measures of attribution of responsibility. These models indicate that perceptions of responsibility attributions negatively affect electoral participation in both EP and national elections, at the noticeable exception of climate once again. Moreover, ordered-logistic regressions and multilevel estimations also confirm results presented in table 1 (see Appendix), eventually lending credence to our mixed results.




Figure 1. Effects of responsibility attributions on turnout and permissiveness toward abstention. The blue dot corresponds to turnout in general elections; the red dot corresponds to turnout in EU elections; the green dot corresponds to the right to abstain.

Second, our estimations indicate that the EU responsibility perceived as an imposition of constraints fosters permissiveness towards abstention. Indeed, the association between attitudes towards abstention and perception of constraints stemming from the EU are positive with the threshold of significance reaching $p < 0.01$. Specifically, when perceived EU constraints increases by 1 unit, the belief that abstaining is also a right increases, in average, by 0.09 units. This finding first lends credence to the literature, which indicates that perceived constraints decrease the meaningfulness of elections (Steiner, 2016). Interestingly, we do not confirm results from past studies which show that perceptions of (objective or perceived) constraints diminish the likelihood to cast a ballot in national elections (Steiner, 2010, 2016) since the coefficients associated with perceptions of constraints stemming the EU responsibility do not reach threshold of statistical significance. However, we find a negative association between perceived EU constraints and the likelihood to report to have voted in EU elections. Indeed, when perceived EU constraints increases by 1 unit, the belief that abstention is a right decreases,

in average, by 0.003 units. These results clearly rule out H3b and the optimistic perspective on constraints' effects, but provides some support (although incomplete) for the pessimistic constraint hypothesis (H2a).

Additionally, we perform a final robustness check to control for the effects of perceptions of globalization, conceptualized as a process of constraints, on our dependent variables. We do so to further check whether perceptions of external constraints only affect beliefs toward abstention, but not electoral participation. In this framework, we use a question, which is worded as follows: “*Globalization decreases a lot the power of national governments*” on which respondents have to take position. Original values range from 1 (fully disagree) to 11 (fully agree). Through this question, we are able to investigate the effects of perceived constraints on electoral participation. Similar to Figure 1, Figure 2 presents the results of a full model with variables measuring perceived constraints from globalization.




Figure 2. Effects of Globalization constraints on turnout and permissiveness toward abstention (OLS regressions)

Our estimations confirm that globalization constraints enhance permissiveness towards abstention. Indeed, the association between attitudes towards abstention is negatively associated with perceived globalization constraints with the threshold of significance reaching $p < 0.01$. Once again, citizens who perceive constraints from globalization in this case tend to vote less in European parliamentary elections, while we find no effects on turnout in national elections. Finally, no changes appear regarding the association between responsibility attributions and turnout when adding perceptions of globalization constraints, thereby supporting prior results.

Discussion and conclusion

Although EU responsibility has gained prominence in recent years, as a political phenomenon and in political discourses, it has until recently been largely neglected in the literature on turnout. Yet, two streams of literature have addressed this issue, in different subfields of political science though, based on two distinct conceptualizations of the EU responsibility. Distinct individual-level mechanisms are at play, whereby attribution of responsibility or the perception of constraints on governments' autonomous decision-making drive electoral behaviours and attitudes.

This article takes a step towards bridging these two strands of the literature and offers a first comprehensive analysis of how EU responsibility influences electoral participation at the individual level. In order to do so, we did not take a stand on which conceptualization was the right one, either on normative or analytical grounds. Instead, we investigated how European citizens perceive the EU as being in charge or as a constraint on national government and tested how these perceptions of EU responsibility impacted on their electoral participation. We showed that both perceptions affect the act of casting a ballot at the individual level. However,

the effects are different in terms of observed impact on electoral participation at general and European elections and on permissive attitudes towards abstention.

Specifically, our results indicate that EU perceived as being in charge – attribution of responsibility – does not affect attitudes towards the act of voting but depresses electoral participation in EU and national elections. Surprisingly, the more citizens perceive the EU to be responsible, the less likely they are to participate in European elections. In that sense, European integration, perceived as a transfer of authority to the EU, is not a zero-sum game. While we did not test directly for this effect, this result could support the argument that the EU is blurring the line of responsibility (Park et al., 2018). In addition, we find that EU responsibility perceived as a constraint fosters permissive attitudes toward voting: the more a citizen believes her government to be constrained by European integration – or by globalization –, the more prone she is to develop permissive attitudes towards abstention. EU responsibility perceived as a constraint also affects negatively turnout, but only in European elections. This is unexpected as the previous studies tend to show that external constraints put upon national governments decrease turnout in national contests at the aggregate level (Steiner, 2010; Steiner and Martin, 2012); at the individual level (Steiner, 2016), and following external intervention (Turnbull-Dugarte, 2020).

Overall, this paper brings grim evidence to the debate on the growing EU responsibility as well as on the state of democracy in the EU in general. Its results illuminate that regardless of whether citizens perceive the EU as being in charge or as a constraint, they will not participate more in EP elections. In addition, perceptions of constraints stemming from European integration reinforce permissive attitudes towards abstention and abstention at the EU level – leading to reject an optimistic perspective on how constraints on governments' autonomous decision-making impact democratic participation. Analyses of the outcomes of EU constraints should thereby include not only the limits put on member states' autonomous

decision making, but also the undermining impacts on European citizens' electoral participation and attitudes toward voting. Thus, if democratic detachment is by no means restricted to EU-level politics, our results demonstrate that perceiving EU responsibility plays a role in it, both at national and European levels. Here, the glass is certainly half-empty.

Besides, our results lend support to previous qualitative studies of citizens' reactions to European integration which emphasized that EU integration's impacts are shaped by how the EU is framed as a political object and what dimensions of European integration are emphasized and discussed in political discourses (Baglioni and Hurrelmann, 2016; Medrano, 2005; Van Ingelgom, 2014; White 2011). In addition, our study brings additional empirical evidence on the fact that the broader politicization of European integration has not resulted in the increased political engagement of EU citizens. European citizens do perceive the role played by the EU as they are able to distinguish between its responsibility in different policy areas and its potential to constraint their national government. However, these perceptions are conducive neither to a higher electoral participation nor to stronger norms of participation contradicting Habermas' vision of the glass being half full as citizens' willingness to exercise democratic influence in their role of EU citizens doesn't seem to be happening (2012).

In addition, this paper contributes to the democratic detachment thesis according to which citizen detachment from national democracy is also due to the external constraints imposed by the EU on national autonomy (Schraff and Schimmelfennig, 2019; Turnbull-Dugarte, 2020). In the absence of meaningful autonomous decision making, the function of voting to hold government accountable and initiate policy change is undermined, which raises fundamental questions about the democratic legitimacy of the EU and the impact of European integration on citizens' democratic attitudes. As shown elsewhere, the perceived lack of political agency is a common feature of citizens' perceptions and the ensuing political fatalism poses a challenge for political authority at both the national and the European level (Delmotte

et al., 2017; Duchesne et al., 2013; Van Ingelgom, 2014; White, 2010, 2011). Our robustness checks have demonstrated that European integration could indeed be considered as an intense case of globalisation, thereby echoing previous works that demonstrate that citizens' indifference toward European integration can be explained notably by the fact that national framings of the European integration process tends to drown it in globalization.

Last, our results speak to the ongoing debates on the differentiated politicization of European integration (de Wilde *et al.* 2016; Palonen *et al.*, 2019). Suggesting that the rise of politicisation of European integration is primarily a reaction to the increasing authority of the EU (de Wilde and Zürn, 2012) simply overlooks how the EU is actually politically framed (Dupuy and Van Ingelgom, 2019). The growing authority of the EU seem not to have engaged Europeans in their role of EU citizens. The perception of EU constraints has even weakened their beliefs in their role as voters whereas the EU attribution of responsibility seems to have detached European from their role as national citizens. Considering processes of depoliticization is also fundamental in order to understand why the glass is still half-empty (Hay, Wood and Flinders, 2014).

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Appendix

Table 4. Effects of perceived EU constraints and perceived EU responsibility on electoral participation and permissiveness toward abstention (Logistic and Ordered logistic regressions)

	Participation in Nat. elections	Participation in EU elections	Abstention as a right
EU constraints	0.00780 (0.0104)	-0.0221*** (0.00773)	0.0752*** (0.00571)
EU responsibility Debts	-0.0344*** (0.00841)	-0.0211*** (0.00617)	-0.00422 (0.00445)
EU responsibility Immigration	-0.0179* (0.00971)	-0.00887 (0.00706)	-0.00394 (0.00508)
EU responsibility Climate	0.0347*** (0.00976)	-0.00332 (0.00726)	0.0311*** (0.00526)
EU integration	-0.00199 (0.00962)	0.0247*** (0.00701)	0.00112 (0.00506)
Duty	1.181*** (0.0601)	1.354*** (0.0416)	
Political interest	0.149*** (0.00964)	0.172*** (0.00726)	-0.0555*** (0.00536)
Government record	-0.0120 (0.0103)	-0.00347 (0.00763)	-0.0467*** (0.00539)
Education	0.0567*** (0.0176)	0.0831*** (0.0127)	0.00274 (0.00881)
Income	0.102*** (0.0109)	0.0560*** (0.00782)	-0.00654 (0.00553)
Male	-0.0606 (0.0517)	-0.0237 (0.0381)	0.0726*** (0.0268)
Age	0.305*** (0.0253)	0.250*** (0.0188)	0.101*** (0.0133)
Germany	-0.378*** (0.0980)	0.580*** (0.0649)	0.523*** (0.0450)
Italy	-0.628*** (0.0955)	0.730*** (0.0650)	0.511*** (0.0441)
Spain	-0.484*** (0.0953)	0.352*** (0.0624)	0.835*** (0.0443)
Austria	-0.0876 (0.103)	0.428*** (0.0654)	0.346*** (0.0467)
Greece	-0.941*** (0.144)	1.624*** (0.130)	0.346*** (0.0773)
Portugal	-0.589*** (0.136)	-0.0207 (0.0993)	0.393*** (0.0747)
/cut1			-2.053*** (0.0875)
/cut2			-1.757*** (0.0861)
/cut3			-1.355***

/cut4			(0.0848)
			-1.019***
/cut5			(0.0840)
			-0.747***
/cut6			(0.0836)
			0.218***
/cut7			(0.0833)
			0.540***
/cut8			(0.0834)
			0.916***
/cut9			(0.0837)
			1.394***
/cut10			(0.0841)
			1.760***
			(0.0845)
Constant	-0.277*	-2.121***	
	(0.161)	(0.120)	
Observations	16,609	17,352	18,306

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5. Effects of perceived EU constraints and perceived EU responsibility on electoral participation and permissiveness toward abstention (Multilevel linear regressions)

	Participation in Nat. elections	Participation in EU elections	Abstention as a right
EU constraints	0.00103 (0.000993)	-0.00349*** (0.00129)	0.0982*** (0.00888)
EU responsibility Debts	-0.00301*** (0.000789)	-0.00363*** (0.00102)	0.00270 (0.00710)
EU responsibility Immigration	-0.00157* (0.000900)	-0.00130 (0.00117)	-0.00885 (0.00807)
EU responsibility Climate	0.00366*** (0.000938)	-0.000808 (0.00122)	0.0441*** (0.00835)
EU integration	-0.000559 (0.000885)	0.00374*** (0.00115)	0.00620 (0.00794)
Duty	0.103*** (0.00504)	0.227*** (0.00654)	
Political interest	0.0157*** (0.000968)	0.0320*** (0.00125)	-0.0908*** (0.00845)
Government record	-0.000342 (0.000966)	-0.000580 (0.00125)	-0.0405*** (0.00863)
Education	0.00467*** (0.00162)	0.0136*** (0.00210)	0.0107 (0.0144)
Income	0.00968*** (0.00102)	0.00939*** (0.00132)	-0.00871 (0.00907)
Male	-0.00901* (0.00494)	-0.00659 (0.00640)	0.0930** (0.0441)
Age	0.0307***	0.0428***	0.123***

	(0.00254)	(0.00323)	(0.0221)
Constant	0.576***	0.237***	6.208***
	(0.0180)	(0.0343)	(0.195)
Observations	16,609	17,352	18,306
Number of groups	7	7	7

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1